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“What audit practitioners know and what different parts of society expect and desire audit practitioners 
to be capable of knowing will not always, or ever, coincide (Power, 1998: 77).”
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Die ouditprofessie is gekenmerk deur vele publieke korporatiewe en rekeningkundige mislukkings 
sedert die draai van die 21ste eeu. Die wanpraktyke van Enron Corporation het daartoe gelei dat hul 
ouditeure, Arthur Andersen, se deure gesluit het, kort nadat die praktyke vorendag gekom het wat nie 
deur die ouditeure ten tye van hul oudit bekend gemaak was nie. 
 
Industrie reguleerders en wetstoepassingsinstansies het wêreldwyd gereageer deur konsultasie met 
rolspelers in die industrie, die opstel en bekragtiging van nuwe internasionale ouditstandaarde, asook 
statutêre veranderinge. Statutêre verandering sluit in die instelling van die Sarbanes Oxley Wet in the 
Verenigde State van Amerika, asook plaaslik in Suid Afrika, wysigings soos die voorgestelde 
aanpassings aan die Maatskappyewet, nr. 61 van 1973 en die bekragtiging van die Ouditprofessie Wet 
in 2006. Die doel van hierdie gewysigde en nuwe riglyne is om die kwaliteit van oudits en die vertroue 
van die publiek in die ouditprofessie te verbeter. 
 
Die mees onlangse gebeure is egter voorafgegaan deur konsolidasie in die industrie tussen die grootste 
internasionale ouditfirmas. Verskeie lede van die professie is reeds lank bekommerd oor die impak 
van hierdie konsolidasie op kompetisie in die mark, en die impak van sodanige mark invloed deur die 
“Groot Vier” op ander deelnemers in die professie. Verskeie studies in die verband het tot die 
gevolgtrekking gekom dat dit uiters moeilik is vir mediumgrootte en kleiner ouditfirmas om inderdaad 
mee te ding met die “Groot Vier” vir ouditwerk met betrekking tot veral groot multi-nasionale 
publieke en ook privaat maatskappye. 
 
Die vele statutêre veranderinge in die onlangse reaksie op wyd gepubliseerde korporatiewe 
mislukkings en rekeningkundige skandale, het noodsaaklik gelei tot ‘n wesenlike toename in die koste 
van opleiding van personeel, opgradering van stelsels, asook die aanpassing van metodologië – kostes 
wat ‘n verdere kwelpunt is vir mediumgrootte en kleiner ouditfirmas. 
 
Dit is teen hierdie agtergrond van die Suid Afrikaanse ouditindustrie, dat hierdie studie fokus op die 
besluitnemingsproses van mediumgrootte ouditfirmas wanneer hul oorweeg om op te tree as ouditeur. 
Die oogmerk van die studie is om verder te oorweeg in hoe ‘n mate die motiverings faktore wat 
voortvloei uit dié firmas se posisie in die industrie, sodanige besluite beïnvloed. Die studie fokus dan 
ook voorts op die evaluasie van ouditrisiko gedurende die aannemingsbesluite, asook die basiese 
ouditprosedures toegepas deur mediumgrootte ouditfirmas.  
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Die resultate van hierdie studie het bevind dat geregistreerde ouditeure in medium praktyk hoofsaaklik 
kommersiëel gerig is gedurende hulle aannemingsbesluite. Hierdie orientasie, wat hoofsaaklik die 
gevolg is van kompetisie in the mark vir ouditdienste, het ‘n beduidende impak op die oudit 
akitiwiteite van hierdie geregistreerde ouditeure gedurende hulle aannemingsbesluite, tot so ‘n mate, 
dat hulle blootgestel is aan verskeie risiko’s wat voortspruit uit hulle besluitnemings-aktiwiteite. 
 
‘n Kritiese analise van ouditprosedures, gebaseer op die bevindinge van hierdie studie, word 
weergegee met spesifieke oorweging van risiko-evaluasie; strategieë wat aangewend word om oudit-
risiko te verminder; die oorweging van inligting verskaf deur derde partye asook ander 
ouditprosedures wat aangewend word deur ouditeure gedurende hul aannemingsbesluite. Vanuit 
hierdie analise, is risiko’s geïdentifiseer en die impak daarvan op die ouditprofessie in geheel oorweeg. 
 
In gevolgtrekking, word aanbevelings gemaak aan geregistreerde ouditeure, reguleerders asook 
professionele instansies ten opsigte van spesifieke aksies wat in werking gestel kan word om die 
impak van die risiko’s geïdentifiseer deur hierdie studie, te verminder. 
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The audit profession has been affected by several public corporate failures and accounting scandals 
since the turn of the 21st century. The irregularities that lead to the collapse of Enron Corporation also 
resulted in the demise of Arthur Andersen, their appointed auditors. 
 
Industry regulators and lawmakers reacted to what seemed to be a never ending spate of accounting 
scandals through broad consultation with stakeholders. This lead to numerous new legislation and 
international auditing standards such as the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the United 
States of America, local proposed amendments to the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973 as well the 
enactment of the Auditing Profession Act in 2006 – all in an attempt to address concerns around the 
quality of audit work and to restore the trust in the audit profession and the assurance that it provides. 
 
These recent events in the profession have however been preceded by consolidation within the 
industry between the largest international auditing firms. Many stakeholders have been concerned 
about this consolidation in terms of its impact on competition within the audit services market and the 
impact of competition from the “Big Four” on other market participants. Many studies have concluded 
that it has become very difficult for firms in small and medium practice to compete against the larger 
international audit firms, especially for the audits of large multi-national companies. 
 
The many statutory changes resulting from reaction to corporate failures have further impacted on the 
cost of training staff and updating systems and methodologies – costs which further hamper the ability 
of medium and smaller audit firms to compete with the larger international audit firms for business. 
 
Considering the South African audit industry, this study focuses on the engagement decision process 
of registered auditors in medium practice in order to determine in what manner their decisions are 
impacted by motivational drivers within the industry. This study continues to research the engagement 
decision process, to consider risk evaluation at the core of the engagement decision and also concludes 
on the audit procedures that typically form part of the engagement decision of registered auditors in 
medium practice. 
 
The findings of this study suggests that practitioners in medium audit practice are commercially 
predisposed during their engagement decisions. This commercial predisposition, which is the likely 
result of significant competition within the auditing profession in South Africa, does impact on the 
procedures performed by practitioners during their engagement decisions to such an extent that they 
may be exposed to significant risk during many of their engagement decisions. 
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This study continues to criticaly analyse those procedures pertaining to risk assessment, risk 
mitigation, the use of third party information during engagement decisions and other audit procedures 
performed by practitioners during their engagement decisions. From these findings, risks are identified 
and commented on with specific consideration to their impact on the auditing profession at large. 
 
In conclusion, this study recommends actions to practitioners, regulators and professional institutions 
pertaining to engagement decisions by practitioners in medium audit practice, in order to mitigate the 
impact of those risks identified from the findings of this study. 
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In this study, the researcher studies the engagement decision process of registered auditors in medium 
practice in South Africa. In this first chapter an introduction is provided to this engagement decision 
process considering the purpose of this study. 
 1
 
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION TO AN EVALUATION OF THE ENGAGEMENT 
DECISION AS EXERCISED BY MEDIUM AUDIT PRACTICE 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This study argues that due to the current position of registered auditors in medium practice in South 
Africa, several engagement factors exist that influence the predisposition of such practitioners during 
their decision to accept clients, to such an extent that they may be exposed to risk in certain areas. 
 
It is argued that this position is generally the result of fierce economic competition within this market 
sector and commercial pressures on registered auditors in medium practice. Such pressures are further 
impacted by the oligopoly held by the four largest international audit firms being Deloitte and 
Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers (hereafter Big Four). As a result of this 
oligopoly, registered auditors in medium practice have difficulty in accessing public and private 
company audits; accessing limited staffing resources; and are impacted by the growing importance of 
Black Economic Empowerment (hereafter BEE) in terms of staff representation and ownership as a 
condition to appointments.  Registered auditors in medium practice are further impacted by several 
continued changes to legislation and auditing standards that have resulted in an increase in the cost of 
training and maintaining methodologies. Continued independence concerns within the profession may 
also reduce the scope of rendering non-audit services to audit clients, a typical service line for 
registered auditors in medium practice. 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to the current audit profession environment against which this 
study’s research objectives will be tested. Following a summary of these research objectives, a brief 
overview of each chapter of this study is provided. 
 
In conclusion, it is suggested that this study be considered by industry regulators as well as registered 
auditors in medium practice in obtaining an awareness of current risk exposures related to 
engagement decisions made by registered auditors in medium practice. Such awareness may 
contribute to the development of appropriate support and review structures and methodologies to 
mitigate such risk exposures of practitioners, to acceptable levels, as commented on in chapter 7. 
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1.1. Introduction to the engagement decision as exercised by medium audit practice 
  
The decision by audit practitioners to accept an appointment as independent audit practitioner to a 
client, has in recent years been subject to an increased level of professional care and consideration by 
practitioners, mainly as a result of previous experiences of engagement decisions that has led to audit 
practitioners suffering significant financial losses and litigation exposure (Venuti, Holtzman & Basile, 
2002).  
 
The collapse of Enron Corporation in 2001 has led to what seemed to be an endless suit of other 
corporate collapses and accounting scandals in several countries including those related to Global 
Crossing, World Com, K-Mart and in South Africa - Masterbond, MacMed, Leisurenet and Regal 
Treasury (Terry 2002: 2). The latest significant case was the €10 Billion fraud at Parmalat that came 
to light at the beginning of 2004 (Barigazzi, 2004: 4). Public outcry at the apparent independence 
concerns with regards to Arthur Andersen, the auditors of Enron Corporation, led to the demise of not 
only Enron, but also their auditors (Clulow, 2002; Squires, Smith, McDougall & Yeack, 2003: 25).  
 
Since many of these corporate collapses and accounting scandals occurred, audit practitioners have 
been blamed for losses suffered by investors, employees, creditors and customers. Enormous class 
action suits have been and continue to be brought against audit practitioners involved in alleged 
negligence and even dishonesty (Clulow, 2002). Locally, the South African auditing profession has 
also been subject to scrutiny (Manuel, 2002, as quoted by Steyn, 2002): 
 
“The report from the commission of inquiry into Regal Treasury's collapse was exceedingly 
damning on individuals from Ernst & Young. We have requested action to show the public 
the license to audit is worth something.” 
 
The commission of enquiry into the affairs of Masterbond has even described South African audit 
practitioners as dishonest and inefficient (Nel, 1997: 9).  
 
Shaw (1982: 41) argued that a study of accounting and auditing history is necessary to provide an 
opportunity for those concerned with current developments in accounting and auditing to stand back 
from time to time and to reconsider current problems in the light of longer-term perspectives. Shaw 
(1982: 41) further claimed that it is incontrovertible that auditing principles and conventions have 
their roots in changing technical, economic, political and social context.  It follows that accountants 
and audit practitioners continually run the risk of applying familiar conventions after the 
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circumstances to which they were suited have altered. Shaw continues to argue that capacity and 
willingness to change remain critical for audit practitioners. 
 
Public outcry and introspection within the audit profession soon followed (Akers, Maher & 
Giacomino, 2003), albeit not for the first time. Up to the 1990’s, the expectation gap was arguably 
seen to be the most prominent cause for past dissatisfaction with the inability of audit practitioners to 
forewarn investors and stakeholders of imminent corporate collapse (Cooke, 1990: 23). This however, 
seems to have changed.  
 
Tricker (1982: 56) and recently Bell, et al. (2005: 19) concluded that external expectations of the audit 
function evolve, in response to changing demands for accountability in society. This concept was 
firstly reiterated in 1984 in United States vs. Arthur Young (which resulted from Arthur Young’s 
audit of Amerada Hess), when Chief Justice Warren Burger told the accounting profession (Mano, 
Mouritsen & Swearingen, 2003): 
 
“The independent public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to 
the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public.”  
 
Secondly, demands for accountability emerge as a response to perceived corporate collapses, crises or 
other problems of social regulation. Tricker (1982: 56) notes that the periods of high activity in audit 
standard setting appear to mirror the periods of major crises in the corporate sector. This too was re-
iterated by Moore (2003) who noted that: 
 
“The history of the United States has shown that periods of financial euphoria lead to abuses and 
bursting market bubbles, which then lead to auditing scandals and accounting reform.” 
 
It flows from considering these findings by Tricker, Moore and Shaw, that recent years have seen the 
introduction of significant legislation related to the audit profession worldwide. These include the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (hereafter SOX) in the United States of America (hereafter USA) and locally in 
South Africa proposed changes to the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973, as amended, the Public Audit 
Act, no. 25 of 2004, and the Auditing Profession Act, no. 26 of 2005 (approved by the National 
Council of Provinces in November 2005 and enacted on 16 January 2006, effective 1 April 2006). 
Such legislation have been introduced in an attempt by regulatory bodies to improve the quality of 
audit assurance and performance.  
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The audit profession itself reacted with the introduction of several new and amended International 
Standards on Auditing (hereafter ISA’s); revisions to the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, 
issued by IFAC in 2005 and similarly a new Code of Professional Conduct issued by SAICA in 2006. 
 
These developments within the audit profession has had a pervasive impact on all registered public 
accountants and audit practitioners in South Africa, as all audit practices are required to comply with 
this increase in statutory and professional requirements that regulate the actions and affairs of audit 
practitioners, placing significant strain on audit practices to comply (Sehoole, 2005).  
 
ISA’s are “relatively new” to the auditing profession considering that the first ISA was issued in 1991 
(Roussey, 1999: 14). It was only in 1994 that SAICA decided that South African Auditing Standards 
will be based on ISA’s thereafter (Public Accountants and Auditiors’ Board (hereafter PAAB), 2004: 
8-11), suggesting that practitioners in South Africa may only have had exposure to ISA’s over the last 
10 years. Whilst those practitioners who have qualified during the last 10 years may have had 
exposure to these ISA’s during their formal educational training, many older practitioners have had no 
academic exposure to ISA’s. It is in this regard, that SAICA has formally adopted a Continued 
Professional Development (hereafter CPD) policy with effect from 1 January 2006. This policy is 
based on the International Education Standard (IES7) and aims to develop “lifelong” training 
platforms for registered auditors.  
 
The significance of the Enron Corporation case, is that it has not only highlighted professional 
concerns regarding audit practitioners and their independence, but it has indicated to the profession 
itself that not even a then Big Five audit firm being Arthur Andersen could survive the impact of such 
a significant corporate failure. The Big Four had to reflect on their own existence in the advent of the 
collapse of Arthur Andersen. Systems, procedures and methodologies needed to be reviewed and are 
continuously amended to comply with new legislation; revised ISA’s and revised Codes of Ethics. 
This process has resulted in a significant increase in cost to audit practices, which they in turn would 
pass on to their clients (Sehoole, 2005). 
 
Not only was the audit profession’s credibility at stake at the turn of the 21st century, but regulators 
became concerned by the market concentration following the collapse of Arthur Andersen. This 
concern about market concentration follows the gradual consolidation of the largest international audit 
firms as depicted in Figure 1.1. over the last two decades. 
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Figure 1.1.  Significant mergers of lagre audit firms of the 1980’s and 1990’s (United States 
General Accounting Office (hereafter USGAO), 2003: 11) 
  
The United States General Accounting Office (hereafter USGAO) commissioned a study to determine 
what the impact of this consolidation was on the audit profession. The findings of this study indicated 
that the Big Four exercise significant market power since the demise of Arthur Andersen and is hence 
described as an oligopoly. The Hirshman-Herfindahl index as depicted in Figure 1.2. was used by the 
Department of Justice in the USA in order to review market concentration data; the objective being to 
determine the level of competition and the ability of an individual or group of participants to dominate 
the market in terms of pricing. From their study, it is evident that the Big Four firms exercise 
significant control over pricing within the industry (USGAO, 2003: 37). 
 
The USGAO in their report (2003: 46) further concluded that in fact the audit services market has 
developed into a dual market structure – one market serviced by the Big Four, and another market 
where medium and smaller sized firms compete with the Big Four for the rendering of audit services 
to audit clients. This study has also found that although many smaller firms have arranged themselves 
in international affiliations and associations, these do not really compete with the Big Four, as they 
typically do not share common resources, support systems, audit procedures, and quality and internal 
control structures (USGAO, 2003: 48). 
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Figure 1.2.  Hirschman-Herfindahl Indexes 1988-2002 (USGAO, 2003: 19) 
 
Although the USGAO study was performed in the USA, it is likely that similar market structures 
related to the audit profession can be found in other countries such as in South Africa, due to the 
international footprint of the Big Four. 
 
The increase in audit cost and changes in market power following the demise of Arthur Andersen 
would suggest that public companies in particular are facing significantly higher audit fees, which in 
turn would suggest that other audit firms who are less expensive than the Big Four may receive a 
higher proportion of public company audits. The study by the USGAO has however found the 
opposite. In fact, 98% of the former clients of Arthur Andersen where taken over by the Big Four 
after the formers demise in 2002 (USGAO, 2003: 37), suggesting that there may be several matters 
considered by these public companies that would prevent them from appointing an audit firm that is 
not one of the Big Four. Similarly, Turpen (1995) concluded even before the demise of Arthur 
Andersen that public companies are in fact willing to pay premiums to be audited by a then Big Five 
firm. 
  
Several researchers have studied the differences between the largest international audit firms and 
other medium sized national audit practices and have reached many conclusions pertaining to market 
competition (Burton & Roberts, 1967: 66; Chow & Rice, 1982: 326; Eichenseher & Shields, 1983: 
23; Simon & Francis, 1988: 255-269), service delivery (Wooten, 2003) and the application of the 
Audit Risk (hereafter AR) model (USGAO, 2003: 2). This study argues that the apparent difficulty 
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that firms in medium audit practice (with capacity to perform large multi-national company audits) 
have in entering this market, is likely to have a significant impact on the engagement decision 
processes of such registered auditors in medium practice.  
 
There is no requirements for the income earned by audit practitioners to be disclosed in South Africa 
and hence there is no formal review of competition within the industry in South Africa. The South 
African Institute of Chartered Accountants (hereafter SAICA) performed a survey in 2005 to 
determine the practitioner profitability. From the 97 respondent practices, six qualified as registered 
auditors in medium practice based on the definition of this study as detailed in section 5.3. The 
findings of this study, although not aimed to be a comprehensive study on competition within the 
audit profession in South Africa has highlighted several aspects of competition within the South 
African auditing industry that will be considered by this study. The SAICA profitability study as 
studied in section 1.1.3.2. will be considered in order to determine if medium audit practice in South 
Africa have certain unique structural qualities and challenges that may differentiate them from small 
practices and the Big Four. 
 
In considering the attempts by regulators and the profession to respond and to improve the public trust 
in the profession, as well as the simultaneous impact of market pressures within the audit services 
market, this study will specifically consider the position of registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa within the market for audit services, as this study argues that this very position of 
registered auditors in medium practice may have a direct impact on the engagement decision 
processes followed by such practitioners.  
 
1.1.1. The research objectives of this study 
 
The research objective of this study is to consider the engagement decision of audit practitioners 
that operate in medium practice in South Africa, which it is argued, is impacted directly and 
indirectly by commercial, professional and organisational behavioral drivers that cause audit 
practitioners to be predisposed.  
 
It is held that this predisposition of registered auditors in medium practice impacts the level of 
audit procedures performed during the engagement decision by such practitioners to such an 
extent that it affects the level of risk that these practitioners are exposed to. The research objective 
of this study could therefore be subdivided into three primary research objectives, which are as 
follows: 
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Research objective 1: To determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice are 
impacted by commercial, professional and organisational behavioural drivers, and to what extent 
they are exposed to apparent risk following their predisposition. 
 
Research objective 2: To consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice evaluate 
risk through the application of sufficient audit procedures to support their engagement decisions, 
considering their predisposition.  
 
Research objective 3: To consider if registered auditors in medium practice are exposed to risk 
because of their engagement decision practices in general.  
 
In order to conclude on these objectives, chapter 2 to chapter 4 considers previous related studies 
and professional guidance in order to develop secondary research objectives to sustain the three 
primary objectives. These secondary research objectives are summarised in chapter 5 in order to 
be included in the research design of this study. Chapter 6 provides the conclusions on the 
secondary research objectives following the research performed, which serves as basis for chapter 
7 to conclude on the three primary research objectives and the overall research objective of this 
study. 
 
1.1.2. Identification of current concerns regarding the engagement decision process as 
applied by registered auditors in medium practice 
 
Due to the apparent increase in Litigation Risk (hereafter LR) (Marxen, 1990: 47-57), lack of 
guidance on pro-active risk management strategies within professional guidance (Johnstone, 
2000: 1-27) and increased social scrutiny of the audit profession (Akers, et al. 2003), it is 
important to consider how registered auditors in medium practice have adjusted their engagement 
decision practices to consider these influences. For the purpose of this study, a practitioner in 
medium audit practice in South Africa is defined as an audit firm that has more than five but less 
than sixty audit practitioners. The basis for this criteria selection was designed to exclude the Big 
Four and to exclude single practitioners. 
 
SAICA established the Small Practices Department in 1996. The Small Practices Department 
works closely with the Small Practices Committee of SAICA. The aim of the Department and 
Committee is to identify how SAICA can assist small practitioners in their practices (SAICA, 
2005a). There is no specific SAICA department that deals with only the needs of registered 
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auditors in medium practice or Big Four practices. The latter is understandable as the Big Four all 
have their own practice development departments.  
 
From the conclusions of this study and specifically the risks that registered auditors in medium 
practice are exposed to, chapter 8 will consider if there are very distinct differences between the 
needs of different sized audit practices, and in challenges that registered auditors in medium 
practice face. 
 
Table 1.1. summarises the number of firms in medium practice and their attributes relating to 
number of practitioners, comparing this information for 2005 (Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ 
Board (hereafter PAAB), 2005) to statistics relating to the same firms compiled in 1997 (Gloeck; 
De Jager; Botha; Schumann & Booysen, 1999: 1-220). From table 1.1. that follows hereafter, it is 
evident that there has been a significant increase in the number of practices with ten to sixty 
practitioners, suggesting an increase in the number of registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa over the last decade. It is therefore argued that registered auditors in medium 
practice form a significant part of the audit services industry in South Africa, which could justify 
consideration of their needs as a distinct subpopulation within of the audit services industry.  
 
  2005 
Practitioners
2005 
Firms 
2005 
Practitioners 
per firm 
1997 
Practitioners
1997 
Firms 
1997 
Practitioners 
per firm 
Large 
practice 
60 or more 
practitioners 
597 4 149 754 5 151 
Medium 
practice 
10 or more but 
60 or less 
practitioners 
281 11 25 249 5 50 
 5 or more but 
less than 10 
practitioners 
71 13 5 No 
information 
available 
No 
information 
available 
No information 
available 
 
Table 1.1.   Summary of large and medium audit practices in South Africa  
1.1.3. The position of registered auditors in medium practice in the South African audit 
industry 
 
There are certain industry conditions that are arguably very specific to South Africa, which 
impacts on all participants in the South African industry. This study further argues that some of 
these conditions have a different impact on participants depending on the size of their practice, 
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and more specifically registered auditors in medium practice. These conditions relate to mainly 
the following: 
? The impact of BEE on the audit profession in South Africa; and 
? The impact of market competition on profitability in the South African economic context. 
 
1.1.3.1. The impact of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) on the audit profession 
in South Africa 
 
The emergence of black owned audit practices in South Africa over the last decade as seen 
amongst registered auditors in medium practice is of specific interest. This interest is 
justified based on the unique challenges that these audit firms face. Three of the 11 
practices with more than 10 but 60 or less practitioners are majority owned by black South 
Africans. Many of these practices were not in existence in 1997. Due to the increase in BEE 
charters in various industries such as the financial services and mining industries, black 
owned audit practices are placed at an advantage in terms of individual client procurement 
policies, which include the rendering of audit services. 
  
The Big Four audit firms are transforming at both ownership level, as well as staff 
composition levels, in order to improve their BEE status. They are however lagging far 
behind several black owned audit practices. Despite the apparent competitive advantage of 
these black owned registered auditors in medium practice over the Big Four when 
considering their BEE credentials, these BEE firms face many challenges, some of which 
include the following: 
? As is the case for all medium and small sized audit firms, black auditing firms compete 
with the Big Four for public and private sector clients and access to intellectual capital  
(Ryan, 2005a: 21). This competition is significantly impacted by the limited number of 
audit practitioners from previously disadvantaged backgrounds known as Previously 
Disadvantaged Individuals (hereafter PDI’s). Of the 24 256 chartered accountants in 
South Africa only 600 were black Africans as at October 2005 (Ryan, 2005d: 20). 
Sadler and Erasmus (2003: 129) have commented on these low levels of PDI chartered 
accountants as the goal set by SAICA in 2000 was to have 3 000 registered black 
chartered accountants in 2005.  
 
Sadler and Erasmus (2003: 129) concluded that the interest of black people in the audit 
profession is impacted by limited knowledge and guidance at secondary educational 
level, and that this interest needs to be stimulated through marketing and information. 
Lack of funding, black role models in the profession and career guidance were also 
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identified as reasons for the low levels of black chartered accountants (Sadler & 
Erasmus, 2003: 136). Registered auditors in medium practice therefore need to compete 
in salary and experience exposure with the larger international firms for the same 
limited human capital pool, having significant cost challenges on such registered 
auditors in medium practice. The more specific needs of PDI employees related to 
funding requirements towards the completion of their studies (as they are from 
financially disadvantaged backgrounds) may even be more financially straining on 
registered auditors in medium practice.  
 
Those registered as chartered accountants with SAICA (600 in October 2005) are not 
always in public practice as audit practitioners. In fact, more concerning is the fact that 
there were only 122 black chartered accountants registered with the PAAB in October 
2005 (Ryan, 2005c: 21). This clearly illustrates the difficulty that audit practices are 
facing in attracting and retaining black chartered accountants as most black chartered 
accountants seem to prefer employment other than that of audit practitioner.  
? Sadler (2002: 163) has also concluded that audit practitioners have great difficulty in 
retaining PDI staff. Sadler’s study indicated that 86% of young black chartered 
accountants are younger than 40 years of age, which makes this a very mobile resource. 
Fortyn (2001: 6) and Whitehead (1993: 7) concluded on the trend that companies, 
especially those in the financial services industry are luring black qualified chartered 
accountants from auditing firms. Although these movements are believed to be the 
result of financial remuneration, Sadler (2002: 166) found that only 15,22% of black 
chartered accountants resign because of better financial prospects elsewhere. This 
finding indicated that there are some other concerns that audit practices may be facing 
in retaining their PDI staff, and this, Sadler argued, was the tendency of clients facing 
resistance to PDI staff on their audits. This view was also confirmed by Kuhn (1996: 4) 
and Hawksworth (1991: 137). It may therefore be argued that the practitioner in 
medium practice’s client portfolio, which may consist of many smaller clients than the 
typical Big Four client portfolio, may be impacted by matters pertaining to management 
attitude in this regard. 
? Many of the black owned audit practices receive significant income from public-sector 
audits. Significant concentration of revenue income is therefore likely to be orientated 
towards public-sector clients considering the difficulty that registered auditors in 
medium practice have in gaining access to private and public companies. The loss of 
such public-sector revenues may have a significant impact on the sustainability of these 
practices (Ryan, 2005a: 21) and hence their independence from such clients may be in 
jeopardy. 
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? In order to gain access to private and multi-national public companies, such registered 
auditors in medium practice would need to have systems and technology, as well as 
significant experienced intellectual capital in order to compete with the Big Four (Ryan, 
2005a: 21). Vassi Naidoo, previous Chief Executive Officer of Deloitte. in South 
Africa, as quoted by Ryan, believes the possibility is remote (Ryan, 2005a: 21): 
 
“With globalisation of the accounting profession, what South Africa most needs is 
to ensure it has the necessary global reach and access to world-class systems and 
technology. These only reside in the Big Four firms. The desire to have a medium 
or large black firm is understandable given our history, but unrealistic. Small black 
firms may have some competitive advantage right now through the desire of the 
government and parastatals to give them preference, but if they do not deliver 
world-class performance, then the small-firm model is unsustainable in the private 
sector.” 
? Most registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa are national practices with 
limited international associations. Staff are being attracted to the Big Four specifically 
because of their broad client base and the range of local and international opportunities 
to which their trainees can have access (Ryan, 2005a: 21). 
? Many firms in medium audit practice do participate in the audit of public companies, 
but typically on a joint audit basis (Ryan, 2005a: 21). Joint audits also have risks to 
both sets of audit firms and may result in an increase in the ultimate cost to the client. 
The smaller firm in the joint-audit relationship could also find themselves assigned to 
subordinated status and less responsibility on these assignments (Ryan, 2005a: 21). 
? It is arguable if firms in medium audit practice will achieve sufficient critical mass to 
challenge the position of the Big Four through organic growth, or if they could even 
constitute a Big Five firm, unless they consider mergers (Ryan, 2005c: 21). Mergers 
themselves may again impact on the current BEE status of many of these registered 
auditors in medium practice, which may result in the loss of work in any merged entity, 
or in many instances intensify the structural and cost concerns that these firms are 
already facing (Ryan, 2005c: 21). 
? More traditional small and medium-sized firms that are majority white-owned have 
arguably not embraced transformation with the same enthusiasm as the Big Four. This 
may be in part related to their isolation from such requirements due to the fact that they 
traditionally have not been able to serve as audit practitioners to public companies and 
Stated Owned Enterprises (hereafter SOE’s) as these have typically been the domain of 
the Big Four (Ryan, 2005b: 20). The advent of an Audit Profession Charter in South 
Africa may ultimately impact on these more traditional registered auditors in medium 
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practice and become a further barrier for such practices to compete against the Big Four 
and other BEE registered auditors in medium practice for the private and public 
company audit services sector. 
 
1.1.3.2. The impact of market competition on profitability specific to South Africa 
 
The SAICA profitability survey performed in 2005 has further provided information, which 
indicates structural differences between firms in medium audit practice and other size audit 
practices that need to be considered. These are: 
? Three of the top eight practices surveyed in terms of revenue per practitioner, in the 
2005 SAICA profitability survey were registered auditors in medium practice as defined 
section 5.3. (SAICA, 2005b: 32). The training costs of these practices were significantly 
higher than firms with fewer practitioners, as well as time recorded to training implying 
increasing pressure on the cost structures of these practices (SAICA, 2005b: 1-33). 
? The registered auditors in medium practice have great difficulty in retaining staff once 
articles have been completed (20% to 30%) compared to smaller practices (40% to 60% 
retention) (SAICA, 2005b: 1-33). 
? The productivity of the registered auditors in medium practice at a practitioner level 
(approximately 50%) exceeded the productivity levels of practitioners in smaller firms 
(approximately 20% to 50%), whilst the productivity at the lower levels of staff of 
registered auditors in medium practice were significantly less than that of lower levels 
of staff in smaller firms (SAICA, 2005b: 1-33). This may indicate that there is a 
shortage of skills in medium audit practices, and/or that registered auditors in medium 
practice are overstaffed or have significant imbalances in periods of high and low 
activity as they need large staff compliments to service clients during peak periods, but 
cannot sustain such levels of activity throughout the year. Either way, this indicates a 
structural imbalance that arguably leads to an expensive payroll and thus high cost to 
the practice. 
  
These industry factors studied in section 1.1.3.1. and section 1.1.3.2. are likely to impact on 
auditor predisposition as will be concluded on throughout chapter 6 and chapter 7. The impact of 
these industry factors is referred to in this study as - the position of registered auditors in medium 
practice in the South African audit services market.  
 
The need to study the engagement decisions of registered auditors in medium practice has also 
been commented on by previous studies such as that by Johnstone. Although Johnstone (2000: 1) 
concluded that: “Little is known about how auditors make the client-acceptance decision”, 
  14
studies by Asare, Hackenbrack and Kneckel (1994: 163-178) concluded that there are few 
differences in client-acceptance procedures among the Big Four. Johnstone indicated that studies 
related to the engagement decision process should in future be applied to firms other than the Big 
Four audit firms (Johnstone, 2000: 22). Studies by Wooten (2003) have in fact concluded that 
there are significant differences between challenges and risks faced by various sized audit 
practices and their service delivery. This would suggest that there is a basis to argue that there is 
a need to consider the engagement decision practices of registered auditors in medium practice 
with due consideration to their position within the audit services market, as this very position 
may expose such practitioners to risk.  
 
1.1.4. Achieving the objectives of this study of the engagement decision process 
 
In order to achieve the overall objective of this study, the following need to be studied: 
? A study of the engagement decision process of registered auditors in medium practice in 
order to develop an understanding of their engagement decision process; 
? An understanding of the dynamics of predisposition of registered auditors in medium 
practice through a study of previous literature and professional guidance related to 
motivational behavioural drivers; 
? An understanding of the current audit profession environment within which registered 
auditors in medium practice within South Africa operate, the impact of corporate collapse 
and litigation on this environment, and the related response by audit practitioners with 
specific reference to engagement decision activities; 
? A study of the audit procedures relating to the various stages of the engagement decision 
such as the evaluation of the Audit Risk model (hereafter AR model) with reference to 
Inherent Risk (hereafter IR), Control Risk (hereafter CR) , Detection Risk (hereafter DR), 
Business Risk of the client (hereafter Cbr) and Business Risk of the audit practitioner 
(hereafter Abr); and 
? Concluding on the research objectives of this study following empirical research of the study 
objectives. 
 
1.1.5. Thesis structure per chapter 
 
Table 1.2. that follows provides a brief overview of the structure of the chapters of this study. A 
brief overview of each of these chapters is provided as follows in section 1.2. to section 1.7.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction to an evaluation of the engagement decision as exercised by medium 
practice audit practice 
Chapter 2. Previous studies of risk and the audit practitioner’s engagement decision process 
Chapter 3. The impact of predisposition on the engagement decision process of registered 
auditors in medium practice 
Chapter 4. Audit procedures required to support the engagement decision 
Chapter 5. The research methodology applied 
Chapter 6. Research results and interpretation 
Chapter 7. Interpretation of the engagement decision processes of registered auditors in 
medium practice in South Africa 
Chapter 8. Conclusion on the engagement decision processes of registered auditors in medium 
practice in South Africa 
 
Table 1.2.  Structuring of this thesis per chapter 
 
1.2.  A historical review of risk and the engagement decision (Chapter 2) 
 
Before the engagement decision procedures of registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa 
can be studied, a review of literature related to the engagement decision of audit practitioners in 
general is required. Chapter 2 considers various previous studies in order to: 
? Extract key definitions that have been presented in literature that are relevant to a study of risk 
and the engagement decision; 
? Extract key principles that have been presented by these previous studies; and 
? Integrate and conclude on the evidence provided by such literature as basis for the research 
objectives of this study, to be tested through empirical research. 
 
As indicated by researchers such as Huss and Jacobs (1991: 16-32); Deshmukh (1997); Houston, 
Peters and Pratt (1999: 281); Johnstone (2000: 1); Gendron (2001: 283-310) and Basioudius (2002: 
5), previous studies of the engagement decision as exercised by audit practitioners are limited, 
specifically those aimed at concluding on the integration of the various complex factors and criteria 
that are evaluated during the engagement decision process.  These previous studies have focused 
mainly on three primary aspects of the engagement decision process. These include: 
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? Auditor predisposition - Motivating drivers that cause auditor predisposition and drives decision-
making behavior as studied by Willmott (1986: 576); Humphrey and Moizer (1990: 232) and 
Hanlon (1994: 339-363); 
? Audit practitioner judgement - The process of decision-making by audit practitioners as studied 
by Brown and Solomon (1990: 17-38, 1991: 110-119), Knechel and Messier (1990: 386-406) and 
Kennedy (1993: 231-245, 1995: 249-273); and 
? Risk assessment - Factors to be considered and audit to be performed pertaining to the 
engagement decision as studied by Huss and Jacobs (1991: 16-32); Francis and Reynolds (1998) 
and Johnstone (2000: 1). 
 
In concluding on these previous studies, this study continues to define the engagement decision 
process. Previous studies related to practices in medium audit practice are also considered, in order to 
highlight those unique characteristics that such practices may have revealed through these studies, and 
therefore may affect their engagement decision practices. 
 
1.3. Auditor predisposition and its impact on the engagement decision process (Chapter 3) 
 
The judgement process applied by audit practitioners during the engagement decision process is 
impacted by professional, commercial and organisational motivational drivers (Kaplan, 1987: 6-7; 
Asare, et al. 1994: 169; Trompeter, 1994: 56-68; Johnstone, 2000: 6; Gendron, 2001: 304) that cause 
auditor predisposition. 
 
Chapter 3 considers these motivational drivers and the continuous tension between these drivers. It is 
suggested that this tension itself exposes the audit practitioner to risk, in the event that one 
motivational driver is favoured at the cost of another (Bailey, 1995: 191-195). The impact of these 
drivers on registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa is considered individually, in order 
to conclude on its impact on the predisposition of such practitioners. 
 
1.4. Audit procedures required to support the engagement decision (Chapter 4) 
 
In order to support the engagement decision, chapter 4 considers those audit procedures that need to 
be performed based on the five stages entrenched in the International Standard on Assurance 
Engagements 3000 Revised (hereafter ISAE 3000 R) – Assurance engagements other than audits or 
reviews of historical financial information (IFAC, 2005b: par .33-35). These five stages detail those 
typical stages that need to be performed in order to obtain evidence to support a decision. In this 
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study, these stages are applied to the procedures required to be performed during the engagement 
decision process in order to obtain evidence to support the engagement decision. The individual 
procedures are considered against professional and best practice guidance. The ISAE 3000 (R) stages 
include (IFAC, 2005b: par .33-35): 
? Obtaining an understanding of the prospective client and its operations; 
? Based on this understanding, assessing the risk that the financial results of the prospective client 
may be misstated; 
? Evaluating and responding to the assessed risks, including developing overall responses, and 
determining the nature, timing and extent of further procedures needed to mitigate risks identified; 
? Performing further procedures clearly linked to the identified risks; and 
? Evaluating the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence obtained in order to support the 
engagement decision. 
 
As the evaluation of risk is central to the assessment of engagement risk (hereafter ER), chapter 4 will 
also study the relation between DR and ER with specific reference to a model for the evaluation of ER 
as concluded on by Johnstone (2000: 1-27). 
 
1.5. Research methodology applied in this study (Chapter 5) 
 
Chapter 5 documents the research methodology applied in this study. This methodology serves as 
basis for the design of the research approach and research product. A quantitative study has been 
applied through the use of a research questionnaire addressed to registered auditors in medium 
practice as defined in section 5.3. The research population is also defined and the research strategy 
considered. Chapter 5 continues to summarise the secondary research objectives that has been 
identified throughout chapter 2; chapter 3 and chapter 4, which forms the basis for the design of the 
research questionnaire. 
 
1.6. The results of the research performed (Chapter 6) 
 
Chapter 6 documents the results of the empirical research performed in this study. Critical analysis 
and commentary is provided on the process and stages of the research, and specifically on the content 
of the report and analysis of results for the purpose of interrogation and conclusion. The responses to 
each research question are considered and trends and findings are identified, discussed and concluded 
on. 
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1.7. Interpretation of the engagement decision process of registered auditors in medium 
practice in South Africa (Chapter 7) 
 
Chapter 7 evaluates the conclusions reached in relation to each research question in chapter 6 in as far 
as meaningfull trends and behaviours can be identified in relation to the overall research objectives of 
this study as stated in section 1.1.1. Following from this evaluation, risks which registered auditors in 
medium practice are exposed to as a result of their predisposition during engagement decisions are 
identified. This chapter also considers this study’s conclusion’s against those of previous related 
studies as well as expected study outcomes based on professional guidance, auditing standards and 
legislation.  
 
1.8. Conclusion on the engagement decision of registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa (Chapter 8) 
 
 
Chapter 8 concludes this study as it focuses on the specific outcomes of this study that indicates 
specific behavioural considerations applied by registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa 
during their engagement decisions. Commentary is provided in as far as this behaviour indicates 
significant risk to registered auditors in medium practice, and recommendations are presented in this 
regard. Finally, the relevance of this study in the current South African audit profession is considered 
with specific reference to new research topics and recommendations about the engagement decisions 
of registered auditors in medium practice. 
 
1.9. Considering the impact of regulatory changes in South Africa since October 2005 
 
The auditing industry has been subjected to many regulatory changes in recent years as studied in 
chapter 2 and chapter 3, changes that specifically address concerns around auditor independence, 
auditor rotation and the delivery of non-audit services to audit clients. These changes are continuous 
and as a result, legislation and other regulation as studied in this study have been impacted by changes 
subsequent to the test date of this study. 
 
The test date of this study was 5 October 2005 as respondents submitted their completed research 
questionnaires by this date. As described in chapter 5, the research methodology of this study 
considered regulation and professional guidance available at the time of drafting the research 
questionnaire. Since October 2005, a number of regulatory changes have occurred within the South 
African auditing industry. These include: 
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? The enactment of the Auditing Professions Act, no. 26 of 2005;  
? Following the enactment of the Auditing Profession Act, the institution of the Independent 
Regulatory Board for Auditors (hereafter IRBA). The most significant outflow from the 
enactment of the Auditing Profession Act has been the replacement of the PAAB with the 
IRBA. In broad terms, the IRBA has replaced the PAAB’s regulatory function under the 
Auditing Profession Act, which has repealed the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act, no. 80 
of 1991; and 
? The release of the Corporate Law amendments Act in April 2006. 
 
These statutory changes are considered against those statutory regulations applicable at the test date as 
follows in section 1.9.1. to section 1.9.4. 
 
1.9.1 The Auditing Profession Act, no. 26 of 2005 
 
The Auditing Profession Act, no. 26 of 2005 was signed into legislation by the President in 
January 2006. The effective date of the Act was 1 April 2006. The Auditing Profession Act 
replaces the PAAA as studied in section 3.2.1.1. The following are key outflows from this 
legislation that will affect audit practitioners going forward (Independent Regulatory Board for 
Auditors (hereafter IRBA), 2006: 1): 
 
? “The IRBA supersedes the PAAB from 1 April 2006. 
? The IRBA will comprise a majority of representatives who are not themselves 
registered auditors – not more than 40% of the board may be Registered Auditors. 
? A new ethics committee will be responsible for setting ethical standards for the 
profession. 
? A revised committee for auditing standards will be established to replace the 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. 
? The IRBA will actively review and engage with auditors and audit firms to ensure 
that professional standards are of the highest quality. 
? In addition to individual Registered Auditors, firms must now also register with the 
IRBA. 
? Registered Auditors will be required to submit evidence of appropriate Continuing 
Professional Development. 
? Registered Auditors will be required to report irregularities to the IRBA. 
? The investigation and disciplinary processes will be revised and updated.” 
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1.9.2 The Corporate Laws Amendment Bill 
 
The Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973, as amended which is studied in section 3.2.1.2. will be 
subject to amendments by the proposed Corporate Laws Amendment Bill, issued in April 2006. 
Initially the Companies Act, would have been amended by the Companies Amendment Bill as 
studied in section 3.2.1.4. However, the Companies Amendment Bill (South Africa, 2005a) was 
replaced in April 2006 by the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill (South Africa, 2006). The 
revised Bill repeals the Companies Amendment Bill and suggests several amendments to the 
Companies Act that include the following (South Africa, 2006: 2): 
 
“To amend the Companies Act, 1973, so as:  
? to amend certain definitions and insert new definitions;  
? to make a distinction between public interest companies and limited interest 
companies;  
? to limit the liability of various office bearers to that arising from gross negligence in 
relation to the performance of their functions;  
? to make further provision relating to the use of electronic aids in the furnishing of 
information relating to companies;  
? to broaden the Minister’s powers of delegation; 
? to provide for new ways of giving notice;  
? to make further provision regarding financial assistance for the purchase of a 
company’s shares;  
? to eliminate certain formalities regarding the memorandum and articles;  
? to allow the registrar to restore the registration of a company which has been 
deregistered in certain circumstances;  
? to make further provision regarding matters to be stated in a prospectus;  
? to change the requirements relating to the disposal of the undertaking of a company;  
? to make new provision in respect of the disclosure of information;  
? to make new provision for the appointment of auditors and audit committees;  
? to provide anew in respect of financial statements;  
? to make new provision regarding the Securities Regulation Panel;  
? to make provision in respect of financial reporting standards;  
? to establish and make further provision for a Financial Reporting Standards Council 
and a Financial Reporting Investigations Panel;  
? to create an offence in respect of non-compliant financial reports; and  
? to amend Schedule 4 by inserting definitions and amending other provisions relating 
to financial reporting. 
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To amend the Close Corporations Act, 1984, so as:  
? to insert definitions;  
? to make further provision relating to the use of electronic aids in the furnishing of 
information;  
? to provide for new methods of giving notice; to make further provision with regard 
to disclosure of information;  
? and to allow the registrar to restore the registration of a corporation which has been 
deregistered in certain circumstances; and  
? to provide for matters connected therewith.” 
 
Although technical definitions such as that of a Public Interest Company is amended by the 
Corporate Laws Amendment Bill (South Africa, 2006: s 1) when compared to the Companies 
Amendment Bill’s definition; the number of non-executive audit committee members are 
reduced from the proposed three to two members (South Africa, 2006: s 269A); and auditor 
rotation of a Registered Auditor (hereafter RA) is required every five years rather than every four 
years (South Africa, 2006: s 274); the principal differences between the Companies Amendment 
Bill and the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill does not detract from the difficulty that many 
registered auditors in medium practice may face when dealing with such new legislative 
requirements as concluded in chapter 7. 
 
Whilst it is not the objective of this study to consider the evolution of legislation when 
considering differences between the Companies Amendment Bill and the Corporate Laws 
Amendment Bill, it is apparent that even regulators are having difficulty in sculpting appropriate 
legislation to meet improved international demands in accountability from auditors and of those 
responsible for corporate governance. 
 
 
1.9.3 The Code of Professional Conduct (Issued by SAICA) 
 
In April 2006, after the test date of this study, SAICA issued a revised Code of Professional 
Conduct, which is based on the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by IFAC in 
2005. This Code of Professional Conduct is consistent in all material respects with the Code of 
Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by IFAC as studied in section 3.2.2.1.  
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1.9.4 The Chartered Accountant’s Charter   
 
A BEE charter and scorecard was developed for the auditing profession by representatives 
of various constituencies under the auspices of the BEE Negotiation Forum (BEE Negotiation 
Forum, 2006). This charter was first published in August 2006, and is available at 
http://www.cacharter.co.za/. Whilst not enforceable by virtue of any legislation at its release, as 
concluded in section 8.1.1., registered auditors in medium practice may be impacted significantly 
by this charter. Their inability to comply with PDI staffing requirements and BEE ownership as 
commended on in section 1.1.3.1. may even be a further obstacle in what is already an extremely 
competitive market. These views are similar to those concerns raised by Ryan (2005a: 21) in 
respect of registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa. 
 
 
  
In this chapter the researcher considers prior studies related to risk and the audit practitioner’s 
engagement decision process in order to lead the researcher to more insightful analysis and support 
for the research design. 
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CHAPTER 2  PREVIOUS STUDIES OF RISK AND THE AUDIT PRACTITIONER’S 
ENGAGEMENT DECISION PROCESS 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Risk and the engagement decision have been studied by many researchers. The primary conclusions 
from the studies by these researchers are considered in this chapter. This includes consideration of 
studies related to judgement that is applied during the various stages of the engagement decision. It is 
argued that this judgement is subject to the predisposition caused by professional, commercial and 
organisational motivational drivers.  
 
This chapter also considers literature related to risk assessment during the engagement decision 
process. It is argued that this risk assessment performed by practitioners is subject to the influence of 
professional, commercial and organisational drivers which impacts judgement applied. This chapter 
further considers the inter-related relationship between these motivational drivers during the 
engagement decision process. 
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2.1. Introduction to previous studies of risk and the audit practitioner’s engagement decision 
process 
 
The development of risk based audit methodologies during the 20th century has introduced the 
evaluation of risk as a key principle in auditing.  
 
Due to an increase in absentee ownership, the ever-increasing complexity and volume of client related 
transactions and accounting practices, stakeholder reporting and data-management systems, the 
assessment of risk in general has become critical in order to enable audit practitioners to achieve the 
level of assurance ascribed to their profession (Bell, et al. 2005: 9). Corporate collapses and 
accounting scandals have further increased the level of risk that audit practitioners are exposed to.  
 
This increase in risk to the audit practitioner and audit profession has prompted researchers to study 
these sources of risk, and to broadly categorise such risk in order to determine its impact on audit 
practitioner behaviour, and ultimately assist in the development of guidance to safeguard the auditing 
profession against such risk (Simunic & Stein, 1990: 329-343; Jones & Raghunandan, 1998: 169-181; 
Bell, et al. 2005: 11). 
 
In principle, audit practitioners can either avoid clients that may expose them to an unacceptable high 
level of risk, or they may ensure that they are able to mitigate such risk to an acceptable level through 
the design of appropriate audit procedures (Colbert, et al. 1996: 55; McKelvie, Knight & Fong, 2002: 
32). This principle has elevated the engagement decision to being the first step in any audit firm’s risk 
management process (Odendaal, 2002). 
 
This chapter considers findings from previous studies on the development of the awareness of the 
impact of risk, on specifically the engagement decision process. It aims to: 
? Identify key definitions presented in previous studies that are relevant to a study of the 
engagement decision process; 
? Extract key principles concluded from these previous studies that is considered in this study; and 
? Integrate and conclude on the evidence provided by such previous studies with specific 
consideration of its impact on registered auditors in medium practice. 
 
As indicated by Johnstone (2000: 1), previous studies of the engagement decision as exercised by 
audit practitioners are limited, specifically those aimed at the integration of the various complex 
factors and criteria that are evaluated during this process. This view is consistent with the conclusions 
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of studies performed by several other researchers such as Huss and Jacobs (1991: 16-32); Deshmukh 
(1997); Houston, et al. (1999: 281); Gendron (2001: 283-310) and Basioudius (2002: 5). 
 
To date, studies pertaining to risk and the engagement decision as studied in section 2. to section 2.4. 
focused mainly on the following: 
? Auditor predisposition - motivating drivers that impacts decision-making behavior; 
? Audit practitioner judgement - the process of decision-making by audit practitioners; and 
? Risk assessment - factors to be considered and audit procedures to be performed pertaining to the 
engagement decision. 
 
2.2.   Auditor predisposition during the engagement decision process 
 
Motivational factors are those factors that drive audit practitioners to accept or decline audit 
engagements. It is argued that such factors cause auditor predisposition as concluded by several 
researchers. When researchers began to study risk and its impact on audit decision-making processes, 
very little was known of the joint influence that motivational factors had on audit practitioners’ 
decision-making processes (Johnstone, 2000: 1). Despite such limited studies, the tensions between 
professional and commercial motivational factors have been present within the audit profession for 
many decades according to researchers such as Kirkham (1992: 301) and Bailey (1995: 191-195). 
 
A third group of motivational drivers namely organisational motivational drivers, was only identified 
during later studies by researchers such as Gendron (2002: 8), who found that not only does 
professionalism and commercialism impact on the engagement decision, but organisational factors 
also influence the way in which practitioners deal with the competitive pressures between commercial 
and professional motivating drivers during the engagement decision process.  
 
2.2.1. Definitions of motivational drivers in the engagement decision process 
 
In order to define commercial motivational drivers (referred to as the commercial logic), it is 
inferred from studies by Willmott (1986: 576) and Humphrey and Moizer (1990: 232), that the 
driving motivation of commercial audit practitioners is primarily financial remuneration.  
 
Commercial motivational drivers are therefore defined as engagement specific factors that are 
financially rewarding to the audit practitioner. 
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Professional motivational drivers (referred to as the professional logic) are defined by Gendron as 
(2002: 14): 
 
 “…a logic based on an idealised, coherent and organised set of values and ideas centred 
on the notion of serving the public – and not practitioners’ financial self-interests.”  
 
Professional motivational drivers are therefore defined as engagement specific considerations 
based on the audit practitioner’s ethical and social responsiveness. 
 
Gendron (2002: 7) concluded that organisational motivational factors (referred to as the 
organisational logic): 
 
“…assumes that human action and political processes play a key role in organisational 
life, with activities and decisions within the organisation being subject to the influence of 
organisational factors having different interests and adhering to different logics.” 
 
Organisational motivational drivers are therefore defined as those engagement considerations 
that are impacted by the interests of audit practitioners of an audit firm, individually and 
collectively. 
 
2.2.2. The influence of the commercial logic on the engagement decision 
 
The commercial logic has manifested itself in the design and application of practice development 
strategies, pricing policies, practitioner preferences, the willingness to accept risk and ultimately 
on considering the risk of litigation as studied in section 2.2.2.1. to section 2.2.2.5.  
 
 
2.2.2.1. The impact of commercial considerations related to practice development on 
the engagement decision process 
 
Studies related to the impact of commercial considerations related to practice development 
on the audit practitioner have indicated the following: 
? Asare, et al. (1994: 169) found that the firm’s practice-development strategy plays a 
major role in the client-acceptance decision process, as the extent of data collection and 
analysis in a given situation is closely linked to the way audit practitioners initially 
perceive the potential client against the firm’s practice-development strategy. Data 
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collection and analysis are likely to be more intense for potential clients whose fit with 
the firm’s strategy is initially unknown, than for potential clients that are immediately 
perceived as fitting or unfitting the firm’s strategy.  
? A study by Dirsmith, Heian and Covaleski (1997: 12) concluded that the decision to 
reject a potential client is a difficult decision to make since this decision contradicts the 
pressures on practitioners to contribute to the growth of their practice. 
? Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504) found that practitioner aggressiveness towards 
the development of the practice depends on the existing client base, and the 
competitiveness of the local audit market, that impacts directly on the engagement 
decision. The more established a practitioner’s client base, the less aggressive a 
practitioner would be in obtaining new clients. 
 
 
2.2.2.2. The impact of litigation on financial considerations during the engagement 
decision process 
 
The impact of litigation on financial considerations during the engagement decision of audit 
practitioners has been studied as follows:  
? Prior research focusing on litigation against audit firms demonstrates that as the client’s 
financial position deteriorates, the likelihood of the audit practitioner suffering a loss 
through litigation increases (St. Pierre & Anderson, 1984: 242-263; Palmrose, 1986: 97-
110; Stice, 1991: 516-533; Pratt & Stice, 1994: 639-656). 
? Research by Stice (1991: 516-533) and Pratt and Stice (1994: 649-656) demonstrate that 
a relation exists between the likelihood of litigation and adjustment to audit fees. 
? Huss and Jacobs (1991: 16-32); Francis and Reynolds (1998) and Johnstone (2000: 1-
27) concluded that LR and fierce competitive pressures among audit firms for clients 
have driven audit practitioners to be engaged in risk-management practices. 
? Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178) argue that practitioners who have recently been involved in 
litigation are likely to be more conservative when making engagement decisions than 
they would otherwise be.  
 
 
2.2.2.3. The impact of practitioner preferences on the engagement decision process 
 
The impact of practitioner preferences that are commercially orientated during the 
engagement decision process has been studied as follows: 
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? Studies by Shockley (1981: 785); Knapp (1985: 202) and Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178) 
concluded that practitioners have different risk tolerances, which affect their client 
acceptance decisions.  
? Farmer, Rittenberg and Trompeter (1987: 1-11) and Peecher (1996: 125-140) studied 
practitioner preferences for efficiency or effectiveness, and concluded that this may vary 
depending on a variety of factors including: the profitability of the client, the percentage 
of practitioner and firm revenues represented by the client, the practitioner’s risk 
preferences, and the practitioner’s concerns about litigation. If the practitioner is highly 
concerned about litigation, particularly in the case of a high risk client, the practitioner 
may communicate to the audit team that effectiveness is of the utmost priority.  
? Past studies by Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178) and Auyers and Kaplan (1998: 139-153) 
have also concluded that auditor predisposition is impacted by practitioner compensation 
and the drive to increase revenues. Their studies found that turning away a potential 
client is a difficult choice for many practitioners to make since successful recruiting of 
clients is a criteria often used to determine practitioners’ remuneration. 
? Trompeter (1994: 56-68) further concluded that practitioner compensation schemes that 
emphasize client retention leads to less conservative judgements. 
? Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504) studied the effect of certain practice development 
factors on audit practitioners’ engagement decisions and financial reporting judgements.  
They concluded that both the type of client (being a new or current client) and the type 
of practitioner (being a more or less aggressive individual) significantly affected the 
audit practitioners’ judgements related to the engagement decision. Their study provided 
evidence that the level of conservatism of practitioners had a relation to the level of audit 
procedures performed during the engagement decision. They concluded that new clients 
are likely to require more auditing during the engagement decision.  
? Further, to please a superior, accountability to practitioners with lower risk tolerances 
may lead subordinates to more conservative judgements (Cohen & Trompeter, 1998: 
481-504).  
? Practitioner preferences have also been studied by Bierstaker and Wright (1999: 2) who 
concluded that audit practitioners may adjust audit program plans in response to 
practitioner preferences. They found that audit practitioners significantly reduced 
planned tests, and reduced budgeted hours, in response to a practitioner’s preference for 
efficiency. Their conclusions suggest that audit practitioners would place a greater 
weight on commercial considerations than on professional guidance, introducing risk 
into the engagement decision as audit procedures may be reduced for commercial 
benefit. Bierstaker and Wright (1999: 2) further present findings that suggest audit 
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practitioners may reduce or increase the hours of more or less experienced personnel to 
improve audit efficiency.  
? Bierstaker (2000) found that audit practitioners are highly motivated to respond to the 
perceived preferences of their superiors, since salary increases, promotions, and future 
work assignments are based on the superior’s evaluations of the subordinate’s work.  
 
 
2.2.2.4. The impact of pricing considerations on the engagement decision process 
 
The impact of pricing considerations during the engagement decision process has been 
studied extensively: 
? As early as 1987, Kaplan concluded that commercially orientated audit practitioners tend 
to favour auditees’ interests, striving to be considered in the eyes of management as 
business advisors in order to obtain audit renewal and consulting engagements and thus 
increase revenue income (Kaplan, 1987: 6-7). These primarily commercially orientated 
audit practitioners are typically concerned about their ability to satisfy the needs of their 
clients. This primary focus on customer satisfaction based on the notion of commercially 
rewarding behaviour, indicate the possibility of increased risk of non-compliance with 
professional and ethical standards, in favour of commercial remuneration.  
? Audit firms might not expect to find themselves in a situation where they are not 
operating at a profit as clients who are judged likely to be unprofitable engagements, are 
not likely to be accepted in the first place (Johnstone, 2000: 1-27). 
? Hackenbrack and Hogan studied pricing and found that audit practitioners manage a 
portfolio of continuing audit engagements through the monitoring of engagement-
specific rates of return.  Hackenbrack and Hogan concluded that rates of return improve 
when either the cost of the audit is reduced or the audit fee is increased. Hackenbrack 
and Hogan’s findings suggest severe pricing pressure is more than an isolated source of 
tension between audit firms and their clients. In many instances this pricing pressure 
leads to the resignation by or change to the audit practitioner (2003: 2-6). 
? Schelleman studied the profitability of audit engagements in the USA. His study was 
motivated by the frequently expressed concern regarding the lack of competitiveness in 
the audit services market (Schelleman, 2002: 2). The results of Schelleman’s study show 
that the audit market structure differs across local audit markets, and that this local 
structure has a significant influence on audit engagement profitability. These findings 
have been confirmed in a study by the USGAO (2003: 2). 
? Schelleman also concluded on factors that indicated important determinants in audit fee 
decisions. These relate to client risk based on the client’s financial position, the length of 
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the relationship between the audit practitioner and the client, and the complexity of the 
client (Schelleman, 2002: 2).  
? Turpen (1995) reached several conclusions pertaining to the study of audit fees in the 
auditing profession environment. These include: 
o Audit effort and DR generally determine the quantum of audit fees; 
o Companies are willing to pay premiums for audits by the large international firms 
although there is no identifiable difference in quality; 
o Audit firms do not earn abnormal profits from their profession considering risk; 
o Audit practitioners do not always adjust fees upwards if DR is higher; 
o Fees for new clients are often discounted; 
o Clients that are willing to pay for non-audit services, generally also have high audit 
fees; and 
o Non-audit services may not provide independence issues, but the perception of 
conflicts of interest remains. 
 
 
2.2.2.5. The impact of assessed risk on audit fees on the engagement decision process 
 
Several studies have considered the specific impact that audit fees have in response to 
assessed risk and audit effectiveness. In this regard, the following studies need to be 
considered: 
? Bierstaker and Wright (1999) and Houston (1999: 70-86) indicated that competitive 
pressures lead to reductions in audit hours or tests, which may impair audit effectiveness 
and expose the firm to potential litigation and loss of reputation. 
? Studies by Messier and Plumlee (1987: 349-358); Maletta and Kida (1993: 508-525); 
Bedard and Wright (1994: 62-89); Pratt and Stice (1994: 639-656); Walo (1995: 115-
124); Zimbelman (1997: 75-97); Houston, et al. (1999: 281-298); Johnstone (2000: 1-
27); Asare and Wright (2002) and Bedard and Graham (2003: 55-70) all concluded that 
audit practitioners respond to business risk by charging higher fees or adjusting their 
pre-acceptance information collection strategies.  
? Studies by Bedard (1989: 57-71); Simunic and Stein (1990: 329-360); Mock and Wright 
(1993: 39-61) and O’Keefe, Simunic and Stein (1994: 241-261) however concluded that 
audit practitioners do not always make use of risk adaptation strategies (e.g. adjusting 
audit fees) to mediate the effects of risk during the engagement decision process.  
? Bedard and Wright (1994: 62-89) suggested that as a result of increased competitive 
pressures, audit practitioners are inclined to reduce a previous year’s time budget, 
especially if no problems are uncovered during the prior period audit. Their findings 
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raised concerns related to recurring assignments, as engagement threats identified during 
the first engagement decision may not be considered in later years when safeguarding 
procedures are designed in the interest of budget constraints and resultant efficiency 
designs. 
 
2.2.3. The influence of the professional logic on the engagement decision 
 
The basis of professional factors may be inferred from Hall, who describes the set of attributes 
that are generally considered in the sociology of professions as being representative of ideal 
professionals. According to Hall (1968: 92): 
 
“Ideal professionals strongly identify with their profession, and consider the main 
objective of their work to be that of serving the public.” 
 
Researchers such as Sorensen and Sorensen (1974: 98-106) and Aranya, Pollock and Amernic 
(1981: 271-280), concluded that audit practitioners generally develop a sense of professional 
commitment based on ethical guidance and professional standards. Hanlon (1994: 339) argued 
that the profession reminds audit practitioners of the professional logic. This is achieved as 
follows (1994: 339): 
 
“Auditors’ codes of ethics generally emphasize the chief notions upon which the 
legitimacy of the auditing profession is predicated, namely, public service and 
independence. Concurrently, auditors are exposed to the commercial logic through 
several sources, such as the business literature that constantly stresses the importance of 
the “bottom line”, as well as the firms’ performance evaluation reports that typically are 
based on indicators such as “profits per practitioner”. Auditors therefore have to operate 
and make decisions in the midst of the two logics of action, each of them carrying its own 
representation of decision-making. These representations oftentimes result in points of 
tension in day-to-day decision processes.” 
 
According to Sikka and Willmott (1995: 554) the motivation for professionally orientated audit 
practitioners is the actual challenge to carry out engagements. They argued that audit practitioners 
consider it important to make decisions without external pressures from clients or individuals 
outside of their profession.  
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In a study by Bierstaker (2000) it was concluded that audit practitioners are exposed to the fact 
that they are part of a profession with significant responsibilities to the users of financial 
statements, as highlighted by various codes of ethics and professional guidance. 
 
2.2.4. The influence of the organisational logic on the engagement decision 
 
Audit services are rendered mainly by organisations that are structured as partnerships. These 
organisations are owned by a number of practitioners who are mainly responsible for servicing 
audit clients, obtaining new clients and servicing such clients through staff recruitment 
(Greenwood, Hinings & Brown, 1990: 725).  
 
Studies by Power (1995: 317) and Hopwood (1996: 218) indicated that little research has been 
performed on the influence of the audit firm on the decisions made by an individual practitioner. 
In 2000, Power concluded that a growing body of research concludes that formal audit devices 
are used to connect the audit practice with culturally central values (Power, 2000: 299). These 
culturally central values motivate audit practitioners to comply with organisational direction and 
strategy.  
 
Gendron (2002: 14) supported the findings by these researchers that the decisions made by audit 
practitioners are subject to the influence of professional and commercial motivators. He also 
concluded that practitioners may be predisposed towards one of the motivating drivers or may in 
fact have a balanced approach to these motivating drivers, most often achieved through the 
organisational logic. 
 
In order to understand the broad impact that organisational factors may have on audit 
practitioners’ engagement decisions, the conclusions of a number of studies need to be 
considered. These studies highlight the fact that practitioners can collectively influence individual 
engagement decisions. Such influence in many instances appears to balance the commercial and 
professional logics. These studies include the following: 
? Freidson (1986: 213) studied the organisational influences of individual audit practitioners on 
the audit firm, and concluded that some audit practitioners within an audit firm, have 
significantly more influence than other practitioners within the same firm. This was found to 
be true where practitioners are working at various local offices. Administrative practitioners 
at a firm’s national office assume the co-ordination and control of activities within the firm 
through various organisational components, such as the firm’s practitioner-compensation 
scheme and decision-making policies with which local audit practitioners need to comply. 
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This would suggest that practitioners may influence decision-making such as engagement 
decisions of more junior practitioners. 
? Solomon (1987: 1-25); Libby and Luft (1993: 425-450) and Gendron (2002: 2) concluded 
that the audit firm as an organisation, influences the audit setting within which individual 
audit practitioners operate, as the audit firm is typically a hierarchically structured group. The 
work within a firm is closely guided or prescribed by professional standards, firm policies 
and procedures, and decision support systems.  
? Studies by Covaleski, Dirsmith, Heian and Samuel (1998: 293-327) and Anderson-Gough, 
Grey and Robson (2001: 99-122) have concluded that the influences exercised by more senior 
practitioners impact on the behaviour of junior practitioners within the audit firm. Such 
influences relates to maintaining budgeted revenue targets and regulating individual 
practitioner behaviour within the desired organisational profile. 
? Carpenter, Dirsmith and Gupta (1994: 355-380) concluded that organisational influences due 
to the structure of audit firms leads to tension between individual audit practitioners and 
organisational pressures. Gendron (2002: 8) also concluded that the logics of action often 
conflict when decisions are made. Gendron argued that these conflicts can however be 
dynamic and thus improve the quality of the audit process as the individuals may differ and 
deliberate on these conflicts based on their diverse experiences, cultures, and reflective 
abilities, resulting in improved decision making. 
? Gendron (2001: 304) found that a firm’s client-acceptance policies influence decision 
processes, notably by providing audit practitioners with an: “interpretative scheme, decision 
aids and a vocabulary that they frequently refer to when making decisions.” Gendron argued 
that the organisation is in fact those organisational components that prior research identified 
as being likely to influence the client-acceptance decision. This principle has been widely 
accepted in organisational analysis. Such factors would include (Gendron, 2001: 304): 
o the firm’s respective practice-development strategy; 
o practitioner-compensation schemes used in individual audit firms; 
o a system of management of audit firms by measurement of specific objectives; 
o standardised client-acceptance policies; and 
o the attitudes of individual practitioners towards specific clients or industries. 
? Gendron (2002: 5) later suggested that the audit firm pre-determines the individual audit 
practitioners’ decision-making by configuring its organisational components through design 
tools such as practitioner-compensation and client-acceptance policies. These are used in 
order to balance the commercial and professional motivational drivers. Gendron further 
concluded that one of the main benefits from organisational influences relate to consistency 
of decisions made by its members. 
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“Organisational decisions may be conceived as arenas in which organisational members 
seek to influence the decision processes in accordance with the logic they believe is 
proper to make decisions. To that effect, organisational members will use the resources at 
their disposal, such as their own legitimated expertise to resolve certain types of 
problems. By giving prominence to certain logics, the organisation signals that it expects 
these favoured logics to be influential in decision-making. This signal may become 
instilled over time in the auditors’ mind, through their frequent exposure to the 
organisation’s rhetoric. Instillation results from the routine act of making decisions in 
accordance with the organisation’s favoured logics” (Gendron, 2002: 8). 
 
Researchers also considered factors internal to the audit practitioner’s environment that may 
impact on audit practitioner judgement. These studies although not directly related to bias during 
the engagement decision process, provide valuable consideration to the impact of bias of the 
individual on judgement processes in general, and are therefore considered for the study of the 
engagement decision process. These studies are considered as part of organisational motivational 
drivers as individuals represent the organisation. An example of such internal pressures relates to 
the remuneration practices of audit firms relating to their audit practitioners. Asare, et al. (1994: 
163-178) concluded that audit practitioners’ preferences are also the likely result of remuneration 
policies of audit firms, specifically related to audit practitioners. Audit practitioners’ judgements 
may be affected by the fact that they are compensated based on the amount of revenue that is 
generated through the appointment to new clients. These preferences towards economical 
considerations are further compounded by the competition between audit firms for new clients. 
As a result, practitioners’ judgements may be less conservative, that is that the impact of client-
related risks and the audit practitioner’s ER may be minimised in order to recruit new clients; or 
they may be more conservative due to an audit firms’ increased litigious environment.  
 
2.3. Studies on audit judgement and the engagement decision process 
 
Judgement is required to identify and conclude on the presence of risk factors. Thus, previous studies 
pertaining to risk assessment were impacted significantly by studies pertaining to audit practitioner 
judgement. Such previous studies of judgement as exercised by audit practitioners during the 
engagement decision process, considered some of the following factors and concluded on how these 
factors impact on the judgement of audit practitioners during the engagement decision process:  
? Audit firm policy that impacts on decisions made by the audit practitioner (Brown & Solomon, 
1990: 17-38; 1991: 110-119);  
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? The impact of biases on decisions made by the audit practitioner (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973: 
207-232; 1974: 1124-1131; Joyce & Biddle, 1981a: 120-145; 1981b: 323-349; Butler, 1986: 101-
111; Knechel & Messier, 1990: 386-406; Kennedy, 1993: 231-245; 1995: 249-273); 
? Pre-decisional behaviour such as information gathering audit procedures (Kida, 1984: 332-340; 
Butt & Campbell, 1989: 471-479; Anderson & Maleta, 1994: 1-20); 
? Hypotheses generation during the engagement decision process (Bedard & Biggs, 1991: 622-642; 
Kaplan, Moeckel & Williams, 1992: 50-65); 
? Protocol analysis during decision-making processes of audit practitioners (Biggs & Mock, 1983: 
234-255; Biggs, Mock, & Watkins, 1988: 148-161); 
? Determinants of judgemental performance (Gibbins, 1984: 103-125; Waller & Felix, 1987: 275-
292; Libby & Luft, 1993: 425-450); 
? Institutional setting and the structure of audit firms (Kinney, 1986: 73-79; McDaniel, 1990: 267-
285; Dirsmith, et al. 1997: 1-27; Bowrin, 1998: 40-71); 
? Accountability issues (Ashton, 1990: 148-180; Kennedy, 1993: 231-245; Peecher, 1996: 125-140); 
? The impact of embeddedness with the client on the audit (Tan, 1995: 113-135); 
? The concept and application of professionalism (Mills & Bettner, 1992: 185-200; Baker, 1993: 68-
80; Grey, 1998: 569-587);  
? The influence of negative or positive signals present at the intended client on risk assessment 
(Bedard & Graham, 2002: 1); and 
? Audit efficiency considerations during the engagement decision process (Radcliffe, 1998: 377-
410; 1999: 333-362). 
 
Pertaining to the engagement decision process itself, the following studies have highlighted the impact 
that certain factors may have on the judgement of the audit practitioner. These include: 
? Audit practitioners should take note of the risks and pitfalls surrounding the presentation of facts 
and characteristics by potential clients during the evaluation of ER that directly impacts the 
engagement decision. One of the stages related to the collection of information pertaining to 
potential clients relates to client interviews, as audit practitioners seek to reduce risk through the 
client enquiry process (Basioudius, 2002: 7). 
? Audit practitioners evaluate client-related risks before they assess the audit firm’s level of risk of 
loss on the engagement. In fact, audit practitioners seek to reduce the risks associated with the 
client inquiry process (Basioudius, 2002: 7). This is in accordance with prior research that 
indicated that audit practitioners appear to be sensitive to the objectivity; the expertise and to the 
communication style of the client.  
? Studies performed by Joyce and Biddle (1981b: 323-349), Hirst (1994: 113-126), Reimers and 
Fennema (1999: 117), Goodwin (1999: 1-16) and Beaulieu (2001: 30) all demonstrate that audit 
practitioners assess information from the more objective source as more reliable than information 
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received from a less objective source. In addition, previous studies have shown that audit 
practitioners receiving an estimate or explanation from a source of high competence are more 
confident in their own re-estimate than audit practitioners receiving an estimate or explanation 
from a source of low competence (Bamber, 1983: 396-412; Rebele, Heintz & Briden, 1988: 43-52; 
Hirst, 1994: 113-126; Anderson & Maleta, 1994: 1-20).  
? Comunale, Sexton and Sincish (2001: 1) explored audit practitioners’ judgements in the presence 
of differing levels of client presentation skills and their findings suggest that the communication 
style of the client influences audit practitioners’ judgements and assessments of client credibility. 
This is particularly relevant to the performance of an evaluation of the client’s business during the 
engagement decision process as the client may be new to the audit practitioner, public information 
may be limited, and hence the audit practitioner may place a high level of reliance on information 
as communicated to the audit practitioner by the client. An audit practitioner should however 
consider the continuance of the engagement relationship, should other high risk facts be 
discovered regarding the client during the performance of audit procedures. 
 
From these studies it is argued that research has conceptualised auditing as a cognitive process as these 
studies confirmed the existence of specific paradigms of thought and models used during the decisions 
made by individuals. These paradigms of thought and models mainly exist in order to produce certain 
outcomes and reveal certain audit strategies, mostly focused on reducing risk to the audit practitioner. 
From this it is evident that judgement would also be relevant to the engagement decision process, as 
the impact of risk on the engagement decision would necessitate audit practitioners to make 
judgements in order to produce those outcomes that reflect desired levels of risk to the audit 
practitioner. 
 
2.4. Risk assessment - The evolution of risk based auditing 
 
In order to study ER in auditing, one needs to consider the evolution of the AR model, as ER and AR 
is closely related. It may be argued from a study of the history of auditing that the audit process has 
evolved. This evolution has mainly been as a result of entities moving from being owner managed to 
being large public listed entities managed by those who do not necessarily own the entity (Bell, et al. 
2005: 9). At the same time, the increase in the volume of transactions and the evolution of complex 
systems to deal with such volumes has further resulted in changes to the audit process. In essence, 
where audit practitioners were able to audit effectively all transactions of an entity a 100 years ago, 
such an approach will today not be viable, and hence the audit process needed to evolve. 
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Due to the increase in the volume of transactions, audit practitioners began to realise the important 
role of internal controls. As early as 1905, Dicksee’s Auditing noted (Brown, 1962: 696): “A proper 
system of internal check frequently obviates the necessity of a detailed audit.” 
 
The earliest authoritative guidance in this regard was issued after the Second World War when the 
Statement on Auditing Procedures (hereafter SAP) no. 29 - Scope of the independent auditor’s review 
of internal control, was issued in October 1958 in the USA. Several standards followed and audit 
practitioners and researchers grappled with the role that internal controls have in the audit process 
(Hitzig, 2001).  
 
As a result of this evolution of auditing, auditing today is principally concerned with the process of 
evaluating AR. AR, being the risk that the audit practitioner may fail to modify his opinion when 
financial statements are materially misstated, was conceptualised in November 1972 with the issuance 
of SAP no. 54 – The auditors study and evaluation of internal control, issued by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (hereafter AICPA) in the USA (Hitzig, 2001). SAP 54 was 
the first authoritative guidance on the evaluation of internal controls that stated AR as being a function 
between the interaction of IR, CR and DR. 
 
Previous researchers have concluded on the following definitions relating to AR and ER: 
? AR - The risk that the audit practitioner may unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his opinion 
on the financial statements if materially misstated (Johnstone, 2000: 1); 
? ER - The overall risk associated with an audit engagement (Colbert, et al. 1996: 54); 
 
Current guidance on the definitions of AR and its elements can be found in ISA 330 - The auditor’s 
procedures in response to assessed risks (hereafter ISA 330) that states that the assessment of risk 
should be performed for the risk of material misstatement at a financial statement level as well as the 
risk of misstatement at an account balance level (IFAC, 2003c: par. 3). In terms of the Glossary of 
Terms issued by IFAC (IFAC, 2001), the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements is in 
essence the risk associated with CR and IR. The risk associated with misstatement at an account 
balance level is related to AR. The definitions of these risks are found in The International framework 
for assurance engagements that defines these elements of risk (IFAC, 2005c: par .48) as: 
 
“Assurance engagement risk - The risk that the practitioner expresses an inappropriate conclusion 
when the subject matter information is materially misstated. 
 
  38
In general, assurance engagement risk can be represented by the following components, although 
not all of these components will necessarily be present or significant for all assurance 
engagements: 
(a) The risk that the subject matter information is materially misstated, which in turn consists of: 
(i) Inherent risk: the susceptibility of the subject matter information to a material misstatement, 
assuming that there are no related controls; and 
(ii) Control risk: the risk that a material misstatement that could occur will not be prevented, or 
detected and corrected, on a timely basis by related internal controls. When control risk is relevant 
to the subject matter, some control risk will always exist because of the inherent limitations of the 
design and operation of internal control; and 
(b) Detection risk: the risk that the practitioner will not detect a material misstatement that exists.” 
 
The application of the AR model suggested that audit practitioners could obtain an acceptable level of 
AR by evaluating each of IR, DR and CR. The model also suggested that a high level of risk in any 
one of the latter could be mitigated by obtaining a low level of risk in any of the other. The greatest 
criticism against the AR model, which to a great extent remained unresolved to date, is that of non-
sampling risk. In the 1960’s and 1970’s firms and researchers continued to refine their audit 
methodologies specifically focusing on the development of sampling methodologies. Significant 
debate has ensued relating to the acceptability of statistical and non-statistical sampling; the one being 
based on the risk measurement of chance and the other being based on human judgement (Bell, et al. 
2005: 11-15). 
 
Despite these developments around the AR model, it is argued that the AR model has developed into 
the basis for modern day risk based audit methodologies, and has been used as basis in audit 
methodologies during the last four decades.  Considering that the AR model has remained unchanged 
during the last four decades, continued corporate failures would suggest possible shortcomings in the 
model itself. 
 
In an attempt to address the apparent shortcomings of the AR model, some researchers have concluded 
as follows: 
? Hitzig (2001) commented on the AR model by arguing that IR should in fact be removed from the 
audit model. His view is that IR should be used to determine the level of AR that will be 
acceptable in the first place. Hitzig argued that both CR and DR entail evidence which can be 
measured and tested, whereas the influence of the industry on a client’s business and its resultant 
effect on matters such as susceptibility to fraudulent reporting remains a judgement call. The 
current application of inherent risk evaluation as part of the current model may be deceptively 
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simple in concept, yet it has been difficult to apply in practice and as a result many practitioners 
often take a conservative approach and set inherent risk to its maximum. 
? Charmichale (2002) argued that an additional component that may justify its own existence in the 
ER equation is fraud risk (hereafter FR), referring to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(hereafter SEC) of the United States’ Prevention of Fraud Task Force that developed a list of 
circumstances that may lead to a higher assessed conclusion of ER, impacted specifically by fraud.  
 
These very concerns around the continued inability of audits performed with the AR model at its core 
prompted the Panel on Audit Effectiveness in the USA in 1998 to question its relevance. The Panel 
concluded that the AR model is still relevant and sound and that focus should be directed towards the 
application of the AR model, rather than its constructive merit (Carpenter & Mahoney, 2001: 3). 
 
Recent thinking on the AR model seems to confirm the findings of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness in 
that the AR model and its role as the premise for assurance is perhaps not the problem, but the 
application of the AR model by audit practitioners in practice may be questionable (Bell, et al. 2005: 
11). This thinking would suggest that the procedures performed by audit practitioners in obtaining 
evidence in order to satisfy and conclude on the elements of the AR model is perhaps not sufficient, 
alternatively the audit quality of current audit methodologies and procedures may be the cause of audit 
failure. 
 
In support of this view, Bell, et al. argue that audit practitioners have viewed the elements of AR (IR, 
CR and DR) as substitutes and have hence planned audit procedures on that basis, rather than 
acknowledging the complimentary nature of each of these elements and hence ensuring that sufficient 
evidence is obtained and documented to satisfy each of these elements of AR (2005: 14). This notion 
of substitution can be found in auditing standards such as ISA 320 – Audit materiality (IFAC 1996a: 
par .10) which states that: 
 
“There is an inverse relationship between materiality and the level of AR, that is, the higher 
the materiality level, the lower the AR and vice versa. The auditor takes the inverse 
relationship between materiality and AR into account when determining the nature, timing and 
extent of audit procedures.  
 
For example, if, after planning for specific audit procedures, the auditor determines that the 
acceptable materiality level is lower, AR is increased. The auditor would compensate for this 
by either: 
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(a) Reducing the assessed risk of material misstatement, where this is possible, and supporting 
the reduced level by carrying out extended or additional tests of control; or 
 
(b) Reducing detection risk by modifying the nature, timing and extent of planned substantive 
procedures.” 
 
Figure 2.1. illustrates this inverted relationship as follows: 
 
Materiality
Audit Risk
Low
High
High
 
 
Figure 2.1.  The relationship between materiality and Audit Risk (AR) 
 
The view of Bell, et al. (2005: 2) that audit quality in the application of the AR model needs to be 
considered is shared by regulators and lawmakers alike as the 21st century has seen a flurry of new 
auditing standards and regulations being issued in countries all across the world. The objective of such 
guidance is to improve the standard of audit evidence to support the audit practitioners’ understanding 
of their clients, the documentation of procedures, the evaluation of controls and ultimately the review 
of the quality of audit work performed. For the first time the “policing” of such guidance has also been 
instituted with the concepts of quality review functions and the review of individual audit practices. 
Statutory regulation in many countries has further introduced significant penalties applicable to those 
audit practitioners who fail their duties under such regulation as studied in section 3.2. 
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2.5. Engagement Risk (ER) and Audit Risk (AR) 
 
Researchers have reflected on the risk to the audit practitioner as a result of the assessed AR of a 
client. Initial research on risk and its impact on the engagement decision process, although not directly 
focused on the engagement decision itself, indicated that the existence of risk should be considered 
during the design of audit procedures and in fact during the audit in general. This was concluded from 
studies such as those performed by Simunic (1980: 161-190); Willingham and Wright (1985: 57-70) 
and Palmrose (1986: 97-110). These studies indicated that an increase in AR factors might increase the 
likelihood that the audit practitioner may suffer a loss from that engagement. 
 
Later studies indicated that in fact, the evaluation of risk during the engagement decision process is 
impacted by several risks as concluded by the following researchers: 
? Kreutzfeldt and Wallace (1986: 20-43) and O’Keefe, et al. (1990: 241-261) concluded that a client 
with an unhealthy financial position may pose risk to the audit firm. 
? Huss and Jacobs (1991: 16-32); Lord (1992: 89-102) and Frost (1994: 22-35) concluded that audit 
firms expect their members to exercise considerable caution in acquiring clients where such clients 
have been identified as high risk clients. They also concluded that audit practitioners are more 
conservative in their reporting practices when a client is identified as a high risk client. 
? Arens and Loebbecke (1991: 258) concluded that audit practitioners attempt to control their 
business risk by reducing AR to the audit practitioner to an acceptable level, through the design of 
mitigating strategies, to compensate for elements associated with increased client risk.  
? Mock and Wright (1993: 39-61) presented evidence that although the nature of audit tests 
performed are not affected, adjustments to budgeted hours in subsequent years on continuing 
engagements are related to account-specific, and not engagement-wide inherent risks, resulting in 
increased audit procedures related to high risk clients. 
? Studies by Huss and Jacobs (1991: 16-32) and Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178) concluded that several 
risk factors may exists that may impact the audit practitioner’s business risk, mainly being 
concerns related to LR as well as the profitability of such high risk assignments. 
 
The conclusions of these studies indicated that there was a need for audit practitioners to consider 
those attributes of their clients that indicate risk, being those risks typically identified when assessing 
elements of AR, as these risks may in fact impact on the audit practitioner’s desire to be associated 
with a client. These conclusions led in part to the issuance of Practice alert 1994-3 in the USA. 
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2.5.1. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants’ 1994-3 practice alert on 
Audit Risk (AR) 
 
Practice alert 1994-3 – Acceptance and continuance of audit clients, issued by AICPA in 1994 
was arguably the first regulated auditing guidance that attempted to address the relation 
between AR and ER. The risk alert specifically focused on the assessment, relation and 
conclusions relating to AR, Cbr and Abr. 
 
Practice alert 1994-3 has since been replaced by an updated version, Practice alert 2003-3 – 
Acceptance and continuance of clients and engagements. This risk alert provides qualitative 
considerations and indicators of risk that audit practitioners should consider during an audit 
and its impact on the design of audit procedures aimed at reducing higher risk levels to 
acceptable risk levels (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (hereafter AICPA), 
2004). 
 
2.5.2. Johnstone’s risk assessment model and the client acceptance decision 
 
Despite the issuance of Practice alert 1994-3, Johnstone (2000: 6) argued that a limited 
amount of descriptive research has investigated strategies for adapting to client related risks. 
Although Practice alert 1994-3 could be seen as a first attempt at highlighting the connection 
between AR and ER, Johnstone argued that compliance with the indicators in Practice alert 
1994-3 does not assist audit practitioners in being able to design strategies to mitigate and 
conclude on ER. 
 
Although Huss and Jacobs (1991: 16-32) concluded that risk evaluations occur early on in the 
engagement decision process, no examination existed as to how specific client-acceptance 
risks would impact the engagement decision, nor did professional guidance provide any 
insights on audit practitioner response to risk. The existence of such limited research and 
guidance on specific client-acceptance related risk assessment studies, prompted Johnstone to 
study their existence and inter-relation in order to model audit practitioner decision-making in 
response to the existence of risk during the engagement decision. The following definitions 
need to be considered when studying Johnstone’s model: 
? Client business risk - The risk that the client’s economic condition will deteriorate in 
either the short or long term (Huss & Jacobs, 1991: 16); and 
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? Audit practitioner business risk - The risk of loss or injury to the audit practitioner due 
to a failed audit (Bushong & Weatherhold, 2000: 35). 
 
Johnstone developed a model that simultaneously evaluates the assessment of business risk of 
the client, the assessment of AR and its impact on the business risk of the audit practitioner. 
She concluded that the business risk of the audit practitioner is evaluated in response to the 
assessment of the business risk of the client and of AR. This relation suggests that audit 
practitioner judgement of risks identified relating to the business risk of a client and AR, will 
impact the audit practitioner’s judgement of its own business risk (Johnstone, 2000: 1). This 
conclusion was based on studies by researchers such as Barron and Kenny (1986: 1173-1182) 
that concluded that the audit practitioner’s business risk will mediate the effect of a higher 
level of AR in the client acceptance decision under the following circumstances: 
? The audit practitioner’s evaluation of the business risk of the client impacts the audit 
practitioner’s evaluation of AR; 
? The audit practitioner’s business risk affects the possibility of accepting or rejecting the 
engagement; and 
? The strength of the relationship between the assessment of audit-risk and the decision to 
accept the client is impacted by the underlying relationship of these risks. 
 
The relationship between these risk evaluations is depicted in figure 2.2. 
 
Clients 
business 
risk evaluation
Client 
engagement 
decision
Auditors business 
risk evaluation
Pro-active risk 
adaptation
Audit risk 
evaluation
 
 
Figure 2.2. The client acceptance decision (Johnstone, 2000: 5) 
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2.5.3. The assessment of the business risk of the audit practitioner during the 
engagement decision process 
 
Johnstone based her model on research performed by several researchers who concluded the 
following in terms of the assessment of business risk of the audit practitioner: 
? Huss and Jacobs (1991: 16-32) and Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178) concluded that there is a 
possible relationship between the audit practitioners assessment of audit and client 
business risk, and the possibility that the audit practitioner would accept or decline an 
engagement. Both the Huss and Jacobs and Asare, et al. studies indicated that despite their 
findings of a relationship between the assessment of the client’s business risk and the 
acceptance by the audit practitioner of the engagement, more research was required in 
order to formulate views on audit practitioner response to identified risks. 
? Houston, et al. (1999: 281) concluded that the audit practitioner's business risk is that the 
audit firm will suffer a loss resulting from the engagement, either by a lack of engagement 
profitability or through future litigation. 
? Similarly, Bushong and Weatherhold (2000: 35) concluded that the business risk of the 
audit practitioner is the risk of loss or injury to the audit practitioner due to a failed audit. 
This risk can take the form of litigation and regulatory sanctions, or it can be a lessening 
of the firm's reputation. 
 
Colbert, et al. (1996: 54) identified several factors that indicate business risk to the audit 
practitioner and would impact the evaluation of the audit practitioner’s business risk. These 
include considering: 
? If clients are involved with significant legal concerns and contraventions; 
? Instances where a client has frequently changed their audit practitioners; 
? The possibility that the client’s financial results may be used in a public offering; and 
? Situations where the financial statements of the company may be used as part of the 
merger or disposal of a business. 
 
 
2.5.4. The assessment of the business risk of the client during the engagement decision 
process 
 
Johnstone concluded on the assessment of business risk of the client with reference to studies 
on the business risk of the client by Bushong and Weatherhold (2000: 35). They concluded 
that the client's business risk is the risk that the client will not survive and remain profitable. 
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They continued by providing examples of factors that increase the client's business risk 
including entity-specific characteristics such as new and unproven products, substantial doubt 
about its ability to remain a going concern, inadequate capital base, and vulnerability to 
rapidly changing technology. Additional factors include industry-specific characteristics such 
as rapid change, high competition or market saturation, and low barriers to entry (Bushong & 
Weatherhold, 2000: 35). 
 
Studies by Francis and Reynolds (1998), Jones and Raghunandan (1998: 169-181), Pratt and 
Stice (1994), Hill, Ramsay and Simon (1994: 185-203), Clarkson and Simunic (1994: 207-
228) and Huss and Jacobs (1991: 16-32) have all argued that the assessment of business risk 
related to a prospective client is central to engagement decisions and the management of ER.   
 
Several previous studies have identified risk factors that should be considered when evaluating 
business risk of the client such as studies by Colbert, et al. (1996: 55) and Durak (2004).  
Durak (2004) views the business risk of the client as a risk to the audit profession as a whole 
and identified certain risk indicators which have been compiled based on a review of 
accounting scandals and business failures up to 2004. These include (Durak, 2004): 
 
 “Indicators of management risk: 
? A company culture of arrogance and management entitlement;  
? Management previously committed dishonest acts; 
? Cash flows from operations that bear little relationship to reported earnings;  
? Compensation plans geared toward enriching executives rather than generating 
profits; 
? Significant insider trading; 
? Departure of key senior management personnel; 
? Relationships and credibility with customers, creditors, and other third parties 
declining; and 
? Failure to listen to key people within the company. 
 
Indicators of entity risk: 
? Receivables are growing faster than sales; 
? Unusual changes in profit margin; 
? Significant declines in stock price; 
? Inability to meet past-due obligations; 
? Net income growing at a pace far outstripping revenue growth; 
? Transactions lack economic purpose; 
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? Small company's mentality in a large company's body; 
? Inability to obtain future financing; 
? Undisciplined acquisition growth; 
? Accounting policies that rely heavily on management's judgement or that seem 
aggressive; 
? Ineffective audit committees and board governance; 
? Obsession with meeting earnings targets and expectations; 
? Difficulty explaining how the company actually makes money; and 
? Overly centralised control over financial reporting. 
 
Indicators of industry risk: 
? Ratios and benchmarks differ significantly from industry averages; 
? Predictions by management are at odds with industry trends; and 
? Prolonged periods of success.” 
 
ISA 315 - Understanding the entity and its environment and assessing the risks of material 
misstatement (hereafter ISA 315) provides similar guidance on business risk factors in 
Appendix I of this standard (IFAC, 2003b: Appendix I) than those identified by Durak (2004).  
 
ISA 315 lists many business risk factors pertaining to the following factors that should be 
considered in relation to an assessment of business risk (IFAC, 2003b: Appendix I): 
? Industry, regulatory and other external factors, including the financial reporting 
framework; 
? Factors that reflect on the nature of the entity; 
? Factors impacted by the objectives, strategies and related business risks of the entity; and 
? Measurements of the financial performance of the entity. 
 
Due to the vast nature of risk factors that should be considered, audit practitioners typically 
make use of decision aids (Trotman, 1997: 22) in order to ensure that all matters have been 
considered as studied in section 2.6. 
  
2.5.5. The use of risk mitigating strategies to mitigate high levels of Engagement Risk 
(ER) 
 
Based on studies performed by O’Keefe, et al. (1994: 241-261); Pratt and Stice (1994: 639-
656); Simunic and Stein (1990: 329-343); Simon (1985: 71-78) and Walo (1995: 115-124), 
Johnstone considered the existence and use of methods by audit practitioners to mitigate 
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higher levels of risk identified to an acceptable level of risk (Johnstone, 2000: 7), and 
concluded that there are mainly three strategies that audit practitioners use in mitigating 
assessed levels of risk. These are studied in section 4.3.5 as part of the engagement decision 
audit procedures that audit practitioners would perform, in mitigating risks identified to 
acceptable risk levels. 
 
2.6. The development of engagement decision aids  
 
The existence of audit strategy aimed at establishing the level of risk to the audit practitioner, at an 
acceptable level, as well as the vast number of factors that needs consideration in this process, has led 
to the development of decision aids, used to assist audit practitioners in making informed decisions 
when assessing risk. The use of decision aids has been impacted significantly with the advent of the 
portable personal computer. Decision aids have been developed using software as early as 1989 by 
AICPA, through the release of APG2, which is a software program that supports the completion of 
checklists (Blundell, 1989).  
 
It has been argued that decision aids contribute to the effectiveness of audits, and enables consistent 
decisions within an organisational context. In this regard, research by Power has indicated the 
increasing use of decision aids to connect members of the audit practice with culturally central values 
(Power, 2000: 299). Throughout the 1990’s risk factors have been identified through several studies. 
These risk factors have been built into risk questionnaires which are today commonly used in the 
evaluation of ER and other audit procedures. The use of these decision aids in auditing has in fact 
become unavoidable (Trotman, 1997: 22). 
 
According to research by Rose, decision aid research in auditing generally addresses the quality of 
decisions made, reliance placed by users on such decision aids, and the process of knowledge 
acquisition built into such decision aids as studied in section 2.6.1. to section 2.6.3. (2002: 111-113).  
 
2.6.1. Research on the impact of decision aids on the quality of decisions made by audit 
practitioners 
 
In terms of the quality of the decisions that audit practitioners make, prior research indicated that 
some statistical models, can outperform human decision-making in complex decision tasks 
involving many pieces of evidence (Dawes, 1971: 180-188; Dawes & Corrigan, 1974: 95-106; 
Blattberg & Hoch, 1990: 887-889). According to Bell, Bedard, Johnstone and Smith (2002: 2): 
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“Human decision makers have difficulty determining optimal cue weights and combining the 
weighted evidence in an unbiased manner to form an overall judgement.”  
  
As the engagement decision process ultimately evolves around a decision related to risk, 
considering many variables, it is likely that decision aids will be used in this process. It is 
however also important to consider studies related to the actual reliance, advantages and 
disadvantages of such decision aids, as it is argued these impact on the ultimate use of such aids. 
  
2.6.2. Research on the reliance by audit practitioners on decision aids 
 
In terms of user reliance, previous studies by Kachelmeier and Messier investigated the influence 
of decision aids on decision-making behavior and concluded on the existence of possible 
impediments to users' reliance on decision aids. They concluded that there is a high possibility 
that audit practitioners work backwards from a desired decision outcome when using decision 
aids, therefore questioning the effectiveness of such decision aids. This may ultimately impact on 
the integrity of the process as the audit practitioner is biased towards the consideration of facts 
and even the completion of the decision aid (Kachelmeier & Messier, 1990: 209-226). 
 
Audit firms use decision aids as they provide guidance to the engagement team and promote 
consistency of decision-making across engagements and over time. Several studies have 
examined how appropriately designed decision aids and procedural guidance can improve audit 
effectiveness and efficiency. For instance, Eining, Jones and Loebbecke (1997: 1-20) concluded 
that design features affect the extent of decision aid use and the quality of the conclusions reached 
by such decision aids. McDaniel and Kinney (1995: 59) concluded that procedural guidance 
improves audit effectiveness in performing audit procedures. This research suggested that 
decision aids enhance performance of individuals and improves effectiveness of audits. 
 
The inherent weaknesses in decision aids have prompted researchers such as MacLullich (2001) 
to study such decision aids. She concluded that decision aids alone cannot measure some of the 
more ambiguous aspects of judgement processes. Qualitative research in the wider environmental 
context of the audit practitioner, integrated with the complex motivational drivers that impact 
audit practitioner behaviour needs to be performed. MacLullich stated that (2001): 
 
“Emerging research has to develop an altogether more localised focus attending to the 
auditor’s understanding of operational practices providing insights into individual judgement 
processes.” 
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It has been argued by MacLullich (2001) that the structure provided by decision aids such as risk 
questionnaires, limits the scope of the audit practitioner’s judgement in the context of operational 
audit approaches. In such a context, the individual’s judgement appears to end where the structure 
provided by the decision aid ends. The danger is that continuous standardisation in audit practices 
endanger practical thinking by the users of decision aids and as a result may limit the scope of 
audit procedures as users are constrained by the options provided by the relevant decision aid. 
The existence of standards and procedures requires considerable judgement on the part of the 
audit practitioner in the process of interpreting the client’s situation and applying detailed rules 
while conducting an audit.  Similar to MacLullich, Francis (1994: 235-270) argued that the 
administrative nature of the completion of risk questionnaires during the engagement decision 
process, may further expose audit firms to risk as such decision aids may limit the application of 
judgement by the audit practitioner. This is due to the fact that the very evaluation of risk may be 
limited to the extent of the content of the questionnaire, rather than considering the development 
of judgement by the individual audit practitioner within a dynamic and complex decision-making 
environment. 
 
Despite the need to develop decision aids, approaches and methods to assist in the evaluation and 
the mitigation of risk, research by Humphrey, Moizer and Turley (1993: 39-62) and Pentland 
(1993: 605-620), confirmed the existence of a “gut feeling” for audit practitioners over the 
rationale of formal procedures and decision aids. Pentland argued that any attempt to construct a 
purely rational explanation of audit practitioner’s behaviour fails as follows:  
 
“For any given rule, one must decide when to apply it, which requires more rules, each of 
which requires even more rules” (Pentland, 1993: 619). 
 
2.6.3. Research on the process of knowledge management through the use of decision aids 
 
The following studies concluded on the process of knowledge management through the use of 
decision aids: 
? Johnstone (2000: 1-27) concluded that the audit practitioner’s evaluation of a client’s IR and 
CR affected their evaluations of the client’s future financial prospects. This assessment will 
affect the audit practitioner’s evaluations of the firm’s risk of loss on the engagement, due to 
the possible lack of engagement profitability, or the risk of future litigation.  
? A study by Bedard and Graham considered the impact of the design of decision aids by 
differentiating between positively and negatively orientated aids. Positively orientated 
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decision aids typically ask questions in the affirmative whereas negatively orientated decision 
aids typically ask questions in the negative. Bedard and Graham (2002: 3) confirmed that 
audit practitioners using negatively oriented risk identification decision aid documents 
identify more risk factors than those using the positively oriented decision aids. Bedard and 
Graham (2002: 3) continued to argue that audit interventions such as decision aids have 
important potential value in preventing AR as a result of ineffective risk identification when 
auditing high risk clients. 
? Venuti, et al. (2002) concluded on the need for audit firms to consider implementing systems 
that evaluate ER based on both quantitative and qualitative factors and to integrate these 
decision aids into their audit methodologies and software. 
 
From these prior studies, it is concluded that decision aids (qualitative and quantitative) is likely to be 
used during engagement decisions by audit practitioners. However, reliance on the outcome of such 
decision aids is still impacted by professional judgement of the audit practitioner. Bell, et al. contends 
in this regard that professional judgement remains the very essence of auditing (2005: 20). 
 
2.7. Prior studies related to registered auditors in medium practice 
 
There are no prior studies that have been performed specific audit firms in medium practice in South 
Africa that this researcher could consider.  Similarly, international studies such as that of Wooten 
(2003) have also concluded that in fact there are limited studies that consider the impact of the size of 
an audit practice on its engagement decisions. Wooten (2003) did however conclude on the need to 
distinguish between different size audit practices in his study, as he concluded that there are differing 
levels of audit quality and service between different size audit practices. 
 
Recent studies in the USA indicated that smaller firms may have different engagement decision 
processes than those of the Big Four auditing firms (USGAO, 2003: 2). This is consistent with the 
findings of Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3) who commented in their study that: 
? Smaller firms should be assisted by the profession to develop software and decision aids to be 
used in the evaluation of ER as these are limited amongst such firms; and 
? There appears to be limited procedures performed by firms in medium audit practice during the 
planning and performance of risk testing once ER has been evaluated. 
 
This study further argues that audit firm characteristics, such as its size, directly impact on its risk 
management and engagement decision practices. The basis of this argument is deduced from Wooten 
(2003) and the USGAO (2003: 2) that concluded that: 
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? Firms in medium audit practice generally lack the staff, technical expertise, and global reach to 
audit large and complex national and multi-national public companies; 
? The current Big Four audit firms have significantly more practitioners and professional staff 
than firms in medium audit practice; 
? Many registered auditors in medium practice indicate that litigation and insurance costs 
associated with auditing a large public company made growth into the large public company 
market less attractive than other growth opportunities; 
? Raising the amount of capital to build the infrastructure necessary to audit large multi-national 
companies is difficult, in part because the partnership structure of accounting firms limits these 
firms’ ability to raise outside capital; and 
? Firms in medium audit practice do not always use the same level of audit automation due to cost 
vs. benefit considerations. As a result engagement decisions may not be as standardised as those 
performed by the Big Four.  
 
The Big Four firms were all firms in medium audit practice at some stage. Mergers between these 
firms occurred during the latter half of the previous century leading to the current Big Four firms as 
studied in section 1.1. The consolidation of the largest public accounting and auditing firms was 
driven by many factors but primarily by the need to (USGAO, 2003: 2): 
? Be able to provide services to their multi-national clients as they themselves grow 
internationally; 
? Achieve more centralised and thus cost effective operations, methodologies and other 
technological capabilities; 
? Expand industry-specific and technical expertise; and 
? Merge with compatible firms as it is the quickest way to increase geographic coverage; to build 
industry-specific expertise; and to increase their capital bases in order to spread risk. 
 
It is these vary factors that indicate the limitations that registered auditors in medium practice have to 
manage as a result of their specific position within the audit services industry. 
 
2.8. Implications from the study of prior studies on risk and the engagement decision 
process 
 
When considering the conclusions from prior research studies, this study proposes the following 
definition of the engagement decision: 
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The engagement decision of an audit practitioner is the decision to accept or reject a client, 
based on an assisted judgement of risk, towards which the audit practitioner is predisposed. 
 
The engagement decision process is graphically depicted in figure 2.3. which indicates that 
engagement decisions are based on judgement related to risk assessment to which the audit 
practitioner is predisposed. 
 
 
Textt
Textt
Engagement  
Decisioni i
Prer --dispositioni iti
Judgement
Risk assessment
 
 
Figure 2.3.  The engagement decision process 
 
It is argued that predisposition is pervasive to the engagement decision process as it impacts directly 
on the judgement applied by audit practitioners during risk assessment and related audit procedures. 
Chapter 3 will therefore study these motivational drivers in order to obtain an understanding of how 
this predisposition may impact on the engagement decision process. 
 
2.9. Conclusions from the review of prior studies on risk and the engagement decision 
process 
 
The conclusion on the historical review of risk and the engagement decision provides the basis of 
conclusion on such research that underlines the research objectives of this study, to be tested through 
empirical research. Based on the study of previous studies related to risk and the engagement decision, 
several primary conclusions have been identified which, although the subject of individual study, 
indicate that a study of the engagement decision would need to consider the implications of these 
findings. The primary conclusions reached, based on previous studies of risk and the engagement 
decision, are as follows: 
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Firstly, it is concluded that judgement is applied during the various stages of the engagement decision. 
This judgement is subject to the predisposition caused by professional, commercial and organisational 
motivational drivers. 
 
Secondly, it is concluded that audit practitioners are predisposed before and during the engagement 
decision process due to commercial, professional and organisational motivational drivers.  It is 
concluded that these drivers are inter-related and are under continuous tension during the engagement 
decision process. 
 
It is concluded that professional motivational drivers mainly result from: 
? The audit practitioners awareness of professional requirements related to statutory and 
professional requirements; and 
? The audit practitioner’s consideration of his/her ethical and social responsibility. 
 
Commercial motivational drivers arise during the engagement decision process as a result of: 
? practice development policies with regards to revenue growth and pricing policy; 
? the impact of competition in the audit services market; and 
? the impact of litigation. 
 
Organisational motivational drivers are mainly present as a result of: 
? practitioner preferences for efficiency; 
? prior experience of practitioners related to their clients; 
? the impact of practitioner compensation schemes; and 
? firm policy and structure in decision making processes. 
 
Lastly, it is concluded that audit practitioners perform a risk assessment during the engagement 
decision process. This risk assessment performed by practitioners is subject to the influence of 
professional, commercial and organisational drivers that impact judgement applied during such risk 
assessment.  
 
Previous research of motivational drivers and auditor predisposition suggests that these drivers are 
under continuous tension, and further suggests that this tension itself can expose the audit practitioner 
to risk if one driver is favoured at the cost of another. Chapter 3 considers and concludes on the impact 
of these drivers on the engagement decision process of registered auditors in medium practice and 
specifically considers research objective 1. This objective is to determine to what extent commercial, 
professional and organisational behavioural drivers impact registered auditors in medium practice, and 
to what extent they are exposed to apparent risk following their predisposition. 
Prior studies have concluded on the existence of motivational drivers that cause predisposition during 
judgement applied in risk assessment. This chapter studies the impact of these drivers on the 
engagement decision itself. 
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CHAPTER 3  THE IMPACT OF PREDISPOSITION ON THE ENGAGEMENT DECISION 
PROCESS OF REGISTERED AUDITORS IN MEDIUM PRACTICE 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Professional motivational drivers, being engagement specific considerations based on the audit 
practitioners ethical social responsiveness, is a reflection on professional guidance which in turn is a 
reflection on expectations of the audit profession. It follows that these professional drivers have been 
impacted significantly by corporate collapses and accounting scandals, leading to regulators and 
lawmakers alike, acting promptly with the enactment of several regulatory changes and guidance 
towards accounting practices and also the audit profession itself.  
 
It could be argued that the objective of these professional requirements is to prevent a repetition of the 
magnitude of corporate collapses and accounting scandals that investors and the public in general have 
been exposed to during the last decade. Simultaneously they intend to result in restoring the public 
trust in the audit profession. Previous studies of commercial drivers have concluded that they are 
mainly driven by practitioner preferences.  
 
Previous studies of the engagement decision further concluded on a direct relationship between 
practitioners’ preferences for certain audit procedures; profit motivation; pricing considerations as a 
risk mitigating strategy related to high risk audit assignment and the risk of ever-increasing litigation, 
that has significantly impacted audit fees and pricing of high risk audit assignments. 
 
Lastly, researchers concluded in studies of organisational motivational drivers that the audit firm as an 
organisation influences the audit setting within which individual audit practitioners operate. These 
firms are typical hierarchically structured groups, whose work is closely guided or prescribed by 
professional standards, firm policies and procedures, and decision support systems. It is argued that 
this very structure and relationship to the commercial and motivational drivers suggests that 
organisational motivational drivers can be used to balance the tension between commercial and 
professional drivers through standardised firm policy and concurring review practices. 
Prior studies have concluded on the existence of motivational drivers that cause predisposition during 
judgement applied in risk assessment. This chapter studies the impact of these drivers on the 
engagement decision itself. 
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This chapter concludes on those considerations that significantly affect these motivational drivers 
during the engagement decision of registered auditors in medium practice, and ultimately causes 
predisposition of practitioners towards certain decision outcomes in their engagement decisions.  
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3.1. Introduction to the development of auditor predisposition and its impact on the 
engagement decision process  
 
As concluded in chapter 2, several studies indicated that professional, commercial and organisational 
motivational drivers affect the judgement process applied by audit practitioners during the engagement 
decision process. This study will consider to what extent these drivers cause audit practitioners to be 
predisposed during the engagement decision process and the evaluation of risk, depending on the 
balance achieved in the application of these motivational drivers. 
 
From the definition of predisposition, it follows that auditor predisposition can be seen as a state of 
mind of the audit practitioner, which allows the audit practitioner to favour certain decision outcomes 
during the engagement decision process. Previous research on motivational drivers and auditor 
predisposition has suggested that these drivers are under continuous tension, and further suggested that 
this tension itself can expose the audit practitioner to risk if one driver is favoured at the cost of 
another (Bailey, 1995: 191-195).  
 
Due to the impact of these motivational drivers on audit practitioners’ predisposition, it is necessary to 
obtain a detailed understanding of the basis of motivation for each of these categories of drivers. The 
impact of professional, commercial and organisational drivers is studied in section 3.2. to section 3.4. 
 
The impact of professional, commercial and organisational motivational drivers is considered in each 
subsection of this chapter with reference to the engagement decision process of audit registered 
auditors in medium practice. From these factors that may impact auditor predisposition as highlighted 
in grey frames, research objectives and questions have been drafted with reference to section 5.10. 
 
3.2. The impact of professional motivational drivers on the engagement decision process 
 
Professional motivational drivers are engagement specific considerations based on the audit 
practitioner’s ethical and social responsiveness. It is argued that this ethical social responsiveness is a 
reflection on professional (statutory and professional) guidance which in turn is a reflection on 
expectations of the audit profession. These expectations of the audit profession are subject to 
continuous change as a result of changing demands for accountability in society (Tricker, 1982: 36; 
Bell, et al. 2005: 11).  
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Although continued change in the audit profession environment is arguably the only certainty, it is 
evident that corporate collapses have impacted on regulatory action towards the accounting profession 
in general. The following key events related to corporate collapses and accounting scandals, to name 
but a few, have contributed to the need for such regulatory changes in the current audit profession 
environment (Terry, 2002: 2): 
 
? The Asian financial crisis in the 1990’s;  
? Fraud at companies in Europe such as BCCI, Barings Bank and Parmalat;  
? Accounting scandals in the USA related to Enron, Global Crossing, World Com, K-Mart; and  
? Corporate collapses in South Africa related to Masterbond, MacMed, Leisurenet and Regal 
Treasury. 
 
From these corporate collapses and accounting scandals, regulators and lawmakers alike, acted 
promptly, resulting in the enactment of several regulatory changes and guidance towards accounting 
practices, and also the audit profession itself. Examples of some of these actions include: 
 
? The introduction of SOX in the USA that has had a far reaching impact on both clients and their 
audit practitioners;  
? During April 2002, the European Commission (hereafter EC) published: “A First Response to 
Enron Related Policy Issues.” One of the recommendations of this report was that the EC should 
try to develop a pan-European code of corporate governance (Baker, 2004); and 
? In South Africa, proposed changes to the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973, as amended and the 
enactment of the Auditing Profession Act, no. 26 of 2005, have been introduced. 
 
The objective of these professional requirements is to prevent a repetition of the magnitude of 
corporate collapses and accounting scandals that investors and the public in general have been exposed 
to during the last decade. Simultaneously these requirements intend restoring the public trust in the 
audit profession. Bell, et al. (2005: 11) also contends that such changes are aimed at improving the 
quality of auditing. It follows that, based on the requirements of these individual acts within their 
respective jurisdictions; an audit practitioner is required to consider the implications of professional 
requirements when deciding on the acceptance of an engagement. 
 
Compliance with professional guidance is also dependent on the attributes of an audit practitioner’s 
client, rather than the size of the audit firm. For example, certain requirements are only applicable to 
certain type industries, such as public entities or listed companies.  
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Professional motivational factors are impacted by a significant quantity of legislation that impacts on 
the activities of audit practitioners, including the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973, the Public 
Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act, no. 80 of 1991 (hereafter the PAAA), the Auditing Profession Act, 
no. 26 of 2005, and the Public Audit Act, no. 25 of 2004, as discussed in section 3.2.1. hereafter. 
Compliance with such legislation by audit registered auditors in medium practice will be considered 
by this study in section 5.10.1. 
 
In order to study professional motivational drivers, it is necessary to obtain an understanding of the 
specifics of the following, and to conclude on their impact on the audit practitioner’s ethical social 
responsiveness during the engagement decision process, as studied in section 3.2.1. and section 3.2.2.: 
? Statutory requirements and proposed amendments thereto; and 
? Professional requirements with reference to ethical considerations. 
 
3.2.1. Statutory regulation of the external audit function and its impact on the engagement 
decision process 
 
Statutory regulation refers to specific legislation within the Republic of South Africa and includes 
acts of parliament and Bills. Revisions to statutory regulation in response to industry developments, 
as well as an improvement in reporting practises of public and government entities, have led to the 
proposed amendments to the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973, the enactment of the Public Audit 
Bill, no. 25 of 2004 and the Auditing Profession Bill (as approved by the National Council of 
Provinces on 16 November 2005 and enacted on 16 January 2006, effective 1 April 2006). 
Statutory regulation of the South African auditing profession was contained in the PAAA until the 
enactment of the Auditing Profession Act, no. 26 of 2005. These various statutory regulations are 
studied in section 3.2.1.1. to section 3.2.1.4. As studied in section 1.9., it is noted that some of the 
statutory regulation as studied in section 3.2.1.1. to section 3.2.1.4. that follows, have been subject 
to amendments since the test date of this study (5 October 2005). 
 
3.2.1.1. The Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act, no. 80 of 1991 (as amended) 
 
The PAAA regulates the actions of public accountants and audit practitioners in South Africa 
(South Africa, 1991: s 1). The act itself does not specifically deal with the process of the 
engagement decision in any direct fashion. However, the act does dictate several areas of 
specific compliance by audit practitioners and accountants, which are statutory areas for 
compliance that directly impact an audit practitioners engagement decision, as non-
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compliance implies that an audit practitioner will not be able to serve a particular client. 
Specific statutory areas of compliance, which may impact the engagement decision, are: 
? Section 14 of the PAAA that specifically states that an audit practitioner can not provide 
an opinion on the fairness of the financial results of a company unless the audit 
practitioner has been registered with the PAAB under section 13 of the PAAA (South 
Africa, 1991: s 14). This would imply that an unregistered audit practitioner could not 
commit to an audit assignment unless registered. Such registration implies that annual 
licensing fees need to be fully paid to the PAAB in order to attest financial statements. 
Non-compliance implies criminal behaviour. 
? Section 15 deals with specific examples when individuals do not qualify to be registered 
with the PAAB for example when the person is deemed to be of “unsound mind” (South 
Africa, 1991: s 15). 
? Section 20 addresses various specific duties of audit practitioners of which subsection 
(a) specifically states that audit practitioners must perform their duties without any 
constraints. This requirement directly impacts on the engagement decision process in 
instances where situational factors may constrain audit practitioner behaviour (South 
Africa, 1991: s 20). 
 
As the PAAA is the primary legislation that regulates the audit industry, this study will 
question the consideration that registered auditors in medium practice give to the PAAA as 
considered in section 5.10.2.  
 
3.2.1.2. The Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973 (as amended) 
 
In South Africa, companies registered under the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973, as amended 
(hereafter Companies Act), must be audited (South Africa, 1973: s 269-270). Section 300 of 
the Companies Act details the responsibilities of audit practitioners with regards to the audit of 
a company (South Africa, 1973: s 300).  
 
The Companies Act in itself, however, does not directly address the engagement decision of 
audit practitioners. It is however implied that, when audit practitioners provide an audit 
opinion on the results of a company and specifically report that the company is in compliance 
with the Companies Act, that the audit practitioners themselves have complied with the 
Companies Act by ensuring that its regulations pertaining to the audited entity have been 
complied with. 
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Certain amendments to the Companies Act are required in order to achieve the objectives of 
the Auditing Profession Bill. The proposed amendments to the Companies Act aim to 
establish and maintain the independence of audit practitioners in support of the Auditing 
Profession Bill. These amendments should be studied in conjunction with the Auditing 
Profession Bill as studied in section 3.2.1.4. 
 
Although the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973 as amended has been in existence for a number 
of years, its mere existence does not imply compliance or consideration by registered auditors 
in medium practice, and hence this study will consider such levels of compliance and 
consideration in section 5.10.3. 
 
 
3.2.1.3. The Public Audit Act, no. 25 of 2004 
 
The Public Audit Act aims to provide for the establishment of the public audit function of 
SOE’s, government departments and institutions through the assignment of its audit function 
to the Auditor General. In terms of section 25 of the Public Audit Act, if the Auditor General 
has opted not to perform the audit of a public enterprise, the latter needs to appoint an audit 
practitioner to perform the duties of the Auditor General (South Africa, 2004: s 25). 
 
Provision is made for the extensive engagement of private sector audit practitioners in the 
audit of public sector entities. In terms of section 3 of the Public Audit Act, the Auditor 
General will consider the minimum qualifications, experience and competence for authorised 
audit practitioners (South Africa, 2004: s 3). This will require knowledge and skills regarding 
(South Africa, 2004: s 3): 
? The Public Finance Management Act, no. 1 of 1999 (hereafter PFMA); 
? The Municipal Finance Management Act, no. 56 of 2003 (hereafter MFMA); 
? Treasury regulations; and  
? Government auditing standards. 
 
Although the Public Audit Act does not directly address the engagement decision of an audit 
firm, working on behalf of the Auditor General does imply that the private sector audit 
practitioner needs to review their skill levels in terms of the above, before accepting such an 
engagement. 
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Compliance with the Public Audit Act, no 25. of 2004, is likely to be impacted to the extent 
that registered auditors in medium practice are exposed to subcontracting to the Auditor 
General. In order to qualify in terms of section 3 of the act, the firm needs to satisfy certain 
requirements related to qualifications and skills. The availability of these within the practice 
may determine their ability to participate in Auditor General audits. This study will hence 
consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa consider 
compliance with the Public Audit Act, no. 25 of 2004, during their related engagement 
decisions that may be impacted by this Act as stated in section 5.10.4. 
 
3.2.1.4. The Auditing Profession Bill and proposed amendments to the Companies 
Act 
 
The objective of the Auditing Profession Bill is to regulate the auditing profession; to make 
provision for an independent regulatory board of audit practitioners, a standard setting board 
of audit practitioner ethics, and a standard setting board for auditing. The Auditing Profession 
Bill has been enacted subsequent to the test date of this study (5 October 2005) and the 
proposed Companies Amendment Bill has been replaced by the Corporate Laws Amendment 
Act as studied in 1.9. The Auditing Profession Bill itself does not directly address the 
engagement decision of audit practitioners, however as with other legislation it requires 
compliance, which if not achieved will disqualify an audit practitioner from acting as an audit 
practitioner. The Bill henceforth deals with registration of audit practitioners and their duties 
(South Africa, 2005b: s 37). 
  
It is important to consider the proposed amendments to the Companies Act alongside the 
Auditing Profession Bill, as these amendments directly impact on several matters affecting the 
profession and indeed any engagement decision, specifically with regards to: 
? The appointment and remuneration of audit practitioners as part of the required functions 
of an audit committee; 
? Rotation of audit practitioners; and 
? Other services rendered by an audit practitioner to a company when it is also the 
appointed audit practitioner to the company. 
 
It should be noted that the proposed amendments to the Companies Act are only applicable to 
the audit of public interest companies and not to limited purpose companies. The definition of 
a public interest company as provided by the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill (South Africa, 
2006: 2) is as follow: 
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‘‘(a)  A company is a public interest company if: 
(i)   its articles provide for an unrestricted transfer of its shares; 
(ii)   it is permitted by its articles to offer shares to the public; 
(iii)   it decides by special resolution to be a public interest company; or 
(iv)   it is a subsidiary of a company described in subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii). 
(b)  A company with two or more types or classes of shares is a public interest 
company if its articles provide for the unrestricted transfer of shares in one or more 
of these types or classes. 
(c)  For the purposes of this subsection: 
(i)  a transfer of shares is unrestricted if it is not subject to an effective right of pre-
emption; 
(ii)  an effective right of pre-emption is a right of pre-emption which operates in favour 
of all shareholders of the company and upon every proposed sale of shares to a 
person who is not a shareholder of the company. 
(d) A company is a limited interest company if it is not a public interest company.” 
 
The amendments to the Companies Act propose that no person may be the appointed auditor 
of a company unless that person is a registered auditor in terms of the Auditing Profession 
Bill.  The Companies Amendment Bill further requires the appointment of an audit committee 
for public interest companies as follow (South Africa, 2005a: s 269A): 
 
“For every financial year of a company which, on the qualifying date, is a public 
interest company, the board of directors shall appoint an audit committee.” 
 
The statutory requirement for the establishment of an audit committee is important to audit 
practitioners as the audit committee has certain functions, which include some of the 
following (South Africa, 2005a: s 270A): 
? To nominate an independent registered auditor for the company; 
? To determine the audit fees and any other terms of the engagement; 
? To consider the delivery of any non-audit services by the audit firm to the company; and 
? To consider any complaints related to accounting and auditing matters. 
 
These duties impact directly on the audit practitioner’s engagement decision, especially with 
regards to matters such as independence where firms perform consulting services to 
prospective clients as well as the negotiation and payment of fees. This process of negotiating 
fees with management has placed a significant amount of pressure on audit practitioners in the 
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past (Van Dijk & Jansman, 1994: 1) as they are under pressure to keep good relations with 
management but also be able to have sufficient budgetary scope to complete their 
assignments.  
 
The imposition of an audit committee (who may be more objective than management), is 
likely to decrease this pressure in instances where management only considered audit fees in 
terms of its cost, rather than ensuring that appropriate assurance is obtained. The Auditing 
Profession Bill specifically addresses matters that have been highlighted locally and 
internationally as concerns related to the audit profession that may require regulation. The 
Auditing Profession Bill has been enacted subsequent to the test date of this study (5 October 
2005) and the proposed Companies Amendment Bill has been replaced by the Corporate Laws 
Amendment Act as studied in 1.9. 
 
The institution of audit committees required by amendments to the Companies Act, no. 61 of 
1973 (South Africa, 2005a: s 269A) is likely to impact on the future influence of undue 
management pressure on audit fees and reporting practices as concluded by Van Dijk and 
Jansman (1994: 1).  Considering the impact of this statutory obligation, this study will reflect 
on the extent that audit pracititoners in medium practice consider the impact of audit 
committees during their engagement decisions as stated in section 5.10.5. 
 
As discussed in section 3.2.1.4.1. to section 3.2.1.4.2., the proposed amendments to the 
Companies Act addresses the following which aim to address concerns related to audit 
practitioner independence: 
? The rotation of audit practitioners; and 
? Non-audit services provided by audit practitioners to their clients. 
 
3.2.1.4.1. Rotation of audit practitioners 
 
In 2002, the Minister of Finance of South Africa, Trevor Manuel, called for a system of 
rotation of audit firms. It was not a question of whether or not firm rotation should be 
introduced, but rather how often firm rotation should occur (SAICA, 2002: 1-23). According 
to Steyn (2002), the Auditor General, as well as the Finance Minister has made clear their 
view that rotation of audit firms may be a solution to concerns regarding audit practitioner 
independence. Although not the subject of this study it should be noted as argued by Terry 
(2002: 7) that South Africa has a serious shortage of skills and that rotation (if mandatory) 
could create more problems than serving the purpose it is intended for.  
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The International Standard on Quality Control (hereafter ISQC) 1 - Quality control for firms 
that perform audits and reviews of historical information, and other assurance and related 
services engagements (ISQC 1) rather focuses on the rotation of the individual audit 
practitioner than on the audit firm as a measure to safeguard independence. It provides the 
following guidance related to rotation of staff (IFAC, 2004a: par .26-27): 
 
“Using the same senior personnel on assurance engagements over a prolonged period 
may create a familiarity threat or otherwise impair the quality of performance of the 
engagement. Therefore, the firm establishes criteria for determining the need for 
safeguards to address this threat. In determining appropriate criteria, the firm considers 
such matters as (a) the nature of the engagement, including the extent to which it 
involves a matter of public interest, and (b) the length of service of the senior personnel 
on the engagement. Examples of safeguards include rotating the senior personnel or 
requiring an engagement quality control review.  
 
The IFAC Code recognises that the familiarity threat is particularly relevant in the 
context of financial statement audits of listed entities. For these audits, the IFAC Code 
requires the rotation of the engagement partner after a pre-defined period, normally no 
more than seven years, and provides related standards and guidance. National 
requirements may establish shorter rotation periods.” 
 
The arguments for audit practitioner rotation rest on the principle of improving auditor 
independence. Auditors who report to shareholders have a duty to be independent of their 
clients, so that they can bring objectivity into their reporting. Over the years there have been 
many calls for the introduction of a system of rotation, initially aimed at the rotation of audit 
firms; however regulators in most countries have resisted these calls (SAICA, 2002: 1-23). 
Opponents of firm rotation are often perceived to be protecting their own client bases.  
 
Concerns have also been expressed against the option of rotating individuals, rather than 
firms. The following include some concerns against the rotation of individuals (SAICA, 
2002: 1-23): 
? There are limited high-level specialist auditing resources in South Africa, more so in 
firms in small and medium audit practice; and  
? Considering that it normally takes auditors between two and three years to fully 
understand all the complexities and nuances of a complex client, auditor rotation may 
increase AR levels. Forced rotation rather than enhancing the quality of audit, could in 
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fact diminish the quality. This likelihood may also be inferred from international 
experience as in 1987, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, also 
known as the Treadway Commission in the USA, stated in its final report that its review 
of fraud related cases revealed that a significant number of involved companies had 
recently changed their auditors.  
 
Proposed amendments to the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973 as amended, indicates a need 
for individual practitioner rotation, rather than audit firm rotation. In response to concerns 
regarding the independence of auditors, international and South African lawmakers have 
argued the principle of rotation of auditors rather than audit firms. Proposed amendments to 
Section 274A of the Companies Act will require auditor rotation as follows (South Africa, 
2005a: s 274A): 
 
“The same individual may not serve as the nominated auditor of a public interest 
company for more than four consecutive financial years.  Where an individual has 
served as the nominated auditor of a public interest company for two or more 
consecutive financial years and then ceases to be the nominated auditor, the individual 
may not again become the nominated auditor of that company until after the expiry of 
at least two further financial years.” 
 
As studied in section 1.9., the Corporate Laws Amendment Bill that has replaced the 
Companies Amendment Bill, requires rotation of the nominated RA every 5 years (South 
Africa, 2006: s 274A). 
 
The auditing profession will be impacted by the proposed amendments to the Companies Act 
in relation to matters such as the provisioning of non-audit services to audit clients, and the 
rotation of auditors (SAICA, 2002: 1-23; Terry, 2002: 7). The practicality and consideration of 
rotation by registered auditors in medium practice as required by the proposed amendments to 
the Companies Act no. 61 of 1973, is of concern, noting the fact that auditors in firms in 
medium audit practice are limited in terms of their number of practitioners (SAICA 2002: 1-
23; Terry, 2002: 7). The impact of these considerations on the engagement decisions of 
registered auditors in medium practice will be considered in section 5.10.6. 
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3.2.1.4.2. Non-audit services provided by auditors to their clients 
 
Auditor independence remains central to the debate regarding the provision of non-audit 
services to audit clients. Auditors must act independently to be able to perform their task of 
providing independent and objective assurances to shareholders. It is suggested that by 
providing non-audit services to the audit client, the auditor's independence and objectivity is 
impaired (SAICA, 2002: 1-23). 
 
The principle arguments in favour of prohibiting non-audit services to audit clients include the 
following: 
? Additional services strengthen the economic dependence of the auditor on the client 
(Clulow, 2002).  
? The auditor's objectivity may be affected by the threat of losing the assignment (Dirsmith, 
et al. 1997: 12).  
? Auditors are prone towards compromise or acceptance of the client’s position (Kaplan, 
1987: 6-7). 
? Studies by Lord (1992: 89-108) and Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996: 43-59) have 
concluded on the impact of ER on auditors’ willingness to permit aggressive reporting 
methods under management pressure. 
? In terms of section 280 of the Ethics for Professional Accountants, issued by the IFAC, it 
is however not only necessary for auditors to be independent, but there is also a need for 
auditors to be seen to be independent. Even a perception of a conflict of interest can 
compromise the auditor’s position (IFAC, 2005a: par .280.2).  
? All of the international firms have recognised that the provision of non-audit services is 
affecting their image of independence, and most of them have sold off their consulting 
divisions (SAICA, 2002: 1-23). 
 
Reaction to concerns around independence and the provision of non-audit services includes 
the following: 
? There is significant pressure on auditors to add value. Due to high costs associated with an 
audit, clients want auditors to provide more than just an audit report (Kaplan, 1987: 6-7; 
Gloeck, 2003).  
? During the audit, the auditor obtains a thorough knowledge and understanding of the 
client’s business. This knowledge enables the auditor to provide other services at a much 
more affordable price than outsiders would be able to. If other auditing firms were to be 
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engaged, the company would also have to pay them to obtain the knowledge the audit firm 
has already acquired (Gloeck, 2003). 
? Specialised knowledge on accounting matters is a scarce resource in South Africa. If 
certain firms are prohibited from offering non-audit services to their audit clients, a 
valuable resource is lost to their clients (SAICA, 2002: 1-23).  
? Many smaller audit practices would be adversely affected if they were denied the right to 
provide non-audit services to their clients (Gloeck, 2003). 
? There is little research evidence that suggests that the delivery of non-audit services 
impairs audit independence. It is however more difficult to prove that the delivery of non-
audit services do not impact on independence due to perceptions that it does (SAICA, 
2002: 1-23).  
 
Despite these arguments, the proposed amendments to the Companies Act by the Companies 
Amendment Bill requires that the nominated auditor may not perform, for that company, any 
bookkeeping, accounting (as distinct from auditing) or internal audit services, nor any other 
non-audit services prescribed by the Minister of Trade and Industry (South Africa, 2005a: s 
275A). Amendments to the Companies Act will require audit practitioners to be conscious of 
all non-audit services provided to their audit clients, to ensure that there are no non-audit 
services provided to public interest companies that are also audit clients, as well as those 
clients where the provision of such non-audit services may cause perceived independence 
concerns. 
 
In the study performed by SAICA in 2005 to investigate profitability of firms in small and 
medium audit practice, the registered auditors in medium practice that were covered by this 
study indicated that their non-audit services divisions generated between 30% to 40% of their 
turnover (SAICA, 2005b: 31). The smaller practices however earned as much as 60% to 70% 
of their turnover from non-audit services (SAICA, 2005b: 1-33). This indicates that there may 
be a significant influence on the turnover of these practices should they not be able to provide 
such non-audit services to audit clients. At the same time this may indicate that in fact they do 
have many non-audit clients that they service, that would render their business sustainable. 
 
The provision of non-audit services to public interest companies may be limited by 
amendments to the Companies Act (South Africa, 2005a: s 275A). This may impact on current 
revenue earnings from such companies (Gloeck, 2003), resulting in registered auditors in 
medium practice needing to refocus their service delivery and products. This study will 
therefore question the current prevalence of the delivery of non-audit services by registered 
auditors in medium practice to their audit clients as considered in section 5.10.7. 
  
 68
3.2.2. Professional guidance related to the engagement decision process 
 
Professional guidance refers to auditing standards and ethical guidance that comprises of Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards (hereafter GAAS) and Code’s of Ethics. The South African audit 
profession is regulated through the PAAA (replaced by the Auditing Profession Act, no. 26 of 2005 
after 1 April 2006) as studied in section 3.2.1.1., but is also self-regulated through membership to 
SAICA. This institute issues professional guidance related to accounting, and auditing standards.  
 
Ethical considerations are central to professional behavioural motivators. The auditor’s inability to 
comply with ethical guidelines would necessarily result in the auditor being exposed to risk. Such 
ethical considerations are studied in section 3.2.2.1. to section 3.2.2.2. as they are found in:  
? The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (hereafter Code of Ethics), issued by IFAC; 
and  
? The Code of Professional Conduct issued by SAICA. 
 
3.2.2.1. The Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (Issued by IFAC) 
 
Although the subject of many past studies and certainly deserving of a study on its own, one 
cannot study the engagement decision of auditors without considering auditor independence. 
The collapse of Enron is perhaps a case in point. According to Terry, the key audit lesson 
from the collapse of Enron is independence. Terry states that (2002: 6): 
 
“They should never have been in a position where there is ever a potential conflict of 
interest. The fact that Andersen’s received US$ 23 million in non-audit services, on top of 
a US$ 25 million audit fee, has lead to the questioning of whether or not Andersen could 
really be independent.” 
 
Independence, although important, is not absolute according to Hill and Booker (2003) and 
Tricker (1982: 67) as auditors are hired and paid by their clients, thus eliminating total 
independence. Independence has since the beginning of the profession been under scrutiny by 
stakeholders, and more so when corporate failures come to light.  
 
In November 2001, the Independent Auditing Standards Board (hereafter IASB) in the USA 
issued an exposure draft of a conceptual framework for auditor independence. The framework 
defines auditor independence as (Terry, 2002: 18): “the freedom from those factors that 
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compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise an auditor’s ability to make 
unbiased audit decisions.”  
 
Similarly, the Code of Ethics, issued by the Ethics Committee of IFAC provides some 
guidance regarding the ethical considerations that an auditor should apply to all engagements 
and hence this study argues that it is an important consideration during the engagement 
decision process.  
 
The fundamental ethical principles that need to be applied by professional accountants and 
auditors are noted in the Code of Ethics (IFAC, 2005a: par .100.4) as: 
? “Integrity - A professional accountant should be straightforward and honest in all 
professional and business relationships. 
? Objectivity - A professional accountant should not allow bias, conflict of interest or 
undue influence of others to override professional or business judgements. 
? Professional Competence and Due Care - A professional accountant has a continuing 
duty to maintain professional knowledge and skill at the level required to ensure that a 
client or employer receives competent professional service based on current 
developments in practice, legislation and techniques. A professional accountant 
should act diligently and in accordance with applicable technical and professional 
standards when providing professional services. 
? Confidentiality - A professional accountant should respect the confidentiality of 
information acquired as a result of professional and business relationships and should 
not disclose any such information to third parties without proper and specific authority 
unless there is a legal or professional right or duty to disclose. Confidential 
information acquired as a result of professional and business relationships should not 
be used for the personal advantage of the professional accountant or third parties. 
? Professional Behavior - A professional accountant should comply with relevant laws 
and regulations and should avoid any action that discredits the profession.” 
 
The application of these ethical principles is key to any engagement decision. In fact, the Code 
of Ethics continues to specifically warn against the threats of (IFAC, 2005a: par .100.10): 
?  “Self-interest threats, which may occur as a result of the financial or other interests of 
a professional accountant or of an immediate or close family member; 
? Self-review threats, which may occur when a previous judgement needs to be re-
evaluated by the professional accountant responsible for that judgement; 
? Advocacy threats, which may occur when a professional accountant promotes a 
position or opinion to the point that subsequent objectivity may be compromised; 
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? Familiarity threats, which may occur when, because of a close relationship, a 
professional accountant becomes too sympathetic to the interests of others; and 
? Intimidation threats, which may occur when a professional accountant may be 
deterred from acting objectively by threats, actual or perceived.” 
 
The Code of Ethics requires that auditors should consider both quantitative and qualitative 
threats to compliance with fundamental accounting principles. The standard requires an 
auditor to decline any obligation to potential clients in the event that the auditor is not able to 
implement appropriate risk mitigating safeguards to reduce the risks related to these identified 
threats.  
 
The Code of Ethics indicates that once threats have been identified, the auditor should 
consider safeguards against such threats. If the auditor believes safeguards do not exist to such 
threats, then the auditor should consider not entering into any relationship with the client 
(IFAC, 2005a: par .210.5). 
 
In order to address independence concerns, ISQC 1 requires audit firms to obtain signed 
independence declarations from all staff members stating that they are independent to the 
client or that any such independence threats have been mitigated (IFAC, 2004a: par .77). Most 
firms also request independence declarations from staff before new assignments are 
considered or tendered for. 
 
Compliance with ethical guidance aims to address independence and other concerns within the 
profession. Addressing these concerns may be costly as argued by Wooten (2003) in section 
2.7. and hence compliance with ethical guidance may be at risk. This study will research the 
current consideration by registered auditors in medium practice of such ethical guidance as 
stated in section 5.10.8. 
 
 
3.2.2.2. The Code of Professional Conduct (Issued by the PAAB) 
 
The PAAB is responsible for the issuance of the Code of Professional Conduct. All registered 
Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ in South Africa are required to comply with the code under 
the PAAA. The Code of Professional Conduct addresses specific concerns that may impact on 
the auditor’s engagement decision (PAAB, 2003: par .4.1-4.6). These are similar to those 
contained in the IFAC Code of Ethics listed in section 3.2.2.1. except that the Code of 
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Professional Conduct also makes reference to independence, indicating that practitioners, 
when undertaking a reporting assignment, should be independent in fact and appearance.  
 
Researchers such as Gloeck (2003) have criticised the Code of Professional Conduct as being 
outdated. As an example, the Code’s current treatment of independence of auditors does not 
reflect current thinking in audit research and concerns with regards to the audit profession at 
large. The Code allows auditors to provide certain non-audit services with authorization, 
although current thinking clearly argues independence concerns on non-audit services. As a 
result of such criticism of the PAAA, the Auditing Profession Act as studied in section 1.9. 
and section 3.2.1.4. replaced the PAAA, effective 1 April 2006. A new Code of Professional 
Conduct has also been issued in 2006 by SAICA as the PAAB was replaced by the IRBA. 
 
Although the Code of Professional Conduct (PAAB, 2003) has been in existence for a number 
of years, the importance of compliance considering those concerns related to independence of 
auditors, highlights the need to consider the extent to which registered auditors in medium 
practice consider ethics during their engagement decisions as stated in section 5.10.9. 
 
 
3.2.3. Auditing standards and the engagement decision process 
 
The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (hereafter IAASB) develops ISA’s, 
which deal with the audit and review of historical financial statements. These standards serve as the 
benchmark for high quality auditing and assurance standards worldwide. They establish standards 
and provide guidance for auditors and other professional accountants, giving them the tools to cope 
with the increased and changing demands for reports on financial information, and provide 
guidance in specialised areas. In addition, the IAASB develops quality control standards for firms 
and engagement teams in the practice areas of audit, assurance and related services. A number of 
these standards have an impact on the engagement decision process and will be considered in 
chapter 4 when a study is made of the audit procedures performed during the engagement decision 
process. 
  
The institution of regulatory authorities such as the Financial Services Board (hereafter FSB), the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s Generally Accepted Accounting Practices Monitoring Panel 
(hereafter GAAP monitoring panel) and the PAAB’s Practice review department, further increases 
the pressure on reporting practices of auditors, their compliance with ISA’s and the quality of their 
work paper preparation and decision making.  As an example, the GAAP monitoring panel of the 
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Johannesburg Stock Exchange (hereafter JSE) reported 16 public entities within its first year of 
operation in 2003 of which two companies had to re-issue their financial statements and two 
companies were suspended from the stock exchange (Wainer, 2004). The institution of firm review 
procedures by the PAAB will further place increasing strain on auditors to comply with ISA’s and 
quality control standards (Sehoole, 2005, Temkin, 2006: 17). 
  
Past studies by independent institutions indicated that auditors do not always adequately adhere to 
auditing standards as will be indicated in section 4.3. (Gloeck, 2003). Wooten (2003) and Ryan 
(2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1.3. and section 2.7., have further commented on concerns relating 
to the ability of registered auditors in medium practice to maintain generally costly systems that 
would ease compliance as well as difficulties that audit firms are facing in general due to the vast 
volume of new and amended auditing standards. This study therefore needs to consider the 
compliance by registered auditors in medium practice with auditing standards, in light of these 
concerns as stated in section 5.10.10. 
 
3.3. Commercial considerations during the engagement decision process 
 
Despite the professional motivational drivers based on professional guidance as studied in section 3.2, 
which would primarily support the assurance objective of the audit profession and its related moral 
and ethical status, auditing is a business. The 1990’s marked the diversification of audit and consulting 
services offered by the largest multi-national auditing firms that has arguably led to much criticism of 
auditor independence and auditor remuneration (Moore, 2003).  
 
In considering the studies as stated in section 2.2.2.1. by Asare, et al. (1994: 169), Dirsmith, et al. 
(1997: 12) and Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504) it is evident that practitioners are under 
significant pressure to increase revenue. This underlying pressure during the engagement decision 
therefore warrants the need to determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice are 
under the same pressure in their firms, and to what extent they may be commercially orientated during 
engagement decisions as studied in section 5.10.11. 
 
Several studies of commercial considerations have been performed and from these studies it is 
concluded that commercial drivers are mainly impacted by the following as studied in section 3.3.1. to 
section 3.3.3.: 
? Practitioner preferences; 
? Pricing considerations; and 
? Litigation. 
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3.3.1. Practitioner preferences and their influence on the engagement decision process 
 
A study by Bierstaker (2000) concluded that auditors are highly motivated to respond to the 
perceived preferences of their superiors, as they argued that salary increases, promotions and future 
work assignments are based on the superiors evaluations of the subordinate’s work, therefore 
suggesting that practitioner preferences are also likely to influence their engagement decisions.  
 
Peecher further argued in his study that ER might be impacted by attempts to enhance audit 
efficiency (1996: 125-140). Peecher argued that for instance, auditors may attempt to enhance audit 
efficiency in response to the practitioner’s preferences. Peecher found that when the practitioner 
encouraged reliance on the client, auditors’ likelihood assessments of a client explanation were 
higher, and the search for alternative explanations was reduced. It would seem that this increased 
reliance is a mechanism to justify the reduction in audit effort. It therefore follows that in order to 
achieve efficiencies, with the audit budget in mind, AR may be increased which in itself should be 
highlighted in the auditor’s engagement decision review. 
 
Similarly, in an audit planning context, Bierstaker and Wright (1999: 12) suggest that auditors may 
adjust program plans in response to practitioner preferences. They concluded that auditors 
significantly reduced planned tests, and reduced budgeted hours in response to a practitioner’s 
preference for efficiency. Again, in the context of the engagement decision, ethical guidance that 
requires safeguards against possible threats identified during the engagement decision process may 
be at risk, as auditors may limit such safeguards and their testing in order to achieve efficiencies. 
These activities generally include planning activities, and auditors may fear that time spent on such 
activities may not be recoverable. 
 
Bierstaker and Wright concluded that auditors adjust the budgeted hours of personnel to improve 
audit efficiency. The engagement decision is clearly the responsibility of the engagement 
practitioner and includes a second practitioner review function as required under quality control 
and risk management practices. In many instances lower level staff document the engagement 
decision. This practice poses a risk to the auditor as the decision to engage a client may have 
become a review function for practitioners rather than an information gathering and decision 
function (Bierstaker & Wright, 1999: 2). 
 
Practitioner preferences for efficiency or effectiveness may vary depending on a variety of factors 
including the profitability of the client, percentage of practitioner and firm revenues represented by 
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the client, the practitioner’s risk preferences, and the practitioner’s concerns about litigation 
(Farmer, et al. 1987: 1-11). If the practitioner is highly concerned about litigation, particularly in 
the case of a high risk client, the practitioner may communicate to the audit team that effectiveness 
is of the utmost importance.  
 
As indicated by Farmer, et al. (1987: 1-11), there are many factors that may impact on practitioner 
preferences. The following two areas are specific to South Africa and are likely to impact on 
practitioner preferences during the engagement decision process: 
? The introduction of an audit profession charter in South Africa, which will be aimed at 
particularly medium and small sized audit firms, may have a significant impact on the 
employment policies and strategies of such firms. The charter is seen as a method to 
encourage firms in small and medium audit practice to advance the interests of black trainees. 
The demographics of a firm’s staff compliment may thus become an important engagement 
factor as it may disqualify a firm from participation in certain audits, specifically government 
funded audits (Temkin, 2004a; Ryan, 2005c: 21).  
? The South African audit profession environment is further impacted by client pressures for 
audit costs to be minimised. These economic pressures on audit fees are typical not only 
within emerging markets but also in developed countries (Houston, 1999: 70-86). 
  
Several researchers have concluded on the impact that certain practitioner preferences may have 
on the engagement decision process. Bierstaker (2000) concluded on the relationship between 
practitioner preferences and their remuneration; Peecher (1996: 125-140) and Bierstaker and 
Wright (1999: 12) noted practitioners’ preferences for efficiencies which may also impact their 
remuneration as profitability improves, and Farmer, et al. (1987: 1-11) concluded on the impact of 
litigation on practitioner preferences during the engagement decision process. This study will 
hence reflect on the impact that practitioner remuneration and practitioner preferences have on the 
engagement decision of registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa as stated in section 
5.10.12. 
 
3.3.2. Pricing considerations during the engagement decision process 
 
Pricing considerations are directly impacted by the market for audit services. The market 
conditions related to registered auditors in medium practice have been commented on extensively 
in section 1.1.3. Auditors’ reaction to such pricing pressures has been the subject of much research 
as studied in section 2.2.2.4. The following factors, however, are most likely to impact on the 
pricing of assignments by registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa: 
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? In response to the significant number of new and amended regulatory requirements, audit 
firms are exposed to significant pressures on cost to operate such practices. Registered 
auditors in medium practice who have limited financial pooling ability may even experience 
these pressures to a greater extent than their larger competitors (Ryan, 2005a-d). Some of 
these include: 
o Increased training costs and resource requirements due to a lack of qualified chartered 
accountants as well as an uneven representation of race demographics within the 
profession (Temkin, 2004a); 
o Greater use of specialists needed relating to matters such as post retirement benefits, 
decommissioning provisions, environmental matters and sustainability reporting (South 
African Institute of Directors (hereafter SAID), 2002: 1-44); 
o Enhanced quality controls to ensure independence such as suggested auditor rotation 
within the profession as required by ISQC 1 (IFAC, 2004a: par .26) and the proposed 
amendments to the Companies Act (South Africa, 2005: s 274A); 
o Mandatory continuing professional education requirements resulting in increased skills 
development costs (Ryan, 2005a-d); and 
o Greater investment in professional practice departments and industry specialisation (Ryan, 
2005a-d). 
? Other studies have concluded that firms in medium audit practice do not always use the same 
level of audit automation due to cost vs. benefit considerations. As a result, engagement 
decisions may not be as standardised as those performed by Big Four audit firms (USGAO, 
2003: 2). According to the PAAB’s practice review department, engagement decisions are 
generally well documented by the Big Four (Bailey, 2003);  
? Raising the amount of capital to build the infrastructure necessary to audit large multi-national 
companies is difficult, in part because the partnership structure of audit firms limits these 
firms’ ability to raise funding (USGAO, 2003: 2); and 
? Some BEE audit firms are classified as registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa. 
These firms are however more often than not appointed to the joint audit of large multi-
national SOE’s. The audit methodologies of these practitioners need to be considered against 
those of their international joint auditors who have much greater access to systems and 
methodologies (Ryan, 2005a: 21), thereby placing such black owned firms in medium audit 
practice at a disadvantage. 
 
There are several studies that concluded on the existence of significant market pressures on 
registered auditors in medium practice, in not only competing against the Big Four for business 
(USGAO, 2003: 2), but also in the ability of registered auditors in medium practice to implement 
and maintain expensive systems to support their activities (Ryan, 2005a-d).  
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The ability to implement and maintain such systems are likely to impact other aspects of the 
business of audit firms in medium practice such as improved staff retention which may further 
provide such practices with a competitive edge. These and other factors have a direct impact on 
the competitive advantage that audit firms may consider in order to attract and retain audit 
assignments.  
 
This study will consider to what extent pricing of assignments by registered auditors in medium 
practice is impacted by considering their competitive edge in the market, their firms’ revenue 
targets and the targeting of specific industry clients as stated in section 5.10.13. 
 
3.3.3. The impact of litigation on commercial considerations during the engagement 
decision process 
 
Internationally, many registered auditors in medium practice have indicated that litigation and 
insurance costs associated with auditing a large public company made growth into the large public 
company market less attractive than other growth opportunities (USGAO, 2003: 2). Since the 
1990’s the number and the magnitude of legal actions against public auditing firms have become a 
significant concern for the audit profession in general (Deshmukh, 1997, Marx & Van der Watt, 
2002: 26). According to McKelvie, et al. (2002: 35) professional indemnity insurers recorded an 
increase in claims against the then Big Five in a 124 countries during 2001. This increase in legal 
risk to the auditor is not new. Ronen and Cherney (2003) have commented in their study, that: 
 
“A review of audit failures during the last 50 years, suggests that the visibility of the 
frequency and magnitude of audit failures has increased substantially. This is mainly as a 
result of a more active plaintiff’s bar, the increase in demands on the auditor, and the fact that 
enterprises and regulation have become more sophisticated and complex.” 
 
Following from those factors that currently surround the audit profession as studied in section 
1.1.3., the thought of possible legal action is likely to be one of the main factors auditors consider 
when deciding to accept an audit engagement. An error in the engagement decision phase of the 
audit can be and is most likely to be a costly error. Settlement of legal claims may be very costly 
both in monetary terms and in damage to a firm’s reputation (Odendaal, 2002). Most claims are 
successfully defended, yet the cost of defence is very high, including legal costs and the time of 
senior professionals. Odendaal (2002) refers to the international liability crisis, as a rise in legal 
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litigation and stiff competition amongst auditing firms has lead auditors to progressively place 
greater reliance on the client acceptance stage, as the first step in their risk control program. 
 
As a result of this increase in litigation, practitioners have become increasingly risk averse, and 
more focused on audit quality (Marxen, 1990: 47-57). Studies by Gendron (2002: 3) and Hall and 
Renner (1991: 63-71) further suggest that auditors are better able to avoid lawsuits when rejecting 
potential clients for which available information suggests high potential for litigation. Anon (1995: 
62) reported that auditors are selective about audit engagements, especially at initial acceptance, in 
an attempt to mitigate the risk of lawsuits that has significantly increased.  
 
Obtaining statistics dealing with litigation involving auditors is difficult in South Africa, as most 
settlements are reached out of court, mainly as a result of the threat of reputational risk (Steyn, 
2004: 18). In fact Gloeck (2003) found that courts in South Africa have seldom made an allocation 
of damages against auditors up to 1999. Other countries where such statistics are available, such as 
the USA, have shown tendencies of increased litigation involving auditors during the last number 
of years. It is argued that these tendencies are perhaps more global than country specific. 
 
Regulation in the USA provides opportunity for meaningful commentary on the litigation 
tendencies involving registered auditors. In the USA, Section 703 of SOX requires the SEC to 
conduct a study and report on violations by securities professionals that include independent 
auditors (Steyn, 2004: 18). The first of such reports was issued in January 2003, covering reported 
litigation from 1998 to 2001. In 2002, the auditing profession in the USA came under the spotlight, 
as the number of securities class actions brought against auditors reversed a declining trend, during 
1998 to 2001, by increasing to 34 cases, up 98% over 2001, and up 21% over the period 1998-2001 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002).  
 
The number of cases brought are however still small when compared to the number of SEC clients 
in the USA (about 4%). However the impact of securities litigation in terms of regulatory 
sanctions, penalties and damage to reputational risk is significant (Deppe, 1992). Arthur 
Andersen’s demise was not solely because of litigation and criminal prosecution, but greatly due to 
the severe damage to its professional reputation (Reynolds, 2004). In fact, on 31 May 2005, the 
USA Supreme Court reversed the 2002 obstruction of justice charge and criminal conviction 
against Arthur Andersen (Bell, et al. 2005: 3). 
 
Litigation against auditors in 2003 did not sketch a rosier picture as the first seven months recorded 
$1.5 Billion in total securities litigation settlement, related to 60 cases (this includes settlement 
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related to other securities officials such as brokers). This indicates an increase over the 2002 total 
of $2.1 Billion securities litigation representing 107 cases (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003). 
 
Van Gass (2003) indicates that despite the already litigious environment in which auditors find 
themselves, the introduction of new legislation is likely to be even more onerous to both auditors 
and directors, as acts such as SOX is clearly focused on the introduction of criminal penalties for 
directors of companies. In South Africa, similar penalties will be introduced by the Companies 
Amendment Bill to the Companies Act (South Africa, 2005a: s 287). 
 
At the same time, changes under new SEC independence regulations imposed in connection with 
SOX, also impact on engagement liability even if non-audit services are performed for SEC 
registrant clients (Van Gass, 2003). Again, similar amendments to the Companies Act and the 
introduction of the Auditing Profession Bill will restrict registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa as to the services that they may render to their audit clients. Certain services that 
could previously be performed by auditors of public interest companies are now prohibited to them, 
and will need to be performed by other professional service firms (South Africa, 2005a: S 275A).  
 
Even those regulatory requirements that are new to other jurisdictions have an impact on the South 
African audit profession. Onerous SOX requirements applicable to SEC listed clients may be 
operating in countries other than the USA. This act has given the United States Public Accounting 
Oversight Board the power to inspect South African and international audit firms that service 
companies that are listed in the USA (Temkin, 2004c). Under Section 404 of SOX, public company 
management is required to issue an internal control report to be included in its quarterly and annual 
reports. External auditors cannot prepare this report, although the external auditors are required to 
attest to the representations made in the report (Wolfe, 2003). In South Africa, the PFMA and 
MFMA have similar objectives where management is required to make certain representations as to 
their control environments as part of their financial statements (Steyn, 2004: 18-20). At the same 
time the SOX's internal control certification requirements has expanded auditors' responsibilities 
that may require auditors to amend their audit approach. 
 
Although securities and private litigation involving audit firms in South Africa are not tracked, 
indications are that LR has increased significantly during the last number of years (Marx & Van 
der Watt, 2002: 28).  
 
It is argued that changes to South African legislation followed international trends with regards to 
corporate governance requirements, and increased levels of penalties related to transgressions by 
registered auditors and directors of companies. South Africa has seen the introduction of legislation 
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such as the PFMA, MFMA, the Public Audit Act, the Auditing Profession Act, and the proposed 
amendments to the Companies Act. This legislation in part aims to achieve similar objectives as 
these of international legislation such as SOX. The commission responsible for the King Report on 
Corporate Governance even proposed that directors and auditors should be held liable for damages 
on a basis proportional to their contribution to any failure (SAID, 2002: 44). The commission 
accordingly suggested amendments to the Appointment of Damages Act, no. 34 of 1956 (Marx & 
Van der Watt, 2002: 28). 
 
A key concern regarding litigation remains around the auditor’s level of liability. For the last 
decade auditors have been lobbying in South Africa, North America and Europe for the revision of 
the principle of joint and several liability (Power, 1998: 77). To date there has been no success in 
amending the principle of joint and several liability (Reynolds, 2004).  
 
In the UK, auditors have been lobbying for changes to Section 310 of the Companies Act in the 
UK, which would allow auditors to enter into contractual arrangements as to their liability with 
companies on an individual basis (Reynolds, 2004). Acceptance of such limitations on auditor 
liability is however highly unlikely as researchers Gramling, Schatzberg, Bailey and Zhang (1998: 
437) concluded in their study that lower audit effort is present on assignments where proportionate 
liability is applied as to joint and several liability. This change in audit effort suggests that 
considering current risk based audit methodologies applied, and the continued occurrence of 
corporate collapse, a further decrease in auditor liability may certainly not be deemed to be 
sufficient to maintain the auditor’s social contract as “watchdogs”. 
 
Reynolds comments on the principle of joint and several liability in the suit in 2004 from Equitable 
Life against Ernst and Young for £3.5 Billion. The firm’s reaction to this suit is as follows: 
 
“We are fighting the deep pockets syndrome. In a corporate collapse, the company, its 
directors and shareholders may all be wiped out. The auditor may be the only party left 
standing (Reynolds, 2004).” 
 
In South Africa the drafters of the Auditing Profession Bill rather focused on the introduction of 
penalties where auditors make misleading statements, than on limiting auditor liability (Temkin, 
2004b: 16). Section 52 (3) of the Auditing Profession Bill also states that any auditor who, for the 
purposes of an audit makes a false statement, knowingly or recklessly is liable for a fine or 
imprisonment or both, the term not exceeding ten year (South Africa, 2004b: chapter VI). Such 
legislation rather suggests increased penalties relating to registered auditors than a relaxation of 
legislative sanctions. 
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An outflow from the increased risk of litigation has been an increase in professional indemnity 
costs (Kenny, 2000). In fact many registered auditors in medium practice have indicated that 
litigation and insurance costs associated with auditing a large public company made growth into 
the large public company market less attractive than other growth opportunities (USGAO, 2003: 2). 
 
The collapse of Arthur Andersen clearly indicated that the risk of litigation can destroy even a large 
international audit firm, long before the matter is served in court as stated in section 1.1. (Venuti, et 
al. 2002). It may be argued that publicised corporate collapses appear to have affected only the 
larger international auditing firms, and hence this study will consider to what extent the risk of 
litigation impacts on the engagement decisions of registered auditors in medium practice as stated 
in section 5.10.14.  
 
3.4. Organisational considerations during the engagement decision process 
 
As concluded from previous studies on organisational considerations during the engagement decision 
process, little research has been performed on the influence of the audit firm and in fact the audit firm 
as organisation on the decisions made by an individual auditor. The following conclusions of 
researchers are considered in order to obtain an understanding of the influence that the audit firm as 
organisation, and the individual members as part of the organisation have on engagement decisions. 
These include the following: 
? Studies by Greenwood, et al. (1990: 725); Power (1995: 317) and Hopwood (1996: 218), 
concluded that the organisational structure of an organisation, and as such an audit firm has an 
impact on the decisions made by various members at different organisational levels. Such 
influence would therefore also be applicable to engagement decisions made by individual 
practitioners. Such influence is further likely to be achieved through the application of 
professional standards, firm policies and procedures, and decision support systems that impact 
decisions made by auditors as concluded by Solomon (1987: 1-25); Gendron (2002: 2) and Libby 
and Luft (1993: 425-450).  
? Similarly Gendron (2002: 2) concluded that the audit firm as organisation influences auditor 
decision-making through: 
o The practice-development strategy of the audit firm, thereby impacting on the selection and 
targeting of new clients; 
o Designing practitioner-compensation schemes that reward auditors according to new clients 
and the growth within their portfolio of clients; 
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o The application of a system of managing the audit firm by setting objectives in terms of 
revenue and new client retention; 
o The design, implementation and monitoring of client-acceptance policies; and 
o The individual auditor’s attitude towards a client or industry based on many personal factors 
such as workload, risk appetite, past litigation experience and remuneration incentives. 
? Due to the hierarchical structure of audit firms, decisions made by junior practitioners are likely to 
be influenced significantly by senior practitioners (Freidson, 1986: 213; Covaleski, et al. 1998: 
293-327; Anderson-Gough, et al. 2001: 99-122). This finding suggests that younger less 
experienced practitioners, who typically have smaller client portfolios in revenue, are likely to be 
motivated to a greater extent than their senior practitioners to increase their client portfolios and to 
consider senior practitioner advice on such appointments. The relationship between junior and 
senior practitioners often leads to tension as experience levels and risk tolerance may differ. This 
process is however likely to be a dynamic process, allowing for the balanced application of 
motivational drivers (Carpenter, et al. 1994: 355-380; Gendron, 2002: 8). 
? One of the main benefits from organisational influences relate to consistency of decisions made by 
its members. In this context Gendron (2002: 8) concluded that: 
 
“Organisational decisions may be conceived as arenas in which organisational members seek 
to influence the decision processes in accordance with the logic they believe is proper to make 
decisions. To that effect, organisational members will use the resources at their disposal, such 
as their own legitimated expertise to resolve certain types of problems. By giving prominence 
to certain logics, the organisation signals that it expects these favoured logics to be influential 
in decision-making. This signal may become instilled over time in the auditors’ mind, through 
their frequent exposure to the organisation’s rhetoric. Instillation results from the routine act of 
making decisions in accordance with the organisation’s favoured logics.” 
 
Studies related to the impact of organisational motivational drivers on audit practices in general has 
been limited to date, when compared in quantum to those related to studies of professional and 
commercial drivers.  Although Gendron (2002: 8) have commented on the balancing nature of 
organisational motivators between commercial and professional drivers, this study will question the 
existence of such organisational motivational drivers such as targeting strategies that may be used as 
instrument to meet the objectives of these organisational drivers as detailed in section 5.10.15. 
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3.5. Implications from the study of predisposition on the engagement decision process of 
registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa 
 
From the literature study, it would appear that commercial, professional and organisational 
motivational drivers impact on the engagement decision process through the predisposition that it 
causes. It is argued that this predisposition will have a direct impact on the scope, individual 
engagement decision audit procedures and risk assessment performed during the engagement decision 
process as studied in chapter 4. 
 
Although the existence of commercial, professional and organisational motivational drivers have been 
confirmed by researchers such as Johnstone (2000: 1); Kirkham (1992: 301); Bailey (1995: 191-195) 
and Gendron (2002: 8) as studied in section 3.2. to section 3.4., it is important to consider to what 
extent registered auditors in medium practice acknowledge the impact of these motivational drivers on 
their predisposition during risk assessment as stated in section 5.10.16. 
 
3.6. Conclusions from the study of predisposition on the engagement decision process of 
registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa 
 
Professional, commercial and organisational motivational drivers cause auditors to be predisposed 
during the engagement decision process and the evaluation of risk. Previous research on motivational 
drivers and auditor predisposition suggests that these drivers are under continuous tension, and further 
suggests that this tension itself can expose the auditor to risk if one driver is favoured at the cost of 
another. 
 
This chapter concludes that the following considerations impact motivational drivers significantly and 
should be considered during the engagement decision process: 
? Professional motivational drivers, being engagement specific considerations based on the auditors 
ethical social responsiveness, is a reflection on professional (statutory and professional) guidance 
that in turn is a reflection on expectations of the audit profession. These professional drivers have 
been impacted significantly by corporate collapses and accounting scandals, leading to regulators 
and lawmakers alike, acting promptly with the enactment of several regulatory changes and 
guidance towards accounting practices and also the audit profession itself. The objective of these 
professional requirements is to prevent a repetition of the magnitude of corporate collapses and 
accounting scandals that investors and the public in general have been exposed to during the last 
decade. Simultaneously they intend to result in restoring the public trust in the auditing profession. 
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? From several studies related to commercial motivational drivers, it is concluded that commercial 
drivers are mainly impacted by: 
o Practitioner preferences that show a direct relationship between practitioner’s preferences for 
certain audit procedures, efficiencies in the audit process, and profit motivation; 
o Pricing considerations as a risk mitigating strategy related to high risk audit assignments; and 
o The risk of ever-increasing litigation that has impacted significantly on audit fees and the 
pricing of high risk audit assignments. 
? The study of organisational motivational drivers concludes that the audit firm as an organisation 
influences the audit setting within which individual auditors operate. These firms are typical 
hierarchically structured groups, whose work is closely guided or prescribed by professional 
standards, firm policies and procedures, and decision support systems. It is this very structure and 
relationship to the commercial and professional motivational drivers that suggests that 
organisational motivational drivers can be used to balance the tension between commercial and 
professional drivers through policy and review practices. 
 
The primary objective of the engagement decision process is to assess risk. The effectiveness of such 
risk assessment is impacted by predisposition as argued in this chapter.  Once the auditor has 
determined his/her predisposition and mitigated its impact on the engagement decision process 
through consideration of the other motivational drivers, the auditor will assess the AR of the specific 
assignment as studied in chapter 4, in order to support the engagement decision. 
 
The engagement decision as process for the gathering and evaluation of evidence is a systematic 
process. Chapter 4 hereafter considers this process of obtaining evidence, evaluating evidence and 
concluding on the engagement decision procedures likely to be performed by registered auditors in 
medium practice. The stages of the engagement decision process is studied and it is argued that the 
five audit stages required by ISAE 3000 (R) in obtaining evidence is required to support the 
engagement decision process. 
  
Having studied and concluded on the existence of motivational drivers and their impact on judgement 
during the engagement decision process, it is necessary to consider the audit procedures within the 
engagement decision and related risk assessment that may be impacted by the  
practitioner’s predisposition. 
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CHAPTER 4  AUDIT PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE ENGAGEMENT   
DECISION 
 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The role of the engagement decision as first step in any audit practice’s risk management strategy is 
highlighted and the use of risk mitigating strategies to address high risk assignments are considered. 
Research objective 2 considers to what extent registered auditors in medium practice evaluate risk 
through the application of sufficient audit procedures to support their engagement decisions, 
considering their predisposition. Chapter 4 will identify those secondary research objectives to be 
researched in order to conclude on research objective 2. 
 
Finally this chapter considers the arguments to revisit the AR model and the conclusions reached in 
this regard. It further considers the relationship between AR and ER, as well as the current focus on 
improving the quality of audit work. 
 
The characteristics of registered auditors in medium practice are considered and weighed throughout 
this chapter against these engagement decision stages and procedures, in an effort to assist in 
identifying those areas that require focus in the empirical research of this study. 
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4.1. Introduction to audit procedures required to support the engagement decision 
 
Chapter 4 considers those procedures that are likely to be performed by registered auditors in medium 
practice during the engagement decision process. Thomas indicated that these engagement decision 
procedures consist principally of two phases: information gathering and information evaluation 
(1992). The main focus of these two phases is the assessment of risk, and the auditor’s ability to 
respond to the identified level of risk. Bedard and Graham (2002: 1) commented in this regard as 
follows: 
 
“Once risk factors are identified and documented, auditors can direct evidence-gathering 
procedures to address potential sources of misstatement. In addition to facilitating audit 
planning and pricing, documentation of client risk factors also provides an important means of 
communication between audit team members, enabling them to focus on key issues. Thus, risk 
identification at the planning stage is important to audit effectiveness and efficiency. The risk 
factors found at this stage become the context in which auditors view evidence gained 
subsequently in the course of the engagement.” 
 
ISAE 3000 (R) describes the five stages required in obtaining evidence to support a decision as: “an 
iterative, systematic engagement process”. Although ISAE 3000 (R) is applicable to assurance 
engagements other than audits of the review of historical financial information, it does provide a 
framework for decision making related to the sufficiency of audit evidence to support a decision 
(IFAC, 2005b: par .33-35). As the engagement decision is a decision based on audit evidence, this 
framework as been considered in studying those audit procedures that support the engagement 
decision of registered auditors in medium practice. These five stages as adopted from ISAE 3000 (R) 
are (IFAC, 2005b: par .33-35): 
? Obtaining an understanding of the prospective client and its operations; 
? Based on this understanding, assessing the risk that the financial results of the prospective client 
may be misstated; 
? Evaluating and responding to the assessed risks, including developing overall responses, and 
determining the nature, timing and extent of further procedures needed to mitigate risks identified; 
? Performing further procedures clearly linked to the identified risks; and 
? Evaluating the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence obtained in order to support the 
engagement decision. 
 
Central to these five stages is audit evidence. In terms of ISAE 3000 (R) (IFAC, 2005b: par .33): 
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“The practitioner should obtain sufficient appropriate evidence on which to base the 
conclusion. Sufficiency is the measure of the quantity of evidence. The practitioner uses 
professional judgement and exercises professional skepticism in evaluating the quantity and 
quality of evidence, and thus its sufficiency and appropriateness, to support the assurance 
report.” 
 
4.2. Risk management and the engagement decision process 
 
Risk management in the audit profession could arguably be studied in many aspects and as such is 
only highlighted in this study, to the extent that the engagement decision is viewed as an element of 
risk management. 
  
Willingham and Carmichael (1979: 176-187) identified the need to establish procedures and policies 
for investigating potential clients before the acceptance of an engagement. Since their study, many 
researchers have concluded that audit procedures performed during the engagement decision process 
are central to risk management practices of audit firms (Huss & Jacobs, 1991: 16; Francis & Reynolds, 
1998; Johnstone, 2000: 2; Bedard & Biggs, 2002: 622-642; Basioudius, 2002: 3). With more specific 
reference to an applied definition of auditing, Bedard and Graham  define risk management as follows 
(2002: 1):  
 
“Risk management involves identifying client facts or issues that may affect engagement risk, 
and planning evidence-gathering strategies accordingly.” 
 
The importance of risk management is amplified by the risks associated with ineffective risk 
management. According to McKelvie, et al., the consequences that an auditor faces as a result of 
actual or perceived negligence include (2002: 30): 
? The loss of, or damage to the auditor’s reputation; 
? The consequent loss of business; 
? Increased difficulty of securing new work; and 
? The costs of managing and settling legal claims against the auditor. 
 
Registered auditors in medium practice face many challenges and risks that may impact on their future 
sustainability. As concluded in section 1.1.3. and section 2.7., registered auditors in medium practice 
are faced with many difficulties in competing against the traditional Big Four international audit firms. 
Although many of these studies have been performed internationally such as the study by the USGAO 
(2003: 37); Wooten (2003) and Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3), auditors in South Africa in medium 
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practice are facing many similar challenges as commented on by Ryan (2005a-d). These challenges 
include competition not only in attaining sought after clients such as public listed multi-national 
clients, but also attracting and retaining experienced staff with appropriate levels of technical skills. 
These researchers have all concluded and commented on the risk that registered auditors in medium 
practice may not have sufficient support structures to support the operations of their practices, 
specifically commented on a lack of risk management pertaining to engagement decisions as well as 
quality control structures. The position of registered auditors in medium practices in South Africa is 
further impacted by their position in the audit industry as highlighted in section 1.1.3. 
 
Considering these difficulties as highlighted, the need for risk management is amplified, bearing in 
mind the existing challenges that registered auditors in medium practice are faced with.  
 
As concluded in section 2.7., firms other than the Big Four do not always have systems and policies 
for the evaluation of engagement decisions and as a result procedures around engagement decisions 
are generally limited (USGAO, 2003: 2; Carpenter & Mahoney, 2001: 3). A lack of systems and 
processes around the evaluation of engagement decisions may be indicative of a lack of proper 
systems regarding greater risk management, such as firm policies related to the acceptance of new 
clients. Considering the engagement decision’s role in greater risk management, it is imperative that 
this study considers the existence of systems for the evaluation of ER, the existence and application of 
audit firm policies on the assessment of engagement decisions, as well as the existence of risk 
management frameworks within medium audit practice in South Africa as stated in section 5.10.17. 
 
4.3. Engagement decision guidance provided by auditing standards 
 
The external audit function is performed with reference to auditing standards that provide a framework 
to external auditors to perform an audit in order to effectively address risk as referred to in section 
3.2.3. In 2000, Johnstone noted that professional standards state that firms should establish procedures 
for making the client-acceptance decision, but provided no guidance about how to make the actual 
engagement decision (2000: 2). However, since 2000 auditing standards provided more clarity on 
certain aspects of the engagement decision process through several amendments to previous auditing 
standards and the issuance of new standards. These include the following: 
? The issuance of Practice Alert 2003-3 in January 2004 titled Acceptance and continuance of 
clients and engagements by AICPA in the USA (AICPA, 2004: 1). This was an update of the 
previous Practice Alert 1994-3 – Acceptance and continuance of Audit clients, issued in 1994. 
? Revisions the International Standard on Auditing 200 Revised – Objective and general principle 
governing an audit of financial statements (hereafter ISA 200 R) provide clearer guidance on the 
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evaluation of AR specifically with reference to understanding the entity and its environment, 
assessing the risks of material misstatement and obtaining audit evidence (IFAC, 2003a: par .13-
23). 
? The introduction of ISQC 1 which has further provided guidance, specifically on operational 
considerations during the engagement decision process (IFAC, 2004a). 
 
ISA’s have been used as reference for the purpose of this study as it was decided in 1994 by SAICA 
that the statements of South African Auditing Standards (hereafter SAAS) should be based on the 
standards issued by IFAC (PAAB, 2004: 8-11). Despite the existence of these uniform standards, 
several studies, as referred to by Wooten (2003), concluded that there are real differences in service 
delivery and quality between larger firms and smaller firms. This would in part suggest that 
compliance with auditing standards may also be different between audit firms. It is not possible to 
conclude on the compliance with auditing standards by firms in medium audit practice in comparison 
with that of larger firms, without performing an extensive specific study to the extent.  
 
It should further be noted that although it is reasonable to assume that compliance by auditors with 
ISA’s is a necessary component to any risk management strategy, all auditors do not comply with 
these standards. In fact, research by independent institutions indicated that auditors do not adequately 
adhere to auditing standards (Gloeck, 2003). This finding has been confirmed by findings of the 
PAAB practice reviews (Bailey, 2003). 
 
Past studies by independent institutions indicated that auditors do not always adequately adhere to 
auditing standards (Gloeck, 2003). Wooten (2003) and Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1. and 
section 2.7. have further commented on concerns relating to the ability of registered auditors in 
medium practice to maintain generally costly systems that would ease compliance with an increasing 
number of auditing standards. This will be considered in section 5.10.10. 
 
The audit procedures required to obtain audit evidence to support the engagement decision process 
which is based on those stages identified in section 4.2. are studied in section 4.3.1. to section 4.3.7.  
  
4.3.1. Obtaining an understanding of the prospective client and its operations 
 
The first stage in obtaining evidence to support the engagement decision involves obtaining an 
understanding of the prospective client and its business (Willingham & Carmichael, 1979: 176; 
Puttick & Van Esch, 1992: 57; Robertson, 1993: 389). This process typically begins with a 
meeting between the auditor and the prospective client (Willingham & Carmichael, 1979: 177; 
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Thomas, 1992). Topics to be discussed at the preliminary meeting will vary depending on a 
variety of factors including the audit firm’s familiarity with the client and the client’s familiarity 
with the auditor (Willingham & Carmichael, 1979: 176). The initial client meeting provides the 
auditor with the client’s expectations in terms of the defined service delivery. In terms of ISA 315 
(IFAC, 2003b: par .2-5): 
  
“The auditor should obtain an understanding of the entity and its environment, including 
its internal control, sufficient to identify and assess the risks of material misstatement of 
the financial statements whether due to fraud or error, and sufficient to design and perform 
further audit procedures. In particular, that understanding establishes a frame of reference 
within which the auditor plans the audit and exercises professional judgement about 
assessing risks of material misstatement of the financial statements and responding to 
those risks throughout the audit. The auditor uses professional judgement to determine the 
extent of the understanding required of the entity and its environment, including its 
internal control. The auditor’s primary consideration is whether the understanding that has 
been obtained is sufficient to assess the risks of material misstatement of the financial 
statements and to design and perform further audit procedures.” 
 
The revisions to ISA 315 also direct the auditor’s focus on obtaining an understanding of the 
entity’s internal controls (IFAC, 2003b: par .6). This process is seen as a continuous and dynamic 
process and needs to be considered even as early as the initial engagement decision phase. Internal 
control, as discussed in ISA 315, consists of the following components (IFAC, 2003b: par .43): 
? The control environment; 
? The entity’s risk assessment process;  
? The information system, including the related business processes, relevant to financial 
reporting, and communication; 
? Control activities; and 
? Monitoring of controls. 
 
Obtaining a detailed understanding of the client’s business is a cost effective audit procedure that 
is performed during the engagement decision process (Willingham & Carmichael, 1979: 177; 
Tomas, 1992). Although ISA 315 provides detailed guidance in this regard as stated in section 
4.3.1., findings by Gloeck (2003) as stated in section 4.3., concluded that auditors do not always 
comply with auditing standards. It is thus necessary for this study to consider to what extent 
registered auditors in medium practice document their understanding of a prospective client’s 
business and industry during their engagement decision procedures as stated in section 5.10.18. 
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4.3.2. Sources of information used during the engagement decision process 
 
Enquiries from management are one of many methods available to auditors to obtain information 
needed to understand the prospective client’s business. The following are other methods that can 
be used as studied in section 4.3.2.1. to section 4.3.2.4.: 
 
? Inquiries of other staff within the entity; 
? Analytical procedures related to financial performance; 
? Observation and inspection of client activities; and 
? Other procedures to support the engagement decision. 
 
 
4.3.2.1. Inquiries of management and others within the entity 
 
An auditor should perform other audit procedures where the information obtained may be 
helpful in identifying risks of material misstatement. In terms of ISA 315 most information 
can be obtained from management and those responsible for financial reporting. In 
determining others within the entity to which inquiries may be directed, and the extent of 
those inquiries, the auditor should consider what information may be obtained that will assist 
the auditor in identifying risks of material misstatement (IFAC, 2003b: par .7). This may 
include enquiries from  those charged with governance; internal audit personnel; employees 
involved in initiating, processing or recording complex or unusual transactions; in-house legal 
counsel and marketing or sales personnel (New York State Society of Certified Public 
Auditors (hereafter NYSCPA, 2003). 
 
 
4.3.2.2. Analytical procedures related to financial performance 
 
In terms of ISA 315 analytical procedures may be helpful in identifying the existence of 
unusual transactions or events, and amounts, ratios, and trends that might indicate matters that 
have financial statement and audit implication (IFAC, 2003b: par .7). Such procedures 
performed by experienced staff are likely to be cost effective engagement decision procedures. 
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4.3.2.3. Observation and inspection of client activities 
 
In terms of ISA 315 observation and inspection may support inquiries of management and 
others, and also provide information about the entity and its environment (IFAC, 2003b: par 
.7). Such audit procedures ordinarily include some of the following (NYSCPA, 2003):  
? Observation of entity activities and operations through visits to the entity’s premises;  
? Inspection of documents such as business plans and strategies, records, and internal 
control manuals; 
? Reading reports prepared by management such as quarterly management reports and 
interim financial statements and those charged with governance such as minutes of board 
of directors’ meetings; and 
? Tracing transactions through the information system relevant to financial reporting. 
 
 
4.3.2.4. Other procedures to support the engagement decision 
 
The auditor may also consider information about a prospective client through enquiries from 
parties external to the client, in order to obtain more independent information than the 
information presented by the prospective client to the auditor as studied in section 4.3.2.4.1. to 
section 4.3.2.4.3. 
 
 
4.3.2.4.1. Communicating with predecessor auditors 
 
The auditor should communicate with the predecessor auditor (Willingham & Carmichael, 
1979: 176; PAAB, 2003: s 15). A predecessor auditor is an auditor who has reported on 
the most recent audited financial statements or was engaged to perform, but did not 
complete an audit of any subsequent financial statements and has since resigned or has 
been asked to resign as auditor to a client (AICPA, 2004). 
 
Inquiries from these predecessor auditors are specifically directed to such matters as: 
? management's integrity;  
? any disagreements between the predecessor auditor and management with respect to 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (hereafter GAAP) or other significant 
matters;  
? the reasons why the prospective client is seeking to change auditors; and  
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? if the predecessor auditor will be willing to re-issue reports or otherwise provide 
consent with respect to previously issued financial statements.  
 
The auditor should also review the predecessor's work-papers before taking on a new 
client (NYSCPA, 2003; AICPA, 2004). Clients that have had disputes with their prior 
auditors will often make disapproving remarks about their prior auditors in an effort to 
discourage contact with the prior auditor. Such remarks should not prevent a firm from 
communicating with the prior auditors and should be considered when evaluating the 
acceptability of the client (NYSCPA, 2003). 
 
4.3.2.4.2. Screening of prospective clients 
 
Due to the risk of litigation and lessons learnt from such litigation as studied in section 
3.3.3, client screening has become an important part in managing ER (NYSCPA, 2003; 
McKelvie, et al. 2002: 32; MacDonald, 1997: 2). Client screening is a process comprising 
the gathering of information, in a systematic manner, usually with the assistance of a 
checklist, leading to an informed assessment of the risks involved in a potential client, 
usually employing some form of decision aid, followed by an approval or rejection 
decision (NYSCPA, 2003).  The client screening process is intended in particular to 
identify potential clients of questionable reputation (McKelvie, et al. 2002: 32; AICPA 
2004): 
 
4.3.2.4.3. Obtaining third party confirmations during engagement decisions 
 
Timely confidential inquiries of attorneys, bankers, underwriters, and other sources, where 
appropriate, should be made in order to obtain information concerning the reputation or 
integrity of key management and significant owners of the prospective client (AICPA, 
2004). Reviewing information obtained from external sources such as reports by analysts, 
banks, or rating agencies; trade and economic journals; or regulatory or financial 
publications may also be useful in obtaining information about a prospective client. 
 
As concluded by Houston (1999: 70-86) and Wooten (2003) as studied in section 3.3.2., audit 
procedures performed by registered auditors in medium practice are significantly impacted by 
audit fees and cost to perform the audit.  
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Due to cost concerns in firms in medium audit practice (Houston, 1999: 70-86; Wooten, 2003), 
the use of information sources during the engagement decision process is likely to be impacted by 
the cost involved in using such sources as considered in section 5.10.19.  
 
4.3.3. Assessing the risk that the financial results of the prospective client may be 
misstated 
  
As studied in section 2.4. and section 2.5., before accepting appointment to an audit 
engagement, the auditor should assess ER. The assessment of ER should be based on a 
combination of the risk associated with the client and the audit engagement, and the financial 
statements as a whole (Deloitte, Touche & Tohmatsu, 1996; Thomas, 1992). Section 2.5. also 
concluded on the relationship between AR and ER, and hence an assessment of risk at the 
planning stage would require as a minimum a preliminary review of the AR of the client. ISA 
200 (R) defines AR as (IFAC, 2003a: par .14): 
 
“The risk that the auditor expresses an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial 
statements are materially misstated.” 
 
The AR model was derived from the relationship between IR, CR and DR and was first 
introduced in 1972. The relationship between these elements of AR is formulated as 
(Robertson, 1993: 455): “AR = IR X DR X CR.”  
 
In order to be able to form any view on AR, the auditor also needs to consider materiality 
when assessing AR in terms of ISA 320 – Audit Materiality (hereafter ISA 320) at the 
engagement phase. This assessment of materiality is required when risk levels are assessed. 
Materiality may however change from the planning phase once audit work has been 
performed. ISA 320 defines materiality as follows (IFAC, 1996a: par .3): 
 
“Information is material if its omission or misstatement could influence the economic 
decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements. Materiality depends on 
the size of the item or error judged in the particular circumstances of its omission or 
misstatement. Thus, materiality provides a threshold or cut-off point rather than being a 
primary qualitative characteristic which information must have if it is to be useful.” 
 
The definitions of assurance ER and AR as per the International Framework for Assurance 
Engagements (definition of ER) (IFAC, 2005a) and ISA 200 (R) (definition of AR) (IFAC, 
  
 94
2003a), would suggest that AR and ER is in fact equal. It is however questionable if an 
assessment of these individual elements of AR can effectively be completed at the engagement 
decision phase as evidence to support the conclusion on each of the risk elements is only 
likely to be obtained once tests of controls and substantive testing had been performed. The 
AR model is a dynamic model, as risk assessment may change as the auditor obtains more 
information regarding the client.  
 
In order to effectively assess ER, an alternative approach needs to be considered. This study 
supports the model developed by Johnstone (2000: 1-27) as studied in section 2.5. for the 
evaluation of engagement risk as this model is not only reliant on the assessment of AR, 
considering the impracticality of concluding on AR at the engagement decision phase. 
According to Johnstone (2000: 1-27) the process of assessing ER in response to the 
assessment of the business risk of the client, business risk of the auditor, and an initial 
assessment of AR is more focused on evaluating the auditor’s risk of loss on an engagement 
than the AR model, thereby focusing on what level of risk is acceptable to the auditor that 
directly impacts on the auditor’s decision to accept an engagement. 
 
Johnstone’s model suggests that the process of applying judgement and concluding on the 
acceptability of engagement risks identified is followed by applying three concurrent risk 
mitigating strategies. These strategies are studied as they explain what procedures the auditor 
should perform and what risks should be considered for each strategy during the engagement 
decision phase. Johnstone (2000: 1-27) argued that auditors adapt the level of client-
acceptance risk by using these three strategies.  
 
These strategies are broadly highlighted in section 4.3.3.1. to section 4.3.3.3. and include: 
? Screening clients based on their risk characteristics; 
? Screening clients based on the auditors risk of loss on the engagement; and 
? Pro-actively utilising risk-adaptation strategies. 
 
 4.3.3.1. Screening clients based on their risk characteristics 
 
Auditors screen client characteristics to eliminate undesirable clients (Johnstone, 2000: 
6). This strategy presumes that the auditor is predisposed as to what constitutes 
desirable and undesirable clients. As studied in section 2.2. auditor predisposition is the 
likely result of measuring client characteristics against professional, commercial and 
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organisational behavioural motivators. This strategy further requires the assessment of 
business risk of the client and a preliminary view on AR. 
 
4.3.3.2. Screening clients using the auditor’s business risk as a mediator 
 
The auditor’s business risk is determined by reflecting on both the client’s business risk, 
as well as the AR of an engagement (Johnstone, 2000: 7). An increased level of risk 
related to the client’s business risk and/or the AR of the engagement may necessarily 
lead to a higher level of auditor business risk and as a result ER is in direct relation to 
this assessment of the auditor’s business risk (Johnstone, 2000: 5). The dynamic of the 
relationship between the auditor’s business risk as a response to the level of the client’s 
business risk and AR, indicates the need to consider the impact of procedures that may 
change the assessed levels of client business risk and AR, known as risk adaptation 
strategies (Johnstone, 2000: 7). These strategies aim to reduce risk levels to an 
acceptable level. 
 
4.3.3.3. The use of pro-active risk adaptation strategies to eliminate risk 
 
Auditors use pro-active risk adaptation strategies such as adjusting the audit fee 
downwards or upwards depending on the assessed levels of risk, planning the process of 
obtaining certain additional audit evidence, planning appropriate independent staffing, 
and adjusting the level and nature of audit procedures according to a desired level of 
acceptable risk (Johnstone, 2000: 7).  
 
Although Johnstone’s study indicated that auditors might not always effectively make 
use of risk adaptation strategies, the consideration of these strategies is available to the 
auditor as part of the engagement decision process. Features of the audit firm such as its 
size and potential for litigation should also be considered in pro-active risk mitigation 
strategies (Johnstone, 2000: 8).  
 
The possible influence of organisational motivational drivers on not only risk 
assessment itself, but also on the design and use of risk adaptation strategies during the 
engagement decision process should be considered in order to conclude on the assessed 
level of ER. 
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The AR model as stated in section 2.4. (Hitzig, 2001) and the model for the assessment of 
ER developed by Johnstone (2000: 1-21) as stated in section 4.3.3.1. and section 4.3.3.3. are 
both models available to auditors to assist them during their engagement decision processes, 
but does not guarantee that auditors in fact apply these models. It is therefore important to 
consider the application of the elements of both the AR model being IR, DR and CR, and the 
elements of Johnstone’s model being the assessment of AR in relation to Cbr and Abr. 
 
This study will further consider the level of risk identification of registered auditors in 
medium practice during their engagement decision procedures through an assessment of IR, 
DR and CR (the traditional AR model) as well as the assessment of the Business Risk of the 
client and the Business Risk of the auditor (based on the model of Johnstone) as stated in 
section 5.10.20. 
 
 
4.3.4. Fraud Risk (FR) and its impact on the engagement decision process 
 
Any assessment of risk would be incomplete without due consideration to FR. The 
International Standard on Auditing 240 Revised – The auditor’s responsibility to consider 
fraud in an audit of financial statements (hereafter ISA 240 (R)) does not explicitly define FR.   
ISA 240 (R) does however provide some definition by indicating that FR is the risk of the 
presence of (IFAC, 2004d: par .49): “events or conditions that indicate an incentive or 
pressure to commit fraud or provide an opportunity to commit fraud.” Standards initially 
placed a minimal responsibility on auditors to detect fraud and error (Nel, 1997: 1-26; Gloeck, 
2003). ISA 240 (R) has however since been amended and placed the evaluation of FR central 
to the evaluation of IR during the engagement decision phase. 
 
As studied in section 3.3.3. Van Gass (2003) indicated that despite the already litigious 
environment in which auditors find themselves, the introduction of new legislation is likely to 
be even more onerous to both auditors and directors, clearly indicating on the impact that 
fraud would have not only on the perpetrators, but also to the auditors and directors of a 
company. 
 
Researchers such as Van Gass have argued that the threat of litigation following fraud is high 
(2003). This coupled with the devastating impact of litigation both in terms of reputation and 
financial consequences may indicate that FR may be considered by registered auditors in 
medium practice during the engagement decision process as studied in section 5.10.21. 
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4.3.5. Evaluating and responding to assessed risks 
 
Once an assessment of ER has been performed through a review of audit and FR, the auditor 
is likely to conclude on an assessed level of ER. According to Puttick and Van Esch (1992: 
57), most audit firms have developed a scale whereby engagements can be classified. Risk 
pertaining to each engagement can be classified as:  
? Normal; 
? Greater than normal; or 
? Much greater than normal. 
 
According to Odendaal (2002), should an auditor decide to accept a client with an expected 
greater than normal level of business risk, the AR will have to be reduced (to compensate for 
the part of an auditor’s business risk which has not been addressed sufficiently), which entails 
obtaining more evidence (quantitative as well as qualitative). The latter is referred to as 
defensive auditing which is an extension of audit procedures as legal litigation or financial 
failure may be associated with the engagement. 
 
In terms of ISA 330 (IFAC, 2003c: par .3), the auditor should design specific procedures to 
address the risk of material misstatement at both the financial statement level and account 
specific levels. This would again suggest that the conclusion on such risks is only likely to be 
made once audit procedures have been performed. Considering the fact that risk cannot be 
eliminated entirely and that concluding on the elements of the AR model is only likely to 
follow audit procedures, alternative risk mitigating procedures, that specifically address ER, 
should be considered. These procedures are based on Johnstone’s model which suggests that 
ER can be mitigated through certain practices that the auditor should consider pertaining to 
their involvement with the client (Johnstone, 2000: 1-27). 
 
Risk mitigating strategies that auditors can utilise to mitigate levels of assessed ER are studied 
in section 4.3.5.1. to section 4.3.5.5. and relate to: 
? Adjusting audit fees to reflect on risk; 
? Implementing policies around client refusals; 
? Reviewing indemnity insurance;  
? Appropriately staffing assignments; and  
? Communicating activities of an audit firm’s risk mitigating strategies and broader risk 
management framework to audit staff. 
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4.3.5.1. The impact of risk on audit fees 
 
The impact of audit fees on the commercial logic has been studied and concluded on in 
section 2.2.2. and section 3.3.2. It is apparent that auditors face significant pressure to 
reduce costs due to competition among auditing firms as a result of bidding, advertising, 
and direct solicitation, as well as from merger activity in the corporate sector, which 
reduces the number of available audit clients.  
 
Not only do auditors face significant pricing pressures within the audit services market, 
but they also need to contend with continued pressures from client management to 
decrease the cost of an audit. Watts and Zimmerman concluded that managers acted in this 
manner as early as 1979, as they have incentives to use accounting standards to report in 
ways that are in their best interest, even at the expense of stakeholders (1979: 273). Client 
management controls the current and future audit fees that the audit firm hopes to obtain 
from the audit, and therefore is in a powerful position in audit conflict situations (Van 
Dijk & Jansman, 1994: 3). 
 
According to Moore (2003), audit fees have been so drastically reduced by factors such as 
bidding and price competition that firms have been forced to think of ways to reduce the 
time spent working on audits. Auditors remain under pressure to meet their agreed audit 
budgets. In recent years many companies have put their audits out for tender. This trend 
has exerted pressure on audit fees, which as a result declined in real terms. For a new 
auditor to win an audit or for the existing auditor to retain an audit when tendering takes 
place, the audit fee in most instances would have to be reduced. As a result, firms began 
supplementing audit fees with fees from consulting and other services (SAICA, 2002: 1-
23). 
 
It is in the interest of the company and the stakeholders that the scope of the audit is not 
restricted and it is carried out effectively and efficiently. To achieve this objective, 
auditors need to be properly remunerated to avoid auditors decreasing their procedures to 
meet agreed budgets. Management may be more interested in restricting costs rather than 
obtaining the appropriate levels of assurance. As a result audit fees may be less than 
required resulting in a scope limitation for the auditor (SAICA, 2002: 1-23). 
 
The pricing policies of audit firms are likely to be impacted by the proposed amendments 
to the Companies Act, as audit fees are likely to fall within the ambit of audit committees 
that will bring some independence to the auditor-client relationship as concluded in 
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section 3.2.1.4. It however remains to be seen if these amendments will have any real 
impact on the current pressure on audit fees in general as clients that do not have audit 
committee’s negotiate audit fees at a managerial level. 
 
SAICA performed a survey on pricing practices of firms in small and medium audit 
practice in 2005. Only three out of the top eight net income earning practices measured 
per practitioner, were registered auditors in medium practice. This clearly indicated that 
the pricing policies of registered auditors in medium practice place them at a much higher 
cost to a prospective client than smaller practices, indicating the need by these practices to 
recover their large cost structures. In fact the staff salary costs of these registered auditors 
in medium practice are also typically higher than that of the smaller practices ranging 
between 60% and 70% of turnover (SAICA, 2005b: 31). This again indicates the high cost 
of retention of staff that these practitioners need to employ in the current environment. 
These very same practices indicated a low retention rate of between 20% to 33% of staff 
once qualified, again indicating on the difficulty these practices have in retaining their 
staff (SAICA, 2005b: 33).  
 
Based on conclusions by Wooten (2003) as stated in section 2.7. pricing of assignments 
by registered auditors in medium practice, considering the ability of their clients to pay 
audit fees, is impacted to a great extent by the position of such practitioners within the 
audit services market. This study will therefore consider to what extent registered auditors 
in medium practice are able to consider pricing to be reflective of risk, relating to a 
potential client as a risk mitigating strategy as stated in section 5.10.22. 
 
4.3.5.2. Firm policies related to client refusals 
 
ISQC 1 (2004a) provides guidance related to client refusals. It broadly requires discussion 
with the appropriate level of the client’s management and those charged with governance 
surrounding the reasons for the refusal should an auditor decide not to accept an 
engagement. The auditor should also consider if there is a professional or legal 
requirement to report the reasons for the refusal to regulatory authorities. ISQC 1 further 
requires the documentation of significant issues, consultations and the basis for the 
conclusions reached (IFAC, 2004a: par .34-35).  
 
When a firm decides not to accept a prospective client for any reason such as excessive 
risk or a conflict of interest, it should send the client a formal rejection letter. Otherwise, if 
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the contemplated service is not performed by others on a timely basis, the client may 
attempt to hold the firm that refused the work, liable for any damages or penalties, which 
flowed from non-performance of the service in question (NYSCPA, 2003). 
 
Ross (1997) who argued that practitioners should resign from high risk assignments 
concluded the following: 
? “Many practitioners are too concerned about the quantity rather than the quality of 
clients and should be more selective about whom they take on as clients. 
? A disproportionate amount of time is spent on clients whose businesses are not 
doing well and who, as a consequence, do not pay timeously; time would be more 
profitably spent on adding value to those clients that can and are prepared to pay for 
services. 
? Once a client has defaulted on an account, the client will seldom change and it is 
likely that the collection of fees will always be a battle with that client. Such clients 
often operate under financial constraints and going concern issues expose auditors 
to additional risk.” 
 
These conclusions of Ross are but some of the many reasons that auditors may have for 
resigning from high risk assignments. It is however imperative that, whenever a firm 
withdraws from an engagement as a result of client pruning, the firm should send the 
client a formal resignation letter. Among other things, this letter should inform the client 
of all pending deadlines, so that the client cannot blame the firm if required action is not 
taken on a timely basis (NYSCPA, 2003). 
 
When considering these findings by Ross, they seem to stand in contrast to the findings by 
the USGAO (2003: 2), Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3) and Wooten (2003) as studied in 
section 2.7. They all indicated on the difficulties that registered auditors in medium 
practice face in competing against the Big Four for audit clients, suggesting that registered 
auditors in medium practice may not always be able to apply the same levels of client 
refusal related to high risk assignments as expected by Ross.  
 
Not only is there is significant pressure on auditors to increase revenues, but there appears 
to be an inability of registered auditors in medium practice to access the same clients that 
are currently serviced by the Big Four audit firms (Wooten, 2003) as stated in section 2.7. 
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As concluded by Ross (1997) audit firms are not always able to resign from high risk 
clients, as they are not always able to replace this revenue stream with new clients with a 
lower risk profile.  
 
This study will determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice consider 
resigning from unprofitable clients and refuse to accept high risk assignments as stated in 
section 5.10.23. 
 
4.3.5.3. Considering indemnity insurance during engagement decisions 
 
The risk of litigation has become significant in recent years as concluded in section 
2.2.2.2., despite reported cases in South Africa being limited (Gloeck, 2003). As a result, a 
regular review of indemnity insurance has become an important aspect of modern day 
auditing (Kenny, 2000). 
 
It is argued that the movement towards multi-disciplinary practices by many registered 
auditors in medium practices in order to increase their revenue has resulted in an increase 
in the exposure that these auditors have as a result of taking on risk, without the protection 
of their professional liability insurance. Auditors must be aware of what their indemnity 
policy covers and what it does not (Kenny, 2000). A study by Kenny (2000) has further 
confirmed that not all indemnity insurance products may keep pace with changes in the 
audit profession market, and may thus expose auditors to risk. 
 
Generally, insurers try to determine the inherent risks in the types of services offered by 
the firm, the level of training offered to the firm’s staff, the internal quality controls used 
by the firm, the quality of the firm’s clientele and the extent to which the firm uses 
engagement letters and other loss prevention measures (Kenny, 2000). As a result of 
changes in the auditor’s client portfolio due to new clients being accepted, it is important 
that the auditor update the insurer’s understanding of the auditor’s portfolio of clients and 
related risk exposure. This study argues that a review of indemnity policies and insurance 
levels is an important step in the engagement decision process, in order to ensure that the 
auditor is not exposed to insurance risk in the event of litigation or other claim related 
events.  
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Reported litigation against auditors in South Africa has been limited to date if compared 
to that of other countries (Gloeck, 2003). This limited reporting to the public, does 
however not challenge the importance of indemnity insurance considerations during the 
engagement decision procedures of registered auditors in medium practice.  
 
Some indicators such as a client’s inability to pay their fees or generally unprofitable 
clients may have legal and financial consequences to a practice over a long term period as 
stated in section 2.2.2.2. (St. Pierre & Anderson, 1984: 242-263; Palmrose, 1986: 97-110), 
and hence the changes in behavior of current clients and characteristics of new clients are 
likely to impact on required levels of indemnity insurance. 
 
This study will therefore consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice 
review their indemnity insurance levels during the engagement decision process as studied 
in section 5.10.24.  
 
4.3.5.4. Staffing considerations during the engagement decision process 
 
Staff should not be allocated to assignments simply based on availability, but rather on 
industry skills, training and experience. In terms of the International Standard on Auditing 
220 Revised – Quality Control for Audit Work (hereafter ISA 220 (R)), the auditor should 
be satisfied that those performing the engagement collectively have the necessary 
professional expertise to perform the engagement (IFAC, 2004c: par .6). If the skills are 
not available, the auditor should make use of third party specialists. Certain procedures 
need to be performed in order to assess the competence and work performed by such third 
parties (Puttick & Van Esch, 1992: 56). 
 
Past studies have indicated that an important factor associated with expectation formation 
is prior experience. Wofford and Goodwin (1990: 603-612) concluded that the higher the 
risk of public negative exposure an audit firm has towards a particular client, the more 
likely that the auditor will increase audit procedures in order to attend to these negative 
factors. This results in auditors not only being thorough in the identification of risk 
processes, but also in an improvement in the planning of audit procedures. It thus follows 
that a negative experience with similar clients than a prospective client, will impact on the 
engagement decision process. Similarly, Mittal and Ross (1998: 298-324) concluded that a 
negative view of a client is likely to result in increased planning and audit procedures, 
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specifically related to high risk clients. Mittal and Ross however indicated that this 
negative evaluation is likely to be based on past experience with the particular client rather 
than a first time risk assessment (1998: 298-324). 
 
The need for staff with the appropriate professional expertise and sufficient experience to 
audit certain clients is best summarised in ISA 220 (R). According to ISA 220 (R), the 
appropriate capabilities and competence expected of the engagement team as a whole 
should include the following (IFAC, 2004c: par .20): 
? “An understanding of, and practical experience with, audits engagements of a 
similar nature and complexity through appropriate training and participation. 
? An understanding of professional standards and regulatory and legal requirements. 
? Appropriate technical knowledge, including knowledge of relevant information 
technology. 
? Knowledge of relevant industries in which the client operates. 
? Ability to apply professional judgement. 
? An understanding of the firm’s quality control policies and procedures.” 
 
As commented on in section 1.1.3.1., registered auditors in medium practice have 
significant difficulty in attracting staff, retaining them, and also in affording the high cost 
of training once employed. The SAICA pricing survey performed in 2005 related to firms 
in small and medium audit practice has highlighted this fact, as training costs and time 
spent on training are significantly higher in firms in medium audit practice than firms in 
small audit practice (SAICA, 2005b: 33).  
 
Staffing considerations related to registered auditors in medium practice are impacted by 
several factors in order to achieve the objective of maintaining resources that have 
appropriate skills and experience (Ryan, 2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1.3. and section 
2.7. The importance of prior experience when considering the staffing of assignments 
have been concluded upon by Wofford and Goodwin (1990: 603-612). 
  
As commented on by Ryan (2005a-d), the lack of qualified black accountants place 
significant strain on the future resourcing of all audit practices, not only registered 
auditors in medium practice. This however, coupled with commercial pressures within the 
profession as concluded on in section 1.1.3.1. are likely to highlight the importance of 
BEE to registered auditors in medium practice as suggested by Ryan (2005a-d). 
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Puttick and Van Esch (1992: 56) and ISA 220 (R) comment on the use of third party 
specialists in instances where certain skills may not be available internally to the firm in 
order to appropriately audit a potential client. Considering cost constraints of firms in 
medium audit practice as highlighted by Houston (1999: 70-86) and Ryan (2005a-d), 
registered auditors in medium practice may further be impacted by cost constraints when 
considering the use of third party specialists. 
 
This study will consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice consider 
using third party specialists and appropriate staffing resources on high risk assignments 
during their engagement decisions as stated in section 5.10.25. 
 
4.3.5.5. Communication of risk mitigating strategies 
 
Audit firms communicate their strategies concerning the desired composition of their 
clients to their employees, and they are expected to engage these desired clients and to 
prevent such clients from leaving the audit firm (Van Dijk & Jansman, 1994: 4). At the 
same time, risk management strategies of a firm should also be communicated to all staff 
members if an attempt is to be made at uniform and consistent client acceptance 
procedures. The use of firm policy and standardised decision aids during the engagement 
decision process is likely to improve the decision process, and is directly dependent on 
training and communication provided to staff in this regard. Rabinowitz (2003) concluded 
in this regard, that employees cannot be expected to think in the context of an 
organisation’s objectives without structure and at least some initial guidance, through 
training. 
 
The existence of risk management strategies in registered auditors in medium practice 
may be impacted by concerns regarding cost as highlighted by Houston (1999: 70-86) and 
Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1. and section 2.7. It is therefore important to test the 
prevalence of such policies and procedures amongst firms in medium audit practice. 
Against this background this study will question the existence and communication of said 
risk management practices within firms in medium audit practice as stated in 5.10.26. 
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4.3.6. Performing further procedures related to identified risks 
 
In terms of ISA 330, the auditor needs to respond to risks identified as follows (IFAC, 2003c: 
par .3): 
 
“In order to reduce Audit Risk to an acceptably low level, the auditor should 
determine overall responses to assessed risks at the financial statement level, and 
should design and perform further audit procedures to respond to assessed risks at the 
assertion level. The overall responses and the nature, timing, and extent of the further 
audit procedures are matters for the professional judgement of the auditor.” 
 
This guidance would suggest that even during the engagement decision process, the auditor 
should reflect on an initial assessment of AR, and evaluate the need to design specific 
procedures to mitigate the assessed risk level. ISA 330 further states that responses related to 
the overall audit may include emphasising the need to the audit team to maintain professional 
skepticism during audit procedures. It may also include assigning more experienced or skilled 
staff to certain audit procedures. Responses related to risks identified at an assertion level need 
to be addressed through the design of specific substantive or control procedures (IFAC, 2003c: 
par .4-7).  
 
Performing additional audit procedures to support high risk areas following an initial risk 
assessment are required by ISA 330, however this does not guarantee that auditors comply 
with this requirement. It is therefore necessary to determine to what extent registered auditors 
in medium practice consider such additional audit procedures during their engagement 
decision processes related to high risk audit assignments as considered in section 5.10.27. 
 
4.3.7. Evaluating the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence obtained in order to 
support the engagement decision 
 
The evaluation of the sufficiency and appropriateness of the evidence obtained to support the 
engagement decision is one of the most important audit procedures during the engagement 
decision process. Not only should sufficient evidence be obtained as studied in section 4.3.7.1. 
and section 4.3.7.2., but it should be well documented as noted in section 4.3.7.3., and be 
subjected to quality control procedures as concluded in section 4.3.7.4. 
  
 106
4.3.7.1. Considering the quality of audit evidence 
 
Based on the findings of Wooten (2003) and Bell, et al. (2005: 1), quality of evidence to 
support audit decisions is critically important. If one considers those concerns relating 
to cost and limited systems that firms in medium audit practice in particular need to 
deal with (Houston, 1999: 70-86, Wooten, 2003; Ryan, 2005a-d), then it is important to 
reflect on current thinking around improving the quality of audit evidence, as registered 
auditors in medium practice may be exposed to risk. 
 
Recent thinking aimed at improving the quality of evidence has been commented on by 
Bell, et al. (2005: 5-6). They argue that the auditor’s assessment of risk during an audit 
is impacted by the company’s financial reporting process. Bell, et al. argues that 
information is presented regarding the entity business state (hereafter EBS); this 
information is then transformed through management information intermediaries 
(hereafter MII) into management business representations (hereafter MBR). Finally, 
Bell, et al. argue that the reliability of information will be dependent on the manner in 
which information regarding these three stages of the reporting process is corroborated 
by one another. This process of evidence evaluation is referred to as triangulation. Bell, 
et al. defines triangulation as: “the strategy and act of acquiring and evaluating 
complimentary evidence” (2005: 7). 
 
Bell, et al. (2005: 1) argue that auditors of public companies in the current environment 
are involved in “decision-making journeys” in as far as decisions are based on “well-
justified beliefs”; the latter based on evidence obtained from different fundamental 
sources. Bell, et al. clearly consider fraud as they distinguish evidence between that 
which can be distorted by management, and that which is not under the control of 
management. The notion of professional scepticism is highlighted when such a 
distinction is made. 
 
Bell, et al. argue that although the AR model is still applicable, enhancements can be 
made in its application. This is based on their view that in order to improve audit 
quality, the model should not be applied on a substitute basis when reviewing the 
elements of IR, DR and CR, but rather on a complimentary basis by obtaining evidence 
under all the assumptions to such an extent as to eliminate non-sampling risk. This 
argument stems from the fact that the AR model’s application to sampling, risks the 
possibility that a material misstated item may not be included in the selected sample 
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(2005: 19). They suggest an approach to the application of the AR model that will 
substantially decrease non-sampling risk. This contention is made on the basis of 
obtaining triangulated evidence related to EBS, MII and MBR as defined (2005: 19). 
Bell, et al. argue that professional judgement remains the essence of auditing (2005: 
20): “Professional judgement refers to judgements of persons with experience, 
extensive education and/or specialised training within a profession.” 
 
It is this very application of professional judgement in which Bell, et al. argue; 
boundaries exist between knowledge (known facts) and beliefs (states of minds about 
facts). Bell, et al. continue to argue that auditors apply professional skepticism to facts 
in order to develop justifiable beliefs – mental models that consist of organised 
knowledge, integrated data, patterns of cues and rules for linking clues (Bell, et al. 
2005: 24). This process is referred to as “evidence driven, belief-based risk 
assessment”, and suggests that all evidence that is obtained is subject to belief 
formation and revision (Bell, et al. 2005: 25). It is in this context that Bell, et al. argue 
that triangulation of audit evidence may lead to an improvement in audit quality and a 
reduction in non-sample risk. 
 
In essence, triangulation is an evidence gathering strategy similar to observation, 
inspection and others; however it requires corroboration of evidence and the matching 
of evidence with belief-based scepticism. There is no authoritative research on the 
existence, application and success of triangulation as an evidence gathering strategy 
within auditing. However, it is noted that recent improvements to ISA’s relating to 
increased requirements around obtaining an understanding of a client’s business and 
documentation of audit evidence, would suggest that there would be merit in 
triangulation as a method to conclude on the sufficiency of evidence obtained. 
 
Following the publicised corporate collapses and accounting scandals of the early 
2000’s, the IAASB issued several new and revised auditing standards, all in an attempt 
to improve the quality of auditing (Bell, et al. 2005: 3). The policing of audit quality has 
also evolved from the establishment of an audit firm inspection programme in the USA 
under the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter PCAOB) (Bell, et al. 
2005: 4). In South Africa, the PAAB has established a similar program of firm review 
that commences in 2006 (Sehoole, 2005, Temkin, 2006:1). 
 
Several other studies have also considered individual aspects of evaluating audit 
evidence. Ricchiute (1999: 155-171) concluded on previous research that indicated that 
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the memories of work-paper preparers might be biased toward evidence consistent with 
their prior decisions.  The reviewer of work impacted by such bias, if exposed to the 
same set of evidence, can mitigate the bias by evaluating inconsistent evidence based on 
his or her own past experience. When they are however exposed only to the evidence 
that the work-paper preparer recognises and documents, the reviewer might make 
decisions biased in the direction of the preparer’s conclusion, since not all of the 
inconsistent evidence is documented (Ricchiute, 1999: 155-171).  
 
In relation to the engagement decision, it is inferred from Ricchiute’s study that the 
completion or use of decision aids during the decision process (that are standard in most 
audit methodologies), may expose auditors to the risk that an inexperienced staff 
member’s evaluation of ER, may in fact not necessarily be corrected or amended during 
the review process by an audit manager or practitioner due to the impact of biases. This 
clearly indicates an increased risk to the audit practice of making an ill-advised decision 
on client acceptance. 
 
 
As acknowledged by Bell, et al. (2005: 20), the use of professional judgement remains 
prevalent to the final outcome of any engagement decision. This study will therefore 
reflect on the use of professional judgement by registered auditors in medium practice 
during their engagement decisions as considered in section 5.10.28. 
 
4.3.7.2. The use of decision aids and its impact on audit quality 
 
It is important to consider the differences between quantitative and qualitative decision 
aids through reflecting on their respective advantages and disadvantages, as these may 
have a direct impact on the quality of audit work that support the engagement decision 
process.  
 
Advantages of quantitative models include the following (Deshmukh, 1997): 
? Questionnaires constrain auditors to respond in a yes or no fashion, whereas 
quantitative models are more flexible as they allow for probabilities; 
? Quantitative models allow for a uniform evaluation of all clients by all 
practitioners; and 
? Quantitative models provide documented support for the engagement decision 
process and related conclusions. 
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Disadvantages of quantitative models include the following (Deshmukh, 1997): 
? Quantitative models are dependant on the factors that have been included in its 
design; 
? All evaluations of factors still remain a judgemental conclusion from the evaluator; 
? Most evaluation models are focused at client business risk and AR factors, with 
limited focus on auditors business risk; and 
? These models determine measure or monitor the auditors motivating factors that 
impact the engagement decision i.e. commercial, professional and organisational 
motivators. 
 
The use of qualitative decision aids such as checklists has several advantages. These 
include the following (Deppe, 1992): 
? Checklists may prove to be more efficient as those critical issues to be considered 
are specified in the document; 
? A carefully developed document will avoid the cost related to performing 
unnecessary procedures which in turn will increase profitability and efficiency;  
? Checklists ensure that procedures deemed important to the client acceptance 
decision are considered for every client consistently; and 
? A carefully constructed client acceptance questionnaire is likely to provide 
sufficient record of decision making, should any legal action arise. 
 
Qualitative decision aids also have disadvantages (Deppe, 1992). These include:  
? A generic checklist can not be applicable to all clients which implies that such 
questionnaires will continue to require specific customisation;  
? Performing unnecessary procedures may prove inefficient and expensive; 
? Failure to perform certain procedures could be costly and embarrassing; 
? The completion of a checklist can become a mechanical process that poses the risk 
that practitioners may not identify significant risks that may not be covered in a 
checklist; 
? Any record of decision-making may in a legal dispute be used as evidence to be 
criticised as the only basis of decision-making to the extent that it has been 
documented and completed; and 
? Developing and maintaining checklists can be an expensive practice. 
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The advantages and disadvantages of both quantitative and qualitative decision aids as 
concluded on by Deppe (1992) and Deskmukh (1997) needs to be considered by the 
auditor as they decide on their audit procedures to support the engagement decision 
process. The prevalence of the use of such decision aids is directly related to these 
advantages and disadvantages and hence the use of such aids will be studied as stated in 
section 5.10.30. 
 
4.3.7.3. Documentation of engagement decision procedures 
 
ISAE 3000 (R) requires the auditor to only accept an engagement if the subject matter 
(what needs to be audited) is the responsibility of another party (IFAC, 2005b: par .7).  
The auditor should accept the engagement only if the subject matter is identifiable and 
in a form that can be subjected to evidence gathering procedures, and the auditor is not 
aware of any reason for believing that a conclusion expressing a high level of assurance 
about the subject matter based on suitable criteria cannot be expressed. ISA 230 – 
Documentation (hereafter ISA 230) requires the following (IFAC, 1996b: par .2): 
 
“The auditor should document matters that are important in providing evidence 
to support the audit opinion and evidence that the audit was carried out in 
accordance with auditing standards.” 
 
During September 2005, IFAC issued the International Standard on Auditing 230 
(Revised) – Audit Documentation that is applicable for audits after 15 June 2006. The 
most notable amendments following from ISA 230 (R) relates to the completion of 
engagement files within 60 days after the reporting date of an audit, and the need to 
establish policies on the safe custody and retention of audit files (IFAC, 2005b: par .26-
.28). 
 
Puttick and Van Esch (1992: 145), state that working papers should be kept to provide 
evidence that the auditor conducted the audit with the requisite degree of care and skill, 
and to support the opinion on the financial position of the client. The assessment of ER 
should thus be well documented by the auditor in terms of ISA 230 (IFAC, 1996b: par 
.42-43). All factors and considerations and the auditor’s response thereto should be 
documented in detail (Puttick & Van Esch, 1992: 146) 
 
  
 111
According to Bedard and Graham (2002: 1), once risk factors are identified and 
documented, auditors can direct evidence-gathering procedures to address potential 
sources of misstatement. In addition to facilitating audit planning and pricing, 
documentation of client risk factors also provides an important means of 
communication between audit team members, enabling them to focus on key issues. 
Thus, risk identification at the planning stage, is important to audit effectiveness and 
efficiency. The risk factors found at this stage become the context in which auditors 
view evidence gained subsequently in the course of the engagement (Houston, et al. 
1999: 281; Johnstone, 2000: 5). It is common practice among the current Big Four audit 
practices to maintain a checklist relating to the assessment of fraud, the control 
environment, and ER (Colbert, et al. 1996: 55; NYSCPA, 2003). 
 
It is important that the most senior person on the engagement team, namely the auditor, 
reviews and concludes on all documentation with regards to the assessment of ER and 
the engagement decision. Johnstone (2001: 5) argues that once the practitioner 
identifies a contentious issue, the practitioner should involve highly knowledgeable 
auditors in the resolution and negotiation process, as these individuals are most likely to 
respond by generating multiple alternative methods of managing and minimising the 
ER.  
 
Documentation regarding the assessment of the engagement decision should include the 
following according to Odendaal (2002): 
? A detailed description of the nature of the client and the industry that it operates 
in; 
? Third party communication relating to the potential client; 
? Detailed audit procedures for the assessment of ER as well as a response to all 
those risks identified; 
? A risk management evaluation; and 
? An engagement letter. 
 
The final report of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness in the USA concluded that some 
firms are very effective in considering items related to risk, which includes the risk of 
loss or injury to an audit practice as a result of litigation, adverse publicity, or other 
events arising in connection with audits of financial statements. For example, some of 
the firms used sophisticated computer systems that quantitatively assess ER (Panel on 
Audit Effectiveness, 2001).  
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The Panel also recommends that audit firms include qualitative judgements in their risk 
assessments, including potentially derogatory information about the client entity, its 
owners and management. This panel specifically made reference to the continued need 
to support firms in small and medium audit practice in developing procedures around 
the evaluation of ER, due to their limited resources (Panel on Audit Effectiveness, 
2001). 
 
The need to support registered auditors in medium practice in the development of 
engagement decision procedures was identified by the Panel of Audit Effectiveness as 
stated in section 2.4. (Carpenter & Mahoney; 2001: 3). Cost sensitivities in registered 
auditors in medium practice, highlighted in section 1.1. and section 2.7. by Houston 
(1999: 70-86) and Ryan (2005a-d) may also impact on the extent to which registered 
auditors in medium practice evaluate ER. Considering these findings, this study will 
reflect on the documentation of engagement decisions made by registered auditors in 
medium practice in section 5.10.29.  
 
A further concern as raised by Johnstone (2001: 5) relates to the experience level of the 
person who performs and completes any related decision aids to the engagement 
decision process. She argues that this process needs to be performed by the most senior 
person on the engagement team, usually the auditor. This study will thus reflect on the 
current practices of registered auditors in medium practice in this regard, reflecting on 
the extent of the involvement of the auditor, manager and other staff members in the 
engagement decision process as stated in section 5.10.29. 
 
4.3.7.4. Quality control during the engagement decision process 
 
Quality control is central to any risk management strategy in evaluating the sufficiency 
and appropriateness of evidence that would support any engagement decision. The need 
for quality control over audit judgement decisions such as the engagement decision has 
been concluded on as early as 1992 by Steele. According to Steele (1992: 23), quality 
control is the process undertaken under a strategy for managing risks as quality control 
embraces: 
? A business culture that promotes professional integrity and the reputation of the 
auditor; 
? Sound policies around the selection, training and motivating of staff;  
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? The development of standardised procedures, documentation and manuals in 
accordance with best practice and auditing standards; and 
? The use of peer and second practitioner-review. 
 
Steele argues that at the completion of any quality control checklist, the auditor should 
ensure that (Steele, 1992: 23): 
? All of the significant risks have been identified; 
? Practitioner and staff resources have been matched appropriately against high risk 
situations; 
? Strategies that minimise risk through increased audit coverage, through the use of 
industry experience, or through disclosure is achieved; and 
? The information gained will be able to eliminate risk. 
 
Colbert, et al. (1996: 55) state that quality control procedures within an audit practice 
should prescribe, that if an engagement’s risk is assessed at an unacceptably high level, 
the auditor should not accept the engagement. At the same time, Colbert, et al. (1996: 
56) acknowledge that the auditor’s decision regarding ER remains a matter of 
professional judgement. The acceptance of the audit engagement should be approved by 
at least one other practitioner (Steele, 1992: 24). 
 
It thus follows that quality review of the engagement decision is a key risk management 
practice as it ensures the balanced application of behavioural motivational drivers, a 
review of risk assessment and judgement, as well as a review of audit procedures and 
documentation pertaining to the engagement decision process.   
 
ISA 220 (R) provides specific guidance relating to the quality review of the engagement 
decision similar to that provided by ISQC 1 (IFAC, 2004c: par .14-18). ISQC 1 requires 
that the engagement practitioner must be satisfied that appropriate procedures regarding 
the engagement decision have been followed and that evidence and conclusions reached 
are appropriate and well documented. ISQC 1 continues to provide specific guidance to 
practitioners on policies and procedures needed in relation to the acceptance and 
continuance of clients; establishing firm policies on human resources; assignment of 
responsibility within engagement teams; policies to ensure engagement performance; 
and establishing policies and procedures around consultation on assignments (IFAC, 
2004a: par .28-56). 
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The views of Houston (1999: 70-86) and Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1. and 
section 2.7. that argue that registered auditors in medium practice are likely to 
experience difficulty in monitoring complex systems of controls and review, such as 
quality control due to cost concerns, will be tested by this study, as compliance with 
ISQC 1 (2004a) as an auditing standard is mandatory and may reflect on the quality of 
audit work and the existence of policies and procedures within firms in medium audit 
practice. The objective of central or peer review, being the review of engagement 
decisions made by one practitioner through another, is to improve the quality of decision 
making and to eliminate threats to objective decision making (Steele, 1992: 24). The 
existence of a lack of such peer review is thus likely to impact on the quality of decision 
making during engagement decisions.  
 
Systems of quality control as studied by Steele (1992: 23) are central to risk 
management. The existence of such quality control policies, although mandated by 
ISQC 1 (2004a), may however be dependent on the ability of registered auditors in 
medium practice to implement and maintain such functions. The possibility that quality 
control is not being performed, is based on views of Houston (1999: 70-86) and Ryan 
(2005a-d) who argue that registered auditors in medium practice are likely to experience 
difficulty in complying with complex systems of controls and review such as quality 
control due to cost concerns and staffing constraints.  
 
This study will further consider the use of peer and second practitioner reviews of 
engagement decision procedures as applied by registered auditors in medium practice as 
stated in section 5.10.31. 
 
4.3.7.5. Establishing the terms of engagement 
 
ISAE 3000 (R) (IFAC, 2005b: par .10) and ISA 210 (R) (IFAC, 2004b: par .5) requires 
that the auditor should agree on the terms of the assurance engagement with the party 
who engages the practitioner through the use of an engagement letter (IFAC, 2005b: par 
.10). It is important from an audit scope and legal liability perspective, that the scope 
and conditions of employment be specified upfront, through the issuance of an 
engagement letter (Puttick & Van Esch, 1992: 56).  
 
Practice Alert 2003-3 provides clear guidance that a company should be instructed by a 
firm that it should not make public a firm’s appointment as auditors until the auditors 
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have completed their engagement decision procedures. In several instances time 
pressures may be of concern and firms may provide provisional acceptance, but any 
outstanding acceptance procedures should first be completed before final acceptance 
and the signature of a binding engagement letter (AICPA, 2004). 
 
Practice Alert 2003-3 further notes that once it has been decided during the engagement 
decision process not to accept a client, a clear communication should be issued to the 
client stating the non-acceptance and date thereof, and a statement that the firm did not 
assume any responsibilities for any reporting requirements as it had not accepted the 
appointment (AICPA, 2004). 
 
As the issuance of engagements letters is such an important risk management practice 
(Puttick & Van Esch, 1992: 56), this study will consider the prevalence of the use of 
engagement letters by registered auditors in medium practice following their 
engagement decisions as stated in section 5.10.32. Communicating the outcome of all 
engagement decisions, including to those clients who have not been accepted is a 
further risk management procedure (AICPA, 2004) of which the use thereof by 
registered auditors in medium practice will be considered in section 5.10.32.  
 
 
4.4. Conclusion on the audit procedures performed by registered auditors in medium practice 
during the engagement decision process 
  
From a review of guidance and previous studies related to audit procedures that need to be performed 
during the engagement decisions of registered auditors in medium practice, it is concluded that: 
? Auditors are likely to follow a process similar to that as established in ISAE 3000 (R) aimed at 
obtaining sufficient audit evidence to support their decisions that include the following: 
o Obtaining an understanding of the entity’s business, reporting practices and internal 
controls; 
o Enquires from parties internal and external to the entity to support the latter understanding; 
o Assessing the AR and related elements pertaining to the prospective client; 
o Assessing Business risk of the client as well as AR to the client; and 
o Assessing FR. 
? It is further concluded that once risk assessment has been completed, the auditor will evaluate a 
response to the assessed risk that is likely to include the development of risk mitigating strategies 
such as: 
o Adjusting audit fees to reflect the assessed risk of the assignment; 
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o Considering the firm’s policies and procedures around client refusals; 
o A review of indemnity insurances; and 
o Appropriate staffing of assignments. 
? It is likely that, on high risk assignments, the auditor will perform additional substantive work 
during the engagement decision phase to attempt to decrease those high risk areas in relation to the 
engagement decision itself, to an acceptable level. 
? The study further indicates that such engagement decisions will be subject to quality review and 
engagement terms must be documented in an engagement letter. 
? Lastly, from this study, it is concluded that the documentation of the entire engagement decision 
process is key in evaluating the evidence on which this decision is ultimately based. 
 
These conclusions on audit procedures performed during the engagement decision process, along with 
those related to auditor predisposition as concluded on in chapter 3, will be incorporated in the 
research design as set out in chapter 5. 
 
In order to identify the engagement decision process as exercised by auditors, previous studies and 
professional guidance related to the engagement decision, as well as audit procedures, were considered 
in chapter 2; chapter 3 and chapter 4. Based on the conclusions of these, the key areas of 
predisposition, risk assessment and audit procedures were identified as those areas that need to be 
tested through empirical research to conclude on the stated research objectives. 
From the previous studies and professional guidance studied in Chapter 2 to Chapter 4, 
 those areas that require research to support the research objectives  
are built into the quantitative research method in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5  THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY APPLIED 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Chapter 5 provides the basis for the design of the research methodology of this study and integrates 
those research objectives that have been identified for study. This has been achieved through 
considering those motivational factors that have been identified in chapter 2; chapter 3 and chapter 4 
and drafting specific research questions in section 5.10. that would test the impact of such 
motivational drivers on the engagement decisions of auditors on medium practice. 
 
A quantitative approach has been applied in this study through the use of a research questionnaire. The 
questionnaire was drafted with the assistance of Statcon in terms of layout and content. The target 
population, being registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa, has been defined as practices 
with more than five but sixty or less practitioners. The questionnaire was presented to a selected 
number of qualified practitioners in order to review the content for logical layout and validity. 
Following the finalisation of the design of the research questionnaire, the questionnaire was mailed to 
the target population consisting of 281 practitioners in firms in medium audit practice as defined. 
 
Questionnaires were treated anonymously and all responses received were provided to Statcon once 
the notice date for submission expired for statistical analysis as provided in chapter 6. 
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5.1. Introduction to the research methodology 
 
This chapter considers the research methodology applied in this study of the engagement decision of 
registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa. It continues to define the research population 
as being registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa; considers the objective of the study 
and analyses the research population that needs to be identified and selected.  
 
The research area and primary research objectives of this study have been presented in section 1.1.1. 
In order to conclude on these research objectives, several motivational drivers have been identified in 
chapter 2; chapter 3 and chapter 4. These research questions have been drafted in section 5.10. with 
reference to the motivational factors identified in order to determine to what extent registered auditors 
in medium practice in South Africa would consider such drivers. The structure of the questionnaire as 
presented in section 5.9. has been designed with the specific intention of testing the research 
objectives as stated in section 1.1.1.  
 
This chapter continues to integrate these secondary research objectives into the research tool, the 
research questionnaire. Appropriate questions to research these objectives are presented for inclusion 
in the research design. 
 
5.2. Objective of the empirical study 
 
As stated in chapter 1, the objective of this study is to obtain an understanding of the engagement 
decision process as exercised by registered auditors in medium practice within South Africa. The 
empirical study will research and conclude on the stated research objectives as per section 1.1.1. 
Analysis of the research results aims to provide meaningful insight into current engagement decision 
practices applied by registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa. 
 
5.3. Defining the research population 
 
Before the research population could be identified, the following was considered: 
? Audit practices are not classified according to their size, other than the general reference to the 
Big Four, being the four largest international auditing firms (Wooten, 2003). In some countries 
such as the USA and the UK, regulation allows for the publication of revenues per audit firm, 
allowing deductions as to the size of various firms to be made easily. In South Africa 
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regulation or information is limited and hence the size of audit firms in terms of revenue is not 
determinable. An ad-hoc study by SAICA in South Africa as referred to in section 1.1.3.2. 
provides some input in relation to revenue earnings of small and medium practices, however no 
regulated information is available on a consistent basis in relation to revenue earnings of 
auditors. 
? Very little statistical data is freely available regarding audit firms in South Africa (Gloeck, et 
al. 1999: 1). The only source of information on audit firms that is publicly available relates to 
the database of registered auditors as regulated by the PAAB (the IRBA subsequent to 1 April 
2006).  
 
The relative size of an audit firm in South Africa has thus been deduced from the number of 
practitioners registered, for the purpose of this study. Accordingly, a classification applicable 
to audit firms operating within South Africa has been defined as follows: 
? Firms that have more than sixty practitioners – firm in large audit practice; 
? Firms that have five or more, but sixty or less practitioners – firm in medium audit 
practice; and 
? Firms that have less than five practitioners – firm in small audit practice. 
 
The research population of this study is hence defined as those audit practices that have five or 
more but sixty or less practitioners. 
 
5.4. Selecting the research population 
 
Table 5.1. that follows hereafter, details the number of Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ registered 
with the PAAB as per the PAAB database (PAAB, 2004) on 5 September 2005. From Table 5.1. 
hereafter, it is clear that even if the next 24 firms in South Africa had to merge, they would, based on 
number of practitioners, only make up 66% of the practitioners of the current Big Four firms. This is 
consistent with international findings that indicate and conclude on the significant market domination 
by the Big Four of the audit industry (USGAO, 2003). 
 
In table 5.1. that follows hereafter, the annotation # represents APF Inc, an association of firms, that 
consists of 27 practitioners from other firms. No information is available for those practices marked 
with an *. 
 
The basis for the selection criteria of registered auditors in medium practice being between five and 60 
or less practitioners, was designed to exclude the Big Four due to their dominant market position as a 
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first tier group, and to exclude single practitioners as their needs are, to a great extent, catered for and 
considered by the SAICA Small Practices Committee (SAICA, 2005a). 
 
     2005   1997   
    Practitioners Offices Practitioners Offices 
1 PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. 214 20 262 46 
2 Deloitte. 160 12 162 18 
3 KPMG Inc. 146 12 141 22 
4 Ernst and Young 77 9 115 22 
5 Fisher Hoffman PKF 59 11 66 16 
6 Moores Rowland 43 7 40 5 
7 Grant Thornton Kessel Feinstein 40 5 74 8 
8 BDO Spencer Steward 39 5 44 7 
9 SAB&T Inc. 21 5 * * 
10 RSM Inc. 21 6 * * 
11 Gobodo Inc. 16 5 11 4 
12 SizweNtsaluba VSP Inc. 13 2 * * 
13 Lloyd Viljoen 10 4 * * 
14 BGR Inc. 10 6 * * 
15 Theron du Plesis 10 6 10 7 
16 Enslins 9 6 * * 
17 Ngubane & Co. 8 3 * * 
18 Nexia Levit Kirson 7 2 * * 
19 Vos, Steyn and Van Zyl Inc. 7 4 * * 
20 Ramathe 5 3 * * 
21 Baker Tilly 5 1 * * 
22 Claassen Stone 5 3 * * 
23 Alan H English & Co. 5 2 * * 
24 Cecil Kiplin & Co. 5 3 * * 
25 Charteris and Barnes 5 2 * * 
26 Marais and Crowther 5 2 * * 
27 Nkonki Pierce 5 2 * * 
28 APF Inc. # 1 * * 
 
Table 5.1. Audit practices in South Africa ranked according to the number of practitioners 
 
It is noted that the defined population has been applied to those audit firms that operate in South 
Africa. The basis of the research objectives and questions as summarised in section 5.10., has been 
based on international studies in chapters 2; chapter 3 and chapter 4 as well as South African 
regulatory and statutory guidance.  
 
Section 7.2. will reflect on the findings of this research in relation to those international studies and 
professional guidance that served as basis for the design of the research questions and their 
comparison to the South African profession. 
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5.5. Reaching the population 
 
The method of communication selected to be used to reach the population was postal mail. The 
contact details of the population were obtained from the register maintained by the PAAB (the IRBA 
subsequent to 1 April 2006) on http://www.paab.co.za. This process was followed as it was argued 
that postal mail would be more personal, would instil a sense of importance (rather than an e-mail that 
may be seen as generic considering the fact that SAICA communicates via e-mail on almost a daily 
basis to its members) and would provide the confidential environment that is required for a study of 
this nature. The individual questionnaires were mailed to the practice address of each of the 
practitioners registered with the PAAB on 5 September 2005 as provided by the register maintained by 
PAAB. 
 
5.6. Ethical considerations relating to the research 
 
The research topic of this study is sensitive in nature and could possible be impacted by practitioners’ 
academic knowledge related to applicable statutory and professional requirements, rather than actual 
practice. As a result, confidentiality and anonymous response are key elements to this research.  
 
Validation tests are included in the structure of the research questionnaires. It should however be noted 
that in relation to research questions pertaining to professional guidance, practitioners may be 
influenced in their responses by their knowledge of such guidance.  Thus the level of consideration 
may not be a fair reflection on their actual compliance with such guidance, as researchers such as 
Gloeck (2003) as stated in section 4.3. indicated that practitioners do not always comply with 
professional guidance such as auditing standards, despite their knowledge of such guidance. An actual 
review of engagement decisions made by such practitioners may possibly result in different levels of 
consideration and compliance, based on these findings by Gloeck (2003). All research responses were 
collected centrally and provided directly to the Statistical Consultation Service department of the 
University of Johannesburg (hereafter Statcon) for analysis.  
 
5.7. Method and stages of the research 
 
A quantitative method has been selected for use in this study by means of research questionnaires. 
This study consisted of the following four distinct stages:  
? The first stage was to develop an understanding of the engagement decision process, risk 
assessments and related audit procedures in order to support the research objectives of this 
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study and to assist in identifying those areas that need to be researched through empirical 
research. This understanding flows from the conclusions reached in chapters 2; chapter 3 and 
chapter 4. 
? The second stage identified the research population of this study through defining the criteria 
of a firm in medium audit practice and identifying the practices that suit these criteria. 
? The third stage involved the drafting of the research questionnaire used in this study. Annexure 
A contains an example of the introduction letter that was mailed with each questionnaire and 
Annexure B contains an example of the questionnaire provided to each participant.  Research 
questionnaires were not identifiable and thus ensured anonymity of response. This 
questionnaire was focused on evaluating current engagement decision practices of registered 
auditors in medium practice against the stated hypotheses that served as framework for the 
research questionnaire. Statcon assisted in the design of the research questionnaire. 
Respondents were given a month to respond. The questionnaires were mailed on 5 September 
2005, and a response was requested by no later than 5 October 2005. 
? The final stage entailed the analysis of the research data as presented and commented on in 
chapter 6 and concluded on in chapter 7. Based on the stages of the research of this study, it is 
noted that the test-date of this study is 5 October 2005. Hence, any conclusions reached by this 
study would be applicable to the practices of registered auditors in medium practice at 5 
October 2005 and would be impacted by statutory regulations and auditing standards 
applicable at the time. 
 
5.8. Communication of the research results 
 
The results of this study will be communicated to participants on individual request. A final copy of 
this study will also be provided to the SAICA Small Practices Committee and to the IRBA. 
 
5.9. Designing the research questionnaire 
 
The study of available research is an essential part of the research design (Yin, 1994: 19-20). The 
study of literature related to the engagement decision served to ensure that the study started at the 
highest possible level, and provided guidance in determining what data should be collected and the 
strategies for analysing this data. The purpose of this literature review was not to determine the 
answers about what is known about the engagement decision process, but to develop more astute 
questions (Yin, 1994: 19-20). 
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In order to design the research questionnaire, the secondary research objectives that require study have 
been identified throughout chapter 3 and chapter 4. Factors that are likely to have an impact on the 
predisposition and therefore the engagement decision processes of registered auditors in medium 
practice have been identified following from conclusions related to prior studies on elements of the 
engagement decision as well as professional guidance. In order to conclude on the impact of such 
secondary research objectives specifically pertaining to registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa, research questions have been compiled for inclusion in the research questionnaire. The 
final format of the research questionnaire (Annexure C to this study) has been drafted by classifying 
these factors into groupings as set out in section 5.9.1. to section 5.9.5. 
 
5.9.1. Personal data of the respondents 
 
The confidentiality of this questionnaire was of utmost importance due to the sensitive nature of 
the research subject. As a result, the questionnaires were not identifiable. The respondents were 
however asked to provide information relating to the size of the practice, the age of the 
respondent and the province within which the practice is located. Cross tabulation was 
performed by Statcon for both size of firm and age of respondent as commented on in chapter 6. 
 
5.9.2. Part 1 – Auditor predisposition 
 
Part one was designed to firstly determine if registered auditors in medium practice are biased to 
any professional, commercial or organisational motivators and to what extent. The questions 
were designed so that the respondent could answer if they are impacted as follows: 
? Not at all; 
? To a small extent; 
? To a moderate extent; or 
? To a large extent. 
 
The remainder of part one was designed to observe specific influences within each of these 
motivational drivers and to what extent they currently impact on registered auditors in medium 
practice. This will be used to highlight any possible risk exposures that may arise from the 
unbalanced application of motivational drivers during engagement decisions as highlighted by 
past studies and professional guidance. 
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5.9.3. Part 2 – Risk assessment 
 
The assessment of risk is central to any engagement decision and hence part 2 observes the 
current evaluation of risk practices of registered auditors in medium practice. The study attempts 
to observe the application of AR vs. the evaluation of business risk of the client and auditor, as a 
means to evaluate ER. The use of risk adaptation strategies are further considered as well as the 
extent of the use of decision aids by registered auditors in medium practice during risk 
assessment in the engagement decision process. The questions were designed so that the 
respondent could answer if they make use of these risk adaptation strategies as follows: 
? Not at all; 
? To a small extent; 
? To a moderate extent; or 
? To a large extent. 
 
5.9.4. Part 3 – Audit procedures 
 
Based on professional guidance as considered in chapter 3 and chapter 4, part 3 observes current 
engagement decision audit procedures applied by registered auditors in medium practice in an 
attempt to identify any possible risk areas that these practitioners may be exposed to. The 
questions were designed so that the respondent could answer if they make use of certain 
procedures as follows: 
? Not at all; 
? To a small extent; 
? To a moderate extent; or 
? To a large extent. 
 
5.9.5. Additional comments from respondents 
 
At the end of the questionnaire there was an opportunity to submit additional comments that 
would be considered by the researcher in the analysis and conclusion of the study.  
 
5.10.  Summary of research areas 
 
Section 5.10.1. to section 5.10.32. summarises those secondary research objectives identified in 
chapter 3 and chapter 4 for empirical research. For ease of use, the relevant research questions have 
been referenced to the underlying sections in chapters 3 and chapter 4 of this study. Each factor that 
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may impact auditor predisposition has been documented in such a manner that a research question 
could be formulated that would serve as basis to determine the respondents’ consideration of the 
relevant factor. It should be noted that these factors have been documented in chronological order as 
documented in chapter 3 and chapter 4, and that this order is different than the order of questions in 
the final research questionnaire, as the questions were ordered according to the parts of the 
questionnaire that they are relevant to, as set out in section 5.9. 
 
5.10.1. The impact of professional motivational drivers on the engagement decision 
process 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.2.: Professional motivational factors are 
impacted by a significant quantity of legislation that impacts on the activities of auditors, 
including the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973, the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act, no. 80 
of 1991, the Auditing Profession Bill (enacted on 16 January 2006) and the Public Audit Act, no. 
25 of 2004. Such legislation is principally concerned with matters that regulate an auditor’s duties 
and responsibilities, in order to maintain principles such as auditor independence.  
 
Research question as studied in section 6.3.: To what extent is your decision to accept a new 
client impacted by professional considerations, such as independence from the client? 
 
 
5.10.2. Statutory regulation of the external audit function and its impact on the 
engagement decision: The Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act, no. 80 of 1991, 
as amended 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.2.1.1.: The PAAA is the primary 
legislation that regulates the audit industry.   
 
Research question as studied in section 6.10.: To what extent do you consider compliance with 
the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act? 
 
 
5.10.3. Statutory regulation of the external audit function and its impact on the 
engagement decision: The Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973, as amended 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.2.1.2.: Although the Companies Act, no. 
61 of 1973 as amended, has been in existence for a number of years, its mere existence does not 
imply compliance or consideration thereof by registered auditors in medium practice.   
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Research question as studied in section 6.10.: To what extent do you consider compliance with 
the Companies Act? 
 
5.10.4. Statutory regulation of the external audit function and its impact on the 
engagement decision: The Public Audit Act, no. 25 of 2004 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.2.1.3.: Compliance with the Public Audit 
Act, no. 25 of 2004, is likely to be impacted by the extent that registered auditors in medium 
practice are exposed to subcontracting to the Auditor General. In order to qualify in terms of 
section 3 of the Public Audit Act, the firm needs to satisfy certain requirements related to 
qualifications and skills.   
 
Research question as studied in section 6.10.: To what extent do you consider compliance with 
the Public Audit Act? 
 
 
5.10.5. Statutory regulation of the external audit function and its impact on the 
engagement decision: The Auditing Profession Bill and proposed amendments to 
the Companies Act 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.2.1.4.: The institution of audit committees 
required by amendments to the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973 (South Africa, 2005a: s 269A) is 
likely to impact on the future influence of undue management pressure on audit fees and reporting 
practices as concluded by Van Dijk and Jansman (1994: 1) as discussed in section 3.2.1.4. The 
proposed amendments to the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973 and the Auditing Profession Bill 
(enacted on 16 January 2006) address concerns that related to auditor independence. The 
institution of audit committees required by amendments to the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973 
(South Africa, 2005a: s 269A) is likely to impact on the future influence of undue management 
pressure on audit fees and reporting practices as concluded by Van Dijk and Jansman (1994: 1) as 
discussed in section 3.2.1.4.  
 
Research questions as studied in section 6.19. and section 6.21.: 
? To what extent do you consider your independence to the client? 
? To what extent do you consider interaction with the Audit Committee, where applicable? 
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5.10.6. Statutory regulation of the external audit function and its impact on the 
engagement decision: Rotation of auditors 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.2.1.4.1.: The auditing profession will be 
impacted by the proposed amendments to the Companies Act in relation to matters such as the 
delivery of non-audit services to audit clients, and the rotation of auditors (SAICA, 2002: 1-23; 
Terry, 2002: 7). The practicality and consideration of rotation by registered auditors in medium 
practice as required by the proposed amendments to the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973, is of 
concern, noting the fact that registered auditors in medium practice firms are limited in terms of 
their number of practitioners (SAICA 2002: 1-23; Terry, 2002: 7).  
 
Research question as studied in section 6.18. and section 6.23.:  To what extent do you consider 
each of the following factors: 
? Proposed amendments to the Companies Act and the Auditing Profession Bill? 
? The rotation of your auditors on all assignments after a certain number of years on an 
assignment? 
 
 
5.10.7. Statutory regulation of the external audit function and its impact on the 
engagement decision: Non-audit services provided by auditors to their clients 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.2.1.4.2.:  The provision of non-audit 
services to public interest companies will be limited following the proposed amendments to the 
Companies Act (South Africa, 2005: s 275A). This may impact on current revenue earnings from 
such companies, resulting in registered auditors in medium practice needing to refocus their 
service delivery and products.  
 
Research question as studied in section 6.22.: To what extent do you consider the delivery of 
non-auditing services to the prospective audit client? 
 
 
5.10.8. Professional guidance related to the engagement decision process: The Code of 
Ethics for Professional Accountants 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.2.2.1.: Compliance with ethical guidance 
aim to address independence and other concerns within the profession. Addressing these concerns 
may be costly as argued by Wooten (2003) in section 2.7. and hence compliance with ethical 
guidance may be at risk.  
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Research question as studied in section 6.11.: To what extent do you consider compliance with 
the Code of Ethics for independent auditors and accountants? 
 
 
5.10.9. Professional guidance related to the engagement decision process: The Code of 
Professional Conduct 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.2.2.2.: Although the Code of Professional 
Conduct (PAAB, 2003) has been in existence for a number of years, the importance of compliance 
considering those concerns related to independence of auditors’, highlights the need to consider 
the extent to which registered auditors in medium practice consider ethics during their engagement 
decisions. Due to the criticism against the Code of Professional Conduct as stated in section 
3.2.2.2., the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by IFAC will be referred to in the 
research question. 
 
Research question as studied in section 6.11.: To what extent do you consider compliance with 
the Code of Ethics for independent auditors and accountants? 
 
 
5.10.10. Auditing standards and the engagement decision process 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.2.3. and section 4.3.: Past studies by 
independent institutions indicated that auditors do not always adequately adhere to auditing 
standards (Gloeck, 2003). Wooten (2003) and Ryan (2005a-d) have further commented on 
concerns relating to the ability of registered auditors in medium practice to maintain generally 
costly systems, that would ease compliance with an increasing number of auditing standards.   
 
Research question as studied in section 6.12.: To what extent do you consider compliance with 
auditing standards on the acceptance of a new client? 
 
 
5.10.11. Commercial considerations during the engagement decision process 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.3.: In considering studies by Asare, et al. 
(1994: 169), Dirsmith, et al. (1997: 12) and Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504), it is evident 
that practitioners are under significant pressure to increase revenue and therefore accept new 
clients in order to increase the revenue base of their practices and the overall profitability of their 
assignments.  
  129
 
Research questions as studied in section 6.2.; section 6.5. and section 6.6.:  To what extent is 
your decision to accept a new client impacted by commercial considerations, such as the 
profitability of an assignment? 
 
To what extent do you consider: 
? Your firm’s targets to increase annual revenues; and 
? Your firm’s strategic focus to gain certain clients in certain industries during the engagement 
decision process? 
 
 
5.10.12. Practitioner preferences and their influence on the engagement decision process 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.3.1.: Several researchers have concluded 
on the impact that certain practitioner preferences may have on the engagement decision process. 
Bierstaker (2000) concluded on the relation between practitioner preferences and their 
remuneration; Peecher (1996: 125-140) and Bierstaker and Wright (1999: 12) noted practitioners’ 
preferences for efficiencies which may also impact their remuneration as profitability improves. 
The impact of practitioner remuneration on engagement decisions therefore needs to be 
considered.  
 
Research question as studied in section 6.15.: To what extent do you consider your personal 
remuneration during the engagement decision process? 
 
 
5.10.13. Pricing considerations during the engagement decision process 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.3.2.: There are several studies that 
concluded on the existence of significant market pressures on registered auditors in medium 
practice, in not only competing against the Big Four for business (USGAO, 2003: 2), but also in 
the ability of registered auditors in medium practice to implement and maintain expensive systems 
to support their activities (Ryan, 2005a-d).  
 
The ability to implement and maintain such systems are likely to impact other aspects of the 
business of audit firms in medium practice such as improved staff retention which may further 
provide such practices with a competitive edge. These and other factors have a direct impact on 
the competitive advantage that audit firms may consider in order to attract and retain audit 
assignments.  
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Research question as studied in section 6.8.: To what extent do you consider the competitive 
edge of your auditing firm during the engagement decision process? 
 
 
5.10.14. The impact of litigation on commercial considerations during the engagement 
decision 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.3.3.: The collapse of Arthur Andersen 
clearly indicated that the risk of litigation can destroy even a large international audit firm, long 
before the matter has served in court (Venuti, et al. 2002). Although it may be argued that 
publicised corporate collapses appear to have affected only the larger international auditing firms, 
it is important to consider if registered auditors in medium practice consider: 
? Possible litigation as a result of accepting certain assignments; and 
? Possible litigation that may follow once a prospective client has been audited.   
  
Research question as studied in section 6.9. and section 6.31.:  
 
To what extent do you consider probable litigation against your auditing firm when considering 
accepting a new client? 
 
To what extent do you consider the risk that you may be exposed to litigation following the 
auditing of the prospective client? 
 
 
5.10.15. Organisational considerations during the engagement decision process 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.4.: Studies related to the impact of 
organisational motivational drivers on audit practices in general has been limited to date, if one 
compares these studies in quantum to those related to studies of professional and commercial 
drivers as commented on by Power (1995: 317) and Hopwood (1996: 218) in section 2.2.4.   
 
Studies by Solomon (1987: 1-25); Libby and Luft (1993: 425-450) and Gendron (2002: 2) all 
concluded on the influence that the partnership as organisation has on practitioners when 
considering matters such as targeting strategies for specific clients in certain industries. These 
strategies serve as organisational motivators to achieve in many instances a balance between 
commercial and professional drivers (Gendron, 2002: 8).  
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Research question as studied in section 6.4.: To what extent is your decision to accept a new 
client impacted by organisational considerations, such as the strategy adopted by your firm on 
targeting certain clients in certain industries? 
 
 
5.10.16. Implications from the study of predisposition on the engagement decision process 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 3.5.: Despite the conclusion as to the 
existence of commercial, professional and organisational motivational drivers by researchers such 
as Johnstone (2000: 1); Kirkham (1992: 301); Bailey (1995: 191-195) and Gendron (2002: 8), it is 
important to consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice acknowledge the 
impact of these motivational drivers on their predisposition during risk assessment. 
 
Research question as studied in section 6.24.: Do you believe that commercial, organisational 
and professional considerations impact on the number of risks that you identify during the 
engagement-decision process? 
 
 
5.10.17. Risk management and the engagement decision process  
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.2.: As concluded in section 2.7. firms 
other than the Big Four, do not always have systems and policies for the evaluation of engagement 
decisions and as a result procedures around engagement decisions are generally limited (USGAO, 
2003: 2; Carpenter & Mahoney, 2001: 3). A lack of systems and processes around the evaluation 
of engagement decisions may be indicative of a lack of proper systems regarding greater risk 
management, such as firm policies related to the acceptance of new clients. 
 
Research question as studied in section 6.16.: To what extent do you consider your firm’s policy 
on the acceptance of new clients? 
 
 
5.10.18. Obtaining an understanding of the prospective client and its operations 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.1.: Obtaining a detailed understanding of 
the clients business is a primary and cost effective audit procedure that is performed during the 
engagement decision process (Willingham & Carmichael, 1979: 177; Tomas, 1992). Although 
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ISA 315 provides detailed guidance in this regard, auditors do not always comply with auditing 
standards as concluded by Gloeck (2003).  
 
Research question as studied in section 6.44.: To what extent do you document your 
understanding of the nature of the prospective client’s business whilst deciding whether to accept 
the prospective client? 
 
 
5.10.19. Sources of information used during the engagement decision phase: Inquiries of 
management and others within the entity 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.2.4.: Due to cost concerns in firms in 
medium audit practice (Houston, 1999: 70-86; Wooten, 2003), the use of information sources 
during the engagement decision process is likely to be impacted by the cost involved in using such 
sources.  
 
Research question as studied in section 6.47.; section 6.48.; section 6.49.; section 6.50. and 
section 6.51.: To what extent do you make use of the following sources of information during the 
engagement decision process: 
? Information obtained from the prospective client’s lawyers? 
? Information obtained from the prospective client’s previous auditors? 
? Background searches on the directors of the prospective client? 
? Client information held by credit bureaus? 
? Information from regulatory bodies to which the prospective client reports? 
 
 
5.10.20. Assessing the risk that the financial results of the prospective client may be 
misstated 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.3.: The AR model (Hitzig, 2001) and the 
model for the assessment of ER developed by Johnstone (2000: 1-21) are both models available to 
auditors to assist them during their engagement decision processes, but does not guarantee that 
auditors in fact apply these models. It is therefore important to consider the application of the 
elements of both the AR model being IR, DR and CR, and the elements of Johnstone’s model 
being the assessment of AR in relation to Cbr and Abr. 
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Research question as studied in section 6.25.; section 6.26.; section 6.27.; section 6.28. and 
section 6.29.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the following risks during the 
decision to accept a new client:  
? IR? 
? CR? 
? DR? 
? The impact that the prospective client may have on the business risk of your auditing practice? 
? The business risk of the client? 
 
 
5.10.21. Fraud Risk (FR) and its impact on the engagement decision process 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.4.: Researchers such as Van Gass have 
argued that the threat of litigation following fraud is high (2003). This coupled with the 
devastating impact of litigation both in terms of reputation and financial consequences may 
indicate that FR may be considered by registered auditors in medium practice during the 
engagement decision process.  
 
Research question as studied in section 6.30.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of 
fraud risk related to a prospective client? 
 
 
5.10.22. Evaluating and responding to assessed risks: Audit fees and risk 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.5.1.: Based on conclusions by Wooten 
(2003), pricing of assignments by registered auditors in medium practice, considering the ability 
of their clients to pay audit fees, is impacted to a great extent by the position of such practitioners 
within the audit services market. 
 
Studies by Moore (2003); Van Dijk and Jansman (1994: 1), and Watts and Zimmerman (1979: 
273) indicated that management pressure to decrease audit fees, may impact on the pricing of 
assignments as management attempts to influence the audit approach and reporting practices of 
their auditors.  
 
As stated in section 2.2.2., studies by Messier and Plumlee (1987: 349-358); Maletta and Kida 
(1993: 508-525); Houston, et al. (1999: 281-298); Johnstone (2000: 1-27); Asare and Wright 
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(2002) and Bedard and Graham (2003: 55-70) all concluded that auditors respond to risk by 
charging higher fees or adjusting their pre-acceptance information collection strategies. 
 
Research questions as studied in section 6.7.; section 6.20. and section 6.32.: To what extent do 
you consider the prospective client’s ability to pay your fees when accepting a new assignment? 
 
To what extent do you consider the influence of undue management pressure in your intended 
auditing approach and reporting practices? 
 
When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk client, to what extent do you consider 
increasing the audit fee due to the increased risk posed by the client? 
 
 
5.10.23. Evaluating and responding to assessed risks: Firm policies related to client refusals 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.5.3.2.: Not only is there significant 
pressure on auditors to increase revenues, but there appears to be an inability of registered auditors 
in medium practice to access the same clients that are currently serviced by the Big Four audit 
firms (Wooten, 2003).  
 
As concluded by Ross (1997) audit firms are not always able to resign from high risk clients, as 
they are not always able to replace this revenue stream with new clients with a lower risk profile. 
  
Research question as studied in section 6.33. and section 6.34.: When a prospective client is 
evaluated as a high risk client, to what extent do you consider the following practices: 
? Refusing to accept the engagement?  
? Reviewing your client base and resigning from other high risk assignments? 
 
 
5.10.24. Evaluating and responding to assessed risks: Indemnity insurance  
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.5.3.: Reported litigation against auditors 
in South Africa has been limited to date if compared to that of other countries (Gloeck, 2003). 
This limited reporting to the public, does however not challenge the importance of indemnity 
insurance considerations during the engagement decision procedures of registered auditors in 
medium practice.  
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Some indicators such as a client’s inability to pay their fees or generally unprofitable clients may 
have legal and financial consequences to a practice over a long term period (St. Pierre & 
Anderson, 1984: 242-263; Palmrose, 1986: 97-110), and hence the changes in behaviour of 
current clients and characteristics of new clients are likely to impact on required levels of 
indemnity insurance. 
 
Research question as studied in section 6.35.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high 
risk client, to what extent do you consider reviewing your level of indemnity insurance? 
 
 
5.10.25. Evaluating and responding to assessed risks: Staffing considerations during the 
engagement decision process 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.5.4.: Staffing considerations related to 
registered auditors in medium practice are impacted by several factors in order to achieve the 
objective of maintaining resources that have appropriate skills and experience (Ryan, 2005a-d) as 
stated in section 1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2.  The importance of prior experience (when considering 
the staffing of assignments) has been concluded by Wofford and Goodwin (1990: 603-612). 
  
As commented on by Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2. the lack of 
qualified black accountants place significant strain on the future resourcing of all audit practices, 
not only registered auditors in medium practice. This however, coupled with commercial pressures 
within the profession as concluded in section 1.1.3.1. are likely to highlight the importance of BEE 
to registered auditors in medium practice as suggested by Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 
1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2. 
 
Puttick and Van Esch (1992: 56) and ISA 220 (R) comment on the use of third party specialists in 
instances where certain skills may not be available internally to the firm in order to appropriately 
audit a potential client. Considering cost constraints of firms in medium audit practice as 
highlighted by Houston (1999: 70-86) and Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1.3.1. and section 
3.3.2. registered auditors in medium practice may further be impacted by cost constraints when 
considering the use of third party specialists.  
 
Research questions as studied in section 6.14.; section 6.17.; section 6.36. and section 6.37.:  
When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk client, to what extent do you consider 
increasing the number of experienced staff assigned to the high risk client? 
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To what extent do you consider your prior experience of clients similar to the prospective client? 
 
To what extent do you consider your firm’s ability to satisfy BEE criteria and your employment 
statistics related to persons from previously disadvantaged communities?  
 
When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk client, to what extent do you consider making 
use of third-party specialists to perform those auditing functions that you are not able to staff, 
such as using valuators and actuaries? 
 
 
5.10.26. Evaluating and responding to assessed risks: Communication of risk mitigating 
strategies 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.5.5.: The existence of risk management 
strategies in registered auditors in medium practice may be impacted by concerns regarding cost 
as highlighted by Houston (1999: 70-86) and Ryan (2005a-d). It is therefore important to test the 
prevalence of such policies and procedures amongst firms in medium audit practice. 
 
Research question as studied in section 6.53.: Does your auditing firm have standardised 
policies and procedures that all auditors need to comply with for the evaluation of new 
assignments and engagement risk? 
 
 
5.10.27. Evaluating and responding to assessed risks: Performing further procedures 
related to identified risks 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.6.: Performing additional audit 
procedures to support high risk areas following an initial risk assessment is required by ISA 330 
(IFAC, 2003c). This auditing standard requirement does however not guarantee that auditors 
comply with these requirements as concluded by Gloeck (2003).   
 
Research question as studied in section 6.43.: To what extent do you design specific substantive 
auditing procedures to mitigate specific risks that you have identified during the engagement-
decision process? 
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5.10.28. Evaluating the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence obtained in order to 
support the engagement decision: Personal preferences and professional 
judgement’s impact on the quality of audit evidence 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.7.1.: As argued by Bell, et al. (2005: 19) 
the use of professional judgement remains prevalent to the final outcome of any engagement 
decision. Studies by Shockley (1981: 785); Knapp (1985: 202) and Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178) 
concluded that practitioners have different risk tolerances, which affect their client acceptance 
decisions, thus indicating the impact that personal practitioner preferences may have on 
engagement decisions. 
 
Research question as studied in section 6.13. and section 6.41.: To what extent do you consider: 
? Your personal preferences on client selection? 
? Your personal professional judgement as to whether or not to accept a prospective client? 
 
 
5.10.29. Evaluating the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence obtained in order to 
support the engagement decision: Documentation of engagement decision 
procedures 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.7.3.: The need to support registered 
auditors in medium practice in the development of engagement decision procedures was identified 
by the Panel of Audit Effectiveness (Carpenter & Mahoney; 2001: 3). Cost sensitivities in 
registered auditors in medium practice, highlighted by Houston (1999: 70-86) and Ryan (2005a-d) 
may also impact on the extent to which registered auditors in medium practice are involved in 
engagement decisions. Johnstone (2001: 5) argued that the person who performs and completes 
any related decision aids to the engagement decision process should be the most senior person on 
the engagement team, usually the auditor.  
 
Research questions as studied in section 6.45. and section 6.46.: To what extent do the 
following people perform the assessment of engagement risk of your prospective clients:  
? The auditor? 
? The audit manager? 
? Audit staff other than the practitioner or manager? 
 
To what extent do the following people document the assessment of your prospective clients’ 
engagement risk: 
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? The auditor? 
? The audit manager? 
? Audit staff other than the practitioner? 
 
 
5.10.30. Evaluating the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence obtained in order to 
support the engagement decision: The use of decision aids and its impact on the 
quality of the audit 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.7.2.: The advantages and disadvantages 
of both quantitative and qualitative decision aids as concluded on by Deppe (1992) and Deskmukh 
(1997) need to be considered by the auditor as they decide on their audit procedures to support the 
engagement decision process. Considering these advantages and disadvantages, this study will 
reflect on the prevalence of the use of these categories of decision aids during the engagement 
decision process of registered auditors in medium practice.  
  
Research question as studied in section 6.39. and section 6.40.: To what extent do you evaluate 
the AR of a prospective client using each of the following aids:  
? Qualitative aids such as questionnaires that evaluate client facts and circumstances that would 
indicate high- and low-risk factors? 
? Quantitative aids such as auditing software tools and statistical models that provide a “risk 
rating”, for instance, high, medium or low? 
 
 
5.10.31. Evaluating the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence obtained in order to 
support the engagement decision: Quality control during the engagement decision 
process 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.7.4.: The views of Houston (1999: 70-
86) and Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2. which argued that registered 
auditors in medium practice are likely to experience difficulty in maintaining complex systems of 
controls and review such as quality control due to cost concerns, will be tested by this study, as 
compliance with ISQC 1 (2004a) is mandatory and may reflect on the quality of audit work.  
 
The objective of central or peer review, being the review of engagement decisions made by one 
practitioner on another, is to improve the quality of decision making and to eliminate threats to 
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objective decision making (Steele, 1992: 24). The existence of a lack of such peer review is thus 
likely to impact on the quality of decision making during engagement decisions. 
 
Systems of quality control as studied by Steele (1992: 23) are central to risk management. The 
existence of such quality control, although mandated by ISQC 1 (2004a), may however be 
dependent on the ability of registered auditors in medium practice to implement and maintain such 
functions. The possibility that quality control is not being performed, is based on views of 
Houston (1999: 70-86) and Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2. who 
argue that registered auditors in medium practice are likely to experience difficulty in complying 
with complex systems of controls and review such as quality control due to cost and staffing 
concerns. 
 
As acknowledged by Bell, et al. (2005: 20) the use of professional judgement remains prevalent to 
the final outcome of any engagement decision. The relationship between junior and senior 
practitioners often leads to tension as experience and risk tolerance levels may differ. This process 
is however likely to be a dynamic process, allowing for the balanced application of motivational 
drivers (Carpenter, et al. 1994: 355-380; Gendron, 2002: 8).  
 
Research question as studied in section 6.42.; section 6.54. and section 6.55.: Are engagement 
decisions made by auditing practitioners in your firm reviewed: 
? centrally before a final decision is made? 
? by a quality control function? 
? by considering the professional judgement of their fellow practitioners? 
 
 
5.10.32. Establishing the terms of engagement 
 
Predisposition determinant as identified in section 4.3.7.5.: As the issuance of engagements 
letters is such an important risk management practice (Puttick & Van Esch, 1992: 56), this study 
will consider the prevalence of the use of engagement letters by registered auditors in medium 
practice following their engagement decisions.  
 
Communicating the outcome of all engagement decisions, including to those clients who have not 
been accepted, is a further risk management procedure of which the use by registered auditors in 
medium practice will be considered in this research (AICPA, 2004).  
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Research questions as studied in section 6.38. and section 6.52.: When a prospective client is 
evaluated as a high risk client, to what extent do you consider obtaining agreement with the client 
on an appropriately worded engagement letter before the auditing process commences?  
 
Do you communicate the outcome of your decision to accept/reject a prospective client to the 
prospective client? 
 
5.11. Conclusion on the research methodology applied 
 
The population as defined for the purposes of this study identified 11 audit firms in section 5.4. that 
are considered as firms in medium audit practice. These practitioners in these practices exercise the 
engagement decisions individually and collectively and hence these practitioners are referred to as 
pracititoners in medium audit practice for the purpose of this study. It is these practitioners to who the 
research questionnaire has been sent and their responses will be studied in chapter 6.  
 
The research questionnaire as discussed in section 5.9. has considered all those motivational drivers 
identified in chapter 2 to chapter 4. Based on these drivers, several research questions, as detailed in 
section 5.10. have been identified. These questions are based on previous literature studies and 
professional guidance that suggests the existence of predisposition. Chapter 6 will consider the 
detailed results to these research questions as tabled in table 6.5. to table 6.120. 
 
In this chapter the data collected from the research questionnaire is  
analised in order to provide a platform for the overall conclusions on this study  
as presented in chapter 7 and chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 6  RESEARCH RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The detailed results of the statistical analysis, as performed by the Statistical Consultation Services 
department of the University of Johannesburg, of the responses to the research questions in section 
5.10.1. to section 5.10.32. are presented in this chapter. The researcher in both the design of the 
research questionnaire (Annexure A to this study) as well as the analysis of the research results used 
Statcon extensively. Commentary is further provided on the research stages as well as conclusions 
pertaining to the credibility of the results. 
 
Table 6.5. to table 6.120. consider the detailed findings of this study in relation to the research 
questions detailed in section 5.10.1. to section 5.10.32. From these conclusions, findings specific to 
each research question as well as risks have been identified. These conclusions are presented in 
chapter 7. 
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6.1. Introduction to the results of the empirical research 
 
This chapter studies the results of the empirical research based on the research design and execution as 
outlined in chapter 5. Commentary is provided on the process and stages of the research, credibility 
considerations, and the research response rate and on the content of the analysis provided by Statcon.  
Section 5.10. documented those factors identified in chapter 3 and chapter 4 which this study argues 
impacts on the predisposition of registered auditors in medium practice. Research questions were 
drafted accordingly as stated in section 5.10.1. to section 5.10.32., for inclusion in the research 
questionnaire sent to the research population. Chapter 6 analyses the results of the responses to each of 
these research questions through reflection on the research objective and conclusion on such results in 
order to conclude on possible areas of risk that registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa 
may be exposed to. From these conclusions, chapter 7 provides critical analysis of the impact of these 
conclusions on the predisposition of registered auditors in medium practice, risks flowing from such 
predisposition and suggested actions to address such risk areas appropriately. 
 
6.1.1. Commentary on the stages of the study 
 
The first stage of this study focused on the study of literature on previous studies of the auditor’s 
engagement decision, as well as the study of professional guidance. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 have 
identified several research areas pertaining to auditor predisposition that has served as basis for the 
research design as commented on in section 5.10. 
 
The second stage of this study identified the research population through defining registered 
auditors in medium practice and identifying the practices that suit this definition as outlined in 
section 5.4. This stage was completed through a study of the PAAB website where the detailed 
information on the research population was found (This information is maintained by the IRBA 
subsequent to 1 April 2006). 
 
The third stage of this study involved the drafting of the research questionnaire used in this study 
as documented in Annexure C to this study. This questionnaire was focused on evaluating current 
engagement decision practices of registered auditors in medium practice against the stated 
research objectives in section 1.1.1. Statcon assisted in the design of the research questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was provided in draft format to select experienced practitioners for review of 
logical content and form, incorporating any improvements and amendments following from their 
review. 
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The last stage of this study related to collecting the research questionnaires returned by the 
participants and providing these to Statcon for analysis, the latter being presented and concluded 
on in section 6.2. onwards. 
 
6.1.2. The application of credibility strategies during this study 
 
The Cronbach Alpha Coefficient (measures credibility on a scale of 0% to 100% - 0% being 
unreliable and 100% being reliable) of this study is 98.9% as calculated by Statcon.  It is also 
argued that due to the importance of ethical behaviour of the research population in general, the 
responses would generally be credible, and that there would be no reason to believe the responses 
to be otherwise. 
 
6.1.3. The research response rate of this study 
 
In the following table and tables thereafter, Nu represents the number of respondents and % 
represents the percentage that the relevant respondents that marked the stated response represent 
out of the total response population. 
 
Size of audit  
practice 
Total practitioner 
population Submissions received 
Response 
Representation 
  Nu % Nu % % 
Zero returns 0 0 8 12 0 
5 to 10 practitioners 29 10 19 24 66 
11 to 20 practitioners 29 10 12 15 41 
21 to 30 practitioners 42 15 12 15 29 
31 to 40 practitioners 79 28 6 8 8 
41 to 50 practitioners 43 15 6 8 14 
51 to 60 practitioners 59 21 14 18 24 
Total 281 100 77 100 28 
 
Table 6.1. Research response rate 
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As per table 6.1., this study has achieved an overall response rate of 28% of the total population. 
This response rate was higher than expected and is acceptable as being representative of the 
population. The response rate was specifically high relating to practices with 5 to 30 practitioners. 
A total of 9 Zero returns were received. Returns related to research participants that did not want 
to complete the return (Zero returns) are the likely result of concerns related to confidentiality, the 
fact that the respondent is not an audit practitioner with the respective firm, or in instances, the 
PAAB register was not up to date with the latest partnership details of certain practices at the 
time. 
6.1.4. A profile of practitioners in South Africa in medium audit practice 
 
Statcon applied SPSS (statistical software) to the responses received from the participants. Tables 
6.2. to 6.4. details the results of the frequency analysis performed on: 
? The relevant size of the audit practice represented by the respondent; 
? The demographical location of the practice; and 
? The age of the respondent.  
 
Size of the Firm Nu % 
Zero return (hereafter 0) 8 11.5 
5 to 10 Practitioners 19 24.4 
11 to 20 Practitioners 12 15.4 
21 to 30 Practitioners 12 15.4 
31 to 40 Practitioners 6 7.7 
41 to 50 Practitioners 6 7.7 
51 to 60 Practitioners 14 17.9 
Total 77 100.0 
 
Table 6.2. Frequency analysis based on the size of the audit firm of the respondent 
 
The frequency analysis provided in table 6.2. hereafter, to some extent confirms the fact that there 
are more audit firms with 5 to 30 practitioners than 30 to 60 practitioners and hence the frequency 
of response was higher from those practices with 5 to 30 practitioners. Researchers such as 
Wooten (2003) have concluded that there may be differences in service delivery based on the size 
of an audit practice. Based on this finding by Wooten, this study will consider the engagement 
  145
decision activities of registered auditors in medium practice with reference to the size of such 
audit practice within the defined research population. Cross tabulation has been performed 
between the relevant responses of the respondents to the research questions considering the size 
of the audit firm that these respondents are from. 
 
The response rate per province has been considered with reference to the provincial mid-year 
population estimates as issued by Statistics South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2005) as tabled 
in table 6.3. Three provinces being Northern Cape, North West and Mpumalanga, comprising 
17,0% (1,9% + 8,2% + 6,9%) of the population of South Africa were not covered by this study. It 
is however argued that the geographical location of audit practices in South Africa would rather 
follow the levels of economical activity in a province than its population, as those provinces that 
have not been covered by this study, are mainly rural provinces. This would also explain the high 
density of registered auditors in medium practice in Gauteng, where economic activity is higher.   
 
Geographical location 
Nu of 
respondent 
to this 
study 
% of 
respondents to 
total 
respondents 
Total population  
of South Africa  
(Statistics  South Africa, 2006)  
% 
Zero returns 8 11.5 - 
Eastern Cape 9 11.5 15.0 
Free State 3 3.8 6.3 
Gauteng 29 37.2 19.2 
Kwazulu Natal 7 9.0 20.6 
Limpopo 1 1.3 12.0 
Western Cape 20 25.6 9.9 
Northern Cape 0 0 1.9 
North West 0 0 8.2 
Mpumalanga 0 0 6.9 
Total 77 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 6.3.  The representation of respondents per province in relation to the total 
population of South Africa 
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No cross tabulation of response per research question per province has been considered as it is 
argued that no value would be added for the purpose of this study considering the fact that the 
majority of respondents are from Gauteng and Western Cape, and would thus have a significant 
impact on the outcome of any cross tabulation. 
 
Age of the respondent 
Nu of 
respondents to 
this study 
% 
Age distribution of the total population of 
South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2006)
% 
Zero returns 8 10.4 - 
21 to 29 years 2 2.6 34.7 
30 to 39 years 29 37.7 25.7 
40 to 49 years 20 26.0 18.4 
50 to 59 years 17 22.1 12.5 
60 to 69 years 1 1.3 8.7 
Total 77 100.0 100.0 
 
Table 6.4.  The age distribution of the respondents to this study compared to the age 
distribution of the population of South Africa 
 
The frequency analysis of the respondents per age category has been considered against the 2005 
mid-year population estimate issued by Statistics South Africa (2005) in table 6.4. Although it 
would not be reasonable to argue that the number of practitioners in South Africa should reflect a 
representative population in comparison to the general population statistics of the country due to 
the many social and economic considerations, such as high levels of unemployment and poverty, 
it could be argued that the life expectancy and therefore age distribution of the respondents may 
be related to that of the general population. 
 
The low level of representation in the age category of 21 to 30 years of respondents to this study 
could be ascribed to the fact that the career path to become a registered auditor in South Africa is 
a lengthy process and could range between 4 to 12 years from completion of the required 
academical qualifications, which commences typically at the age of 22 years. The decreasing age 
representation per age category from 30 years onwards in the general population is however 
reflected to a similar extent in the age frequency analysis of the respondents to this study. There 
appears to be a significant decrease in the number of older practitioners in the response 
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population. This may be as a result of the difficulty that many older practitioners have in staying 
abreast with many regulatory, accounting and auditing standard changes during the last decade. 
As concluded in section 1.1., many older practitioners have not had any formal academic 
exposure to ISA’s or statutory amendments, which in many instances may render the prospect of 
remaining in the auditing profession less attractive to older practitioners. These very concerns 
have lead to the introduction of CPD from 2006.  
 
Tables 6.5. to 6.120. provide the detailed frequency results based on cross tabulation of the 
findings of this study considering the size of the audit firm, as well as the age of the respondents. 
The research fields and corresponding research questions as summarised in section 5.10. have 
been commented and concluded on in these tables, and serve as the basis for considering the 
impact of these conclusions on the research objectives of this study as concluded on in chapter 7.  
  
6.1.5. Coding of frequency responses 
 
The responses provided by the respondents to the research questions in the research 
questionnaires are detailed in Tables 6.5. to 6.120. The tables have been colour coded based on 
the following codes, representing the percentage or frequency of respondents who answered a 
particular research question as tabulated either by the size of the audit practice represented by the 
respondent, or the age of the respondent.  The following colour coding has been applied to assist 
in the analysis of the research responses. 
 
%  Colour code  
0-9  
10-19  
20-29  
30-39  
40-49  
50-59  
60-69  
70-79  
80-89  
90-100  
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In some instances, zero responses representing 10,4% (8 respondents) of the response population 
have been included in the cross-tabulation response total as marked with an “ * ” in tables 6.5. to 
6.120. hereafter. 
6.1.6. Definition of response categories 
 
The response categories allowed for in the research questionnaire included options to indicate that 
the motivational factor (that may cause auditor predisposition) researched by the respective 
research question, impacts on the engagement decision of the practitioner to: 
? No extent – (The motivational factor does not impact the engagement decision of the 
practitioner at all). 
? A small extent – (The motivational factor does impact the engagement decision of the 
practitioner to some extent, but less than to a moderate extent). 
? A moderate extent – (The motivational factor does impact the engagement decision of the 
practitioner more than to a small extent, but less than to a large extent). 
? A large extent – (The motivational factor does impact the engagement decision of the 
practitioner more than moderately). 
 
It should be noted that no numerical scale was defined nor communicated to the respondents in 
terms of which they could measure the impact of the specific motivator against the response 
categories above. 
 
6.1.7. Considering the impact of cross tabulation on the results of this study 
 
The tables presented in tables 6.5. to 6.120. are presented considering the results of cross 
tabulation between the response categories and the size of the audit firm or the age of the 
respective respondent. In this regard it should be noted that the interpretation of these tables are 
based on the overall responses of respondents within the population to the research question, as 
well as the predisposition of the respondents in each firm size or age category. Thus, although a 
particular firm size or age category may indicate a high level of predisposition to a particular 
research question, the overall response of the research population may be different. This is as a 
result of the impact of cross tabulation. As an example, the number of respondents decreases by 
age category, and hence a high level of predisposition amongst the older age categories may not 
be representative of the outcome of the population response, as there are less older practitioners 
than younger practitioners. 
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6.2. The impact of commercial considerations on registered auditors in medium practice 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.11.: When considering studies by Asare, et al. (1994: 
169), Dirsmith, et al. (1997: 12) and Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504), it is evident that 
practitioners are under significant pressure to increase revenue and therefore accept new clients in 
order to increase the revenue base of their practices and the overall profitability of their assignments. 
The research objective is therefore to determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice 
in South Africa are impacted by such commercial considerations such as the profitability of their 
assignments. This objective is in table 6.5., as well as in table 6.6. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.11.: To what extent is your decision to accept a new 
client impacted by commercial considerations, such as the profitability of an assignment? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
0 
response 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
8  1     9 
88.9%  11.1%     100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%  8.3%     11.7% 
   1    1 
   100.0%    100.0% 
Not at all 
   8.3%    1.3% 
 3  2 1 1 3 10 
 30.0%  20.0% 10.0% 10.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
 15.8%  16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 21.4% 13.0% 
 7 5 7 3 2 6 30 
 23.3% 16.7% 23.3% 10.0% 6.7% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a 
moderate 
extent  36.8% 41.7% 58.3% 50.0% 33.3% 42.9% 39.0% 
 9 6 2 2 3 5 27 
 33.3% 22.2% 7.4% 7.4% 11.1% 18.5% 100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 47.4% 50.0% 16.7% 33.3% 50.0% 35.7% 35.1% 
Total 8 19 12 12 6 6 14 77 
 
Table 6.5. Impact of commercial considerations such as the profitability of an assignment by the 
size of the audit practice 
  150
Conclusion related to the impact of commercial considerations considering the size of the 
practice: It is concluded that practitioners consider commercial motivational drivers from a moderate 
to a large extent (39,0% - moderate and 35,1% - to a large extent). In each audit firm size category, the 
highest response was either to a moderate or to a large extent, from which it is deducted that 
commercial considerations such as the profitability of an assignment is a significant factor in the 
engagement decisions of practitioners in medium audit practice. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.11.: To what extent is your decision to accept a new 
client impacted by commercial considerations, such as the profitability of an assignment? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
0 
response 
21 to 
29 
30 to 
39 
40 to 
49 
50 to 
59 
60 to 
69  
Total 
8  1    9 
88.9%  11.1%    100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%  3.4%    11.7% 
    1  1 
    100.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
    5.9%  1.3% 
  4 3 3  10 
  40.0% 30.0% 30.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
  13.8% 15.0% 17.6%  13.0% 
 2 14 5 8 1 30 
 6.7% 46.7% 16.7% 26.7% 3.3% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
 100.0% 48.3% 25.0% 47.1% 100.0% 39.0% 
  10 12 5  27 
  37.0% 44.4% 18.5%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
  34.5% 60.0% 29.4%  35.1% 
Total 8 2 29 20 17 1 77 
 
Table 6.6. Impact of commercial considerations such as the profitability of an assignment by age 
of the respondent 
 
Conclusion related to the impact of commercial considerations considering the age of the 
respondent: From table 6.6., this study has found that registered auditors in medium practice are 
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generally commercially orientated as 82,8% (48,3% + 34,5%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years 
consider commercial considerations from a moderate to a large extent, similar to 85,0% (25,0% + 
60,0%) of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 76,5% (47,1% + 29,4%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 
years. Risks, studies and guidance are reflected on in this regard in section 7.2.  
 
6.3. The impact of professional considerations on registered auditors in medium practice 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.1.: Professional motivational factors are impacted by a 
significant quantity of legislation that influences the engagement decision activities of auditors. Such 
legislation includes some of the following: the Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973, the Public 
Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act, no. 80 of 1991, the Audit Profession Bill and the Public Audit Act, 
no. 25 of 2004.  Such legislation is principally concerned with matters that regulate an auditor’s duties 
and responsibilities, in order to maintain principles such as auditor independence. This study will 
therefore consider the extent to which registered auditors in medium practice consider such 
professional considerations, such as their independence from prospective clients, which is required by 
professional guidance and legislation. This objective is in table 6.7., as well as in table 6.8. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.1.: To what extent is your decision to accept a new client 
impacted by professional considerations, such as independence from the client? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 10  11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
 1   1 1 3 
 33.3%   33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
 8.3%   16.7% 7.1% 3.9% 
4 1 2 2 2 2 13 
30.8% 7.7% 15.4% 15.4% 15.4% 15.4% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
21.1% 8.3% 16.7% 33.3% 33.3% 14.3% 16.9% 
15 10 10 4 3 11 53 
28.3% 18.9% 18.9% 7.5% 5.7% 20.8% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
78.9% 83.3% 83.3% 66.7% 50.0% 78.6% 68.8% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.7. Impact of professional considerations such as independence from the client by the size 
of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on the impact of professional considerations on engagement decisions of registered 
auditors in medium practice in terms of the size of the audit practice: From table 6.7., it is 
concluded that registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa consider professional 
motivational drivers to a large extent (68,8% of respondents) during their engagement decisions. The 
level of consideration would suggest that auditors in South Africa in medium practice have generally 
developed a sense of professional commitment based on ethical guidance and professional standards 
which supports previous views held by Sorensen and Sorensen (1974: 98-106) and Aranya, et al. 
(1981) as stated in section 2.2.3. Of these practitioners that consider professional considerations to a 
large extent, only 34,0% (7,5% + 5,7% + 20,8%)  are represented by firms with 40 to 60 practitioners. 
It would therefore seem that professional considerations are considered to a greater extent by 
practitioners in smaller practices than practitioners in larger practices, which raises concerns with 
regards to practitioners in larger practices and their compliance with professional considerations. 
Legislative requirements are non-optional in nature, and any response other than compliance to a large 
extent is concerning. In this regard, it is concerning that 20,8% (3,9% + 16,9%) of the respondents 
indicated that they consider professional considerations only from a small to a moderate extent. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.1.: To what extent is your decision to accept a new client 
impacted by professional considerations, such as independence from the client? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 1 1 1  3 
 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 3.4% 5.0% 5.9%  3.9% 
 5 4 4  13 
 38.5% 30.8% 30.8%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 17.2% 20.0% 23.5%  16.9% 
2 23 15 12 1 53 
3.8% 43.4%  28.3% 22.6% 1.9% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 79.3% 75.0% 70.6% 100.0% 68.8% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.8. Impact of professional considerations such as independence from the client by age of 
the respondent 
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Conclusion on the research question in terms of the age of the respondent: In considering the 
impact of professional considerations such as independence from the client based on the age of the 
respondents as detailed in table 6.8., this study found that younger practitioners are impacted to a 
greater extent by professional considerations than older practitioners. In each age category, those who 
consider professional considerations to a large extent, decreases when considering ages 30 to 39 years 
– 79,3%; ages 40 to 49 years – 75,0%; and ages 50 to 59 years - 70,6%. 
 
As argued in section 1.1., many older practitioners have not had any formal academic exposure to 
ISA’s or statutory amendments and may not be aware of current regulatory requirements.  
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question, section 7.3. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.4. The impact of organisational considerations on registered auditors in medium practice 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.15.: Studies related to the impact of organisational 
motivational drivers on audit practices in general has been limited to date, if one compares these 
studies in quantum to those related to studies of professional and commercial drivers as commented on 
by Power (1995: 317) and Hopwood (1996: 218) in section 2.2.4.   
 
Studies by Solomon (1987: 1-25); Libby and Luft (1993: 425-450) and Gendron (2002: 2) all 
concluded on the influence that the partnership as organisation has on practitioners when considering 
matters such as targeting strategies for specific clients in certain industries. These strategies serve as 
organisational motivators to achieve in many instances a balance between commercial and 
professional drivers (Gendron, 2002: 8).  
 
The research objective is to determine to what extent audit pracititoners in medium practice in South 
Africa consider the impact of such organisational motivational drivers during their engagement 
decision processes, such as client targeting strategies. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practice’s of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.9., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 6.10. 
hereafter. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.15.: To what extent is your decision to accept a new 
client impacted by organisational considerations, such as the strategy adopted by your firm on 
targeting certain clients in certain industries? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 10  11 to 20 21 to 30 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60  Total 
 1 1 1 1 5 9 
 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 55.6% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 8.3% 8.3% 16.7% 16.7% 35.7% 11.7% 
4 2 4 1  4 15 
26.7% 13.3% 26.7% 6.7%  26.7% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
21.1% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7%  28.6% 19.5% 
11 4 5 2 4 5 31 
35.5% 12.9% 16.1% 6.5% 12.9% 16.1% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
57.9% 33.3% 41.7% 33.3% 66.7% 35.7% 40.3% 
4 5 2 2 1  14 
28.6% 35.7% 14.3% 14.3% 7.1%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
21.1% 41.7% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7%  18.2% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.9. The impact of organisational considerations such as the strategy adopted on targeting 
certain clients in certain industries by the size of the audit practice 
 
Conclusion on the impact of organisational considerations per the size of the firm: It is concluded 
from table 6.9., that registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa consider organisational 
motivational drivers to a moderate extent (40,3% of the respondents). Of these practitioners that 
consider organisational considerations to a moderate extent, 48,4% (35,5% + 12,9%) are from firms 
that have 5 to 20 practitioners. 
 
Based on studies as stated in section 2.2.2.1. by Gendron (2002: 8); Asare, et al. (1994: 169) and 
Dirsmith, et al. (1997: 12), the impact of organisational factors on auditors in terms of practice 
development and revenue growth was expected to be significant. The fact that only 18,2% of 
respondents consider organisational factors to a large extent would therefore suggest that registered 
auditors in medium practice in South Africa, may not be impacted by organisational drivers to the 
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same extent than practitioners in other countries. This is perhaps also highlighted by the finding that 
practices with 51 to 60 practitioners had no respondents that consider organisational considerations to 
a large extent, and in fact 55,6% of such practitioners do not consider organisational factors at all 
during their engagement decisions. 
 
The study further indicates that practices with fewer practitioners consider organisational 
considerations, such as the targeting of certain clients in certain industries, to a greater extent than 
practices with more practitioners. This finding may be as a result of significant competition as 
commented on in section 1.1.3. in the market for audit services, amplifying the need of smaller 
practices to have strategies for targeting clients and increasing revenue. 
  
Research question as stated in section 5.10.15.: To what extent is your decision to accept a new 
client impacted by organisational considerations, such as the strategy adopted by your firm on 
targeting certain clients in certain industries? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 4 2 3  9 
 44.4% 22.2% 33.3%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 13.8% 10.0% 17.6%  11.7% 
 7 2 6  15 
 46.7% 13.3% 40.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 24.1% 10.0% 35.3%  19.5% 
2 9 12 7 1 31 
6.5% 29.0% 38.7% 22.6% 3.2% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
100.0% 31.0% 60.0% 41.2% 100.0% 40.3% 
 9 4 1  14 
 64.3% 28.6% 7.1%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 31.0% 20.0% 5.9%  18.2% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.10. The impact of organisational factors such as the strategy adopted on targeting 
certain clients in certain industries by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on the impact of organisational factors on practitioners per the age of the 
respondent: When considering the age of the respondents who consider organisational motivators 
such as targeting strategies to a large extent, it is concluded that younger practitioners give greater 
consideration to such strategies than older practitioners. This is based on 62,0% (31,0% + 31,0%) of 
practitioners aged 30 to 39 years considering organisational factors from a moderate to a large extent, 
compared to 80% (60,0% + 20,0%) of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 47,1% (41,2% + 5,9%) of 
practitioners aged 50 to 59 years.  
 
This finding it is argued is based on similar findings by Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504) who 
found that practitioner aggressiveness towards the development of the practice depends on the existing 
client base of the practice and the competitiveness of the local audit market. The more established a 
practitioner’s client base, the less aggressive a practitioner would be in obtaining new clients, and 
hence it is argued that older practitioners, who are more likely to have a more established client base, 
are less likely to consider organisational motivators such as client targeting strategies in client 
selection.  
 
In considering these conclusions, section 7.4. will reflect on the risks flowing from these conclusions, 
as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the inclusion of this research 
question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.5. Consideration of revenue targets by registered auditors in medium practice 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.11.: In considering studies by Asare, et al. (1994: 169), 
Dirsmith, et al. (1997: 12) and Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504), it is evident that practitioners 
are under significant pressure to increase revenues and therefore accept new clients in order to increase 
the revenue of their practices.  
 
This study will therefore reflect on the extent to which registered auditors in medium practice in South 
Africa consider their firms’ targets to increase annual revenues during their engagement decision 
processes. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practice’s of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.11., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.12. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.11.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your firm’s targets to increase annual revenues? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10 
11 to 
20 
21 to 
30 
31 to 
40 
41 to 
50 
51 to 
60  
Total 
 1    4 5 
 20.0%    80.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 8.3%    28.6% 6.5% 
4 1 6  2 3 16 
25.0% 6.3% 37.5%  12.5% 18.8% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
21.1% 8.3% 50.0%  33.3% 21.4% 20.8% 
9 9 3 4 2 6 33 
27.3% 27.3% 9.1% 12.1% 6.1% 18.2% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
47.4% 75.0% 25.0% 66.7% 33.3% 42.9% 42.9% 
6 1 3 2 2 1 15 
40.0% 6.7% 20.0% 13.3% 13.3% 6.7% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
31.6% 8.3% 25.0% 33.3% 33.3% 7.1% 19.5% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.11. Consideration of annual revenue targets by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the consideration of annual revenue targets as considered in terms of the size of 
the audit practice: From table 6.11., it is concluded that the respondents consider their firms’ revenue 
targets to a moderate extent during engagement decisions (42,9% of the respondents). Of these 
practitioners, 54,6% (27,3% + 27,3%) are from firms with 5 to 20 practitioners. Respondents from 
firms with 51 to 60 practitioners indicated that 28,6% of such respondents would not consider their 
firms’ targets to increase revenue during their engagement decisions at all.  
 
As stated in section 2.2.2.3., Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178) and Auyers and Kaplan (1998: 139-153) 
concluded that auditor predisposition is impacted by practitioner compensation which is directly 
linked to their ability to increase revenues. Similarly, as stated in section 2.7., studies by the USGAO 
(2003: 2) and Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3) suggested that achieving revenue targets would be 
important to practitioners.  
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This study would suggest that this drive to increase revenue influences the predisposition of the 
respondents only to a moderate extent. This study does however also indicate that the firms with fewer 
practitioners are generally more predisposed to this commercial motivator than firms with more 
practitioners, suggesting that economic drivers have a greater impact on firms with fewer practitioners, 
which it is argued is as a result of the significant competition in the market for audit services as 
commented on in section 1.1.3. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.11.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your firm’s targets to increase annual revenues? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 1 2 2  5 
 20.0% 40.0% 40.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 3.4% 10.0% 11.8%  6.5% 
 8 2 6  16 
 50.0% 12.5% 37.5%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 27.6% 10.0% 35.3%  20.8% 
1 16 11 5  33 
3.0% 48.5% 33.3% 15.2%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 55.2% 55.0% 29.4%  42.9% 
1 4 5 4 1 15 
6.7% 26.7% 33.3% 26.7% 6.7% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 13.8% 25.0% 23.5% 100.0% 19.5% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.12. Consideration of annual revenue targets by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question as considered in terms of the age of the respondent: From 
table 6.12. it is concluded that younger practitioners consider revenue targets to a greater extent than 
older practitioners. This is based on 69,0% (55,2% + 13,8%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years 
considering such targets from a moderate to a large extent, compared to 52,9% (29,4% + 23,5%) of 
practitioners aged 50 to 59 years.  In the case of younger practitioners, it is argued, that such 
practitioners at the beginning of their careers and thus the achievement of revenue targets may be more 
important, specifically considering the impact that such targets have on remuneration as concluded on 
by several researchers. Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178) and Auyers and Kaplan (1998: 139-153) as stated 
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in section 2.2.2.3. have concluded to that revenue targets are linked to practitioners compensation in 
general, and is likely to have a significant impact on their remuneration.  
 
It is also argued that similar findings by Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504) who found that 
practitioner aggressiveness towards the development of the practice depends on the existing client 
base of the practice and the competitiveness of the local audit market. The more established a 
practitioner’s client base, the less aggressive a practitioner would be in obtaining new clients, and 
hence it is argued that older practitioners, who are more likely to have a more established client base, 
are less likely to consider achieving revenue targets. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question, section 7.2. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.6. Considering a firm’s strategic focus to gain certain clients in certain industries during the 
engagement decision 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.11.: In considering studies by Asare, et al. (1994: 169), 
Dirsmith, et al. (1997: 12) and Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504), practitioners are under 
significant pressure to increase revenue and thus accept clients in order to increase the revenue of their 
practices.  
 
It is important to reflect on the extent to which these registered auditors in medium practice consider 
their firms’ strategies to target certain clients in certain industries in order to increase revenue. This 
objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practice of which the respondents are 
practitioners as detailed in table 6.13., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 6.14. 
 
Conclusion on the research question based on size of the practice: From table 6.13. that follows, it 
is concluded that 61,1% (29,9% + 10,4% + 20,8%) of registered auditors in medium practice consider 
from a small to no extent at all, the targeting of strategic clients during their engagement decisions.  
 
A significant number of respondents did not provide any response to this question. This would suggest 
that for a significant number of respondents, client-targeting strategies are not considered or may not 
exist in their practices. Due to the large number of Zero responses to this question, no conclusion is 
drawn in relation to the preference of practitioners from different sized firms in relation to client 
targeting strategies. 
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It is further argued that this finding may be the result of the fact that registered auditors in medium 
practice may not be in any position to be selective in their client targeting strategies at this stage, due 
to significant competition in the audit profession as argued by Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 
1.1.3.2. It is further noted that the response to this question is different than the response to the 
research question in section 6.4. which concluded that client targeting as an organisational motivator 
influences engagement decisions of registered auditors in medium practice to a moderate extent. It is 
however noted that the primary objective of section 6.4. was to research the impact of organisational 
motivational factors on an overall basis. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.11.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your firm’s strategic focus to gain certain clients in certain 
industries? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
0 
response 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
8 5 1 3 2 1 3 23 
34.8% 21.7% 4.3% 13.0% 8.7% 4.3% 13.0% 100.0% 
0 response 
100.0% 26.3% 8.3% 25.0% 33.3% 16.7% 21.4% 29.9% 
  1 1 1  5 8 
  12.5% 12.5% 12.5%  62.5% 100.0% 
Not at all 
  8.3% 8.3% 16.7%  35.7% 10.4% 
 2 2 4 1 2 5 16 
 12.5% 12.5% 25.0% 6.3% 12.5% 31.3% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
 10.5% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 33.3% 35.7% 20.8% 
 8 5 3 1 2 1 20 
 40.0% 25.0% 15.0% 5.0% 10.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
To a 
moderate 
extent  42.1% 41.7% 25.0% 16.7% 33.3% 7.1% 26.0% 
 4 3 1 1 1  10 
 40.0% 30.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%  100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 21.1% 25.0% 8.3% 16.7% 16.7%  13.0% 
Total 8 19 12 12 6 6 14 77 
 
Table 6.13. Consideration of strategic clients by the size of the audit practice  
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.11.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your firm’s strategic focus to gain certain clients in certain 
industries? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
0 
response 
21 to 
29 
30 to 
39 
40 to 
49 
50 to 
59 
60 to 
69  
Total 
8  9 2 3 1 23 
34.8%  39.1% 8.7% 13.0% 4.3% 100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%  31.0% 10.0% 17.6% 100.0% 29.9% 
  4 2 2  8 
  50.0% 25.0% 25.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
  13.8% 10.0% 11.8%  10.4% 
 2 5 4 5  16 
 12.5% 31.3% 25.0% 31.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 100.0% 17.2% 20.0% 29.4%  20.8% 
  9 7 4  20 
  45.0% 35.0% 20.0%  100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
  31.0% 35.0% 23.5%  26.0% 
  2 5 3  10 
  20.0% 50.0% 30.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
  6.9% 25.0% 17.6%  13.0% 
Total 8 2 29 20 17 1 77 
 
Table 6.14. Consideration of strategic targets by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question based on age of the respondent: As 40,3% (29,9% + 10,4%) 
of respondents did not respond to this research question, or indicated that strategic targets are not 
considered at all during their engagement decisions, this study draws no conclusion as to any 
relationship between the age of a practitioners and their preference for the application of client 
targeting strategies, due to the large number of zero responses.   
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question, section 7.2. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that serve as basis for the 
inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
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6.7. Considering the prospective client’s ability to pay audit fees during the engagement decision 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.22.: Based on conclusions by Wooten (2003), pricing of 
assignments by registered auditors in medium practice, considering the ability of their clients to pay 
audit fees, is impacted to a great extent by the position of such practitioners within the audit services 
market. This study will therefore consider if registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa 
consider such factors as their clients’ ability to pay their audit fees during their engagement decisions. 
This objective is researched in table 6.15., as well as in table 6.16. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.22.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - The prospective client’s ability to pay your fees? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 10  11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
4 2 1  1  8 
50.0% 25.0% 12.5%  12.5%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
21.1% 16.7% 8.3%  16.7%  10.4% 
8 5 8 4 1 7 33 
24.2% 15.2% 24.2% 12.1% 3.0% 21.2% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
42.1% 41.7% 66.7% 66.7% 16.7% 50.0% 42.9% 
7 5 3 2 4 7 28 
25.0% 17.9% 10.7% 7.1% 14.3% 25.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
36.8% 41.7% 25.0% 33.3% 66.7% 50.0% 36.4% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.15. Consideration of the client’s ability to pay audit fees by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the impact of the client’s ability to pay audit fees by size of the practice: From the 
results of the table 6.15., it is concluded that 79,3% (42,9% + 36,4%) of registered auditors in medium 
practice in South Africa consider their client’s ability to pay their fees from a moderate to a large 
extent. Larger firms are more dependent on such cashflows as this study found that 66,7% of 
practitioners from firms with 41 to 50 practitioners and 50% of practitioners from firms with 51 to 60 
practitioners have indicated that the consider such ability to a large extent, compared to 36,8% of firms 
with 5 to 10 practitioners and 41,7% of firms with 11 to 20 practitioners that consider such ability to a 
large extent.  Most practitioners consider their clients’ ability to pay their fees to a moderate extent. 
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From this finding, it is argued that registered auditors in medium practice are dependent on cash flows 
from their clients, possibly highlighting similar significant financial requirements of registered 
auditors in medium practice as suggested by the USGAO (2003: 2) in section 1.1.3. and section 2.7., 
and as argued by Ryan (2005a: 21) in section 1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2.   
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.22.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - The prospective client’s ability to pay your fees? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 4 2 2  8 
 50.0% 25.0% 25.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 13.8% 10.0% 11.8%  10.4% 
1 13 9 9 1 33 
3.0% 39.4% 27.3% 27.3% 3.0% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 44.8% 45.0% 52.9% 100.0% 42.9% 
1 12 9 6  28 
3.6% 42.9% 32.1% 21.4%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 41.4% 45.0% 35.3%  36.4% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.16. Consideration of the client’s ability to pay audit fees by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the impact of a client’s ability to pay their audit fees by age of the respondent: 
Based on table 6.16., it is concluded that all practitioners are impacted from a moderate to a large 
extent by their clients’ ability to pay their audit fees, irrespective of their age. This is based on the 
following responses of those who consider their client’s ability to pay their audit fees from a moderate 
to a large extent in each of the following age categories: 30 to 39 years - 86,2% (41,4% + 44,8%); 40 
to 49 years - 90% (45,0% +45,0%) and 50 to 59 years - 88,2% (52,9% + 35,3%). Section 7.2. will 
reflect on the risks flowing from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance 
that served as basis for the inclusion of this research question in the research questionnaire. 
 
6.8. Considering the competitive edge of an auditing firm during the engagement decision  
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.13.: There are several studies that concluded on the 
existence of significant market pressures on registered auditors in medium practice, in not only 
competing against the Big Four for business (USGAO, 2003: 2), but also in the ability of registered 
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auditors in medium practice to implement and maintain expensive systems to support their activities 
(Ryan, 2005a-d).  The ability to implement and maintain such systems are likely to impact other 
aspects of the business of audit firms in medium practice such as improved staff retention which may 
further provide such practices with a competitive edge. Such factors have a direct impact on the 
competitive advantage that audit firms may consider in order to attract and retain audit assignments.  
The research objective would therefore be to consider the extent to which registered auditors in 
medium practice in South Africa, consider their firms’ competitive edge during engagement decisions. 
This objective is researched in table 6.17., as well as in table 6.18. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.13.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - The competitive edge of your auditing firm? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
0 
response 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
8  1    1 10 
80.0%  10.0%    10.0% 100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%  8.3%    7.1% 13.0% 
 1    1  2 
 50.0%    50.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 5.3%    16.7%  2.6% 
 2 3 4 1 2 2 14 
 14.3% 21.4% 28.6% 7.1% 14.3% 14.3% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
 10.5% 25.0% 33.3% 16.7% 33.3% 14.3% 18.2% 
 10 5 7 5 2 7 36 
 27.8% 13.9% 19.4% 13.9% 5.6% 19.4% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
 52.6% 41.7% 58.3% 83.3% 33.3% 50.0% 46.8% 
 6 3 1  1 4 15 
 40.0% 20.0% 6.7%  6.7% 26.7% 100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 31.6% 25.0% 8.3%  16.7% 28.6% 19.5% 
Total 8 19 12 12 6 6 14 77 
 
Table 6.17. Consideration of competitive edge by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the competitive edge of a respondent by size of the practice: From table 6.17., this 
study concludes that the respondents consider their competitive edge to a moderate extent (46,8% of 
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respondents) during their engagement decisions. The highest response rate in the moderate category is 
from practices with 5 to 10 practitioners (27,8%). Similarly, the highest response rate of those who 
consider their competitive edge to a large extent, are represented by firms with 5 to 10 practitioners 
(40,0%). Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504), as stated in section 2.2.2.1., concluded that local 
competitiveness, impacts on the engagement decision. It is argued that factors specific to the South 
African profession such as BEE, as studied in section 1.1.3.1., have a direct impact on the competitive 
edge of firms. From Ryan (2005a-d), as stated in section 1.1.3.1., it is evident that many smaller firms 
have neither BEE status, nor a competitive edge in terms of specialisation. This would impact on their 
consideration of any competitive edge during decisions. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.13.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - The competitive edge of your auditing firm? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
0 
response 
21 to 
29  
30 to 
39  
40 to 
49  
50 to 
59  
60 to 
69  
Total 
8  1  1  10 
80.0%  10.0%  10.0%  100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%  3.4%  5.9%  13.0% 
    2  2 
    100.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
    11.8%  2.6% 
  5 2 7  14 
  35.7% 14.3% 50.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
  17.2% 10.0% 41.2%  18.2% 
 2 16 12 5 1 36 
 5.6% 44.4% 33.3% 13.9% 2.8% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
 100.0% 55.2% 60.0% 29.4% 100.0% 46.8% 
  7 6 2  15 
  46.7% 40.0% 13.3%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
  24.1% 30.0% 11.8%  19.5% 
Total 8 2 29 20 17 1 77 
 
Table 6.18. Consideration of competitive edge by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on the research question considering the age of the respondents: When considering 
table 6.18., it is concluded that younger practitioners are more concerned with their competitive edge 
during engagement decisions than older practitioners. This is based on 17,2% of practitioners aged 30 
to 39 years that to a small or no extent consider their competitive edge, compared to 10% of 
practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 53,0% (11,8% + 41,2%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. 
 
This finding, it is argued, may be as a result of older practitioners likely to have more established 
client portfolios, whilst younger practitioners may still be actively involved in marketing and the 
search for new clients in order to increase their client portfolios.  
 
This argument is based on Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504) as stated in section 2.2.2.1., who 
found that practitioner aggressiveness towards gaining new clients become less as practitioners attain 
more established client portfolios over time. Section 7.2. will reflect on the risks flowing from these 
conclusions, and those guidance that served as basis for this research question. 
 
 
6.9. Considering litigation against the auditor during the engagement decision process 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.14.: The collapse of Arthur Andersen clearly indicated 
that the risk of litigation can destroy even a large international audit firm, long before any litigation 
has served in court (Venuti, et al. 2002).  
 
Although it may be argued that publicised corporate collapses appear to have affected only the larger 
international auditing firms (Clulow, 2002), it is important to consider whether registered auditors in 
medium practice consider possible litigation against their practices during the engagement decision 
process. The research objective is to consider the extent to which registered auditors in medium 
practice in South Africa consider litigation against their audit firms during their engagement decision 
processes. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practice’s of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.19., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.20. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.14.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Probable litigation against your auditing firm? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
0 
response 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
8 1      9 
88.9% 11.1%      100.0% 
0 response 
100.0% 5.3%      11.7% 
 3 1 1 1 2 3 11 
 27.3% 9.1% 9.1% 9.1% 18.2% 27.3% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
 15.8% 8.3% 8.3% 16.7% 33.3% 21.4% 14.3% 
 10 4 4 1 1 4 24 
 41.7% 16.7% 16.7% 4.2% 4.2% 16.7% 100.0% 
To a 
moderate 
extent  52.6% 33.3% 33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 28.6% 31.2% 
 5 7 7 4 3 7 33 
 15.2% 21.2% 21.2% 12.1% 9.1% 21.2% 100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 26.3% 58.3% 58.3% 66.7% 50.0% 50.0% 42.9% 
Total 8 19 12 12 6 6 14 77 
 
Table 6.19. Consideration of litigation by the size of the audit practice  
Conclusion on the consideration of litigation during engagement decisions by registered auditors 
in medium practice in terms of the size of their practices: From the results in table 6.19. it is 
concluded that registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa consider litigation during the 
engagement decision process to a large extent (42,9 % of respondents). 
More than 50% of the respondents representative from each firm size category, responded that 
litigation is largely considered, except respondents from firms with 5 to 10 practitioners, of which 
52,6% indicated that they only consider litigation to a moderate extent. The latter finding, it is argued, 
is based on the fact that most public litigation tends to surround large multi-national companies and a 
Big Four auditing firm (Clulow, 2002). This may create a false sense of security in that practitioners in 
audit firms with fewer practitioners are less likely to expect to be exposed to litigation. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.14.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Probable litigation against your auditing firm? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
0 
response 
21 to 
29  
30 to 
39  
40 to 
49  
50 to 
59  
60 to 
69  
Total 
8   1   9 
88.9%   11.1%   100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%   5.0%   11.7% 
  1 6 4  11 
  9.1% 54.5% 36.4%  100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
  3.4% 30.0% 23.5%  14.3% 
  10 6 8  24 
  41.7% 25.0% 33.3%  100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
  34.5% 30.0% 47.1%  31.2% 
 2 18 7 5 1 33 
 6.1% 54.5% 21.2% 15.2% 3.0% 100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 100.0% 62.1% 35.0% 29.4% 100.0% 42.9% 
Total 8 2 29 20 17 1 77 
 
Table 6.20. Consideration of litigation by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the consideration of litigation on the engagement decisions of registered auditors 
in medium practice in terms of the age of the respondents: It is concluded from table 6.20., that 
practitioners aged 30 to 39 years are impacted to a greater extent by litigation during the engagement 
decision process than older practitioners. This is based on 62,1% of such practitioners indicating that 
they consider litigation to a large extent compared to 35,0% of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 
29,4% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. This finding, it is argued, is as a result of significant 
changes in legislation during recent years, and the fact that older practitioners may not be familiar with 
such legislation. As concluded in section 1.1., many older practitioners have not had any formal 
academic exposure to statutory amendments and may not be aware of current regulatory requirements.  
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.2. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
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6.10. Considering compliance with statutory requirements during the engagement decision 
 
Research question objectives as stated in section 5.10.2.; section 5.10.3. and section 5.10.4.: As 
the PAAA is the primary legislation that regulates the audit industry, this study will question the 
current consideration that registered auditors in medium practice give to the PAAA. Although the 
Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973 has been in existence for a number of years, it does not guarantee 
compliance or consideration by registered auditors in medium practice, and hence this study needs to 
consider such levels of compliance and consideration. Compliance with the Public Audit Act, no. 25 
of 2004, is likely to be impacted by the extent that practitioners are exposed to subcontracting to the 
Auditor General. The research objective is therefore to consider to what extent practitioners in South 
Africa in medium practice consider compliance with statutory requirements during their engagement 
decision processes. This objective is researched with reference to the size of the practices of which the 
respondents are practitioners as detailed in table 6.21., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed 
in table 6.22. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.2.; section 5.10.3. and section 5.10.4.: To what extent 
do you consider each of the following factors when deciding to accept a new client - Compliance with 
statutory requirements (such as the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act, The Public Audit Act and 
the Companies Act)? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
 1   1 1 3 
 33.3%   33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
 8.3%   16.7% 7.1% 3.9% 
10 3 5 2 1 3 24 
41.7% 12.5% 20.8% 8.3% 4.2% 12.5% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
52.6% 25.0% 41.7% 33.3% 16.7% 21.4% 31.2% 
9 8 7 4 4 10 42 
21.4% 19.0% 16.7% 9.5% 9.5% 23.8% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
47.4% 66.7% 58.3% 66.7% 66.7% 71.4% 54.5% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.21. Consideration of statutory compliance such as the Public Accountants’ and 
Auditors’ Act, The Public Audit Act and the Companies Act by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on statutory compliance in terms of the size of the practice: Registered auditors in 
medium practice consider statutory compliance to a large extent (54,5% of respondents) during the 
engagement decision. Most respondents from all the firm size categories indicated a response of at 
least approximately 60% when considering statutory compliance to a large extent, except 47,4% of 
respondents from firms with 5 to 10 practitioners, suggesting that smaller firms give less consideration 
to such statutory compliance. It is further concerning that there are 3,9% of respondents that do not 
consider statutory regulations, as these practitioners are likely to expose themselves and their 
respective audit practices to significant risk during their engagement decisions. 
 
Many of the recent and proposed amendments to statutory regulations is likely to institute severe 
penalties in instances of non-compliance, such as those under the Auditing Profession Act, no. 26 of 
2005, which may even lead to imprisonment in certain instances.  
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.2.; section 5.10.3. and section 5.10.4.: To what extent 
do you consider each of the following factors when deciding to accept a new client - Compliance with 
statutory requirements (such as the Public Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act, the Public Audit Act and 
the Companies Act)? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
  2 1  3 
  66.7% 33.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
  10.0% 5.9%  3.9% 
 11 8 5  24 
 45.8% 33.3% 20.8%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 37.9% 40.0% 29.4%  31.2% 
2 18 10 11 1 42 
4.8% 42.9% 23.8% 26.2% 2.4% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 62.1% 50.0% 64.7% 100.0% 54.5% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.22. Consideration of statutory compliance such as the Public Accountants’ and 
Auditors’ Act, the Public Audit Act and the Companies Act by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on statutory compliance in terms of the age of the respondents: In concluding on 
practitioners that consider statutory compliance to a large extent as detailed in table 6.22., practitioners 
of the ages of 30 to 39 years are impacted to a greater extent by statutory compliance during their 
engagement decisions than older practitioners.  
 
This is based on 10,0% of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 5,9% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 
years, indicating that they consider statutory compliance to a small extent, whereas practitioners aged 
30 to 39 years only consider such compliance from a moderate to a large extent.  
 
This finding, it is argued, may be as a result of the many significant changes in legislation during 
recent years. As a result of these many changes, older practitioners may not be familiar with new 
legislation, confirming concerns highlighted in section 1.1.  
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question, section 7.3. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as the professional guidance that served as basis for the inclusion of 
this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.11. Compliance with the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.8 and section 5.10.9.: Compliance with ethical 
guidance aim to address independence and other concerns within the profession. Addressing these 
concerns may be costly as argued by Wooten (2003) in section 2.7. and hence compliance with ethical 
guidance may be at risk.  
 
The Code of Professional Conduct, issued by SAICA, has been in existence for a number of years, 
however due to the criticism against the Code of Professional Conduct as stated in section 3.2.2.2., the 
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants issued by IFAC (2005a) will be referred to in the research 
question. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.23., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.24.
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.8 and section 5.10.9.: To what extent do you consider 
the following factor when deciding to accept a new client - Compliance with the Code of Ethics for 
independent auditors and accountants? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
 1 1   1 3 
 33.3% 33.3%   33.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
 8.3% 8.3%   7.1% 3.9% 
4 3 1 3 2 1 14 
28.6% 21.4% 7.1% 21.4% 14.3% 7.1% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
21.1% 25.0% 8.3% 50.0% 33.3% 7.1% 18.2% 
15 8 10 3 4 12 52 
28.8% 15.4% 19.2% 5.8% 7.7% 23.1% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
78.9% 66.7% 83.3% 50.0% 66.7% 85.7% 67.5% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.23. Consideration of compliance with the Code of Ethics by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question in terms of the size of the practice: Registered auditors in 
medium practice consider ethical guidance to a large extent (67,5% of respondents) during their 
engagement decisions of which 28,8% are from firms with 5 to 10 practitioners and 23,1% are from 
firms with 51 to 60 practitioners. 
  
Despite the finding that registered auditors in medium practice consider ethical guidance to a large 
extent during their engagement decisions, concerns exist relating to the lower response level of firms 
with 11 to 50 practitioners as well as to the 3,9% of respondents that consider ethical guidance to a 
small extent, represented by firms with 11 to 30 practitioners.  
 
These practitioners are likely to expose themselves, as well as their audit practices, to significant risk 
during their engagement decisions in the event that they do not appropriately consider all ethical 
guidance during their engagement decisions. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.8 and section 5.10.9.: To what extent do you consider 
the following factor when deciding to accept a new client - Compliance with the Code of Ethics for 
independent auditors and accountants? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 1 1 1  3 
 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 3.4% 5.0% 5.9%  3.9% 
 3 8 3  14 
 21.4% 57.1% 21.4%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 10.3% 40.0% 17.6%  18.2% 
2 25 11 13 1 52 
3.8% 48.1% 21.2% 25.0% 1.9% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 86.2% 55.0% 76.5% 100.0% 67.5% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.24. Consideration of Compliance with the Code of Ethics by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question in terms of age of the respondent: In considering the results 
of the responses related to this research question, practitioners aged 21 to 29 have not been considered 
as only two practitioners belong to this sub-population. When considering the remainder of the sub-
populations by age, it is concluded that practitioners of the ages of 30 to 39 years are impacted to a 
greater extent by ethical considerations during the engagement decisions process than others as 86,2% 
of respondents in this age category consider compliance with the Code of Ethics to a large extent, 
compared to 55,0% of respondents aged 40 to 49 years and 76,5% of respondents aged 50 to 59 years. 
Although older practitioners also consider ethical considerations from a moderate to a large extent, the 
decreasing importance of such considerations relating to older practitioners may be indicative of older 
practitioners having difficulty with, or being unaware of amendments to ethical standards as issued by 
IFAC (2005c) as stated in section 3.3.2.1. This may indicate the possibility that engagement decisions 
made by older practitioners may expose registered auditors in medium practice to risk. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question, section 7.3. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as the ethical guidance that served as basis for the inclusion of this 
research question in the overall research design. 
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6.12. Compliance with auditing standards on the acceptance of a new client 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.10.: Past studies by independent institutions indicated 
that auditors do not always adequately adhere to auditing standards (Gloeck, 2003). Wooten (2003) 
and Ryan (2005a-d) have further commented on concerns relating to the ability of registered auditors 
in medium practice to maintain generally costly systems, that would ease compliance with an 
increasing number of auditing standards. The research objective of this study will thus consider to 
what extent auditors in South Africa in medium practice consider auditing standards during their 
engagement decisions. This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of 
which the respondents are practitioners as detailed in table 6.25., as well as the age of the respondents 
as detailed in table 6.26. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.10.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Compliance with Auditing Standards on the acceptance of a 
new client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
 1 1   2 4 
 25.0% 25.0%   50.0% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
 8.3% 8.3%   14.3% 5.2% 
11 2 1 2 1 3 20 
55.0% 10.0% 5.0% 10.0% 5.0% 15.0% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
57.9% 16.7% 8.3% 33.3% 16.7% 21.4% 26.0% 
8 9 10 4 5 9 45 
17.8% 20.0% 22.2% 8.9% 11.1% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
42.1% 75.0% 83.3% 66.7% 83.3% 64.3% 58.4% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.25. Consideration of auditing standards by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question in terms of size of the practice: Registered auditors in 
medium practice consider auditing standards to a large extent (58,4% of respondents) during the 
engagement decision process. Table 6.25. also indicates that 57,9% of practitioners in firms with 5 to 
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10 practitioners, consider auditing standards to a moderate extent, as opposed to a predominantly large 
extent as is the case in each of the other size categories. 
 
Research by independent institutions indicated that auditors do not adequately adhere to auditing 
standards (Gloeck, 2003; Bailey, 2003) as stated in section 4.3. Carpenter & Mahoney (2001: 3) as 
stated in section 2.7. further concluded that registered auditors in medium practice have very limited 
engagement decision procedures and systems. This finding may be applicable to respondents to this 
study in firms with 5 to 10 practitioners. This study has however found that despite concerns around 
the level of compliance of auditing standards by registered auditors in medium practice; the pressures 
on their cost structures; their apparent inability to deliver similar levels of service than their larger 
international counterparts (Ryan, 2005a: 21) as stated in section 1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2. and lack of 
proper systems (USGAO, 2003: 2; Carpenter & Mahoney, 2001: 3) as stated in section 2.7., 
compliance with auditing standards is considered by registered auditors in medium practice during the 
engagement decision process to a large extent. It is however concerning that 5,2% of respondents 
indicated that they consider auditing standards only to a small extent during their decisions, as these 
practitioners are likely to be exposed to risk. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.10.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Compliance with Auditing Standards on the acceptance of a 
new client? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 1 2 1  4 
 25.0% 50.0% 25.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 3.4% 10.0% 5.9%  5.2% 
 8 8 3 1 20 
 40.0% 40.0% 15.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 27.6% 40.0% 17.6% 100.0% 26.0% 
2 20 10 13  45 
4.4% 44.4% 22.2% 28.9%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 69.0% 50.0% 76.5%  58.4% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.26. Consideration of auditing standards by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on the research question in terms of age of the respondent: This study indicates that 
younger practitioners are more likely to consider compliance with auditing standards than older 
practitioners.  
 
This is based on 96,6% (27,6% + 69,0%) of respondents aged 30 to 39 years indicating such 
consideration from a moderate to a large extent, compared to 90,0% (40,0% + 50,0%) aged 40 to 49 
years and 94,1% (17,6% + 76,5%) aged 50 to 59 years.  
 
It should however be noted as found by Gloeck (2003) that the general consideration of compliance 
with auditing standards, does not imply that practitioners actually do comply with such standards, but 
merely indicates its consideration. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question, section 7.3. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.13. The impact of personal preferences of auditors on client selection 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.28.: Studies by Shockley (1981: 785); Knapp (1985: 
202) and Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178) concluded that practitioners have different risk tolerances, 
which affect their client acceptance decisions, thus impacting on the personal preferences that a 
practitioner may have during engagement decisions.  
 
The research objective will be to determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa consider their own personal preferences during their engagement decision processes. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.27., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.28. hereafter. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.28.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your personal preferences on client selection? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
  1  1 4 6 
  16.7%  16.7% 66.7% 100.0% 
Not at all 
  8.3%  16.7% 28.6% 7.8% 
6 7 2 2  1 18 
33.3% 38.9% 11.1% 11.1%  5.6% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
31.6% 58.3% 16.7% 33.3%  7.1% 23.4% 
9 4 9 3 3 7 35 
25.7% 11.4% 25.7% 8.6% 8.6% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
47.4% 33.3% 75.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 45.5% 
4 1  1 2 2 10 
40.0% 10.0%  10.0% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
21.1% 8.3%  16.7% 33.3% 14.3% 13.0% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.27. Consideration of personal preferences by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question related to the size of the audit practice: Registered auditors 
in medium practice consider their own personal preferences during engagement decisions to a 
moderate extent (45,5% of respondents) of which 62,8% (25,7% + 11,4% + 25,7%) are from firms 
with 5 to 30 practitioners. The fact that smaller practices are impacted to a greater extent by personal 
preferences than their larger counterparts may in part be related to the organisational structures of such 
large practices. Bierstaker (2000: 6) found that auditors are highly motivated to respond to the 
perceived preferences of their superiors as stated in section 2.2.3., and in larger practices, it is 
reasonable to expect guidance related to client targeting and engagement decisions, being influenced 
by practitioners that are more senior rather than by personal preferences on client selection. This is 
also supported by the finding that the organisational influence of senior practitioners on other 
practitioners in larger audit firms is significant as concluded by Samuel (1998: 293-327) and 
Anderson-Gough, et al. (2001: 99-122) as stated in section 2.2.4. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.28.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your personal preferences on client selection? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 1 2 3  6 
 16.7% 33.3% 50.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 3.4% 10.0% 17.6%  7.8% 
 9 6 3  18 
 50.0% 33.3% 16.7%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 31.0% 30.0% 17.6%  23.4% 
2 16 9 7 1 35 
5.7% 45.7% 25.7% 20.0% 2.9% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
100.0% 55.2% 45.0% 41.2% 100.0% 45.5% 
 3 3 4  10 
 30.0% 30.0% 40.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 10.3% 15.0% 23.5%  13.0% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.28. Consideration of personal preferences by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question related to the age of the respondents: Table 6.28. suggests 
that younger practitioners give more consideration to their personal preferences during engagement 
decisions than older practitioners do. This is based on 55,2% of respondents aged 30 to 39 years 
considering such preferences to a moderate extent, compared to 45,0% aged 40 to 49 years and 41,2% 
aged 50 to 59 years. 
 
Cohen and Trompeter as stated in section 2.2.2.1. (1998: 481-504) concluded that practitioner 
aggressiveness towards gaining new clients becomes less as practitioners attain more established client 
portfolios, and hence it is argued that their personal preferences are also less vulnerable to the 
influence of older practitioners. In considering these conclusions on this research question, section 7.4. 
will reflect on the risks flowing from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional 
guidance that serve as basis for the inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
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6.14. The influence of prior experience of similar clients on the engagement decision 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.25.: The importance of prior experience has been 
concluded on by Wofford and Goodwin (1990: 603-612). The research objective will therefore 
consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice consider prior experience with similar 
clients during their engagement decisions. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.29., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.30. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.25.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your prior experience of clients similar to the prospective 
client? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 10  11 to 
20  
21 to 30  31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
  1    1 
  100.0%    100.0% 
Not at all 
  8.3%    1.3% 
5 4 2  1 4 16 
31.3% 25.0% 12.5%  6.3% 25.0% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
26.3% 33.3% 16.7%  16.7% 28.6% 20.8% 
7 5 8 4 4 8 36 
19.4% 13.9% 22.2% 11.1% 11.1% 22.2% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
36.8% 41.7% 66.7% 66.7% 66.7% 57.1% 46.8% 
7 3 1 2 1 2 16 
43.8% 18.8% 6.3% 12.5% 6.3% 12.5% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
36.8% 25.0% 8.3% 33.3% 16.7% 14.3% 20.8% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.29. Consideration of prior experience by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the consideration of prior experience based on the size of the practice: Registered 
auditors in medium practice consider prior experience during the engagement decision process to a 
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moderate extent (46,8% of respondents). This study also indicated that 73,6% (36,8% + 36,8%) of 
firms with 5 to 10 practitioners consider prior experience from a moderate to a large extent whilst this 
importance seems to decrease when 85,7% (28,6% + 57,1%) of practitioners from firms with 51 to 60 
practitioners consider prior experience from a small to moderate extent. This finding may be impacted 
by the difficulties that firms with fewer practitioners face in maintaining appropriately experienced 
staffing as commented on by Ryan (2005a-d) in section 1.1. and section 2.7., hence the importance of 
such prior experience when compared to larger firms who may have more depth of experience due to 
size considerations. This study has also found that 20,8% of practitioners consider prior experience to 
a small extent during their engagement decisions. This finding may be indicative that some registered 
auditors in medium practice may be exposing themselves to risk as they may be accepting audit 
assignments when they do not consider the required experience to effectively audit and service such 
clients. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.25.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your prior experience of clients similar to the prospective 
client? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
   1  1 
   100.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
   5.9%  1.3% 
 6 7 3  16 
 37.5% 43.8% 18.8%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 20.7% 35.0% 17.6%  20.8% 
1 18 8 8 1 36 
2.8% 50.0% 22.2% 22.2% 2.8% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 62.1% 40.0% 47.1% 100.0% 46.8% 
1 5 5 5  16 
6.3% 31.3% 31.3% 31.3%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 17.2% 25.0% 29.4%  20.8% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.30. Consideration of prior experience by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on the consideration of prior experience based on the age of the respondent: When 
considering those practitioners that consider prior experience during their engagement decisions to a 
moderate extent, practitioners aged 30 to 39 years are impacted to a greater extent by prior experience 
than others as 79,3% (62,1% + 17,2%) of such practitioners consider prior experience during their 
engagement decisions from a moderate to large extent, as opposed to 65,4% (40,4% + 25,0%) aged 40 
to 49 years and 76,5% (47,1% + 29,4%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. 
 
This, it is argued, may be as a result of the significant changes to ISA’s, requiring auditors to focus on 
their understanding of a clients business, before accepting an engagement as required by ISA 315 
(IFAC, 2003b: par .2-5). Prior experience on related clients in a similar industry serves as one of many 
sources for such an understanding.  
 
Concerns highlighted in section 1.1. would suggest that younger practitioners are more likely to be 
aware of these recent amendments and requirements of ISA’s than older practitioners. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question, section 7.3. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.15. The impact of personal remuneration of auditors on their engagement decisions 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.12.: Several researchers have concluded on the impact 
that certain practitioner preferences may have on the engagement decision process. As stated in 
section 2.2.3. Bierstaker (2000) concluded on the relation between practitioner preferences and 
practitioner remuneration; Peecher (1996: 125-140) and Bierstaker and Wright (1999: 12) noted 
practitioners’ preferences for efficiencies which may also impact their remuneration as profitability 
improves.  
 
The impact of practitioner remuneration on engagement decisions of registered auditors in medium 
practice therefore needs to be considered. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.31., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.32. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.12.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your personal remuneration? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
0 
response 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
8 1 1    1 11 
72.7% 9.1% 9.1%    9.1% 100.0% 
0 response 
100.0% 5.3% 8.3%    7.1% 14.3% 
 3 5 5 2 1 4 20 
 15.0% 25.0% 25.0% 10.0% 5.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 15.8% 41.7% 41.7% 33.3% 16.7% 28.6% 26.0% 
 7 4 3 1 3 6 24 
 29.2% 16.7% 12.5% 4.2% 12.5% 25.0% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
 36.8% 33.3% 25.0% 16.7% 50.0% 42.9% 31.2% 
 7 2 2 2 2 3 18 
 38.9% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 16.7% 100.0% 
To a 
moderate 
extent  36.8% 16.7% 16.7% 33.3% 33.3% 21.4% 23.4% 
 1  2 1   4 
 25.0%  50.0% 25.0%   100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 5.3%  16.7% 16.7%   5.2% 
Total 8 19 12 12 6 6 14 77 
 
Table 6.31. Consideration of personal remuneration by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the impact of personal remuneration on engagement decisions of registered 
auditors in medium practice by size of the audit practice: Table 6.31. indicates that 31,2% of 
registered auditors in medium practice consider their personal remuneration during their engagement 
decision process to a small extent; 26,0% considers their personal remuneration to no extent; and 
14,3% of respondents did not answer the question. These findings would suggest that personal 
remuneration do not impact on the engagement decisions of auditor registered auditors in medium 
practice in South Africa. Past studies by Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178), Auyers and Kaplan (1998: 139-
153) and Trompeter (1994: 56-68) as studied in section 2.2.2.3. all found that remuneration of 
practitioners are impacted by factors such as growth in client portfolios and revenues, and would 
suggest that remuneration would be considered during engagement decisions.  
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.12.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your personal remuneration? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
0 
response 
21 to 
29  
30 to 
39  
40 to 
49  
50 to 
59  
60 to 
69  
Total 
8  1 1 1  11 
72.7%  9.1% 9.1% 9.1%  100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%  3.4% 5.0% 5.9%  14.3% 
  12 5 3  20 
  60.0% 25.0% 15.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
  41.4% 25.0% 17.6%  26.0% 
 2 7 6 9  24 
 8.3% 29.2% 25.0% 37.5%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 100.0% 24.1% 30.0% 52.9%  31.2% 
  8 7 3  18 
  44.4% 38.9% 16.7%  100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
  27.6% 35.0% 17.6%  23.4% 
  1 1 1 1 4 
  25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
  3.4% 5.0% 5.9% 100.0% 5.2% 
Total 8 2 29 20 17 1 77 
 
Table 6.32. Consideration of personal remuneration by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the impact of personal remuneration by age of the respondent: This study has 
found that 41,4% of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years do not consider their remuneration at all during 
their engagement decisions as opposed to 25,0% of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 17,6% of 
practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. The study also indicates that 24,1% of practitioners aged 30 to 39 
years consider their remuneration to a small extent during their engagement decisions as opposed to 
30,0% of practitioners age 40 to 49 years and 52,9% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. This finding 
suggests that there is some indication that remuneration is considered during engagement decisions to 
a greater extent by older practitioners, than by younger practitioners. Risks, studies and guidance will 
be considered in this regard section 7.2. 
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6.16. The impact of firm policy on the acceptance of new clients 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.17.: As concluded in section 2.7. firms other than the 
Big Four, do not always have systems and policies for the evaluation of engagement decisions and as a 
result procedures around engagement decisions are generally limited (USGAO, 2003: 2; Carpenter & 
Mahoney, 2001: 3). A lack of systems and processes around the evaluation of engagement decisions 
may be indicative of a lack of proper systems regarding greater risk management, such as firm policies 
related to the acceptance of new clients. The research objective is therefore to consider if registered 
auditors in medium practice consider their firms’ policy on the acceptance of new clients during their 
engagement decision processes. This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit 
practices of which the respondents are practitioners as detailed in table 6.33., as well as the age of the 
respondents as detailed in table 6.34. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.17.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your firm’s policy on the acceptance of new clients? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 10  11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
1 1     2 
50.0% 50.0%     100.0% 
Not at all 
5.3% 8.3%     2.6% 
2    2 1 5 
40.0%    40.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
10.5%    33.3% 7.1% 6.5% 
8 7 5 2 3 4 29 
27.6% 24.1% 17.2% 6.9% 10.3% 13.8% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
42.1% 58.3% 41.7% 33.3% 50.0% 28.6% 37.7% 
8 4 7 4 1 9 33 
24.2% 12.1% 21.2% 12.1% 3.0% 27.3% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
42.1% 33.3% 58.3% 66.7% 16.7% 64.3% 42.9% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.33.  Impact of firm policy on engagement decisions by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on the impact of firm policy on client acceptance by size of the audit practice: 
Registered auditors in medium practice consider their firms’ policy on engagement decisions during 
their engagement decisions to a large extent (42,9% of respondents), of which 24,2% are from firms 
with 5 to 10 practitioners and 27,3% are from firms with 50 to 59 practitioners. In considering the 
overall response to this question, it is concluded that practitioners in the larger firms are more likely to 
consider their firms’ policies during engagement decisions than practitioners in smaller firms. This, it 
is argued, may be as a result of larger practices having similar systems and policies to the Big Four 
due to their size as found by the USGAO (2003: 2), and the concerns expressed by the USGAO 
(2003,2) and Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3) that suggested that firms with fewer practitioners do 
not have firm policies on engagement decisions.  It is however concerning that 9,1% (2,6% and 6,5%) 
of the respondents consider their firms’ policies on client acceptance to a small or no extent at all, 
indicating that there is a risk that these policies may not exist, practitioners may not be aware of such 
policies or that engagement decisions amongst practitioners may not be consistent and thus expose the 
relevant practitioners and their firms to risk. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.17.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your firm’s policy on the acceptance of new clients? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 1  1  2 
 50.0%  50.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 3.4%  5.9%  2.6% 
 2 1 2  5 
 40.0% 20.0% 40.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 6.9% 5.0% 11.8%  6.5% 
 12 10 6 1 29 
 41.4% 34.5% 20.7% 3.4% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 41.4% 50.0% 35.3% 100.0% 37.7% 
2 14 9 8  33 
6.1% 42.4% 27.3% 24.2%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 48.3% 45.0% 47.1%  42.9% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.34. Impact of firm policy on engagement decisions by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on client acceptance by age of the respondent: Based on the findings of this study, 
younger practitioners are more likely to consider firm policy in their engagement decisions than older 
practitioners. This is based on 89,7% (41,4% + 48,3%) of respondents aged 30 to 39 years considering 
such policies compared to 82,4% (35,3% + 47,1%) aged 50 to 59 years. The implementation and 
maintenance of policies related to engagement decisions is required by standards such as ISQC 1 
(2004a), and hence it is argued based on the concerns expressed in 1.1., that many older practitioners 
have difficulty in staying abreast of new standards and may thus not be aware of the need to 
implement, maintain and consider policies on matters such as engagement decisions within their firms.  
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question, section 7.4. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that serve as basis for the 
inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.17. The impact of practitioners’ ability to satisfy BEE criteria and consideration of 
employment statistics related to persons from previously disadvantaged communities 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.25.: As commented on by Ryan (2005a-d), the lack of 
qualified black accountants places significant strain on the future resourcing of all audit practices, not 
only registered auditors in medium practice. This however, coupled with commercial pressures within 
the profession as concluded on in section 1.1.3.1. are likely to highlight the importance of BEE to 
registered auditors in medium practice as suggested by Ryan (2005a-d).  
 
This study will therefore consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice in South 
Africa consider their ability to satisfy BEE requirements during their engagement decisions. This 
objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practice’s of which the respondents are 
practitioners as detailed in table 6.35., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 6.36. 
 
Conclusion on the ability of practitioners to satisfy BEE criteria and their engagement decisions 
per the size of the practice: As concluded from table 6.35. hereafter, this study found that registered 
auditors in medium practice consider BEE to a small extent (41,6%).  
 
This study has also found that 36,4% of practitioners from firms with 40 to 49 practitioners do not 
consider BEE criteria during their engagements at all. From the results of this study it would appear 
that the smaller firms are more concerned with BEE criteria during their engagement decisions than 
their larger counterparts as 66,6% (23,8% + 33,3% + 9,5%) of those who consider BEE to a moderate 
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extent are from firms with 5 to 30 practitioners compared to 43,7% (12,5% + 3,1% + 28,1%) that are 
from firms with 31 to 60 practitioners.   
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.25.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your firm’s ability to satisfy BEE criteria and your 
employment statistics related to persons from previously disadvantaged communities? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
2 2 2  4 1 11 
18.2% 18.2% 18.2%  36.4% 9.1% 100.0% 
Not at all 
10.5% 16.7% 16.7%  66.7% 7.1% 14.3% 
9 3 6 4 1 9 32 
28.1% 9.4% 18.8% 12.5% 3.1% 28.1% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
47.4% 25.0% 50.0% 66.7% 16.7% 64.3% 41.6% 
5 7 2 2 1 4 21 
23.8% 33.3% 9.5% 9.5% 4.8% 19.0% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3% 58.3% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 28.6% 27.3% 
3  2    5 
60.0%  40.0%    100.0% 
To a large extent 
15.8%  16.7%    6.5% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.35. Consideration of the firm’s ability to satisfy BEE criteria during the engagement 
decision by the size of the audit practice 
 
Conclusion on the ability of practitioners to satisfy BEE criteria during engagement decisions 
per the age of the respondent: As stated in table 6.36. hereafter, younger practitioners give more 
consideration to BEE than older practitioners. This is based on 34,4% (31,0% + 3,4%) of practitioners 
aged 30 to 39 years that consider BEE from a moderate to large extent, as opposed to 23,5% (17,6% + 
5,9%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. This finding may in part be related to the impact that BEE 
will have over the long term on the audit profession, and younger practitioners, based on the concerns 
expressed in 1.1., being more abreast of developments within the profession. In considering these 
conclusions on this research question section 7.2. will reflect on the risks flowing from these 
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conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the inclusion of 
this research question in the overall research design. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.25.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your firm’s ability to satisfy BEE criteria and your 
employment statistics related to persons from previously disadvantaged communities? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
 4 2 4 1 11 
 36.4% 18.2% 36.4% 9.1% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 13.8% 10.0% 23.5% 100.0% 14.3% 
1 15 7 9  32 
3.1% 46.9% 21.9% 28.1%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 51.7% 35.0% 52.9%  41.6% 
1 9 8 3  21 
4.8% 42.9% 38.1% 14.3%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 31.0% 40.0% 17.6%  27.3% 
 1 3 1  5 
 20.0% 60.0% 20.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 3.4% 15.0% 5.9%  6.5% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.36. Consideration of the firm’s ability to satisfy BEE criteria during the engagement 
decision by the age of the respondent 
 
 
6.18. The impact of proposed amendments to the Companies Act and the Auditing 
Profession Bill on the engagement decision process 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.6.: The auditing profession will be impacted by the 
proposed amendments to the Companies Act in relation to matters such as the provisioning of non-
audit services to audit clients, and the rotation of registered auditors (SAICA, 2002: 1-23; Terry, 2002: 
7). The research objective is therefore to consider to what extent registered auditors in medium 
practice consider the proposed amendments to the Companies Act as well as the Auditing Profession 
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Bill during their engagement decisions. This objective is researched with reference to the size of the 
audit practice’s of which the respondents are practitioners as detailed in table 6.37., as well as the age 
of the respondents as detailed in table 6.38. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.6.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Proposed amendments to the Companies Act and the Auditing 
Profession Bill? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
1 2 2 1 1 3 10 
10.0% 20.0% 20.0% 10.0% 10.0% 30.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
5.3% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 21.4% 13.0% 
12 1 4 4 2 7 30 
40.0% 3.3% 13.3% 13.3% 6.7% 23.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
63.2% 8.3% 33.3% 66.7% 33.3% 50.0% 39.0% 
5 7 2  3 2 19 
26.3% 36.8% 10.5%  15.8% 10.5% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3% 58.3% 16.7%  50.0% 14.3% 24.7% 
1 2 4 1  2 10 
10.0% 20.0% 40.0% 10.0%  20.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
5.3% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7%  14.3% 13.0% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.37. Consideration of proposed statutory amendments by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the impact of proposed statutory amendments in terms of the size of the audit 
practice: Registered auditors in medium practice consider proposed amendments to statutory 
regulation to a small extent (39,0% of respondents), of which 40% are from firms with 5 to 10 
practitioners. The finding that 71,4% (21,4% + 50,0%) of practitioners from firms with 51 to 60 
practitioners consider proposed amendments to statutory regulations from a small to no extent at all, is 
even more concerning. This study suggests that there is no real trend to suggest a relation between the 
size of the firm of the respondent, and their consideration of these amendments. 
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Due to the significant impact of regulations related to rotation and limitations on non-audit services to 
audit clients on registered auditors in medium practice, it was expected that registered auditors in 
medium practice will be greatly concerned with proposed amendments to statutory legislation that 
may impact their sustainability as argued by Gloeck (2003) in section 3.2.1.4.2. The findings of this 
study would however suggest that they may not be aware of the content nor impact of such proposed 
statutory amendments on their practices. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.6.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Proposed amendments to the Companies Act and the Auditing 
Profession Bill? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 3 1 5 1 10 
 30.0% 10.0% 50.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 10.3% 5.0% 29.4% 100.0% 13.0% 
2 12 10 6  30 
6.7% 40.0% 33.3% 20.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
100.0% 41.4% 50.0% 35.3%  39.0% 
 8 8 3  19 
 42.1% 42.1% 15.8%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 27.6% 40.0% 17.6%  24.7% 
 6 1 3  10 
 60.0% 10.0% 30.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 20.7% 5.0% 17.6%  13.0% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.38. Consideration of proposed statutory amendments by age of the respondent  
 
Conclusion on the research question in terms of the age of the respective respondents: 
Practitioners of the ages of 30 to 39 years are impacted to a greater extent by proposed statutory 
amendments than others. This is based on 20,7% of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years considering such 
amendments to a large extent; 50,0% of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years considering such 
amendments to a small extent, and 29,4% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years considering such 
amendments to no extent at all. 
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This finding, it is argued, may be related to the significant number of amendments to statutory 
regulation as highlighted in section 1.1. Concern exists within the industry that older practitioners have 
more difficulty in staying abreast of the many regulatory changes, hence the introduction of CPD from 
2006. In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.3. will reflect on the risks 
flowing from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that serve as basis 
for the inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
6.19. Considering auditor independence to the client 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.5: The proposed amendments to the Companies Act, no. 
61 of 1973 and the Auditing Profession Act, no. 26 of 2005, address concerns that relate to auditor 
independence. The research objective is therefore to consider to what extent registered auditors in 
medium practice consider their independence during their engagement decision processes. This 
objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents are 
practitioners as detailed in table 6.39., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 6.40. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.5.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your independence to the client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
1 1 1 1  2 6 
16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7%  33.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
5.3% 8.3% 8.3% 16.7%  14.3% 7.8% 
5  1 1 4  11 
45.5%  9.1% 9.1% 36.4%  100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3%  8.3% 16.7% 66.7%  14.3% 
13 11 10 4 2 12 52 
25.0% 21.2% 19.2% 7.7% 3.8% 23.1% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
68.4% 91.7% 83.3% 66.7% 33.3% 85.7% 67.5% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.39. Consideration of independence by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on the research question with reference to the size of the firm: Registered auditors in 
medium practice consider their independence during engagement decisions to a large extent (67,5% of 
respondents). This study has also found that 65,4% (25,0% + 21,2% + 19,2%) of those practitioners 
who consider their independence from a potential client to a large extent, are from firms with 5 to 30 
practitioners. 
 
It is however concerning that 66,7% of respondents from firms with 41 to 50 practitioners only 
consider their independence from their clients to a moderate extent suggesting that smaller firms 
consider their independence from a potential client during their engagement decisions to a greater 
extent than some of the larger practitioners.  
 
These practitioners from larger firms within the population of firms in medium audit practice may thus 
expose themselves and their audit firms to risk during their engagement decisions as they may not 
always consider their independence from their clients in the manner required by legislation, auditing 
standards and ethics. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.5.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Your independence to the client? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 2 1 3  6 
 33.3% 16.7% 50.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 6.9% 5.0% 17.6%  7.8% 
 1 7 3  11 
 9.1% 63.6% 27.3%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 3.4% 35.0% 17.6%  14.3% 
2 26 12 11 1 52 
3.8% 50.0% 23.1% 21.2% 1.9% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 89.7% 60.0% 64.7% 100.0% 67.5% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.40. Consideration of independence by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on the research question with reference to the age of the respondent: Practitioners of 
the ages of 30 to 39 years are impacted to a greater extent by their independence during the 
engagement decisions process than others.  
 
This is based on 89,7% of such practitioners considering independence to a large extent as opposed to 
60,0% of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years who consider independence to a large extent and 64,7% of 
practitioners aged 50 to 59 years that consider their independence to a large extent. 
 
It is also concluded that younger practitioners are likely to consider their independence from their 
clients to a greater extent than older practitioners, as only 10,3% (6,9% + 3,4%) of practitioners aged 
30 to 39 years consider their independence from a moderate to small extent during their engagement 
decisions, compared to 35,2% (17,6% + 17,6%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 who consider their 
independence from a moderate to small extent during their engagement decisions.  
 
This finding would suggest that older practitioners, who do not consider their independence from 
potential clients during engagement decisions, might expose themselves and their audit firms to risk 
during their engagement decisions.  
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.3. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that serve as basis for the 
inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.20. The influence of undue management pressure on audit approach and reporting 
practices 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.22.: Studies by Moore (2003); Van Dijk and Jansman 
(1994: 1), and Watts and Zimmerman (1979: 273) indicated that management pressure to decrease 
audit fees may impact on the pricing of assignments as management attempts to influence the audit 
approach and reporting practices of their auditors.  
 
The research objective is therefore to determine to what extent practitioners consider the impact of 
management pressure during their engagement decision processes.  
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.41., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.42. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.22.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - The influence of undue management pressure in your intended 
auditing approach and reporting practices? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
 1   1 1 3 
 33.3%   33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 8.3%   16.7% 7.1% 3.9% 
1 1 2 1  1 6 
16.7% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7%  16.7% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
5.3% 8.3% 16.7% 16.7%  7.1% 7.8% 
11 4 1 2 3 5 26 
42.3% 15.4% 3.8% 7.7% 11.5% 19.2% 100.0% 
To a 
moderate 
extent 57.9% 33.3% 8.3% 33.3% 50.0% 35.7% 33.8% 
7 6 9 3 2 7 34 
20.6% 17.6% 26.5% 8.8% 5.9% 20.6% 100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
36.8% 50.0% 75.0% 50.0% 33.3% 50.0% 44.2% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.41. Consideration of undue management pressure by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question considering the size of the audit practice: This study found 
that 78,0% (33,8% + 44,2%) of registered auditors in medium practice consider undue management 
pressure during engagement decisions from a moderate to a large extent. There is no significant 
difference in the extent to which practitioners (from all size categories) consider undue management 
pressure. This finding suggests that auditors consider undue management pressure on a consistent 
basis during their engagement decisions.  
 
It could be argued that registered auditors in medium practice will be concerned with management 
pressure related to their approach and reporting practices, mainly as a result of section 20 of the PAAA 
that has been in use for a number of years and which requires auditors to be unrestricted in their work 
(South Africa, 1991: s 20) as stated in section 3.2.1.1.  
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.22.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - The influence of undue management pressure in your intended 
auditing approach and reporting practices? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 2  1  3 
 66.7%  33.3%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 6.9%  5.9%  3.9% 
 1 1 4  6 
 16.7% 16.7% 66.7%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 3.4% 5.0% 23.5%  7.8% 
 12 10 4  26 
 46.2% 38.5% 15.4%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 41.4% 50.0% 23.5%  33.8% 
2 14 9 8 1 34 
5.9% 41.2% 26.5% 23.5% 2.9% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 48.3% 45.0% 47.1% 100.0% 44.2% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.42. Consideration of undue management pressure by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question considering the age of the respondent: Practitioners of the 
ages of 30 to 39 years are impacted to a greater extent by management pressure during their 
engagement decisions than older practitioners. This is based on 89,7% (41,4% + 48,3%) of 
practitioners aged 30 to 39 years indicating that they consider such management pressure from a 
moderate to a large extent, as opposed to 70,6% (23,5% + 47,1%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years 
that consider such pressure from a moderate to a large extent. As studied in section 1.1. it is argued, 
that younger practitioners are more likely to be aware of amendments to standards and legislation than 
are older practitioners, and are therefore more likely to consider matters that may impact their 
independence, such as undue management pressure. In considering conclusions on this research 
question section 7.7. will reflect on the risks flowing from such conclusions, as well as those studies 
and professional guidance that served as basis for the inclusion of this research question in the overall 
research design. 
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6.21. Considering interaction with the audit committee  
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.5.: The statutory introduction of audit committees by 
proposed amendments to the Companies Act  for public interest companies (South Africa, 2005a: s 
269A) is likely to impact on the future influence of management on matters such as audit fees and 
reporting practices as concluded by Van Dijk and Jansman (1994: 1) as discussed in section 3.2.1.4. 
The research objective is to determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice consider 
interaction with the audit committee of a prospective client during their engagement decision. This 
objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents are 
practitioners as detailed in table 6.43., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 6.44. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.5.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Interaction with the audit committee, where applicable? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
0 
response 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
8    1   9 
88.9%    11.1%   100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%    16.7%   11.7% 
    1 1  2 
    50.0% 50.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
    16.7% 16.7%  2.6% 
 7 3 3 1 1 7 22 
 31.8% 13.6% 13.6% 4.5% 4.5% 31.8% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
 36.8% 25.0% 25.0% 16.7% 16.7% 50.0% 28.6% 
 9 5 6 1 4 3 28 
 32.1% 17.9% 21.4% 3.6% 14.3% 10.7% 100.0% 
To a 
moderate 
extent  47.4% 41.7% 50.0% 16.7% 66.7% 21.4% 36.4% 
 3 4 3 2  4 16 
 18.8% 25.0% 18.8% 12.5%  25.0% 100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 15.8% 33.3% 25.0% 33.3%  28.6% 20.8% 
Total 8 19 12 12 6 6 14 77 
 
Table 6.43. Consideration of liaison with audit committees by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on the research question pertaining to the size of the practice: As stated in table 6.43. 
hereafter, registered auditors in medium practice consider interaction with audit committees during 
their engagement decisions to a moderate extent (36,4% of respondents). Similarly 31,2% (28,6% + 
2,6%) consider such interaction from a small to no extent at all, suggesting that interaction with audit 
committees may be inconsistent across the population. This finding is the likely result of such 
proposed amendments not being enacted at the test date of this study. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.5.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - Interaction with the audit committee, where applicable? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
0 
response 
21 to 
29  
30 to 
39  
40 to 
49  
50 to 
59  
60 to 
69  
Total 
8 1     9 
88.9% 11.1%     100.0% 
0 response 
100.0% 50.0%     11.7% 
    2  2 
    100.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
    11.8%  2.6% 
  8 10 4  22 
  36.4% 45.5% 18.2%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
  27.6% 50.0% 23.5%  28.6% 
 1 13 5 8 1 28 
 3.6% 46.4% 17.9% 28.6% 3.6% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
 50.0% 44.8% 25.0% 47.1% 100.0% 36.4% 
  8 5 3  16 
  50.0% 31.3% 18.8%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
  27.6% 25.0% 17.6%  20.8% 
Total 8 2 29 20 17 1 77 
 
Table 6.44. Consideration of liaison with audit committees by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question pertaining to the age of the respondent: Practitioners aged of 
30 to 39 years are impacted to a greater extent by interaction with audit committees than others, as 
72,4% (44,8% + 27,6%) of such practitioners consider proposed amendments from a moderate to large 
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extent compared to a 64,7% (47,1% + 17,6%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years who consider these 
amendments from a moderate to a large extent. This may be the result of concerns highlighted in 
section 1.1. related to the challenge of older practitioners to remain abreast of statutory changes. Risks, 
studies and guidance will be reflected on in section 7.7. 
 
6.22. The delivery of non-audit services to the prospective audit client 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.7.: The provision of non-audit services to public interest 
companies will be limited following amendments to the Companies Act (South Africa, 2005: s 275A). 
This may impact on current revenue earnings, suggesting the possibility that practitioners may need to 
refocus their services. The research objective is therefore to determine to what extent practitioners 
consider the delivery of non-audit services to prospective clients in table 6.45. and table 6.46. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.7.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - The delivery of non-auditing services to the prospective audit 
client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
2 1 1   2 6 
33.3% 16.7% 16.7%   33.3% 100.0% 
Not at all 
10.5% 8.3% 8.3%   14.3% 7.8% 
6 2 4 1 1 2 16 
37.5% 12.5% 25.0% 6.3% 6.3% 12.5% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
31.6% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 14.3% 20.8% 
7 7 5 3 4 8 34 
20.6% 20.6% 14.7% 8.8% 11.8% 23.5% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
36.8% 58.3% 41.7% 50.0% 66.7% 57.1% 44.2% 
4 2 2 2 1 2 13 
30.8% 15.4% 15.4% 15.4% 7.7% 15.4% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
21.1% 16.7% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 14.3% 16.9% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.45. Consideration of the delivery of non-audit services by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on the consideration of the delivery of non-audit services by size of the audit 
practice: Registered auditors in medium practice consider the delivery of non-audit services during 
their engagement decision processes to a moderate extent (44,2% of respondents).  
 
It is concerning that 42,1% (10,5% + 31,6%) of practitioners from firms with 5 to 10 practitioners 
consider the delivery of non-audit services to a small or no extent at all, as these practitioners may be 
impacted to a greater extent when such amendments are enacted, as some of the larger firms who are 
likely to have larger and more established clients portfolios, may be less dependent on their income 
from such non-audit services. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.7.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - The delivery of non-auditing services to the prospective audit 
client? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 1 2 3  6 
 16.7% 33.3% 50.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 3.4% 10.0% 17.6%  7.8% 
1 5 4 5 1 16 
6.3% 31.3% 25.0% 31.3% 6.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 17.2% 20.0% 29.4% 100.0% 20.8% 
1 17 9 7  34 
2.9% 50.0% 26.5% 20.6%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 58.6% 45.0% 41.2%  44.2% 
 6 5 2  13 
 46.2% 38.5% 15.4%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 20.7% 25.0% 11.8%  16.9% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.46. Consideration of the delivery of non-audit services by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on consideration of the delivery of non-audit services by age of the respondent:  As 
per table 6.46., 79,3% (58,6% + 20,7%) of practitioners of the ages of 30 to 39 years consider the 
delivery of non-audit services during their engagement decisions from a moderate to a large extent.  
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This compares to 53,0% (41,2% + 11,8%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years that consider the 
delivery of non-audit services during their engagement decision from a moderate to a large extent.  
 
These findings indicate that younger practitioners are more concerned with the delivery of non-audit 
services during their engagement decisions than older practitioners, which would suggest that older 
practitioners might in future expose themselves and their firms to independence risk during their 
engagement decisions. 
 
The apparent lack of consideration of the delivery of non-audit services to audit clients by older 
practitioners is as a result of older practitioners having difficulty in staying abreast of the many 
statutory and regulatory amendments in the current auditing environment, as highlighted in section 
1.1. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.7. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.23. The impact of auditor rotation on the engagement decision process 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.6.: The practicality of the rotation of nominated auditors 
by registered auditors in medium practice as required by proposed amendments to the Companies Act, 
no. 61 of 1973, is of concern, noting the fact that practitioners in firms in medium audit practice are 
limited in terms of their number of practitioners (SAICA 2002: 1-23; Terry, 2002: 7). Not only does 
proposed amendments to legislation require rotation,  but auditing standards such as ISQC 1 further 
requires that the principle of rotation should be considered on all audit assignments (IFAC, 2004a: par 
.26).   
 
The need to consider such practitioners’ ability to comply with rotation principles is further impacted 
by structural concerns and limited access to specialists in firms in medium audit practice as suggested 
by Ryan (2005a-d). 
 
The research objective is therefore to consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa consider the impact of auditor rotation during their engagement decisions. 
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This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.47., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.48. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.6.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - The rotation of your auditors on all assignments after a certain 
number of years on an assignment? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
9 4 4 1 3 7 28 
32.1% 14.3% 14.3% 3.6% 10.7% 25.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
47.4% 33.3% 33.3% 16.7% 50.0% 50.0% 36.4% 
10 4 1 1 1 5 22 
45.5% 18.2% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 22.7% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
52.6% 33.3% 8.3% 16.7% 16.7% 35.7% 28.6% 
 4 6 2 2 2 16 
 25.0% 37.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
 33.3% 50.0% 33.3% 33.3% 14.3% 20.8% 
  1 2   3 
  33.3% 66.7%   100.0% 
To a large extent 
  8.3% 33.3%   3.9% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.47. Consideration of auditor rotation by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question based on the size of the audit practice: Registered auditors in 
medium practice consider the rotation of practitioners to no extent (36,4% of respondents) of which 
32,1% are from firms with 5 to 10 practitioners. This it is argued may be the result of their inability to 
comply, should such a requirement be applicable to their audits. ISQC 1 requires the rotation of staff 
on assignments, which should include the practitioner (IFAC, 2004a: par .26-27) on all audits after 15 
June 2005. This finding raises significant concerns as an inability to consider and apply rotation may 
lead to practitioners being exposed to independence concerns, as well as non-compliance with 
statutory and regulatory regulation. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.6.: To what extent do you consider the following factor 
when deciding to accept a new client - The rotation of your auditors on all assignments after a certain 
number of years on an assignment? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
 9 9 10  28 
 32.1% 32.1% 35.7%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 31.0% 45.0% 58.8%  36.4% 
1 11 7 3  22 
4.5% 50.0% 31.8% 13.6%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 37.9% 35.0% 17.6%  28.6% 
 7 4 4 1 16 
 43.8% 25.0% 25.0% 6.3% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
 24.1% 20.0% 23.5% 100.0% 20.8% 
1 2    3 
33.3% 66.7%    100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 6.9%    3.9% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.48. Consideration of auditor rotation by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question based on the age of the respondents: This study has found 
that younger practitioners are more likely to consider practitioner rotation during their engagement 
decisions than some of the older practitioners, as 31,0% (24,1% + 6,9%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 
years would consider rotation during their engagement decision from a moderate to a large extent, 
compared to 45,0% of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 58,8% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years 
that would not at all consider rotation during their engagement decisions.  
 
This finding may be as a result of older practitioners not being aware of proposed amendments to 
legislation or the requirements of ISQC 1 (2004a). As stated in section 1.1. concerns exists that older 
practitioners are having difficulty in keeping abreast of many statutory and regulatory changes. In 
considering these conclusions on this research question, section 7.7. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions. 
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6.24. The impact of auditor predisposition on assessed risk during the engagement-decision 
process 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.16.: Despite the conclusion as to the existence of 
motivational drivers by researchers such as Johnstone (2000: 1); Kirkham (1992: 301); Bailey (1995: 
191-195) and Gendron (2002: 8), it is important to consider to what extent registered auditors in 
medium practice acknowledge the impact of these motivational drivers on their predisposition during 
risk assessment. The research objective is therefore to determine to what extent registered auditors in 
medium practice in South Africa consider commercial, organisation and professional considerations 
during their risk assessments. This objective is researched in table 6.49., as well as in table 6.50. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.16.: Do you believe that commercial, organisational and 
professional considerations impact on the number of risks that you identify during the engagement-
decision process? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
0 
response 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
8 1      9 
88.9% 11.1%      100.0% 
0 response 
100.0% 5.3%      11.7% 
 1 1 1  1 1 5 
 20.0% 20.0% 20.0%  20.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
 5.3% 8.3% 8.3%  16.7% 7.1% 6.5% 
 14 3 8 3 3 7 38 
 36.8% 7.9% 21.1% 7.9% 7.9% 18.4% 100.0% 
To a 
moderate 
extent  73.7% 25.0% 66.7% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 49.4% 
 3 8 3 3 2 6 25 
 12.0% 32.0% 12.0% 12.0% 8.0% 24.0% 100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 15.8% 66.7% 25.0% 50.0% 33.3% 42.9% 32.5% 
Total 8 19 12 12 6 6 14 77 
 
Table 6.49. The impact of auditor predisposition on risk assessment by the size of the audit 
practice  
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Conclusion on the impact of motivational drivers per size of the audit firm: From table 6.49. it is 
concluded that 81,9% (49,4% + 32,5%) of practitioners are impacted by behavioral motivational 
drivers, from a moderate extent to a large extent during their engagement decisions. In each firm size 
category, 80% or more of the respondents have indicated that motivational drivers affect them during 
their risk assessment procedures from a moderate to a large extent, thereby confirming the influence of 
motivational drivers on the predisposition of registered auditors in medium practice during their risk 
assessment procedures.  
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.16.: Do you believe that commercial, organisational and 
professional considerations impact on the number of risks that you identify during the engagement-
decision process? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
0 
response 
21 to 
29  
30 to 
39  
40 to 
49  
50 to 
59  
60 to 
69  
Total 
8   1   9 
88.9%   11.1%   100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%   5.0%   11.7% 
  3 1 1  5 
  60.0% 20.0% 20.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
  10.3% 5.0% 5.9%  6.5% 
 2 16 9 10 1 38 
 5.3% 42.1% 23.7% 26.3% 2.6% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
 100.0% 55.2% 45.0% 58.8% 100.0% 49.4% 
  10 9 6  25 
  40.0% 36.0% 24.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
  34.5% 45.0% 35.3%  32.5% 
Total 8 2 29 20 17 1 77 
 
Table 6.50. The impact of auditor predisposition on risk assessment by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the impact of motivational drivers per age of the respondent: Risk assessment of 
registered auditors in medium practice are impacted similarly by motivational drivers, irrespective of 
their age as 80% or more of the respondents in each age category have indicated that they are impacted 
by these motivational drivers during their risk assessments from a moderate to a large extent (21 to 29 
years – 100%; 30 to 39 years - 89,7% (55,2% + 34,5%); 40 to 49 years – 90% (45,0% + 45,0%); 50 to 
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59 years – 94,1% (58,8% + 35,3%) and 60 to 69 years – 100%). In considering these conclusions on 
this research question section 7.5. will reflect on the risks flowing from these conclusions, as well as 
those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the inclusion of this research question 
in the overall research design. 
 
6.25. The evaluation of Inherent Risk (IR) 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.20.: The AR model (Hitzig, 2001) and the model for the 
assessment of ER (Johnstone, 2000: 1-21) are both available to auditors to assist during engagement 
decision processes. It is important to consider the application of the elements of both the AR model 
(being IR, DR and CR), and the elements of Johnstone’s model (being the assessment of AR in 
relation to Cbr and Abr). The research objective is firstly to consider to what extent auditors in 
medium audit practice consider the evaluation of IR during their engagement decision processes. This 
objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents are 
practitioners as detailed in table 6.51., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 6.52. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.20.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - The inherent risk posed by the prospective 
client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
3 1 1   1 6 
50.0% 16.7% 16.7%   16.7% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
15.8% 8.3% 8.3%   7.1% 7.8% 
9 7 4 4 2 7 33 
27.3% 21.2% 12.1% 12.1% 6.1% 21.2% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
47.4% 58.3% 33.3% 66.7% 33.3% 50.0% 42.9% 
7 4 7 2 4 6 30 
23.3% 13.3% 23.3% 6.7% 13.3% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
36.8% 33.3% 58.3% 33.3% 66.7% 42.9% 39.0% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.51. The evaluation of Inherent Risk (IR) by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on the evaluation of IR with reference to the size of the firm: This study has found that 
only 7,8% of respondents consider IR to a small extent during their engagement decisions. In fact, 
81,9% (42,9% + 39,0%) of registered auditors in medium practice consider the evaluation of IR from a 
moderate to a large extent. Despite the apparent high level of consideration of IR by registered 
auditors in medium practice, this study has also found that smaller audit firms consider IR to a lesser 
extent than their larger counterparts during their engagement decisions. This finding, it is argued, may 
be as a result of the difficulties firms with fewer practitioners face, as discussed in section 1.1.3. 
relating to competition in the audit services market. Practitioners in firms with 5 to 10 practitioners 
consider IR to a moderate extent (47,4%); practitioners in firms with 11 to 20 practitioners consider IR 
moderately (58,3%); practitioners in firms with 41 to 50 practitioners consider IR largely (66,7%); and 
practitioners in firms with 51 to 60 practitioners consider IR largely (42,9%). Practitioners in smaller 
firms may be exposed to risk as they may be accepting clients without due consideration to their IR, as 
a result of competition in the market. However, a lack of an evaluation of IR may also suggest that 
such firms do not have appropriate systems and methodology requiring such assessment as argued by 
Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3) as stated in section 2.7. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.20.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - The inherent risk posed by the prospective 
client? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 2 2 2  6 
 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 6.9% 10.0% 11.8%  7.8% 
2 14 10 6 1 33 
6.1% 42.4% 30.3% 18.2% 3.0% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
100.0% 48.3% 50.0% 35.3% 100.0% 42.9% 
 13 8 9  30 
 43.3% 26.7% 30.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 44.8% 40.0% 52.9%  39.0% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.52. The evaluation of Inherent Risk (IR) by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on the evaluation of IR with reference to the age of the respondent:  Although there 
are minimal differences to the extent to which different age categories consider IR, it is noted that 
older practitioners aged 50 to 59 years consider IR to a greater extent than younger practitioners in the 
category of those who consider IR to a large extent.  
 
This finding is based on the following responses: practitioners aged 30 to 39 years consider IR to a 
large extent (44,8%); practitioners aged  40 to 49 years consider IR to a large extent (40,0%) and 
practitioners aged 50 to 59 years consider IR to a large extent (52,9%). 
 
This finding, it is argued, may be the likely result of older practitioners being more experienced or 
having prior experience of clients with high levels of IR that may have had detrimental consequences 
to their practices. This view confirms to some extent the argument of Asare et al. (1994: 163-178) that 
practitioners who have experienced events where they have been exposed to risk, are more likely to be 
conservative in their client acceptance policies as stated in section 2.2.2.2. than those who have not 
experienced similar events.  
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.5. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that serve as basis for the 
inclusion of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.26. The evaluation of Control Risk (CR) 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.20.: As stated in section 6.25., it is important to consider 
the application of the elements of both the AR model (being IR, DR and CR), and the elements of 
Johnstone’s model (being the assessment of AR in relation to Cbr and Abr). Following onto section 
6.25. the objective of this research question is to consider to what extent registered auditors in medium 
practice consider the evaluation of CR during their engagement decision processes. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.53., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.54. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.20.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - The control risk posed by the prospective 
client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
2 2    1 5 
40.0% 40.0%    20.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
10.5% 16.7%    7.1% 6.5% 
4 2 1 2  5 14 
28.6% 14.3% 7.1% 14.3%  35.7% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
21.1% 16.7% 8.3% 33.3%  35.7% 18.2% 
11 6 8 3 4 5 37 
29.7% 16.2% 21.6% 8.1% 10.8% 13.5% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
57.9% 50.0% 66.7% 50.0% 66.7% 35.7% 48.1% 
2 2 3 1 2 3 13 
15.4% 15.4% 23.1% 7.7% 15.4% 23.1% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
10.5% 16.7% 25.0% 16.7% 33.3% 21.4% 16.9% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.53. The evaluation of Control Risk (CR) by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the evaluation of CR related to the size of the audit practice: Registered auditors in 
medium practice are impacted by the assessment of CR during the engagement decision process to a 
moderate extent (48,1% of respondents). This study has found that practitioners in larger firms 
consider the evaluation of CR to a greater extent than practitioners in smaller firms. This is based on 
the responses from practitioners in each firm size category that consider the evaluation of CR from a 
moderate to a large extent, increasing as follows from the smaller to the larger firms sizes: 5 to 10 
practitioners – 68,4% (57,9% + 10,5%); 11 to 20 practitioners – 66,7% (50,0% + 16,7%); 21 to 30 
practitioners –  91,7% (66,7% + 25,0%); 31 to 40 practitioners – 66,7% (50,0% + 16,7%) and 41 to 50 
practitioners – 100% (66,7% + 33,3%). This finding would suggest that larger firms might have 
greater access to methodology and systems for the evaluation of ER as concluded by Carpenter and 
Mahoney (2001: 3) section 2.7. 
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A further concern relates to the 24,7% (18,2% + 6,5%) of respondents who consider the evaluation of 
CR during their engagement decisions from a small to no extent at all. Current concerns in the auditing 
profession as argued by Bell, et al. (2005: 11) as stated in section 2.4. and section 4.3.7.1. relates more 
to the application of the AR model by auditors in practice, than to concerns in relation to the model 
itself. This study highlights a similar concern, as it suggests the possibility that registered auditors in 
medium practice are not applying the full scope of the AR model. A full scope application of the AR 
model would include an evaluation of CR. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.20.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - The control risk posed by the prospective 
client? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 5    5 
 100.0%    100.0% 
Not at all 
 17.2%    6.5% 
1 5 4 4  14 
7.1% 35.7% 28.6% 28.6%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 17.2% 20.0% 23.5%  18.2% 
1 14 13 8 1 37 
2.7% 37.8% 35.1% 21.6% 2.7% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 48.3% 65.0% 47.1% 100.0% 48.1% 
 5 3 5  13 
 38.5% 23.1% 38.5%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 17.2% 15.0% 29.4%  16.9% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.54. The evaluation of Control Risk (CR) by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the evaluation of CR by age of the respondent: This study has found that younger 
practitioners give less consideration to the evaluation of control risk than older practitioners during 
engagement decisions. This is based on 65,5% (48,3% + 17,2%) practitioners aged 30 to 39 years 
considering the evaluation of CR from a moderate to a large extent, as opposed to 80,0% (65,0% + 
15,0%) of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 76,5% (47,1% + 29,4) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 
years. It is however argued, that an evaluation of CR during the engagement decision phase will be 
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more dependent on the methodology used by the audit firm, than the age of the practitioner. Risks, as 
well as related studies are reflected on in section 7.5. 
 
6.27. The evaluation of Detection Risk (DR) 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.20.: Following on section 6.25. the objective of this 
research question is to consider to what extent practitioners consider DR during their engagement 
decision processes. This objective is researched in table 6.55., as well as in table 6.56. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.20.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - Detection risk, that is, your ability to design 
appropriate auditing procedures to audit the prospective client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
 1    1 2 
 50.0%    50.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 8.3%    7.1% 2.6% 
4 3   1 4 12 
33.3% 25.0%   8.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
21.1% 25.0%   16.7% 28.6% 15.6% 
11 4 7 4 3 6 35 
31.4% 11.4% 20.0% 11.4% 8.6% 17.1% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
57.9% 33.3% 58.3% 66.7% 50.0% 42.9% 45.5% 
4 4 5 2 2 3 20 
20.0% 20.0% 25.0% 10.0% 10.0% 15.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
21.1% 33.3% 41.7% 33.3% 33.3% 21.4% 26.0% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.55. The evaluation of Detection Risk (DR) by the size of the audit practice 
 
Conclusion on research question related to size of the practice: As stated in table 6.55. 
practitioners are impacted by the evaluation of DR during their engagement decisions to a moderate 
extent (45,5% of respondents). In each size category, approximately 60% or more of the respondents 
consider DR from a moderate to a large extent during their engagement decisions. It is concerning that 
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18,2% (2,6% + 15,6%) of respondents consider DR from a small to no extent during their engagement 
decisions. As stated in section 3.4. current concerns in the auditing profession as argued by Bell, et al. 
(2005: 11) relates more to the application of the AR model by auditors in practice, than by the model 
itself. This study therefore raises the possibility that registered auditors in medium practice are not 
applying the full spectrum of the AR model, as it would include an evaluation of DR.  
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.20.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - Detection risk, that is, your ability to design 
appropriate auditing procedures to audit the prospective client? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69 Total 
 1  1  2 
 50.0%  50.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 3.4%  5.9%  2.6% 
1 6 3 2  12 
8.3% 50.0% 25.0% 16.7%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 20.7% 15.0% 11.8%  15.6% 
1 13 12 8 1 35 
2.9% 37.1% 34.3% 22.9% 2.9% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 44.8% 60.0% 47.1% 100.0% 45.5% 
 9 5 6  20 
 45.0% 25.0% 30.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 31.0% 25.0% 35.3%  26.0% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.56. The evaluation of Detection Risk (DR) by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on research question related to the age of the respondent: The study found that older 
practitioners consider the evaluation of DR during their decisions to a greater extent than younger 
practitioners. This is based on 75,8% (44,8% + 31,0%) of respondents aged 30 to 39 years considering 
an evaluation of DR from a moderate to a large extent, compared to 85,0% (60,0% + 25,0%) of 
respondents aged 40 to 49 years and 82,4% (47,1% + 35,3%) of respondents aged 50 to 59 years. The 
evaluation of DR is however perhaps more likely to be dependent on the firm’s methodology, than on 
the age of the practitioner. Risks and studies will be reflected on in section 7.5. 
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6.28. Considering Auditor’s Business Risk (Abr) during engagement decisions 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.20.: Following on section 6.25. the objective is to 
consider to what extent practitioners consider the evaluation of the impact of Abr during their 
engagement decision processes. This objective is researched as detailed in table 6.57., as well as table 
6.58. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.20.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - Your assessment of the impact that the 
prospective client may have on the business risk of your auditing practice? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
0 
response 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
8      1 9 
88.9%      11.1% 100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%      7.1% 11.7% 
 1 1 1   2 5 
 20.0% 20.0% 20.0%   40.0% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
 5.3% 8.3% 8.3%   14.3% 6.5% 
 7 3 4 1 3 3 21 
 33.3% 14.3% 19.0% 4.8% 14.3% 14.3% 100.0% 
To a 
moderate 
extent  36.8% 25.0% 33.3% 16.7% 50.0% 21.4% 27.3% 
 11 8 7 5 3 8 42 
 26.2% 19.0% 16.7% 11.9% 7.1% 19.0% 100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 57.9% 66.7% 58.3% 83.3% 50.0% 57.1% 54.5% 
Total 8 19 12 12 6 6 14 77 
 
Table 6.57. The impact of Auditor’s Business Risk (Abr) by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to the size of the firm: Registered auditors in 
medium practice are impacted by the evaluation of Abr during the engagement decision process to a 
large extent as practitioners in all firm size categories consider the impact of Abr to a large extent, 
(54,5% of respondents).  
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.20.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - Your assessment of the impact that the 
prospective client may have on the business risk of your auditing practice? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
0 
response 
21 to 
29  
30 to 
39  
40 to 
49  
50 to 
59  
60 to 
69  
Total 
8    1  9 
88.9%    11.1%  100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%    5.9%  11.7% 
  2 2 1  5 
  40.0% 40.0% 20.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
  6.9% 10.0% 5.9%  6.5% 
  9 6 5 1 21 
  42.9% 28.6% 23.8% 4.8% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
  31.0% 30.0% 29.4% 100.0% 27.3% 
 2 18 12 10  42 
 4.8% 42.9% 28.6% 23.8%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 100.0% 62.1% 60.0% 58.8%  54.5% 
Total 8 2 29 20 17 1 77 
 
Table 6.58. The impact of Auditors Business Risk (Abr) by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to age of the respondent: Based on the 
findings of the study, it would seem that all practitioners consider, save one or two exceptions, Abr to 
a large extent during their engagement decisions (54,5% of respondents). This would conclude that 
Abr is a key consideration in the engagement decisions of registered auditors in medium practice. In 
each age category from 30 to 59 years, at least approximately 60% (62,1%; 60,0% and 58,8% 
respectively) of practitioners consider Abr to a large extent. These responses would suggest that 
younger practitioners have a marginal preference above older practitioners for the evaluation of Abr. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.5. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
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6.29. Considering the Client’s Business Risk (Cbr) during engagement decisions 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.20.: Following on section 6.25. the objective of this 
research question is to consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice consider Cbr 
during their engagement decisions. This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit 
practices of which the respondents are practitioners as detailed in table 6.59., as well as the age of the 
respondents as detailed in table 6.60. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.20.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - The business risk of the client and its ability 
to continue trade in the future? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 10  11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
2 1     3 
66.7% 33.3%     100.0% 
Not at all 
10.5% 8.3%     3.9% 
 1 1   1 3 
 33.3% 33.3%   33.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
 8.3% 8.3%   7.1% 3.9% 
7 2 3 1 2 6 21 
33.3% 9.5% 14.3% 4.8% 9.5% 28.6% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
36.8% 16.7% 25.0% 16.7% 33.3% 42.9% 27.3% 
10 8 8 5 4 7 42 
23.8% 19.0% 19.0% 11.9% 9.5% 16.7% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
52.6% 66.7% 66.7% 83.3% 66.7% 50.0% 54.5% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.59. The impact of Client Business Risk (Cbr) by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on research question per the size of the firm: As per table 6.59. registered auditors in 
medium practice consider Cbr to a large extent (54,5% of respondents) during their engagement 
decisions. Practitioners in the various firms in medium practice, consider Cbr consistently, except for 
one or two exceptions. Although minimal, it is concerning that 7,8% (3,9% + 3,9%) of respondents 
consider Cbr to a small or no extent at all. These practitioners are likely to expose themselves and their 
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audit firms to risk. Respondents that consider Cbr to a small or no extent at all are from smaller firms, 
that may suggest the absence of formalised systems and procedures around the evaluation of ER as 
suggested in section 2.7. by Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3). 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.20.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - The business risk of the client and its ability 
to continue trade in the future? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 3    3 
 100.0%    100.0% 
Not at all 
 10.3%    3.9% 
  1 2  3 
  33.3% 66.7%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
  5.0% 11.8%  3.9% 
1 5 10 5  21 
4.8% 23.8% 47.6% 23.8%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 17.2% 50.0% 29.4%  27.3% 
1 21 9 10 1 42 
2.4% 50.0% 21.4% 23.8% 2.4% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 72.4% 45.0% 58.8% 100.0% 54.5% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.60. The impact of Client Business Risk (Cbr) by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on research question per the age of the respondent: Practitioners of the ages of 30 to 
39 years are impacted to a greater extent by the evaluation of Cbr during the engagement decisions 
process than others, when considering those who consider Cbr to a large extent during their 
engagement decisions. This is based on 72,4% of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years considering Cbr to 
a large extent compared to 58,8% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. 
 
At this stage, it should be noted, that the evaluation of IR as studied in section 6.25. indicated that 
registered auditors in medium practice consider IR to a large extent (39,0% of respondents), compared 
to 16,9% and 26,0% related to CR and DR respectively. Cbr and Abr are both considered to a large 
extent by registered auditors in medium practice (54,5% each respectively).  This finding firstly 
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supports the argument of Hitzig (2001) as commented on in section 2.4. suggesting that the evaluation 
of IR should in fact be used to determine the level of AR that will be acceptable in the first place. 
Secondly, this finding also supports the view of Johnstone (2000: 1) as stated in section 4.3.3. that 
practitioners evaluate ER in reflecting on Cbr and Abr. 
 
It is further argued that the consideration of Cbr and Abr appears to be more prevalent than the 
evaluation of elements of the AR model such as IR, DR and CR when considering responses related to 
those who indicated that they would consider the relevant risk to a large extent. This would seem to 
suggest that the application of the model for the evaluation of ER by Johnstone (2000: 1) is being 
applied in practice to a greater extent than the traditional AR model. It is also noted, that younger 
practitioners generally consider Cbr and Abr to a greater extent than older practitioners, whilst older 
practitioners generally considered the more established elements of the Audit Risk model – DR and 
CR to a greater extent.  
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.5. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.30. The impact of Fraud Risk (FR) 
  
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.21.: Researchers such as Van Gass has argued that the 
threat of litigation following fraud is high (2003). This coupled with the devastating impact of 
litigation both in terms of reputation and financial consequences may indicate that registered auditors 
may consider FR in medium practice during the engagement decision process.   
 
The research objective is therefore to study the extent to which registered auditors in medium practice 
consider the risk that fraudulent activity may be present at a prospective client during their 
engagement decisions. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.61., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.62. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.21.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - The risk that fraudulent activity may be 
present at the prospective client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
2    1  3 
66.7%    33.3%  100.0% 
Not at all 
10.5%    16.7%  3.9% 
1 2 1 2   6 
16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 33.3%   100.0% 
To a small extent 
5.3% 16.7% 8.3% 33.3%   7.8% 
6 3 4 1 3 7 24 
25.0% 12.5% 16.7% 4.2% 12.5% 29.2% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
31.6% 25.0% 33.3% 16.7% 50.0% 50.0% 31.2% 
10 7 7 3 2 7 36 
27.8% 19.4% 19.4% 8.3% 5.6% 19.4% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
52.6% 58.3% 58.3% 50.0% 33.3% 50.0% 46.8% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.61. The impact of Fraud Risk (FR) by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question considering the size of the audit practice: Registered auditors 
in medium practice consider FR during the engagement decision process to a large extent (46,8% of 
respondents). Despite the relative high percentage of registered auditors in medium practice that do 
consider FR to a large extent, it is concerning that a similarly large percentage 31,2% of practitioners 
only consider fraud to a moderate extent, when noting the current focus in the profession and concerns 
related to fraud in general. Those who consider the risk of fraud to a small or no extent at all are 
mainly from firms with 5 to 40 practitioners. It would further appear that the larger firms are more 
concerned with fraud as those who consider fraud from a small extent are mainly from firms with 5 to 
40 practitioners, and 66,7% of those who do not consider fraud to any extent are from firms with 5 to 
10 practitioners. This finding would suggest that larger firms are impacted by not only litigation but 
also fraud, as argued by Van Gass (2003) as stated in section in 4.3.4. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.21.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - The risk that fraudulent activity may be 
present at the prospective client? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 2  1  3 
 66.7%  33.3%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 6.9%  5.9%  3.9% 
1 2 1 2  6 
16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 33.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 6.9% 5.0% 11.8%  7.8% 
 7 10 7  24 
 29.2% 41.7% 29.2%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 24.1% 50.0% 41.2%  31.2% 
1 18 9 7 1 36 
2.8% 50.0% 25.0% 19.4% 2.8% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 62.1% 45.0% 41.2% 100.0% 46.8% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.62. The impact of Fraud Risk (FR) by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question considering the age of the respondent: This study has found 
that 62,1% of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years consider FR to a large extent compared to 41,2% of 
those aged 50 to 59 years. This study also indicates that 17,7% (5,9% + 11,8%) of practitioners aged 
50 to 59 years consider FR from a small to no extent.  It is argued that older practitioners are less 
informed of many regulatory and statutory changes than younger practitioners based on concerns 
highlighted in section 1.1. Older practitioners may not be aware of revisions to ISA 240 (R), and the 
importance of the evaluation of FR. In considering these conclusions on this research question section 
7.5. will reflect on the risks flowing from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional 
guidance that served as basis for the enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
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6.31. The evaluation of Litigation Risk (LR) 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.14.: The collapse of Arthur Andersen clearly indicated 
that the risk of litigation can destroy even a large international audit firm, long before the matter has 
served in court (Venuti, et al. 2002). Although it may be argued that publicised corporate collapses 
appear to have affected only the larger international auditing firms, it is important to determine if 
registered auditors in medium practice consider possible litigation that may follow once a prospective 
client has been audited. The research objective therefore considers to what extent registered auditors in 
medium practice in South Africa consider the LR pertaining to a prospective client during their 
engagement decision procedures. This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit 
practices of which the respondents are practitioners as detailed in table 6.63., as well as the age of the 
respondents as detailed in table 6.64. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.14.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - The risk that you may be exposed to 
litigation following the auditing of the prospective client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
4 1 2   2 9 
44.4% 11.1% 22.2%   22.2% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
21.1% 8.3% 16.7%   14.3% 11.7% 
5 4 1 1 3 3 17 
29.4% 23.5% 5.9% 5.9% 17.6% 17.6% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3% 33.3% 8.3% 16.7% 50.0% 21.4% 22.1% 
10 7 9 5 3 9 43 
23.3% 16.3% 20.9% 11.6% 7.0% 20.9% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
52.6% 58.3% 75.0% 83.3% 50.0% 64.3% 55.8% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.63. The impact of Litigation Risk (LR) following a completed audit by the size of the 
audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the impact of Litigation Risk per size of the audit firm: Registered auditors in 
medium practice are impacted by the evaluation of LR during the engagement decision process to a 
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large extent (55,8% of respondents). It is also concluded that the practitioners in larger firms are 
impacted to a greater extent by the risk of litigation during their engagement decisions, than others. 
This finding is based on the following response distribution, considering those who consider litigation 
to a large extent: firms with 5 to 10 practitioners – 52,6%; firms with 11 to 20 practitioners – 58,3%; 
firms with 21 to 30 practitioners – 75,0%; firms with 31 to 40 practitioners – 83,3%; firms with 41 to 
50 practitioners – 50,0% and firms with 51 to 60 practitioners – 64,3%. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.14.: To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the 
following risk during the decision to accept a new client - The risk that you may be exposed to 
litigation following the auditing of the prospective client? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
 3 3 3  9 
 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 10.3% 15.0% 17.6%  11.7% 
 6 6 5  17 
 35.3% 35.3% 29.4%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 20.7% 30.0% 29.4%  22.1% 
2 20 11 9 1 43 
4.7% 46.5% 25.6% 20.9% 2.3% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 69.0% 55.0% 52.9% 100.0% 55.8% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.64. The impact of Litigation Risk (LR) following a completed audit by age of the 
respondent 
 
Conclusion on the impact of Litigation Risk per the age of the respondent: This study has found 
that younger practitioners are more concerned with the risk of litigation than older practitioners are 
during their engagement decisions. This finding is based on 69,0% of practitioners considering the risk 
of litigation to a large extent during their engagement decisions as opposed to 55,0% of practitioners 
aged 40 to 49 years and 52,9% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question, section 7.5. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that serve as basis for the 
enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
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6.32. Increasing audit fees in response to increased risk  
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.22.: As stated in section 2.2.2., studies by Messier and 
Plumlee (1987: 349-358); Maletta and Kida (1993: 508-525); Houston, et al. (1999: 281-298); 
Johnstone (2000: 1-27); Asare and Wright (2002) and Bedard and Graham (2003: 55-70) all concluded 
that auditors respond to risk by charging higher fees or adjusting their pre-acceptance information 
collection strategies. The research objective therefore is to determine to what extent registered auditors 
in medium practice in South Africa consider increasing their audit fees in response to a high risk 
prospective client. This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of 
which the respondents are practitioners as detailed in table 6.65., as well as the age of the respondents 
as detailed in table 6.66. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.22. : When a prospective client is evaluated as a high 
risk client, to what extent do you consider the following practice - increasing the audit fee due to the 
increased risk posed by the client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
5 2 2  2 4 15 
33.3% 13.3% 13.3%  13.3% 26.7% 100.0% 
Not at all 
26.3% 16.7% 16.7%  33.3% 28.6% 19.5% 
3 2 4   3 12 
25.0% 16.7% 33.3%   25.0% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
15.8% 16.7% 33.3%   21.4% 15.6% 
4 5 5 3 1 4 22 
18.2% 22.7% 22.7% 13.6% 4.5% 18.2% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
21.1% 41.7% 41.7% 50.0% 16.7% 28.6% 28.6% 
7 3 1 3 3 3 20 
35.0% 15.0% 5.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
36.8% 25.0% 8.3% 50.0% 50.0% 21.4% 26.0% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.65. Risk mitigation through increasing audit fees by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on the research question related to the size of the audit firm: This study has found that 
54,6% (28,6% + 26,0%) of registered auditors in medium practice consider increasing their audit fees 
on high risk assignments from a moderate to a large extent. This study has found no real trend to 
suggest that registered auditors in medium practice from different size categories would to a greater or 
lesser extent consider increasing their audit fees related to high risk assignments as the risk-mitigating 
tool comprising an increase in audit fees related to high risk assignments is being applied by registered 
auditors in medium practice in South Africa to a varying degree.  This is based on the following 
response distribution of practitioners that consider increasing fees from a moderate to a large extent: : 
firms with 5 to 10 practitioners – 57,9% (21,1% + 36,8%); firms with 11 to 20 practitioners – 66,7% 
(41,7% + 25,0%); firms with 21 to 30 practitioners – 50,0% (41,7% + 8,3%); firms with 31 to 40 
practitioners – 100,0% (50,0% + 50,0%); firms with 41 to 50 practitioners – 67,2% (16,7% + 50,5%) 
and firms with 51 to 60 practitioners – 50,0% 28,6% + 21,4%). 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.22. : When a prospective client is evaluated as a high 
risk client, to what extent do you consider the following practice - increasing the audit fee due to the 
increased risk posed by the client? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 5 3 7  15 
 33.3% 20.0% 46.7%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 17.2% 15.0% 41.2%  19.5% 
 6 2 3 1 12 
 50.0% 16.7% 25.0% 8.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
 20.7% 10.0% 17.6% 100.0% 15.6% 
1 8 7 6  22 
4.5% 36.4% 31.8% 27.3%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 27.6% 35.0% 35.3%  28.6% 
1 10 8 1  20 
5.0% 50.0% 40.0% 5.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 34.5% 40.0% 5.9%  26.0% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.66. Risk mitigation through increasing audit fees by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on the research question related to the age of the respondent: This study has found 
that 100% (50,0% + 50,0%) of practitioners aged 21 to 30 consider increasing audit fees on high risk 
assignments from a moderate to a large extent, compared to 75,0% (35,0% + 40,0%) of practitioners 
aged 40 to 49 years that consider increasing audit fees from a moderate to a large extent and 58,8% 
(41,2% + 17,6%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 who consider increasing audit fees on high risk 
assignments to a small or no extent at all.  
 
This finding would therefore suggest that younger practitioners to a greater extent consider the use of 
increasing audit fees on high risk assignments as a risk mitigating strategy. This finding, it is argued, 
may be as a result of the likely expectation that older practitioners have more established client 
portfolios and thus have less capacity nor appetite to accept new high risk assignments.  
 
This argument is based on Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504) as stated in section 2.2.2.1. who 
found that practitioner aggressiveness towards gaining new clients decreases as practitioners attain 
more established client portfolios, thus explaining why older practitioners are less likely to accept 
new, let alone high risk assignments. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.7. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.33. Resigning from high risk assignments 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.23.: As concluded by Ross (1997) audit firms are not 
always able to resign from high risk clients, as they are not always able to replace this revenue stream 
with new clients with a lower risk profile.  
 
The research objective is therefore to consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa consider resigning from other high risk assignments during their engagement decision 
processes. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.67., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.68. 
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Research question as stated section 5.10.23.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice - Reviewing your client base and 
resigning from other high risk assignments? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
1 3 3  4 3 14 
7.1% 21.4% 21.4%  28.6% 21.4% 100.0% 
Not at all 
5.3% 25.0% 25.0%  66.7% 21.4% 18.2% 
7 6 5 1  4 23 
30.4% 26.1% 21.7% 4.3%  17.4% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
36.8% 50.0% 41.7% 16.7%  28.6% 29.9% 
7 2 2 5 2 5 23 
30.4% 8.7% 8.7% 21.7% 8.7% 21.7% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
36.8% 16.7% 16.7% 83.3% 33.3% 35.7% 29.9% 
4 1 2   2 9 
44.4% 11.1% 22.2%   22.2% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
21.1% 8.3% 16.7%   14.3% 11.7% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.67. Resigning from high risk assignments by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question considering the size of the audit practice: This study has 
found that registered auditors in medium practice are under great pressures when considering 
resigning from high risk assignments as 48,1% (18,2% + 29,9%) of respondents indicated that they 
would not do so or that they would to a small extent. This study indicates that 78,2% (30,4% + 26,1% 
+ 21,7%) of firms with 5 to 30 practitioners have indicated their preference to resign from high risk 
assignments to a small extent and 52,2% (21,7% + 8,7% + 21,7%) of firms with 30 to 59 practitioners, 
to a moderate extent.  
 
These findings suggests that smaller firms are under great pressure to resign from high risk 
assignments, again suggesting the existence of significant competition within the market segment for 
audit services as suggested by Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2. 
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Research question as stated section 5.10.23.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice - Reviewing your client base and 
resigning from other high risk assignments? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 6 3 4 1 14 
 42.9% 21.4% 28.6% 7.1% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 20.7% 15.0% 23.5% 100.0% 18.2% 
2 10 5 6  23 
8.7% 43.5% 21.7% 26.1%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
100.0% 34.5% 25.0% 35.3%  29.9% 
 10 9 4  23 
 43.5% 39.1% 17.4%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 34.5% 45.0% 23.5%  29.9% 
 3 3 3  9 
 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 10.3% 15.0% 17.6%  11.7% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.68. Resigning from high risk assignments by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question considering the age of the respondent: This study concludes 
that there is no definite consistent pattern in the age of the respondents considering the responses 
related to the extent to which registered auditors in medium practice would consider resigning from 
high risk assignments. This finding is based on 55,2% (20,7% + 34,5%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 
years considering resigning from high risk assignments from a small to no extent at all, compared to 
58,8% (23,5% + 35,3%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years in the same response category. This 
finding, it is argued, is the result of fierce market competition as argued by Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in 
section 1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2. within the audit services environment impacting on all its 
participants, irrespective of their age. In considering these conclusions on this research question 
section 7.7. will reflect on the risks flowing from these conclusions, as well as those studies and 
professional guidance that served as basis for the enclosure of this research question in the overall 
research design. 
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6.34. Refusing to accept high risk assignments 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.23.: Not only is there significant pressure on auditors to 
increase revenues, but there appears to be an inability of registered auditors in medium practice to 
access the same clients that are currently serviced by the Big Four (Wooten, 2003). This would 
suggest that registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa might attempt to engage higher 
risk clients in order to maintain and increase their revenue base in a very competitive market 
environment. The research objective therefore considers to what extent registered auditors in medium 
practice in South Africa consider refusing to accept high risk assignments during their engagement 
decisions. This objective is researched in table 6.69., as well as in table 6.70. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.23.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice – Refusing to accept the engagement? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
 1     1 
 100.0%     100.0% 
Not at all 
 8.3%     1.3% 
2 2 1   2 7 
28.6% 28.6% 14.3%   28.6% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
10.5% 16.7% 8.3%   14.3% 9.1% 
7 2 9 2 1 5 26 
26.9% 7.7% 34.6% 7.7% 3.8% 19.2% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
36.8% 16.7% 75.0% 33.3% 16.7% 35.7% 33.8% 
10 7 2 4 5 7 35 
28.6% 20.0% 5.7% 11.4% 14.3% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
52.6% 58.3% 16.7% 66.7% 83.3% 50.0% 45.5% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.69. Refusing to accept high risk assignments by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to the size of the audit practice: Registered 
auditors in medium practice will refuse to accept high risk clients to a large extent (45,5% of 
respondents). Of those who are willing to accept high risk assignments to a large extent, 54,3% (28,6% 
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+ 20,0% + 5,7%) are from firms with 5 to 30 practitioners. The study also indicates that 33,8% of 
respondents will consider refusal to a moderate extent.  
 
It is however concerning to note that 71,5% (28,6% + 28,6% + 14,3%) of those who would consider 
accepting high risk assignments to a small extent are from smaller firms with 5 to 30 practitioners. 
This, it is argued, indicates the significant competition within the audit services market as commented 
on in section 1.1.3.2., resulting in practitioners accepting high risk assignments. Considering concerns 
related to the lack of skills and methodologies that may be present in firms in medium audit practice 
(Ryan, 2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2. and Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3) 
as stated in section 2.7., it is questionable if such practices would be able to negate the high risk 
presented by such assignments, and therefore expose themselves to risk. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.23.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice – Refusing to accept the engagement? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 1    1 
 100.0%    100.0% 
Not at all 
 3.4%    1.3% 
 5 2   7 
 71.4% 28.6%   100.0% 
To a small extent 
 17.2% 10.0%   9.1% 
1 11 6 7 1 26 
3.8% 42.3% 23.1% 26.9% 3.8% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 37.9% 30.0% 41.2% 100.0% 33.8% 
1 12 12 10  35 
2.9% 34.3% 34.3% 28.6%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 41.4% 60.0% 58.8%  45.5% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.70. Refusing to accept high risk assignments by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to the age of the respondent: This study 
indicates that older practitioners are more likely to refuse high risk assignments as only 41,4% of 
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practitioners aged 30 to 39 years will refuse such assignments to a large extent compared to 60,0% of 
practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 58,8% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. 
 
This, it is argued, may be as a result of the principle illustrated by Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178) as 
stated in section 2.2.2.1. that would indicate that older, more experienced practitioners are more likely 
to be more conservative and thus steer away from risk, in many instances because of prior experience 
where they may have been exposed to risk or even litigation. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.7. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.35. Reviewing levels of indemnity insurance 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.24.: Reported litigation against auditors in South Africa 
has been limited to date if compared to that of other countries (Gloeck, 2003). This apparent limited 
litigation against auditors in South Africa, does however not challenge the importance of indemnity 
insurance considerations during the engagement decision procedures of registered auditors in medium 
practice.  
 
Some indicators such as a client’s inability to pay their fees or generally unprofitable clients may have 
legal and financial consequences to a practice over a long term period (St. Pierre & Anderson, 1984: 
242-263; Palmrose, 1986: 97-110), and hence the changes in behavior of current clients and 
characteristics of new clients are likely to impact on required levels of indemnity insurance. 
 
The research objective will therefore determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice 
in South Africa consider reviewing their indemnity insurance levels during their engagement 
decisions. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.71., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.72. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.24.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice – Reviewing levels of indemnity 
insurance? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
0 
response 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
8     1  9 
88.9%     11.1%  100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%     16.7%  11.7% 
 4 3 2 2 2 5 18 
 22.2% 16.7% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 27.8% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 21.1% 25.0% 16.7% 33.3% 33.3% 35.7% 23.4% 
 6 5 6 3 2 5 27 
 22.2% 18.5% 22.2% 11.1% 7.4% 18.5% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
 31.6% 41.7% 50.0% 50.0% 33.3% 35.7% 35.1% 
 7 2 4   3 16 
 43.8% 12.5% 25.0%   18.8% 100.0% 
To a 
moderate 
extent  36.8% 16.7% 33.3%   21.4% 20.8% 
 2 2  1 1 1 7 
 28.6% 28.6%  14.3% 14.3% 14.3% 100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 10.5% 16.7%  16.7% 16.7% 7.1% 9.1% 
Total 8 19 12 12 6 6 14 77 
 
Table 6.71. Reviewing indemnity insurance by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to size of the audit practice: As stated in table 
6.71., 58,8% (23,4% + 35,1%) of respondents review their indemnity insurance during engagement 
decisions to a small or no extent at all. The study has further found that those who consider indemnity 
insurance from a moderate to large extent are generally from smaller audit firms. This is based on 
56,3% (43,8% + 12,5%) of those who review indemnity insurance to a moderate extent, being from 
firms with 5 to 20 practitioners and 57,2% (28,6% + 28,6%) of those who review indemnity insurance 
to a large extent being from firms with 5 to 20 practitioners. The finding may be a reflection on the 
impact that possible litigation may have on the sustainability of smaller practices or that their 
indemnity levels are likely to be lower than some of the larger international audit firms. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.24.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice – Reviewing levels of indemnity 
insurance? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
0 
response 
21 to 
29  
30 to 
39  
40 to 
49  
50 to 
59  
60 to 
69  
Total 
8    1  9 
88.9%    11.1%  100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%    5.9%  11.7% 
  7 5 5 1 18 
  38.9% 27.8% 27.8% 5.6% 100.0% 
Not at all 
  24.1% 25.0% 29.4% 100.0% 23.4% 
  13 7 7  27 
  48.1% 25.9% 25.9%  100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
  44.8% 35.0% 41.2%  35.1% 
 1 5 6 4  16 
 6.3% 31.3% 37.5% 25.0%  100.0% 
To a 
moderate 
extent  50.0% 17.2% 30.0% 23.5%  20.8% 
 1 4 2   7 
 14.3% 57.1% 28.6%   100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 50.0% 13.8% 10.0%   9.1% 
Total 8 2 29 20 17 1 77 
 
Table 6.72. Reviewing indemnity insurance by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to the age of the respondent: This study has 
found that 31,0 (17,2% + 13,8%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years consider indemnity insurance 
from a moderate to a large extent during decisions; similarly 40,0% (30,0% + 10%) aged 40 to 49 
years. In contrast 70,6% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years consider indemnity insurance from a 
small to no extent during their engagement decisions. As highlighted in section 1.1., younger 
practitioners are more likely to be abreast with regulatory and industry developments. Many of these 
developments suggest increased risk to the auditor (Sehoole, 2005). Younger practitioners are more 
likely to consider their indemnity insurance than older practitioners, as they may be more aware of 
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risks in the current regulatory environment, than their older counterparts may. Risks, studies and 
guidance will be reflected on in section 7.7. in this regard. 
  
6.36. Increasing the number of experienced staff assigned to high risk clients 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.25.: Staffing considerations related to registered 
auditors in medium practice are impacted by several factors in order to achieve the objective of 
maintaining resources that have appropriate skills and experience. These concerns may impact on the 
ability of registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa to match appropriate skilled staff with 
high risk assignments. The research objective is to consider to what extent practitioners consider 
increasing the number of experienced staff on high risk assignments during their engagement decision 
processes. This objective is researched in table 6.73., as well as in table 6.74. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.25.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice – Increasing the number of experienced 
staff assigned to the high risk client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
1 1     2 
50.0% 50.0%     100.0% 
Not at all 
5.3% 8.3%     2.6% 
5 1 3  2 1 12 
41.7% 8.3% 25.0%  16.7% 8.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
26.3% 8.3% 25.0%  33.3% 7.1% 15.6% 
6 4 6 2 3 3 24 
25.0% 16.7% 25.0% 8.3% 12.5% 12.5% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
31.6% 33.3% 50.0% 33.3% 50.0% 21.4% 31.2% 
7 6 3 4 1 10 31 
22.6% 19.4% 9.7% 12.9% 3.2% 32.3% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
36.8% 50.0% 25.0% 66.7% 16.7% 71.4% 40.3% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
Table 6.73. Increasing the level of experienced staff on high risk assignments by the size of the 
audit practice 
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Conclusion on considering the increase of experienced staff on high risk assignments by size of 
the firm: Registered auditors in medium practice will consider increasing the level of experienced 
staff on high risk assignments to a large extent (40,3% of respondents). This study also indicates that 
58,1% (9,7% + 12,9% + 3,2% + 32,3%) of those practitioners that consider increasing the number of 
experienced staff on high risk assignments to a large extent are from firms with 21 to 60 practitioners, 
whereas 75,0% (41,7% + 8,3% + 25,0%) of those who consider increasing the number of experienced 
staff on high risk assignments to a small extent, are from firms with 5 to 30 practitioners.  As 
discussed in section 1.1.3.1. there are many staffing challenges facing registered auditors in medium 
practice in South Africa, and thus the inability of registered auditors in medium practice to staff high 
risk assignments with appropriate levels of experienced audit staff, may expose such audit firms to 
significant risk, specifically those with 5 to 30 practitioners. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.25.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice – Increasing the number of experienced 
staff assigned to the high risk client? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
   2  2 
   100.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
   11.8%  2.6% 
 6 2 3 1 12 
 50.0% 16.7% 25.0% 8.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
 20.7% 10.0% 17.6% 100.0% 15.6% 
 9 8 7  24 
 37.5% 33.3% 29.2%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 31.0% 40.0% 41.2%  31.2% 
2 14 10 5  31 
6.5% 45.2% 32.3% 16.1%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 48.3% 50.0% 29.4%  40.3% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.74. Increasing the level of experienced staff on high risk assignments by age of the 
respondent 
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Conclusion on considering the increase of experienced staff on high risk assignments by age of 
the respondent: This study has found that younger practitioners consider increasing the level of 
experienced staff on high risk assignments to a greater extent than older practitioners. This is based on 
48,3% of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years indicating that they will increase such staff levels to a large 
extent, compared to 50,0% of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and only 29,4% of practitioners aged 
50 to 59 years. As  stated in section 1.1., younger practitioners are more likely to be abreast with 
regulatory and statutory developments within the industry, and thus the requirements of standards such 
as ISQC 1 (IFAC, 2004a), which mandates amongst others, appropriate levels of staffing on high risk 
assignments, than their older counterparts. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.7. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that serve as basis for the 
enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
  
 
6.37. Making use of third-party specialists 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.25.: Puttick and Van Esch (1992: 56) and ISA 220 (R) 
comment on the use of third party specialists in instances where certain skills may not be available 
internally to the firm in order to appropriately audit a potential client.  
 
Considering cost constraints of firms in medium audit practice as highlighted by Houston (1999: 70-
86) and Ryan (2005a-d), registered auditors in medium practice may further be impacted by cost 
constraints when considering the use of third party specialists.   
 
The research objective is therefore to consider the extent to which registered auditors in medium 
practice in South Africa make use of third-party specialists to perform certain procedures when such 
experience is not internally available during engagement decision procedures.  
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.75., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.76. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.25.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice – Making use of third-party specialists to 
perform those auditing functions that you are not able to staff, such as using valuators and actuaries? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
0 
response 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
8  1     9 
88.9%  11.1%     100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%  8.3%     11.7% 
 1 2     3 
 33.3% 66.7%     100.0% 
Not at all 
 5.3% 16.7%     3.9% 
 8  6 3 3 3 23 
 34.8%  26.1% 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
 42.1%  50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 21.4% 29.9% 
 6 4 3 1 1 4 19 
 31.6% 21.1% 15.8% 5.3% 5.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
To a 
moderate 
extent  31.6% 33.3% 25.0% 16.7% 16.7% 28.6% 24.7% 
 4 5 3 2 2 7 23 
 17.4% 21.7% 13.0% 8.7% 8.7% 30.4% 100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
 21.1% 41.7% 25.0% 33.3% 33.3% 50.0% 29.9% 
Total 8 19 12 12 6 6 14 77 
 
Table 6.75. Making use of third party specialists by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question related to the size of the audit firm: As per table 6.75. this 
study has found no real trend in terms of the use of third party specialists as 29,9% of practitioners 
make use of third party specialists during their engagement decisions to a large extent, 24,7% make 
use of such specialists to a moderate extent and 29,9% make use of such specialists to a small extent. 
At the same time this study has found that smaller firms with 5 to 20 practitioners make less use of 
third party specialists during their engagement decisions.  
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This study has found that 47,4% (5,3% + 42,1%) of firms with 5 to 10 practitioners will consider their 
use from a small to no extent, and 30,4% of practitioners in firm with 51 to 60 practitioners use such 
services to a large extent - indicating that larger firms are more likely to be able to afford the use of 
third party specialists and hence confirming the cost constraints of smaller firms as argued by Houston 
(1999) as stated in section 2.2.2.5. This finding is concerning as it clearly indicates that smaller firms 
may be exposed to risk during their engagement decisions, when not considering the use of third party 
specialists during their engagement decisions. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.25.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice – Making use of third-party specialists to 
perform those auditing functions that you are not able to staff, such as using valuators and actuaries? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
0 
response 
21 to 
29  
30 to 
39  
40 to 
49  
50 to 
59  
60 to 
69  
Total 
8  1    9 
88.9%  11.1%    100.0% 
0 response 
100.0%  3.4%    11.7% 
  1 1 1  3 
  33.3% 33.3% 33.3%  100.0% 
Not at all 
  3.4% 5.0% 5.9%  3.9% 
 1 10 5 7  23 
 4.3% 43.5% 21.7% 30.4%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 50.0% 34.5% 25.0% 41.2%  29.9% 
  7 8 3 1 19 
  36.8% 42.1% 15.8% 5.3% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
  24.1% 40.0% 17.6% 100.0% 24.7% 
 1 10 6 6  23 
 4.3% 43.5% 26.1% 26.1%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 50.0% 34.5% 30.0% 35.3%  29.9% 
Total 8 2 29 20 17 1 77 
 
Table 6.76. Making use of third party specialists by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on the research question related to the age of the respondent: As per table 6.75. both 
those who make use of third party specialists to a small and large extent are mainly aged 30 to 39 
(34,5% respectively). Similar conclusions can be reached related to the other age categories.  
 
This finding would suggest that there is no conclusive trend that would suggest that certain age 
categories make use of third party confirmations to a greater or lesser extent than others. This, it is 
argued, may be as a result of the size of the audit firm that the practitioner belongs to and its ability to 
afford third party specialists rather than the personal preferences of the practitioner. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.6. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that serve as basis for the 
enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
At this stage, it is important to reflect on the combined results of section 6.36. and section 6.37. as the 
results of this study would suggest that smaller audit firms are greatly exposed to risk, as they may 
have limited staff numbers that are experienced, and at the same time they do not consider the use of 
third party specialists when they do not have the skills available internally. These firms may thus not 
give cognisance to the fact that they may not be able to appropriately staff assignments, especially 
related to high risk assignments. 
 
 
6.38. The use of engagement letters 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.32.: As the issuance of engagements letters is such an 
important risk management practice (Puttick & Van Esch, 1992: 56), this study will consider the 
prevalence of the use of engagement letters by registered auditors in medium practice following their 
engagement decisions.   
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.77., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 
6.78. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.32.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice – Obtaining agreement with the client on 
an appropriately worded engagement letter before the auditing process commences? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
2 1 1   1 5 
40.0% 20.0% 20.0%   20.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
10.5% 8.3% 8.3%   7.1% 6.5% 
5 2 3 1 2 5 18 
27.8% 11.1% 16.7% 5.6% 11.1% 27.8% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
26.3% 16.7% 25.0% 16.7% 33.3% 35.7% 23.4% 
1 2 4 1 3 3 14 
7.1% 14.3% 28.6% 7.1% 21.4% 21.4% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
5.3% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 50.0% 21.4% 18.2% 
11 6 4 4 1 5 31 
35.5% 19.4% 12.9% 12.9% 3.2% 16.1% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
57.9% 50.0% 33.3% 66.7% 16.7% 35.7% 40.3% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.77. The use of engagement letters by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to the size of the practice: From table 6.77. it 
is concluded that 58,5% (18,2% + 40,3%) of registered auditors in medium practice make use of 
engagement letters from a moderate to a large extent. The study has also found that 54,9% (35,5% + 
19,4%) of those practitioners who consider the use of engagement letters to a large extent, are from 
firms with 5 to 20 practitioners.  
 
Considering the requirements in terms of auditing standards to issue engagement letters, it is 
concerning that such a large number of registered auditors in medium practice do not consider the 
issuance of engagement letters to a large extent.  It is concerning that, there is indication that smaller 
practices consider the use of engagement letters to a larger extent than some of the larger practices, 
specifically those with 51 to 60 practitioners. It is expected that larger firms are more likely to comply 
with auditing standards as argued by Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3) in section 2.7. This finding 
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could however also have been impacted by the fact that this research question relates to high risk 
assignments, and based on conclusions from the research question tested in section 6.34., there is an 
expectation that larger practices are less likely to accept high risk assignments in the first place, and 
this may have impacted the research responses received from respondents in larger audit practices. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.32.: When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk 
client, to what extent do you consider the following practice – Obtaining agreement with the client on 
an appropriately worded engagement letter before the auditing process commences? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 2 1 2  5 
 40.0% 20.0% 40.0%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 6.9% 5.0% 11.8%  6.5% 
 9 4 5  18 
 50.0% 22.2% 27.8%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 31.0% 20.0% 29.4%  23.4% 
 4 4 6  14 
 28.6% 28.6% 42.9%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 13.8% 20.0% 35.3%  18.2% 
2 13 11 4 1 31 
6.5% 41.9% 35.5% 12.9% 3.2% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 44.8% 55.0% 23.5% 100.0% 40.3% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.78. The use of engagement letters by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to the age of the respondent: This study 
indicates that there is no trend as to the relationship between the age of a practitioner and the issuance 
of engagement letters, which would suggest that this practice may be largely impacted by the 
respective firm’s policy related to the issuance of engagement letters, rather than by the age of the 
practitioner. This is based on 37,9% (6,9% + 31,0%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years and 41,2% 
(11,8% + 29,4%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years, considering such letters from a small to no 
extent. Similar conclusions can be reached for those who consider the use of such letters from a 
moderate to a large extent.  Risks, studies and guidance will be reflected on in 7.6. in this regard. 
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6.39. The use of qualitative decision aids 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.30.: The advantages and disadvantages of qualitative 
decision aids as concluded on by MacLullich (2001) needs to be considered by the auditor when 
deciding on audit procedures to support the engagement decision process.  The research objective is 
therefore to consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa make use 
of qualitative decision aids during the engagement decision processes.  This objective is researched 
with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents are practitioners as detailed in 
table 6.79., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 6.80. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.30.: To what extent do you evaluate the AR of a 
prospective client using the following aid – Qualitative aids (such as questionnaires that evaluate client 
facts and circumstances that would indicate high- and low-risk factors)? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
1 3  1 1  6 
16.7% 50.0%  16.7% 16.7%  100.0% 
Not at all 
5.3% 25.0%  16.7% 16.7%  7.8% 
7 2 5  4 4 22 
31.8% 9.1% 22.7%  18.2% 18.2% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
36.8% 16.7% 41.7%  66.7% 28.6% 28.6% 
5 4 6 1  5 21 
23.8% 19.0% 28.6% 4.8%  23.8% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3% 33.3% 50.0% 16.7%  35.7% 27.3% 
6 3 1 4 1 5 20 
30.0% 15.0% 5.0% 20.0% 5.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
31.6% 25.0% 8.3% 66.7% 16.7% 35.7% 26.0% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.79. The use of qualitative decision aids by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question related to the size of the audit practice: As per table 6.79. 
hereafter this study has found that 26,0% of respondents consider the use of qualitative decision aids 
to a large extent; 27,3% to a moderate extent and 28,6% to a small extent, indicating that that there is 
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no real preference amongst the population for the use of such aids. This study would suggest that 
practitioners in larger firms give greater consideration to the use of qualitative decision aids when 
considering those that consider the use of such aids from a moderate to a large extent. Of these 
respondents, 71,4% (35,7% + 35,7%) are from firms with 51 to 60 practitioners as opposed to only 
57,0% (26,3% + 31,6%) of such practitioners being from firms with 5 to 10 practitioners. This finding 
highlights concerns expressed by Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1.3.1. and the USGAO (2003: 
2), as stated in section 2.7. suggesting that smaller firms may not have access to such aids to assist 
them in their engagement decisions. It is concerning that 28,6% of practitioners consider such aids to a 
small extent and 7,8% to no extent at all. This finding would suggest that these practitioners apply a 
high degree of professional judgement in the evaluation of engagement decisions. It also raises a 
concern related to the documentation of engagement decisions, which are typically supported by 
engagement decision aids as argued by Deskmukh (1997) as stated in section 4.3.7.2. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.30.: To what extent do you evaluate the AR of a 
prospective client using the following aid – Qualitative aids (such as questionnaires that evaluate client 
facts and circumstances that would indicate high- and low-risk factors)? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
 3 3   6 
 50.0% 50.0%   100.0% 
Not at all 
 10.3% 15.0%   7.8% 
 10 4 8  22 
 45.5% 18.2% 36.4%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 34.5% 20.0% 47.1%  28.6% 
1 7 6 6 1 21 
4.8% 33.3% 28.6% 28.6% 4.8% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 24.1% 30.0% 35.3% 100.0% 27.3% 
1 9 7 3  20 
5.0% 45.0% 35.0% 15.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 31.0% 35.0% 17.6%  26.0% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.80. The use of qualitative decision aids by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on the research question related to the age of the respondent: Practitioners have no 
preference for the use of decision aids based on age as 55,1% (24,1% + 31,0%) of practitioners aged 
30 to 39 years and 52,9% (35,3% + 17,6%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years, use decision aids from 
a moderate to a large extent. Similar conclusions exist for those who consider the use of such aids 
from a small to no extent. The use of aids is likely to depend on firm methodology, rather than the age 
of the respective auditor. Risks, studies and guidance is considered in section 7.3.1.3. 
 
6.40. The use of quantitative decision aids 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.30.: Following on section 6.39. the research objective is 
to consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice use quantitative decision aids during 
engagement decisions. This objective is researched in table 6.81., as well as in table 6.82. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.30.: To what extent do you evaluate the AR of a 
prospective client using the following decision aid - Quantitative aids (such as auditing software tools 
and statistical models that provide a “risk rating”, for instance, high, medium or low)? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
3 5 2 1 2 3 16 
18.8% 31.3% 12.5% 6.3% 12.5% 18.8% 100.0% 
Not at all 
15.8% 41.7% 16.7% 16.7% 33.3% 21.4% 20.8% 
6 4 3  2 4 19 
31.6% 21.1% 15.8%  10.5% 21.1% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
31.6% 33.3% 25.0%  33.3% 28.6% 24.7% 
3 1 3 2 2 5 16 
18.8% 6.3% 18.8% 12.5% 12.5% 31.3% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
15.8% 8.3% 25.0% 33.3% 33.3% 35.7% 20.8% 
7 2 4 3  2 18 
38.9% 11.1% 22.2% 16.7%  11.1% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
36.8% 16.7% 33.3% 50.0%  14.3% 23.4% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.81. The use of quantitative decision aids by the size of the audit practice 
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Conclusion on the research question with reference to the size of the firm: This study has found 
no conclusive trend as to the predisposition of practitioners towards the use of quantitative aids. This 
is based on 45,5% (20,8% + 24,7%) of practitioners indicating that they to a small or no extent at all 
consider such aids, and similarly 44,2% (20,8% + 23,4%) of respondents indicating that they do 
consider the use of such aids from a moderate to a large extent. No specific trend related to the size of 
a firm and the use of quantitative decision aids is evident from the research results.  
 
The study has noted that 20,8% of respondents do not consider the use of quantitive decision aids at 
all. In such instances, this study would suggest that it is likely that professional judgement as argued 
by MacLullich (2001) as stated in section 4.3.7.2. may be applied in such engagement decisions. 
 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.30.: To what extent do you evaluate the AR of a 
prospective client using the following decision aid - Quantitative aids (such as auditing software tools 
and statistical models that provide a “risk rating”, for instance, high, medium or low)? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
 6 5 5  16 
 37.5% 31.3% 31.3%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 20.7% 25.0% 29.4%  20.8% 
1 8 5 5  19 
5.3% 42.1% 26.3% 26.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 27.6% 25.0% 29.4%  24.7% 
 6 5 5  16 
 37.5% 31.3% 31.3%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 20.7% 25.0% 29.4%  20.8% 
1 9 5 2 1 18 
5.6% 50.0% 27.8% 11.1% 5.6% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 31.0% 25.0% 11.8% 100.0% 23.4% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.82. The use of quantitative decision aids by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on the research question with reference to the age of the respondent: Of practitioners 
aged 30 to 39 years, 51,7% (20,7% + 31,0%) consider the use of quantitative aids to a large extent 
compared to 41,2% (29,4% + 11,8%) of respondents aged 50 to 59 years. This marginal decrease in 
the use of such aids by older practitioners, may relate to concerns expressed in 1.1. related to the 
ability of older partners to remain abreast of many industry developments that ultimately impacts on 
the audit methodology applied in engagement decisions. This study would thus suggest that older 
practitioners are more reliant on personal professional judgement. 
 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.6. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
At this stage, it is important to reflect on the findings from international studies such as the study by 
the USGAO (2003: 2) and Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3) as stated in section 2.7. who found that 
smaller firms should be assisted by the profession to develop decision aids and software to assist them 
in their engagement decisions.  
 
This finding also confirms those concerns raised by Ryan (2005a-d) as stated in section 1.1.3.1. and 
section 3.3.2. who suggested that firms in medium audit practice in South Africa, may not have similar 
systems and methodologies as their larger international counterparts and may therefore be exposed to 
risk related to their decision making and audit procedures.  
 
The erratic use of decision aids amongst registered auditors in medium practice as well as the many 
practitioners that do not consider the use of quantitive and qualitative decision aids at all during their 
engagement decisions, raises significant concerns over the quality of decision making as well as the 
documentation of engagement decisions, key concerns in the current auditing profession as 
commented on by Bell, et al. (2005: 20) as stated in section 1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2. 
 
6.41. The impact of the auditor’s professional judgement on the engagement decision 
 
Research objective section 5.10.28.: As acknowledged by Bell, et al. (2005: 20), the use of 
professional judgement remains prevalent to the final outcome of any engagement decision.  The 
research objective will therefore consider to what extent registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa consider their personal professional judgement during their engagement decisions. This 
objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents are 
practitioners as detailed in table 6.83., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 6.84. 
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Research question section 5.10.28.: To what extent do you evaluate the AR of a prospective client 
using the following aid - Your personal professional judgement as to whether or not to accept a 
prospective client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
5 1 4  1 3 14 
35.7% 7.1% 28.6%  7.1% 21.4% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3% 8.3% 33.3%  16.7% 21.4% 18.2% 
14 11 8 6 5 11 55 
25.5% 20.0% 14.5% 10.9% 9.1% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
73.7% 91.7% 66.7% 100.0% 83.3% 78.6% 71.4% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.83. The use of professional judgement by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the use of professional judgement per size of the firm: Registered auditors in 
medium practice apply professional judgement in their engagement decisions to a large extent 
(71,4%), irrespective of the size of their firms.   
 
The findings from section 6.39. and section 6.40. corroborates this finding as those findings suggested 
that the limited application, and in many instances absence of the use of decision aids, would suggest a 
greater reliance on personal preference and professional judgement by registered auditors in medium 
practice during their engagement decisions.  
 
This finding also compliments the finding in section 6.25. related to the impact of motivational drivers 
on the predisposition of registered auditors in medium practice, and highlights the fact that 
professional judgement towards which registered auditors in medium practice are predisposed, 
remains a significant, if not almost absolute, determinant in engagement decisions made by many 
registered auditors in medium practice. 
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Research question section 5.10.28.: To what extent do you evaluate the AR of a prospective client 
using the following aid - Your personal professional judgement as to whether or not to accept a 
prospective client? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
1 5 5 2 1 14 
7.1% 35.7% 35.7% 14.3% 7.1% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
50.0% 17.2% 25.0% 11.8% 100.0% 18.2% 
1 24 15 15  55 
1.8% 43.6% 27.3% 27.3%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 82.8% 75.0% 88.2%  71.4% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.84. The use of professional judgement by the age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the use of professional judgement per age of the respondent: Older practitioners 
are more reliant on professional judgement. This is based on 88,2% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 
years, indicating such reliance to a large extent as opposed to 75,0% of practitioners aged 40 to 49 
years and 82,8% of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years. Although the availability of decision aids in 
audit practices, may impact on the use of such aids, it is apparent that the personal preferences of 
practitioners appear to have a dominant impact on engagement decisions. It is thus concluded, that 
despite the benefits of applying decision aids, professional judgement will always be applied at some 
stage of engagement decisions, as argued by Bell, et al. (2005: 20) in section 1.1.3.1. and section 3.3.2. 
In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.6. will reflect on the risks flowing 
from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis for the 
enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
6.42. The impact of the professional judgement of and review by fellow auditors on the 
engagement decision 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.31.: As acknowledged by Bell, et al. (2005: 20) the use 
of professional judgement remains prevalent to the final outcome of any engagement decision. The 
relationship between junior and senior practitioners often leads to tension as experience levels and risk 
tolerance may differ. This process is however likely to be a dynamic process, allowing for the 
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balanced application of motivational drivers as stated in section 2.2.4. (Carpenter, et al. 1994: 355-
380; Gendron, 2002: 8).  The research objective is therefore to determine to what extent registered 
auditors in medium practice consider the professional judgement of and review of their fellow auditors 
of their engagement decisions. This objective is in table 6.85., as well as table 6.86. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.31.: To what extent do you evaluate the AR of a 
prospective client using the professional judgement of and review by your fellow auditors? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 10  11 to 
20  
21 to 30  31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
  1    1 
  100.0%    100.0% 
Not at all 
  8.3%    1.3% 
2 3 3 1 1 2 12 
16.7% 25.0% 25.0% 8.3% 8.3% 16.7% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
10.5% 25.0% 25.0% 16.7% 16.7% 14.3% 15.6% 
5 4 2  1 5 17 
29.4% 23.5% 11.8%  5.9% 29.4% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3% 33.3% 16.7%  16.7% 35.7% 22.1% 
12 5 6 5 4 7 39 
30.8% 12.8% 15.4% 12.8% 10.3% 17.9% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
63.2% 41.7% 50.0% 83.3% 66.7% 50.0% 50.6% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.85. Review by fellow practitioners by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question based on the size of the audit firm: Registered auditors in 
medium practice will to a large extent (50,6% of respondents) make use of the professional judgement 
of fellow practitioners in engagement decisions, irrespective of the size of the firm. It should also be 
noted that 16,9% (1,3% + 15,6%) of practitioners do not consider the professional judgement of their 
fellow practitioners during their engagement decisions. This finding may be dependent on the 
respective firms’ policies on engagement decisions, or may be as a result of the limited availability of 
registered auditors in medium practice, allowing for such review.  A lack of peer review does hold the 
risk that inconsistent decisions could be made, considering the erratic use of engagement decision aids 
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in registered auditors in medium practice as concluded by this study, and thus expose such 
practitioners and firms to risk. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.31.: To what extent do you evaluate the AR of a 
prospective client using the professional judgement of and review by your fellow auditors? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
    1 1 
    100.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
    100.0% 1.3% 
 5 2 5  12 
 41.7% 16.7% 41.7%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 17.2% 10.0% 29.4%  15.6% 
1 4 7 5  17 
5.9% 23.5% 41.2% 29.4%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 13.8% 35.0% 29.4%  22.1% 
1 20 11 7  39 
2.6% 51.3% 28.2% 17.9%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 69.0% 55.0% 41.2%  50.6% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.86. Review by fellow practitioners by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question based on the age of the respondent: This study has found that 
younger practitioners consider review by fellow practitioners to a greater extent than older 
practitioners. This is based on 69,0% of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years considering such review, 
compared to 55,0% of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 41,2% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 
years. This finding, is the likely result of practices in such firms requiring the review of junior 
practitioners’ decisions by experienced practitioners to a certain degree as found by (Freidson, 1986: 
213; Covaleski, et al. 1998: 293-327; Anderson-Gough, et al. 2001: 99-122) in section 3.4. Concerns 
raised in section 1.1. commented on the difficulty that older practitioners have in staying abreast with 
many regulatory and statutory changes within the profession. It is thus likely that decisions made by 
older practitioners, that have not been reviewed by others, may expose the respective firm to risk in 
the event that the practitioners is not aware of current statutory and regulatory requirements that may 
impact the engagement decision. Risks, studies and guidance is considered in section 7.6. 
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6.43. The design of specific substantive auditing procedures to mitigate specific risks 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.27.: Performing additional audit procedures to support 
high risk areas following an initial risk assessment is required by ISA 330 (IFAC, 2003c). This 
auditing standard requirement does however not guarantee that practitioners comply with its 
requirements as suggested by Gloeck (2003).  The research objective of this study will therefore 
consider the extent to which registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa would design 
specific audit procedures to mitigate specific risks identified during their engagement decision 
procedures, as required by ISA 330 (IFAC, 2003c). This objective is researched as detailed in table 
6.87., as well as table 6.88. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.27.: To what extent do you design specific substantive 
auditing procedures to mitigate specific risks that you have identified during the engagement-decision 
process? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
 1     1 
 100.0%     100.0% 
Not at all 
 8.3%     1.3% 
1    1 1 3 
33.3%    33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
5.3%    16.7% 7.1% 3.9% 
10 3 4 1 4 5 27 
37.0% 11.1% 14.8% 3.7% 14.8% 18.5% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
52.6% 25.0% 33.3% 16.7% 66.7% 35.7% 35.1% 
8 8 8 5 1 8 38 
21.1% 21.1% 21.1% 13.2% 2.6% 21.1% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
42.1% 66.7% 66.7% 83.3% 16.7% 57.1% 49.4% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.87. Designing specific audit procedures by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on considering the design of specific audit procedures during the engagement 
decision by size of the firm: Registered auditors in medium practice will make use of the design of 
specific audit procedures to address risk to a large extent (49,4% of respondents), irrespective of the 
size of the audit practice.  This study has confirmed that registered auditors in medium practice do in 
fact consider the design of specific audit procedures during their engagement decisions to mitigate 
risks identified to a large extent.  
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.27.: To what extent do you design specific substantive 
auditing procedures to mitigate specific risks that you have identified during the engagement-decision 
process? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
 1    1 
 100.0%    100.0% 
Not at all 
 3.4%    1.3% 
  2 1  3 
  66.7% 33.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
  10.0% 5.9%  3.9% 
 9 9 8 1 27 
 33.3% 33.3% 29.6% 3.7% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
 31.0% 45.0% 47.1% 100.0% 35.1% 
2 19 9 8  38 
5.3% 50.0% 23.7% 21.1%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 65.5% 45.0% 47.1%  49.4% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.88. Designing specific audit procedures by the age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on considering the design of specific audit procedures during the engagement 
decision by age of the respondent: Younger practitioners consider the design of specific audit 
procedures to mitigate risk to a greater extent than older practitioners. This is based on 65,5% of 
practitioners aged 30 to 39 years considering the design of such procedures as opposed to 45,0% of 
practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 47,1% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. This, it is argued, 
may relate to the fact that older practitioners have difficulty in staying abreast with many changes to 
  250
auditing standards as stated in section 1.1. and may not be aware of the most recent thinking on 
required audit procedures and risk assessment as required by the revised ISA 330. Risks, studies and 
professional guidance in this regard are reflected on in section 7.8. 
 
6.44. Documenting an understanding of the nature of the prospective client’s business 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.18.: Obtaining a detailed understanding of the client’s 
business is a primary and cost effective audit procedure that is performed during the engagement 
decision process (Willingham & Carmichael, 1979: 177; Thomas, 1992).  Although ISA 315 provides 
detailed guidance in this regard, auditors do not always comply with auditing standards as concluded 
by Gloeck (2003). The research objective would therefore determine to what extent auditors document 
their understanding of a client’s business. This research is detailed in table 6.89., and table 6.90. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.18.: To what extent do you document your 
understanding of the nature of the prospective client’s business whilst deciding whether to accept 
him/her as a new client? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 10  11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
2 1    1 4 
50.0% 25.0%    25.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
10.5% 8.3%    7.1% 5.2% 
6 4 3 1 2 5 21 
28.6% 19.0% 14.3% 4.8% 9.5% 23.8% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
31.6% 33.3% 25.0% 16.7% 33.3% 35.7% 27.3% 
5 4 7 2 2 5 25 
20.0% 16.0% 28.0% 8.0% 8.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3% 33.3% 58.3% 33.3% 33.3% 35.7% 32.5% 
6 3 2 3 2 3 19 
31.6% 15.8% 10.5% 15.8% 10.5% 1 5.8% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
31.6% 25.0% 16.7% 50.0% 33.3% 21.4% 24.7% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.89. Documenting the understanding of the business by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on documenting an understanding of the client’s business in relation to the size of 
the practice: From table 6.89., this study has found that 24,7% of practitioners document their 
engagement decisions to a large extent; 32,5% document such an understanding to a moderate extent 
and 32,5% (5,2% + 27,3%) document their engagement decisions to a small or no extent at all, 
suggesting that there is no real preference amongst the respondents for such documentation. It is 
concerning that this study indicates that a significant number of respondents do not document their 
understanding of a prospective client’s business during their engagement decisions, and thereby not 
complying with ISA’s. Of those who do not consider documenting such an understanding, 75% 
(50,0% + 25,0%) are from firms with 5 to 20 practitioners, and of those who do consider documenting 
such an understanding, 47,6% (28,6% + 19,0%) are from firms with 5 to 20 practitioners. The latter 
confirms the concerns raised by Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3) as stated in section 2.7. who 
concluded that firms with fewer practitioners need to be assisted in developing audit methodologies 
and procedures to assist them in performing and documenting their engagement decisions. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.18.: To what extent do you document your 
understanding of the nature of the prospective client’s business whilst deciding whether to accept 
him/her as a new client? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 3 1   4 
 75.0% 25.0%   100.0% 
Not at all 
 10.3% 5.0%   5.2% 
 10 7 4  21 
 47.6% 33.3% 19.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 34.5% 35.0% 23.5%  27.3% 
1 11 5 7 1 25 
4.0% 44.0% 20.0% 28.0% 4.0% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 37.9% 25.0% 41.2% 100.0% 32.5% 
1 5 7 6  19 
5.3% 26.3% 36.8% 31.6%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 17.2% 35.0% 35.3%  24.7% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.90. Documenting understanding of the business by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on documenting an understanding of the client’s business in relation to the age of the 
respondent: The study has found in table 6.90. hereafter, that 60,0% (35,0% + 25,0%) of practitioners 
aged 40 to 49 years, and 76,5% (41,2% + 35,3%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years, consider 
documenting their understanding of a client’s business during engagement decisions.  
 
This compares to 44,8% (10,3% + 34,5%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years that do not or to a small 
extent consider documenting such an understanding, suggesting that older practitioners are more likely 
to document such an understanding than younger partners.  
 
This findings is concerning as ISA 315 (IFAC, 2004d: par .2-5) requires the practitioner to obtain such 
an understanding, and it would have been expected that younger pracititoners are more abreast with 
the requirements of ISA’s. Risks, studies and guidance will be reflected on in section 7.8. 
 
6.45. Performing an evaluation of Engagement Risk (ER) 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.29.: The need to support registered auditors in medium 
practice in the development of engagement decision procedures was identified by the Panel of Audit 
Effectiveness (Carpenter & Mahoney; 2001: 3) as stated in section 2.7. Cost sensitivities in registered 
auditors in medium practice, highlighted by Houston (1999: 70-86) and Ryan (2005a-d) may also 
impact on the extent to which practitioners evaluate ER.   
 
The research objective is therefore to determine to what extent the auditor, manager or other staff than 
the practitioner or manager respectively performs the engagement decision.  
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.91. (considering practitioners); table 6.93. (considering 
managers); and table 6.95 (considering staff other than practitioners or managers), as well as the age of 
the respondents as detailed in table 6.92. (considering practitioners); table 6.94. (considering 
managers); and table 6.96 (considering staff other than practitioners or managers). 
 
  253
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people perform the 
assessment of engagement risk of your prospective clients - The auditor, manager or staff other than 
the practitioner or manager? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
2 1 1    4 
50.0% 25.0% 25.0%    100.0% 
To a small extent 
10.5% 8.3% 8.3%    5.2% 
4  2 1 1 3 11 
36.4%  18.2% 9.1% 9.1% 27.3% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
21.1%  16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 21.4% 14.3% 
13 11 9 5 5 11 54 
24.1% 20.4% 16.7% 9.3% 9.3% 20.4% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
68.4% 91.7% 75.0% 83.3% 83.3% 78.6% 70.1% 
 
Total 
 
19 
 
12 
 
12 
 
6 
 
6 
 
14 
 
77* 
 
Table 6.91. Practitioner performing ER assessment by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on practitioners performing an ER assessment by size of the audit practice: Per table 
6.91., this study has found that practitioners perform ER assessments to a large extent (70,1% of 
respondents) during their engagement decisions. This study has also found that 5,2% of practitioners 
perform engagement decisions to a small extent during their engagement decisions. 
 
Those practitioners that perform ER assessments to a small extent are mainly from firms with 5 to 30 
practitioners (50% - 5 to 10 practitioners; 25% - 11 to 20 practitioners; and 25% - 21 to 30 
practitioners).  
 
Practitioners in firms with more practitioners such as those with 31 to 60 practitioners, in all instances 
indicated that they would perform ER assessments from a moderate to a large extent. This finding 
would suggest that firms with fewer practitioners might be exposed to risk in instances where 
practitioners do not perform an evaluation of ER. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people perform the 
assessment of engagement risk of your prospective clients - The auditor, manager or staff other than 
the practitioner or manager? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 
29  
30 to 
39  
40 to 
49  
50 to 
59  
60 to 
69  
Total 
 3  1  4 
 75.0%  25.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 10.3%  5.9%  5.2% 
 5 4 2  11 
 45.5% 36.4% 18.2%  100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
 17.2% 20.0% 11.8%  14.3% 
2 21 16 14 1 54 
3.7% 38.9% 29.6% 25.9% 1.9% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 72.4% 80.0% 82.4% 100.0% 70.1% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.92. Practitioner performing ER assessment by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on practitioners performing an ER assessment by age of the respondent: When 
considering the age of the respondents, there is no clearly identifiable trend that would suggest that 
certain practitioners within a certain age category are not involved in the ER evaluation as studied in 
table 6.92. This is based on the findings that 72,4% of respondents aged 30 to 39 years indicated that 
they perform ER assessments to a large extent; 80,0% of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years indicated 
that they perform ER assessments to a large extent, and similarly 82,4% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 
years perform ER assessments to a large extent. 
 
It is concerning to note that of those who do not perform ER assessments, 75,0% are aged 30 to 39 
years. From a different perspective, 10,3% of those aged 30 to 39 years do not perform ER 
assessments during their engagement decisions. This finding is concerning as it would have been 
expected from the concerns expressed in section 1.1., that younger partners would be more abreast 
with ISA’s and the related requirements around risk assessment than older partners. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people perform the 
assessment of engagement risk of your prospective clients - The auditor, manager or staff other than 
the practitioner or manager? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
4 3 1 1 3 3 15 
26.7% 20.0% 6.7% 6.7% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
21.1% 25.0% 8.3% 16.7% 50.0% 21.4% 19.5% 
7 1 2 1 1 6 18 
38.9% 5.6% 11.1% 5.6% 5.6% 33.3% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
36.8% 8.3% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 42.9% 23.4% 
5 6 6 3 1 2 23 
21.7% 26.1% 26.1% 13.0% 4.3% 8.7% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 16.7% 14.3% 29.9% 
3 2 3 1 1 3 13 
23.1% 15.4% 23.1% 7.7% 7.7% 23.1% 100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
15.8% 16.7% 25.0% 16.7% 16.7% 21.4% 16.9% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.93. Manager performing ER assessment by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on audit managers performing an ER assessment by size of the audit firm: As 
concluded from table 6.93., managers perform ER assessments to a moderate extent (29,9%).  
 
The study also found as detailed in table 6.93. that 23,4% of managers perform these assessments to a 
small extent as per table 6.93. Of those respondents that indicated that managers to a small extent 
perform ER assessments, 44,5% (38,9% + 5,6%) are from firms with 5 to 20 practitioners. 
 
These findings would suggest that managers are more likely to perform ER assessments in firms with 
more practitioners, than those with fewer practitioners. This may be the result of firms with fewer 
practitioners having less access to managers than firms do with more practitioners. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people perform the 
assessment of engagement risk of your prospective clients - The auditor, manager or staff other than 
the practitioner or manager? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
 5 5 4 1 15 
 33.3% 33.3% 26.7% 6.7% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 17.2% 25.0% 23.5% 100.0% 19.5% 
1 4 8 5  18 
5.6% 22.2% 44.4% 27.8%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 13.8% 40.0% 29.4%  23.4% 
1 12 2 8  23 
4.3% 52.2% 8.7% 34.8%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 41.4% 10.0% 47.1%  29.9% 
 8 5   13 
 61.5% 38.5%   100.0% 
To a large extent 
 27.6% 25.0%   16.9% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.94. Manager performing ER assessment by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on audit managers performing an ER assessment by age of the respondent: As 
concluded from table 6.94., those practitioners where managers do perform engagement risk 
assessments are likely to be younger. This conclusion is based on 69,0% (41,4% + 27,6%) of 
practitioners aged 30 to 39 years indicating that managers perform ER assessments from a moderate to 
a large extent, as opposed to 47,1% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years who indicated that their 
managers perform ER assessments to a moderate extent. 
 
This finding is concerning as it indicates that younger practitioners with less experience are more 
likely to rely on managers with arguably similar limited experience, performing engagement risk 
assessments that may expose these pracititoners and their audit firms to risk. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people perform the 
assessment of engagement risk of your prospective clients - The auditor, manager or staff other than 
the practitioner or manager? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
12 7 6 3 4 7 39 
30.8% 17.9% 15.4% 7.7% 10.3% 17.9% 100.0% 
Not at all 
63.2% 58.3% 50.0% 50.0% 66.7% 50.0% 50.6% 
5 2 4 3 1 7 22 
22.7% 9.1% 18.2% 13.6% 4.5% 31.8% 100.0% 
To a small 
extent 
26.3% 16.7% 33.3% 50.0% 16.7% 50.0% 28.6% 
1 3 1    5 
20.0% 60.0% 20.0%    100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
5.3% 25.0% 8.3%    6.5% 
1  1  1  3 
33.3%  33.3%  33.3%  100.0% 
To a large 
extent 
5.3%  8.3%  16.7%  3.9% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.95. Other staff performing ER assessment by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on other staff performing an ER assessment by size of the practice: As per table 6.95. 
staff other than the practitioner or manager do not perform ER assessments as indicated by 50,6% of 
the respondents.  
 
The study has also found that 10,4% (6,5% + 3,9%) of respondents indicated that staff other than 
auditors or managers do perform ER assessments from a moderate to a large extent. Of those who 
indicated that staff other than the practitioner or the audit manager perform engagement risk 
assessments from a moderate to a large extent, 80% (20,0% + 60,0%) are from firms with 5 to 20 
practitioners in the moderate response category, and 33,3% are from firms with 5 to 10 practitioners in 
the large response category. This finding is concerning as it suggests that in firms with fewer practices, 
staff other than the practitioner or manager may be performing engagement risk assessments that may 
severely expose these practices to risk. 
  258
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people perform the 
assessment of engagement risk of your prospective clients - The auditor, manager or staff other than 
the practitioner or manager? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
2 16 11 9 1 39 
5.1% 41.0% 28.2% 23.1% 2.6% 100.0% 
Not at all 
100.0% 55.2% 55.0% 52.9% 100.0% 50.6% 
 7 7 8  22 
 31.8% 31.8% 36.4%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 24.1% 35.0% 47.1%  28.6% 
 4 1   5 
 80.0% 20.0%   100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 13.8% 5.0%   6.5% 
 2 1   3 
 66.7% 33.3%   100.0% 
 
To a large extent 
 6.9% 5.0%   3.9% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.96. Other staff performing ER assessment by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on other staff performing an ER assessment by age of the respondent: From this 
study, it is concluded that practitioners aged 30 to 39 years, are more likely to accept that other staff 
perform ER assessments when compared to older practitioners. Practitioners aged 30 to 39 years, 
indicated that 20,7% (13,8% + 6,9%) do make use of staff other than themselves or their managers to 
perform ER assessments, compared to 100,0% (52,9% + 47,1%) of staff aged 50 to 69 years that to a 
small or no extent make use of such staff on ER assessments. 
 
The findings related to the use of decision aids as concluded in table 6.40. and table 6.41. which in 
both instances indicated a very high level of use of decision aids by practitioners of the ages of 30 to 
39 years needs to be considered in this response. When considering the finding in table 6.92. it is clear 
that practitioners aged 30 to 39 years are also largely responsible for the ER assessment.  
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In considering this result with the finding that practitioners aged 30 to 39 years also allow for the 
involvement of their managers and other staff in their engagement decisions, with the high level of use 
of decision aids by the same age category practitioners, it is evident that staff and managers are likely 
to complete and use such decision aids to a certain extent, which would then be reviewed by the 
practitioner.  
 
The findings related to the documentation of engagement decisions as will be studied in table 6.97. 
hereafter is likely to confirm this view, as younger practitioners are not likely to be involved in the 
documentation of engagement decisions to any great extent as other staff would typically complete 
and document such information, utilising decision aids. 
 
This finding also highlights a significant risk in that older practitioners, who do not consider the use of 
decision aids to any great extent, who do not consider the professional judgement from their fellow 
practitioners during review to any great extent, and who do not have involvement from other team 
members in their engagement decisions, may in fact be exposing their audit firms to significant risk, as 
their engagement decisions appear to be mostly based on their own professional judgement, of which 
very little audit trail exists. In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.8. will 
reflect on the risks flowing from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance 
that served as basis for the enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
 
6.46. Documenting the evaluation of Engagement Risk (ER) 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.29.: Johnstone (2001: 5) argued that the person who 
performs and completes any related decision aids to the engagement decision process should be the 
most senior person on the engagement team, usually the auditor. The research objective is therefore to 
determine to what extent the practitioners, manager or staff other than the practitioner or manager 
respectively documents the engagement decision process. 
 
This objective is researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents 
are practitioners as detailed in table 6.97. (considering practitioners); table 6.99. (considering 
managers); and table 6.101. (considering staff other than practitioners or managers), as well as the age 
of the respondents as detailed in table 6.98. (considering practitioners); table 6.100. (considering 
managers); and table 6.102. (considering staff other than practitioners or managers). 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people document 
the assessment of your prospective clients’ engagement risk - The auditor, manager, staff other than 
the auditor or manager? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
2 1     3 
66.7% 33.3%     100.0% 
Not at all 
10.5% 8.3%     3.9% 
6 3 2 1 1 1 14 
42.9% 21.4% 14.3% 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
31.6% 25.0% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 7.1% 18.2% 
3 3 4 2 3 7 22 
13.6% 13.6% 18.2% 9.1% 13.6% 31.8% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
15.8% 25.0% 33.3% 33.3% 50.0% 50.0% 28.6% 
8 5 6 3 2 6 30 
26.7% 16.7% 20.0% 10.0% 6.7% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
42.1% 41.7% 50.0% 50.0% 33.3% 42.9% 39.0% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.97. Practitioner documenting engagement risk assessment by the size of the audit 
practice  
 
Conclusion on the practitioner documenting the ER assessment by size of the firm: This study 
has confirmed that 67,7% (28,6% + 39,0%) of registered auditors in medium practice from a moderate 
to a large extent document their engagement decisions themselves as per table 6.97.  
 
This study has also found that 66,7% of practitioners that do not document their engagement decisions 
themselves, are from firms with  5 and 10 practitioners. Of those practitioners that to a moderate 
extent document engagement risk assessments themselves, 45,4% (13,6% + 31,8%) are from firms 
with 41 to 60 practitioners. These findings are concerning as it may indicate non-compliance with ISA 
230 (R) on documentation of audit evidence to support decisions, and possibly indicate on the lack of 
systems, decision aids, and methodologies in smaller firms as argued by Ryan (2005a-d) in section 
1.1.3.1 and concluded by the USGAO (2003: 49) in section 2.7.  
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people document 
the assessment of your prospective clients’ engagement risk - The auditor, manager, staff other than 
the auditor or manager? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 3    3 
 100.0%    100.0% 
Not at all 
 10.3%    3.9% 
 11 1 2  14 
 78.6% 7.1% 14.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 37.9% 5.0% 11.8%  18.2% 
 5 9 7 1 22 
 22.7% 40.9% 31.8% 4.5% 100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 17.2% 45.0% 41.2% 100.0% 28.6% 
2 10 10 8  30 
6.7% 33.3% 33.3% 26.7%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 34.5% 50.0% 47.1%  39.0% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.98. Practitioner documenting ER assessment by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the practitioners documenting the ER assessment by age of the respondent: When 
considering the results to this research question, the responses from those aged 21 to 29 years, have 
been excluded as only two respondents relate to this subpopulation. In terms of the responses related 
to the remainder of the respondents, table 6.98. identified the trend that younger practitioners are less 
likely to be involved in the documentation of engagement decisions than their older counterparts. 
Practitioners aged 30 to 39 years have indicated that 48,2% (10,3% + 37,9%) consider documenting 
their ER assessments from a small to no extent, compared to 95,0% (45,0% + 50,0%) of practitioners 
aged 40 to 49 years, and 88,3% (41,2% + 47,1%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years who consider 
documenting their ER assessments themselves from a moderate to a large extent. This finding may 
indicate non-compliance with ISA 230 (R), or indicate that other staff may be documenting these 
engagenment decisions, suggesting the use of engagement decision aids during engagement decisions 
by such younger practitioners. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people document 
the assessment of your prospective clients’ engagement risk - The auditor, manager, staff other than 
the auditor or manager? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
6 3  1 3 2 15 
40.0% 20.0%  6.7% 20.0% 13.3% 100.0% 
Not at all 
31.6% 25.0%  16.7% 50.0% 14.3% 19.5% 
4 1 1  1 6 13 
30.8% 7.7% 7.7%  7.7% 46.2% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
21.1% 8.3% 8.3%  16.7% 42.9% 16.9% 
4 3 6 4  3 20 
20.0% 15.0% 30.0% 20.0%  15.0% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
21.1% 25.0% 50.0% 66.7%  21.4% 26.0% 
5 5 5 1 2 3 21 
23.8% 23.8% 23.8% 4.8% 9.5% 14.3% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
26.3% 41.7% 41.7% 16.7% 33.3% 21.4% 27.3% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.99. Manager documenting ER assessment by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the manager documenting the ER assessment by size of the firm: In table 6.99., 
this study found that 53,3% (26,0% + 27,3%) of managers document engagement decisions from a 
moderate to a large extent.  
 
This study indicates that manager involvement in the documentation of engagement decisions is more 
likely in firms with fewer practitioners. This findings is based on 71,4% (23,8% + 23,8% + 23,8%) of 
those practitioners where managers document ER assessments to a larger extent, being from firms 
with 5 to 30 practitioners compared to 28,6% (4,8% + 9,5% + 14,3%) of practitioners from firms with 
31 to 60 practitioners. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people document 
the assessment of your prospective clients’ engagement risk - The auditor, manager, staff other than 
the auditor or manager? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
 8 3 4  15 
 53.3% 20.0% 26.7%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 27.6% 15.0% 23.5%  19.5% 
1 3 6 2 1 13 
7.7% 23.1% 46.2% 15.4% 7.7% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 10.3% 30.0% 11.8% 100.0% 16.9% 
1 8 4 7  20 
5.0% 40.0% 20.0% 35.0%  100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
50.0% 27.6% 20.0% 41.2%  26.0% 
 10 7 4  21 
 47.6% 33.3% 19.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 34.5% 35.0% 23.5%  27.3% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.100. Manager documenting ER assessment by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the manager documenting the ER assessment by age of the respondent: Based on 
table 6.100., 62,1% (27,6% + 34,5%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years indicated that managers 
document their ER assessments. Similarly 64,7% (41,2% + 23,5%) of the respondents aged 50 to 59 
years indicated that managers document their ER assessments to a large extent.  
 
This finding would suggest that there is no real trend to suggest a relationship between the age of the 
practitioners and the documentation of ER assessments by their managers.   
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people document 
the assessment of your prospective clients’ engagement risk - The auditor, manager, staff other than 
the auditor or manager? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
10 4 4 3 4 8 33 
30.3% 12.1% 12.1% 9.1% 12.1% 24.2% 100.0% 
Not at all 
52.6% 33.3% 33.3% 50.0% 66.7% 57.1% 42.9% 
5 3 4 2 1 5 20 
25.0% 15.0% 20.0% 10.0% 5.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
26.3% 25.0% 33.3% 33.3% 16.7% 35.7% 26.0% 
3 1 2   1 7 
42.9% 14.3% 28.6%   14.3% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
15.8% 8.3% 16.7%   7.1% 9.1% 
1 3 2 1 1  8 
12.5% 37.5% 25.0% 12.5% 12.5%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
5.3% 25.0% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7%  10.4% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77** 
 
Table 6.101. Other staff documenting ER assessment by the size of practice  
 
Conclusion on other staff documenting the ER assessment by size of the firm: Table 6.101. 
provides the basis to conclude that staff other than practitioners and managers to no extent at all 
document engagement decisions (42,9% of respondents). However it should be noted that 19,5%  
(9,1% + 10,4%) of respondents do use their other staff to document engagement decisions.  
 
Those practitioners who indicated that their staff document ER assessments to a moderate extent are 
57,2% (42,9% + 14,3%) from firms with 5 to 20 practitioners. Those practitioners who indicated their 
staff document ER assessments to a large extent are 50% (12,5% + 37,5%) from firms with 5 to 20 
practitioners. 
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Research question as stated in section 5.10.29.: To what extent do the following people document 
the assessment of your prospective clients’ engagement risk - The auditor, manager, staff other than 
the auditor or manager? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 
29  
30 to 
39  
40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69  Total 
2 13 9 9  33 
6.1% 39.4% 27.3% 27.3%  100.0% 
Not at all 
100.0% 44.8% 45.0% 52.9%  42.9% 
 5 8 6 1 20 
 25.0% 40.0% 30.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
 17.2% 40.0% 35.3% 100.0% 26.0% 
 3 2 2  7 
 42.9% 28.6% 28.6%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 10.3% 10.0% 11.8%  9.1% 
 7 1   8 
 87.5% 12.5%   100.0% 
To a large extent 
 24.1% 5.0%   10.4% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77** 
(** Includes 9 zero responses totaling 11.7% of response population) 
Table 6.102. Other staff documenting ER assessment by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on other staff documenting the ER assessment by size of the firm: Younger 
practitioners are more likely to rely on other staff to document ER assessments. This is based on 
34,4% (10,3% + 24,1%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years, indicating that staff other than 
themselves or their managers document ER assessments from a moderate to a large extent, as opposed 
to 15,0% (10,0% + 5,0%) of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years and 11,8% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 
years. This finding should be considered with the findings of table 6.46. which have clearly illustrated 
that younger practitioners are more likely to make use of decision aids which would, as concluded 
from this study, involve other staff and audit managers. This study also illustrates the likelihood that 
older practitioners do not use decision aids, do not share the responsibility of documenting 
engagement decisions and thus expose their firms to risk as they are not complying with ISA’s, as 
there would be no clear documented support for their engagement decisions made in terms of ISA 230 
(R). In considering these conclusions on this research question section 7.8. will reflect on the risks 
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flowing from these conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that served as basis 
for the enclosure of this research question in the overall research design. 
 
6.47. Information obtained from the prospective client’s lawyers 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.19.: Due to cost concerns in firms in medium audit 
practice (Houston, 1999: 70-86; Wooten, 2003) as stated in section 2.2.2.5., the use of information 
sources during the engagement decision process is likely to be impacted by the cost of such sources. 
The research objective is therefore to determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice 
in South Africa consider the use of information from the prospective client’s lawyers. This objective is 
researched with reference to the size of the audit practices of which the respondents are practitioners 
as detailed in table 6.103., as well as the age of the respondents as detailed in table 6.104. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.19.: To what extent do you consider information 
obtained from the prospective client’s lawyers? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60 
Total 
5 2 2 2 2 4 17 
29.4% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 11.8% 23.5% 100.0% 
Not at all 
26.3% 16.7% 16.7% 33.3% 33.3% 28.6% 22.1% 
8 4 4 1 2 5 24 
33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 4.2% 8.3% 20.8% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
42.1% 33.3% 33.3% 16.7% 33.3% 35.7% 31.2% 
4 4 4  1 4 17 
23.5% 23.5% 23.5%  5.9% 23.5% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
21.1% 33.3% 33.3%  16.7% 28.6% 22.1% 
2 2 2 3 1 1 11 
18.2% 18.2% 18.2% 27.3% 9.1% 9.1% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
10.5% 16.7% 16.7% 50.0% 16.7% 7.1% 14.3% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.103. Obtaining information from lawyers by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on the research question with reference to the size of the firm: This study found that 
53,3% (22,1% + 31,2%) of practitioners obtain information of clients’ lawyers during the engagement 
decision process to a small extent or no extent at all. Of these respondents, most are from firms with 5 
to 10 practitioners (29,4% and 33,3% respectively). This study confirmed that registered auditors in 
medium practice will make use of information from lawyers during the engagement decision process 
to a small extent or no extent at all, thereby exposing themselves and their practices to the risk that 
they may not be able to identify matters that may be significant to their engagement decisions. It could 
be argued that the cost associated with such procedures may be a deterrent to such practitioners based 
on cost concerns raised by Houston (1999: 70-86) as stated in section 2.2.2.5.  
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.19.: To what extent do you consider information 
obtained from the prospective client’s lawyers? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 6 6 4 1 17 
 35.3% 35.3% 23.5% 5.9% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 20.7% 30.0% 23.5% 100.0% 22.1% 
 12 8 4  24 
 50.0% 33.3% 16.7%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 41.4% 40.0% 23.5%  31.2% 
1 5 3 8  17 
5.9% 29.4% 17.6% 47.1%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 17.2% 15.0% 47.1%  22.1% 
1 6 3 1  11 
9.1% 54.5% 27.3% 9.1%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 20.7% 15.0% 5.9%  14.3% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.104. Obtaining information from lawyers by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to the size of the firm: This study found that 
younger auditors, aged 30 and 39 years, are less likely to use information from the lawyers of 
prospective clients. This is based on 37,8% (17,2% + 20,7%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years 
considering the use of such information from a moderate to a large extent, compared to 53,0% (47,1% 
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+ 5,9%) of practitioners aged 50 to 49 years, that would consider the use of information from lawyers. 
This may be indicative of the application of some other source of information that may be providing 
such practitioners with audit evidence during their engagement decisions. In considering these 
conclusions on this research question, section 7.9. will reflect on the risks flowing from these 
conclusions, as well as those studies and professional guidance that serve as basis for the enclosure of 
this research question in the overall research design. 
 
6.48. Information obtained from the client’s previous auditors 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.19: Following on section 6.47., the research objective of 
this question is to determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa 
consider the use of information from the prospective client’s previous auditors. This objective is 
researched in table 6.105., as well as in table 6.106. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.19.: To what extent do you consider information 
obtained from the client’s previous auditors? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
1 1    1 3 
33.3% 33.3%    33.3% 100.0% 
Not at all 
5.3% 8.3%    7.1% 3.9% 
7 1 3 1  4 16 
43.8% 6.3% 18.8% 6.3%  25.0% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
36.8% 8.3% 25.0% 16.7%  28.6% 20.8% 
7 1 2 1 4 5 20 
35.0% 5.0% 10.0% 5.0% 20.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
36.8% 8.3% 16.7% 16.7% 66.7% 35.7% 26.0% 
4 9 7 4 2 4 30 
13.3% 30.0% 23.3% 13.3% 6.7% 13.3% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
21.1% 75.0% 58.3% 66.7% 33.3% 28.6% 39.0% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.105. Corresponding with previous auditors by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on the research question related to the size of the audit practice: This study has found 
that 65,0% (26,0% + 39,0%) of registered auditors in medium practice correspond with predecessor 
auditors from a moderate to a large extent. ISA 220 (R) and the Code of Conduct require that an 
auditor should communicate with the predecessor auditor (IFAC, 2004c; PAAB, 2003: s 15) as stated 
in section 4.3.2.4.1. Although this study has confirmed the prevalence of such communications from a 
moderate to a large extent, it is concerning that there are 3,9% of practitioners that do not consider 
such practice, and that these practitioners are mainly from smaller practices (33,3% from firms with 5 
to 10 practitioners and 33,3% from firms with 11 to 20 practitioners) . These smaller practices are 
exposing themselves to risk, and may not be aware of information that such auditors could provide. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.19.: To what extent do you consider information 
obtained from the client’s previous auditors? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 2 1   3 
 66.7% 33.3%   100.0% 
Not at all 
 6.9% 5.0%   3.9% 
 4 7 4 1 16 
 25.0% 43.8% 25.0% 6.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
 13.8% 35.0% 23.5% 100.0% 20.8% 
1 7 7 5  20 
5.0% 35.0% 35.0% 25.0%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 24.1% 35.0% 29.4%  26.0% 
1 16 5 8  30 
3.3% 53.3% 16.7% 26.7%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 55.2% 25.0% 47.1%  39.0% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.106. Corresponding with previous auditors by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question related to the age of the respondent: This study has found 
that practitioners of the ages of 30 to 39 years make more use of correspondence with previous 
auditors than older practitioners. This is based on 55,2% of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years, 
indicating that they consider such correspondence to a large extent, as opposed to 25,0% aged 40 to 49 
years and 47,1% aged 50 to 59 years. The concerns raised in section 1.1. relating to the difficulty that 
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older practitioners have in staying abreast of regulatory and statutory regulation may contribute to the 
finding that younger practitioners are more likely to use engagement letters than older practitioners, as 
older practitioners may not be aware of current auditing standards requiring the issuance of 
engagement letters. Risks, studies and guidance are considered in 7.9. 
 
6.49. Background searches on the directors of the client 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.19.: Following on section 6.47. the research objective is 
to determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa consider the use of 
information through searches on the background of directors of the prospective client. This objective 
is researched in table 6.107., as well as in table 6.108. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.19.: To what extent do you consider background 
searches on the directors of the client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
4 1   1 1 7 
57.1% 14.3%   14.3% 14.3% 100.0% 
Not at all 
21.1% 8.3%   16.7% 7.1% 9.1% 
6 5 7 1 1 3 23 
26.1% 21.7% 30.4% 4.3% 4.3% 13.0% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
31.6% 41.7% 58.3% 16.7% 16.7% 21.4% 29.9% 
5 6 3  2 5 21 
23.8% 28.6% 14.3%  9.5% 23.8% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3% 50.0% 25.0%  33.3% 35.7% 27.3% 
4  2 5 2 5 18 
22.2%  11.1% 27.8% 11.1% 27.8% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
21.1%  16.7% 83.3% 33.3% 35.7% 23.4% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.107. Performing director background reviews by the size of the audit practice 
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to the size of the firm: This study has found 
that 50,7% (27,3% + 23,4%) of registered auditors in medium practice do from a moderate to a large 
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extent consider the use of background searches on directors of prospective clients. The finding of this 
study would suggest that registered auditors in medium practice are exposed to risk to the extent that 
they do not consider the use of such background information. The study further indicates that 52,1% 
(21,7% + 30,4%) of those who to a small extent consider such background searches, are from firms 
with 5 to 10 practitioners. Firms with 51 to 60 practitioners are more likely to use such searches as 
71,4% (35,7% + 35,7%) of such practitioners will consider such searches from a moderate to a large 
extent. This finding it is argued may be the result of the cost involved in performing such background 
searches as the information would have to be purchased. Due to cost considerations as highlighted by 
Houston (1999: 70-86) as stated in section 2.2.2.5. it could be argued that the prevalence of 
background searches on directors of prospective clients by firms with fewer practitioners may thus be 
less likely.  
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.19.: To what extent do you consider background 
searches on the directors of the client? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 5 1 1  7 
 71.4% 14.3% 14.3%  100.0% 
Not at all 
 17.2% 5.0% 5.9%  9.1% 
1 10 7 4 1 23 
4.3% 43.5% 30.4% 17.4% 4.3% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 34.5% 35.0% 23.5% 100.0% 29.9% 
 6 7 8  21 
 28.6% 33.3% 38.1%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 20.7% 35.0% 47.1%  27.3% 
1 8 5 4  18 
5.6% 44.4% 27.8% 22.2%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 27.6% 25.0% 23.5%  23.4% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.108. Performing director background reviews by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to the age of the respondent: This study has 
found that those practitioners who are less likely to consider the use of director background reviews 
are aged 30 to 39 years. This is based on 51,7% (17,2% + 34,5%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years, 
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considering such searches from a small to no extent compared to 29,4% (5,9% + 23,5%) of 
respondents aged 50 to 59 years who to a small or no extent consider such searches. Again, it is argued 
that the general lack of use of information from background reviews of directors exposes audit firms to 
risk, or that these practitioners use some other sources of information during engagement decisions.  
Risks, studies and guidance are considered in section 7.9. 
 
6.50. Client information held by credit bureaus 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.19.: Following on section 6.47. the research objective is 
to determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa consider the use of 
information from credit bureaus during their engagement decisions. This objective is researched in 
table 6.109., as well as in table 6.110. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.19.: To what extent do you consider client information 
held by credit bureaus? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
 
Total 
7 6 3  3 6 25 
28.0% 24.0% 12.0%  12.0% 24.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
36.8% 50.0% 25.0%  50.0% 42.9% 32.5% 
7 3 5 1 3 3 22 
31.8% 13.6% 22.7% 4.5% 13.6% 13.6% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
36.8% 25.0% 41.7% 16.7% 50.0% 21.4% 28.6% 
4 3 4 1  2 14 
28.6% 21.4% 28.6% 7.1%  14.3% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
21.1% 25.0% 33.3% 16.7%  14.3% 18.2% 
1   4  3 8 
12.5%   50.0%  37.5% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
5.3%   66.7%  21.4% 10.4% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.109. Contacting credit bureaus by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on research question related to the size of the audit practice: This study has found that 
61,1% (32,5% + 28,6%) of registered auditors in medium practice are likely to make use of 
information provided on prospective clients by credit bureaus from a small to no extent at all. The 
majority of those respondents that do not consider obtaining information from credit bureaus are from 
smaller firms with 5 to 30 practitioners. Of those practitioners that do not consider the use of credit 
bureaus to any extent - 64,0% (28,0% + 24,0% +12,0%) are from firms with 5 to 30 practitioners; of 
those practitioners that do consider the use of credit bureaus to a small extent - 68,1% (31,8% + 13,6% 
+ 22,7%) are from firms with 5 to 30 practitioners. It is argued that this finding is impacted by cost 
considerations as highlighted by Houston (1999: 70-86) in section 2.2.2.5. This finding therefore 
suggests that in most instances, registered auditors in medium practice are exposed to the risk of 
accepting clients who may not be creditworthy and thus expose their firms to risk. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.19.: To what extent do you consider client information 
held by credit bureaus? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 10 8 6 1 25 
 40.0% 32.0% 24.0% 4.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 34.5% 40.0% 35.3% 100.0% 32.5% 
1 9 7 5  22 
4.5% 40.9% 31.8% 22.7%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 31.0% 35.0% 29.4%  28.6% 
 8 2 4  14 
 57.1% 14.3% 28.6%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 27.6% 10.0% 23.5%  18.2% 
1 2 3 2  8 
12.5% 25.0% 37.5% 25.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 6.9% 15.0% 11.8%  10.4% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.110. Contacting credit bureaus by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on research question related to the age of the respondent: There is no real trend to 
suggest an age preference for the use of information from credit bureaus. This finding is based on 
34,5% (27,6% + 6,9%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years, considering such information from a 
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moderate to a large extent, compared to 35,5% (23,5% + 11,8%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years 
that consider such information. It is argued that the use of credit bureaus will be more dependent on 
firm policy than on the age of the practitioner. Risks, studies and professional guidance will be 
reflected on in section 7.9. 
 
6.51. Information from regulatory bodies to which the client reports 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.19.: Following on section 6.47. the research objective is 
to determine to what extent registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa consider the use of 
information from the regulatory bodies to which the prospective client reports during their engagement 
decisions. This objective is researched in table 6.111., as well as table 6.112. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.19.: To what extent do you consider information from 
regulatory bodies to which the client reports? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
5 3 3  2 5 18 
27.8% 16.7% 16.7%  11.1% 27.8% 100.0% 
Not at all 
26.3% 25.0% 25.0%  33.3% 35.7% 23.4% 
7 4 3 3 3 2 22 
31.8% 18.2% 13.6% 13.6% 13.6% 9.1% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
36.8% 33.3% 25.0% 50.0% 50.0% 14.3% 28.6% 
5 2 3  1 6 17 
29.4% 11.8% 17.6%  5.9% 35.3% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3% 16.7% 25.0%  16.7% 42.9% 22.1% 
2 3 3 3  1 12 
16.7% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%  8.3% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
10.5% 25.0% 25.0% 50.0%  7.1% 15.6% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.111. Contacting regulatory bodies by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question related to the size of the audit practice: This study has found 
that 52,0% (23,4% + 28,6%) of registered auditors in medium practice consider the use of information 
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obtained from regulatory bodies to whom prospective clients may report from a small to no extent at 
all. It is less likely that smaller audit firms will make use of such information from regulatory bodies 
during their engagement decisions. Of those practitioners that do not consider the use of regulatory 
bodies to any extent - 61,2% (27,8% + 16,7% + 16,7%) are from firms with 5 to 30 practitioners; of 
those practitioners that do consider the use of regulatory bodies to a small extent, 68,1% (31,8% + 
18,2% + 13,6%) are from firms with 5 to 30 practitioners. It is argued that due to cost considerations 
as highlighted by Houston in section 2.2.2.5. (1999: 70-86) the extent to which practitioners will make 
use of information from regulatory bodies may be limited. This finding suggests that such practitioners 
who do not consider information obtained from regulatory bodies during their engagement decisions, 
are exposing themselves and their audit firms to risk, by not considering all available information 
during their engagement decisions. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.19.: To what extent do you consider information from 
regulatory bodies to which the client reports? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 8 6 3 1 18 
 44.4% 33.3% 16.7% 5.6% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 27.6% 30.0% 17.6% 100.0% 23.4% 
1 10 6 5  22 
4.5% 45.5% 27.3% 22.7%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
50.0% 34.5% 30.0% 29.4%  28.6% 
1 4 6 6  17 
5.9% 23.5% 35.3% 35.3%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 13.8% 30.0% 35.3%  22.1% 
 7 2 3  12 
 58.3% 16.7% 25.0%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 24.1% 10.0% 17.6%  15.6% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.112. Contacting regulatory bodies by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question related to the age of the respondent: This study has found 
that younger practitioners are less likely to consider information from regulatory bodies, as 37,9% 
(13,8% + 24,1%) of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years consider such information from a moderate to a 
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large extent, compared to 53,1% (35,3% + 17,6%) of such practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. This 
finding may be indicative of such practitioners making use of other sources of information during their 
engagement decisions. Risks flowing from these conclusions, as well as those studies and guidance 
that served as basis for the enclosure of this research question in the overall research design will be 
considered in section 7.9. 
 
6.52. Communicating the outcome of engagement decisions 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.32.: Communicating the outcome of all engagement 
decisions, including to those clients who have not been accepted is an important risk management 
procedure (AICPA, 2004).  The research objective is therefore to consider to what extent practitioners 
communicate the outcome of their decisions. This objective is researched in tables 6.113. and 6.114. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.32.: Do you communicate the outcome of your decision 
to accept/reject a prospective client to the client? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
1 1 2   1 5 
20.0% 20.0% 40.0%   20.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
5.3% 8.3% 16.7%   7.1% 6.5% 
5  3  2 1 11 
45.5%  27.3%  18.2% 9.1% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
26.3%  25.0%  33.3% 7.1% 14.3% 
5  1 2  2 10 
50.0%  10.0% 20.0%  20.0% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3%  8.3% 33.3%  14.3% 13.0% 
8 11 6 4 4 10 43 
18.6% 25.6% 14.0% 9.3% 9.3% 23.3% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
42.1% 91.7% 50.0% 66.7% 66.7% 71.4% 55.8% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.113. Communicating the outcome of engagement decisions by the size of the audit 
practice  
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Conclusion on communicating the outcome of engagement decisions by size of the firm: This 
study has found that 68,8% (13,0% + 55,8%) of practitioners communicate the outcome of their 
decisions from a moderate to a large extent. This study has further found that 80,0% (20,0% + 20,0% 
+ 40,0%) of those respondents who do not consider communicating the outcome of their decisions are 
from firms with 5 to 30 practitioners.  This, it is argued, may relate to staffing shortages within these 
firms, as well as a lack of appropriate systems and procedures. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.32.: Do you communicate the outcome of your decision 
to accept/reject a prospective client to the client? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 2 1 1 1 5 
 40.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 6.9% 5.0% 5.9% 100.0% 6.5% 
 5 2 4  11 
 45.5% 18.2% 36.4%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 17.2% 10.0% 23.5%  14.3% 
1 4 4 1  10 
10.0% 40.0% 40.0% 10.0%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 13.8% 20.0% 5.9%  13.0% 
1 18 13 11  43 
2.3% 41.9% 30.2% 25.6%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 62.1% 65.0% 64.7%  55.8% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.114. Communicating the outcome of engagement decisions by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on communicating the outcome of engagement decisions by age of the respondent: 
This study has found that there is no real trend to suggest that there would be a relation between the 
age of a respondent and their practice of communicating the outcome of their engagement decisions to 
prospective clients. This is based on 75,9% (13,8% + 62,1%) of respondents aged 30 to 39 years, 
indicating that they do communicate the outcome of their engagement decisions from a moderate to a 
large extent, compared to 70,6% (5,9% + 64,7%) of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years that also 
consider such communication. Risks, studies and guidance, are considered in section 7.8.  
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6.53. The existence of standardised policies and procedures related to the evaluation of new 
assignments and Engagement Risk (ER) 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.26.: The existence of risk management strategies in 
registered auditors in medium practice may be impacted by concerns regarding cost as highlighted by 
Houston (1999: 70-86) as stated in section 2.2.2.5. and Ryan (2005a-d) in section 1.1.3.1. and section 
3.3.2. It is therefore important to test the prevalence of such policies and procedures amongst firms in 
medium audit practice.  The research objective is to consider to what extent registered auditors in 
medium practice consider standardised policies and procedures during the evaluation of ER of 
prospective clients. This objective is researched in table 6.115., as well as in table 6.116. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.26.: Does your auditing firm have standardised policies 
and procedures that all auditors need to comply with for the evaluation of new assignments and 
engagement risk? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
1 3    1 5 
20.0% 60.0%    20.0% 100.0% 
Not at all 
5.3% 25.0%    7.1% 6.5% 
7 2 3  4  16 
43.8% 12.5% 18.8%  25.0%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
36.8% 16.7% 25.0%  66.7%  20.8% 
1 3 5  1 5 15 
6.7% 20.0% 33.3%  6.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
5.3% 25.0% 41.7%  16.7% 35.7% 19.5% 
10 4 4 6 1 8 33 
30.3% 12.1% 12.1% 18.2% 3.0% 24.2% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
52.6% 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 16.7% 57.1% 42.9% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.115. Standardised engagement decision policies by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on research question related to the size of the firm: This study has found in table 
6.115., that 62,4% (19,5% + 42,9%) of respondents consider their firms’ standardised policies and 
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procedures during their engagement decisions from a moderate to a large extent. Of the 27,3% (6,5% 
+ 20,8%) of respondents that consider their firms’ standard policies and procedures from a small to no 
extent at all during their engagement decisions, the majority are from firms with 5 to 30 practitioners. 
Of those practitioners that do not consider standardised engagement policies to any extent – 80,0% 
(20,0% + 60,0%) are from firms with 5 to 20 practitioners; of those practitioners that do consider 
standardised engagement policies to a small extent – 75,1% (43,8% + 12,5% + 18,8%) are from firms 
with 5 to 30 practitioners. These findings suggest the non-existence of such policies in smaller firms 
and hence non-compliance with standards such as ISQC 1 (2004a). 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.26.: Does your auditing firm have standardised policies 
and procedures that all auditors need to comply with for the evaluation of new assignments and 
engagement risk? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 4 1   5 
 80.0% 20.0%   100.0% 
Not at all 
 13.8% 5.0%   6.5% 
 8 3 5  16 
 50.0% 18.8% 31.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 27.6% 15.0% 29.4%  20.8% 
 5 4 6  15 
 33.3% 26.7% 40.0%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 17.2% 20.0% 35.3%  19.5% 
2 12 12 6 1 33 
6.1% 36.4% 36.4% 18.2% 3.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
100.0% 41.4% 60.0% 35.3% 100.0% 42.9% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.116. Standardised engagement decision policies by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on research question related to the age of the respondent: This study has found that 
younger practitioners have indicated that their firms have, and they consider engagement policies to a 
greater extent than older practitioners. This is based on 41,4% of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years 
indicating the existence of such policies to a large extent; 60,0% of practitioners aged 40 to 49 years 
indicating their existence to a large extent, as opposed to 35,5% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years. 
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ISQC 1 (2004a) requires the implementation of policies that include the evaluation of engagement 
decisions. Concerns highlighted in section 1.1. suggests older practitioners have difficulty in 
remaining abreast of the requirements of standards. These concerns may explain the results to this 
research question. Risks, studies and professional guidance is considered in section 7.8. in this regard. 
 
6.54. Central review of engagement decisions 
 
Research objective as stated in section 5.10.31.: The objective of central review, being the review of 
decisions made by one practitioner on another, is to improve the quality of decision-making and to 
eliminate threats to objective decision-making (Steele, 1992: 24). The existence of a lack of such peer 
review is thus likely to impact on the quality of decision making during engagement decisions.  The 
research objective is therefore to consider to what extent engagement decisions of practitioners are 
subject to peer review. This objective is researched in table 6.117., as well as in table 6.118. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.31.: Are engagement decisions made by auditing 
practitioners in your firm reviewed centrally before a final decision is made? 
Nu of 
practitioners 
5 to 10  11 to 20 21 to 30 31 to 40 41 to 50 51 to 60  Total 
2 3 4  1 3 13 
15.4% 23.1% 30.8%  7.7% 23.1% 100.0% 
Not at all 
10.5% 25.0% 33.3%  16.7% 21.4% 16.9% 
5 5 2 1 3 3 19 
26.3% 26.3% 10.5% 5.3% 15.8% 15.8% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
26.3% 41.7% 16.7% 16.7% 50.0% 21.4% 24.7% 
5 3 6 2 1 5 22 
22.7% 13.6% 27.3% 9.1% 4.5% 22.7% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
26.3% 25.0% 50.0% 33.3% 16.7% 35.7% 28.6% 
7 1  3 1 3 15 
46.7% 6.7%  20.0% 6.7% 20.0% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
36.8% 8.3%  50.0% 16.7% 21.4% 19.5% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.117. Central review of engagement decisions by the size of the audit practice  
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Conclusion on the research question in relation to the size of the audit practice: The finding of 
this study is that 41,6% (16,9% + 24,7%) of practitioners do not consider peer review during their 
decisions. The study further indicates that practitioners from smaller firms consider peer review to a 
lesser extent than other firms. Of those practitioners that do not consider central review to any extent – 
69,3% (15,4% + 23,1% + 30,8%) are from firms with 5 to 30 practitioners; of those practitioners that 
do consider central review to a small extent – 63,1% (26,3% + 26,3% + 10,5%) are from firms with 5 
to 30 practitioners. This, it is argued, may be as a result of limited resources within such smaller firms 
that may render peer review impractical as argued by the USGAO (2003: 49).  
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.31.: Are engagement decisions made by auditing 
practitioners in your firm reviewed centrally before a final decision is made? 
Age of the practitioner 21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69 Total 
 7 2 3 1 13 
 53.8% 15.4% 23.1% 7.7% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 24.1% 10.0% 17.6% 100.0% 16.9% 
2 5 7 5  19 
10.5% 26.3% 36.8% 26.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
100.0% 17.2% 35.0% 29.4%  24.7% 
 12 2 8  22 
 54.5% 9.1% 36.4%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
 41.4% 10.0% 47.1%  28.6% 
 5 9 1  15 
 33.3% 60.0% 6.7%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
 17.2% 45.0% 5.9%  19.5% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.118. Central review of engagement decisions by age of the respondent 
 
Conclusion on the research question in relation to the age of the respondent: Table 6.118. 
suggests that there is no real relation between the age of a respondent and the likelihood of considering 
central review of engagement decisions. Of those practitioners aged 30 to 39 years, 58,6% (41,4% + 
17,2%) consider central review from a moderate to a large extent, compared to 53,0% (47,1% + 5,9%) 
of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years, that consider such review from a moderate to a large extent. 
Risks, studies and professional guidance are considered in section 7.8. in this regard. 
  282
6.55. Quality control review of engagement decision procedures and decisions 
 
Research objective: Systems of quality control as studied by Steele (1992: 23) are central to risk 
management. The existence of such quality control procedures, although mandated by ISQC 1 
(2004a), may however be dependent on the ability of practitioners to implement and maintain such 
functions. The possibility that quality control is not being performed, is based on views of Houston 
(1999: 70-86) as stated in section 2.2.2.5. and Ryan (2005a-d) who argued that practitioners are likely 
to experience difficulty in complying with requirements such as quality control due to cost and 
staffing concerns. The research objective is therefore to consider to what extent practitioners consider 
quality control review during their decisions. This objective is researched in table 6.119., as well in 
table 6.120. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.31.: Are the engagement decisions made by practitioners 
in your firm reviewed by a quality control function? 
Nu of practitioners 5 to 
10  
11 to 
20  
21 to 
30  
31 to 
40  
41 to 
50  
51 to 
60  
Total 
6 4 3  1 2 16 
37.5% 25.0% 18.8%  6.3% 12.5% 100.0% 
Not at all 
31.6% 33.3% 25.0%  16.7% 14.3% 20.8% 
3 3 1  3 2 12 
25.0% 25.0% 8.3%  25.0% 16.7% 100.0% 
To a small extent 
15.8% 25.0% 8.3%  50.0% 14.3% 15.6% 
4 2 7 1 1 4 19 
21.1% 10.5% 36.8% 5.3% 5.3% 21.1% 100.0% 
To a moderate 
extent 
21.1% 16.7% 58.3% 16.7% 16.7% 28.6% 24.7% 
6 3 1 5 1 6 22 
27.3% 13.6% 4.5% 22.7% 4.5% 27.3% 100.0% 
To a large extent 
31.6% 25.0% 8.3% 83.3% 16.7% 42.9% 28.6% 
Total 19 12 12 6 6 14 77* 
 
Table 6.119. Quality review of engagement decisions by the size of the audit practice  
 
Conclusion on the research question with reference to the size of the firm: This study has found 
that only 53,3% (24,7% + 28,6%) of registered auditors in medium practice consider quality control 
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review during their engagement decisions from a moderate to a large extent. From the study it is also, 
evident that of those who consider quality review during their engagement decisions to a small or no 
extent at all, a significant portion are from respondents from firms with 5 to 20 practitioners. This is 
based on 62,5% (37,5% + 25,0%) of those who do not consider quality review to any extent being 
from firms with 5 to 20 practitioners and 50,0% (25,0% + 25,0%) of those who consider quality 
control to a small extent, being from firms with 5 to 20 practitioners. The findings of this study is 
therefore concerning due to the mandatory nature (ISQC 1 became effective for audits after 15 June 
2005) related to quality control reviews and the concerns expressed by researchers such as Bell, et al. 
(2005: 3) that attempts to improve the quality of decision making as stated in section 1.1.3.1. and 
section 3.3.2. As studied in section 1.1.2. and section 2.7. limited staffing resources and experienced 
employees are challenges facing registered auditors in medium practice, which in itself may contribute 
to the low level of consideration of quality review requirements by smaller audit firms. A lack of 
quality review may expose these practitioners and their firms to significant risk. 
 
Research question as stated in section 5.10.31.: Are the engagement decisions made by practitioners 
in your firm reviewed by a quality control function? 
Age of the 
practitioner 
21 to 29  30 to 39  40 to 49  50 to 59  60 to 69  Total 
 9 4 2 1 16 
 56.3% 25.0% 12.5% 6.3% 100.0% 
Not at all 
 31.0% 20.0% 11.8% 100.0% 20.8% 
 5 3 4  12 
 41.7% 25.0% 33.3%  100.0% 
To a small extent 
 17.2% 15.0% 23.5%  15.6% 
1 7 5 6  19 
5.3% 36.8% 26.3% 31.6%  100.0% 
To a moderate extent 
50.0% 24.1% 25.0% 35.3%  24.7% 
1 8 8 5  22 
4.5% 36.4% 36.4% 22.7%  100.0% 
To a large extent 
50.0% 27.6% 40.0% 29.4%  28.6% 
Total 2 29 20 17 1 77* 
 
Table 6.120. Quality review of engagement decisions by age of the respondent 
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Conclusion on the research question with reference to the age of the respondent: This study has 
found that 31,0% of practitioners aged 30 to 39 years do not consider quality control during their 
engagement decisions, compared to 11,8% of practitioners aged 50 to 59 years that do not consider 
such control. This finding is concerning as concerns in section 1.1. would suggest that younger 
practitioners are more likely to be abreast with requirements of standards such as ISQC 1 (2004a) than 
older practitioners. It may however also be argued that due to these very concerns expressed in section 
1.1., older practitioners are more reliant on quality control reviews due to the difficulties they face in 
remaining abreast with changes in standards, hence the indications that older practitioners consider 
quality review to a greater extent than younger practitioners. In considering these conclusions section 
7.8. will reflect on the risks, previous studies and guidance in this regard. 
 
6.56. Summary of the research results 
 
Chapter 6 has considered the detailed responses of the respondents to the research questions as defined 
in section 5.10. As stated in Chapter 5, these questions were in fact designed to provide conclusions 
related to the engagement decisions of registered auditors in medium practice with reference to the 
three main research objectives of this study as set out in section 1.1.1.  
 
Table 6.121. to table 6.127.  summarises the conclusions reached on each of the motivational factors 
tested in table 6.5. to table 6.120. This summary is presented with reference to the general responses 
received by the respondents as follows: 
? General population – The overall predisposition of the respondents to the research question is 
indicated with reference to the highest response category e.g. To no extent at all; to a small extent; 
to a moderate extent; from a moderate to a large extent; to a large extent; or where the results are 
inconclusive. 
? Firm size (subpopulation) – Consideration is given to differences in responses from respondents 
from different firm sizes. In general terms, distinction is made between larger and smaller firms 
within the population. Responses from these sub-populations may indicate that the subpopulation 
is predisposed towards a specific motivational factor to a greater extent (indicated by >) than the 
other, or to a lesser extent (indicated by <) or that their responses are consistent amongst 
respondents or that their responses are inconclusive. 
? Age (Subpopulation) – Consideration is given to differences in responses from respondents from 
different age categories. In general terms, distinction is made between older and younger 
practitioners within the population. Responses from these sub-populations may indicate that the 
subpopulation is predisposed towards a specific motivational factor to a greater extent (indicated 
by >) than the other, or to a lesser extent (indicated by <) or that their responses are consistent 
amongst respondents or that their responses are inconclusive. 
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Table 6.121. to table 6.127. have been colour coded to indicate similar responses from respondents. 
These similar responses provide meaningful insights into the behaviour of respondents within certain 
subpopulations as will be considered and commented on in section 7.4. 
 
Conclusions related to the impact of commercial considerations 
 
  General Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulation) 
Age  
(Subpopulation) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Commercial 
considerations 
6.2. 
Moderate to large Consistent Consistent 
Annual 
revenues 
6.5. 
Moderate   Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Strategic focus 
on certain 
clients and 
industries 
6.6. 
Small to No extent Inconclusive Inconclusive 
Ability to pay 
audit fees 
6.7. 
Moderate to large Larger firms > Smaller firms Consistent 
Competitive 
edge  
6.8. 
Moderate Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Probable 
litigation  
6.9. 
Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
Personal 
remuneration 
6.15. 
Small to No extent Inconclusive Older > Younger 
BEE criteria 6.17. Small   Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
 
Table 6.121. Conclusions related to the impact of commercial considerations on registered 
auditors in medium practice 
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Conclusions related to the impact of organisational motivational drivers 
 
  
General  
Population Firm Size (subpopulation) Age (Subpopulation) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Organisational 
considerations 
6.4. 
Moderate   Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Personal 
preferences 
6.13. 
Moderate Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Firm policy 6.16. Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
 
Table 6.122.  Conclusions related to the impact of organisational motivators on registered 
auditors in medium practice 
 
Conclusions related to the impact of professional considerations 
 
  
General  
Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulation) Age (Subpopulation) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Professional 
considerations 
6.3. 
Large Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Compliance 
with statutory 
requirements  
6.10. 
Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
Compliance 
with the Code 
of Ethics 
6.11. 
Large Consistent Younger > Older 
Compliance 
with Auditing 
Standards 
6.12. 
Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
Prior 
experience  
6.14. 
Moderate Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Table 6.123. Conclusions related to the impact of professional considerations on registered 
auditors in medium practice 
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  General  
Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulation) Age (Subpopulation) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Proposed 
statutory 
amendments  
6.18. 
Small   Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
Independence  6.19. Large Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
 
Table 6.123. Conclusions related to the impact of professional considerations on registered 
auditors in medium practice (continued) 
 
 
Conclusions on the evaluation of risk 
 
  
General Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulation) Age (Subpopulation) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Making use 
of third-
party 
specialists  
6.37. 
Inconclusive Larger firms > Smaller firms Inconclusive 
Use of 
engagement 
letters 
6.38. 
Large Smaller firms > Larger firms Inconclusive 
Qualitative 
aids  
6.39. 
Inconclusive Larger firms > Smaller firms Inconclusive 
Quantitative 
aids 
6.40. 
Inconclusive Inconclusive Younger > Older 
Professional 
judgement  
6.41. 
Large Consistent Older > Younger 
Professional 
judgement 
of fellow 
auditors 
6.42. 
Large Consistent Younger > Older 
 
Table 6.124. Conclusions on the evaluation of risk during the engagement decision process  
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Conclusions related to the risk mitigating strategies 
 
  General  
Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulation) 
Age  
(Subpopulation) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Undue 
management 
pressure  
6.20. 
Moderate to large Inconclusive Younger > Older 
Interaction with 
the Audit 
Committee 
6.21. 
Moderate Inconclusive Younger > Older 
Delivery of non-
auditing services 
6.22. 
Moderate Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
Rotation of 
auditors  
6.23. 
Not at all Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
Increasing audit 
fees on high risk 
clients 
6.32. 
Moderate to large Inconclusive Younger > Older 
Resigning from 
high risk 
assignments 
6.33. 
Small to No extent Larger firms > Smaller firms Inconclusive 
Refusing to 
accept the 
engagement 
6.34. 
Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
Reviewing 
indemnity 
insurance 
6.35. 
Small to No extent Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Increasing 
experienced staff 
assigned  
6.36. 
Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
 
Table 6.125. Conclusions related to the use of risk mitigating strategies by registered auditors 
in medium practice 
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Conclusions related to the assessment of the elements of risk 
 
  
General Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulation) 
Age  
(Subpopulation) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Impact of 
commercial, 
organisational 
and 
professional 
considerations  
6.24. 
Moderate to large Consistent Consistent 
Evaluation of 
risk: 
 
     
IR 6.25. Moderate to large Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
CR 6.26. Moderate Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
DR 6.27. Moderate Consistent Older > Younger 
Abr 6.28. Large Consistent Younger > Older 
Cbr 6.29. Large Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
FR 6.30. Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
LR 6.31. Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
 
Table 6.126. Conclusions related to the assessment of the elements of risk during engagement 
decisions by registered auditors in medium practice 
 
Conclusions related to the use of information from third parties 
 
  
General Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulation) 
Age  
(Subpopulation) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Third party 
information:  
 
   
- Lawyers 6.47. Small to No extent Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
Table 6.127. Conclusions related to the use of information from third parties during 
engagement decisions by registered auditors in medium practice 
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General Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulation) 
Age  
(Subpopulation) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
- Previous 
auditors 
6.48. 
Moderate to large Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
- Director 
background 
searches  
6.49. 
Moderate to large Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
- Credit 
bureaus 
6.50. 
Small to No extent Larger firms > Smaller firms Inconclusive 
- Regulatory 
bodies  
6.51. 
Small to No extent Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
 
Table 6.127. Conclusions related to the use of information from third parties during 
engagement decisions by registered auditors in medium practice (continued) 
 
Conclusions related to the use of specific audit procedures during engagement decisions 
  General  
Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulation) Age (Subpopulation) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Design specific 
audit 
procedures on 
risk areas 
6.43. 
Large Consistent Younger > Older 
Document 
understanding 
of business  
6.44. 
Inconclusive Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
Perform the 
assessment of 
ER: 
6.45. 
     
- The auditor  Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Inconclusive 
 
Table 6.128. Conclusions related to the use of specific audit procedures during engagement 
decisions by registered auditors in medium practice 
  291
  General  
Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulation) Age (Subpopulation) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
- The audit 
manager 
 
Moderate Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
- Audit staff  Small Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
Document 
assessment of 
ER: 
6.46. 
     
- The auditor  Moderate to large Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
- The audit 
manager 
 
Moderate to large Smaller firms > Larger firms Inconclusive 
- Audit staff   Not at all Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Communicate 
outcome of 
engagement 
decision 
6.52. 
Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Inconclusive 
Existence of 
standardised 
policies and 
procedures 
on ER 
6.53. 
Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
Peer review 6.54. Small to No extent Larger firms > Smaller firms Inconclusive 
Quality 
review 
6.55. 
Moderate to large Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
 
Table 6.128. Conclusions related to the use of specific audit procedures during engagement 
decisions by registered auditors in medium practice (continued) 
 
Section 7.2. to section 7.9. will critically consider these conclusions and risks following from the 
findings of this study in order to conclude on the research objectives, and to consider suggested 
actions in section 7.13. to address and mitigate these risks that registered auditors in medium practice 
are exposed to during their engagement decisions. 
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From the analysis of the research results in chapter 6, chapter 7 considers the findings of this study in 
relation to the research objectives of this study as stated in section 1.1.1. Chapter 7 continues to 
consider the findings of this study in relation to the impact of commercial, professional and 
organisational motivational drivers on the engagement decisions of auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa. Conclusions are presented in relation to the assessment of risk; the application of 
judgement; the use of risk mitigating strategies; the use of specific audit procedures and audit 
information from third parties during engagement decisions of such practitioners. These conclusions 
are considered to the extent that they expose practitioners in medium audit practice to risk, which is 
addressed in chapter 8 hereafter.  
 
Chapter 7 hereafter also compares this study’s conclusions on the engagement decisions of 
practitioners in medium audit practice to the findings of international studies, and hence allows for 
specific conclusions to be made with reference to the South African audit profession. 
The analysis of the research questionnaires provided meaningful insights on many behavioural 
aspects of registered auditors in medium practice. It is however necessary to consider these results 
holistically against the stated research objectives in order to conclude on this study and to make 
recommendations to regulators, practitioners and future researchers. 
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CHAPTER 7  INTERPRETATION OF THE ENGAGEMENT DECISION PROCESS OF 
REGISTERED AUDITORS IN MEDIUM PRACTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The interpretation of the research results in this chapter has found that practitioners in medium audit 
practice in South Africa, are largely commercially predisposed during their engagement decisions. 
This finding, the likely result of significant competition within the South African audit profession, has 
a severe impact on the engagement decisions of such practitioners, including the following: 
? The cost of maintaining systems and methodologies such as those required by ISQC 1 (2004a) in 
relation to quality review is expensive to maintain. Competition in the market leads to pressures 
on margins resulting in the possibility that practitioners in medium practice may not have such 
systems and methodologies in place. 
? The use of information from third parties, third party specialists as well as decision aids to assist in 
the quality of engagement decisions in many smaller firms are limited, again the likely result of 
competition and pressures on profit margins. 
? As a result of these cost pressures following from such significant competition, many practitioners 
in medium audit practice are accepting high risk assignments, which considering their suggested 
limited engagement risk procedures, may expose such firms to significant risk. 
? Proposed amendments to statutory regulation as well as changes in ISA’s may in many instances 
have a detrimental impact on practitioners in medium audit practice, and hence their limited 
consideration by practitioners in smaller firms during engagement decisions, which are likely to 
impact on the sustainability of these practices. 
? The possible lack of policies and procedures in many smaller firms in medium audit practice in 
South Africa; limited staffing resources considering experienced staff; limited risk mitigation 
procedures and limited use of decision aids and information from third parties during engagement 
decisions are likely to expose these practitioners to non-compliance with ISA’s and regulatory 
requirements. 
? Practitioners in medium audit practice do not consider BEE criteria during their engagement 
decisions. Such practitioners are likely to have great difficulty in complying with BEE 
benchmarks at an ownership and employee level, most likely the result of a limited number of 
qualified PDI staff within the current profession. 
The analysis of the research questionnaires provided meaningful insights on many behavioural 
aspects of registered auditors in medium practice. It is however necessary to consider these results 
holistically against the stated research objectives in order to conclude on this study and to make 
recommendations to regulators, practitioners and future researchers. 
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? Lastly, although not limited to practitioners in medium audit practice, the many regulatory 
changes and new and amended ISA’s, pose the risk that older practitioners may not be abreast of 
the requirements of these changes. Pressures on profits, considering the cost of increased training 
requirements, further expose these practitioners to risk. 
 
In conclusion, limited access to resources (both internal and external), limited use of risk mitigation 
strategies and pressures on profit margins warrants that regulatory bodies the Big Four and other audit 
firms consider the impact of competition in the auditing profession on practitioners in medium 
practice. Current engagement practices in these firms are likely to expose practitioners and their firms 
to significant risk. 
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7.1. Introduction to the interpretation of the engagement decision of practitioners in medium 
audit practice 
 
Chapter 7 considers the findings from the analysis of the research responses as detailed in chapter 6 in 
order to conclude on the three research objectives identified in section 1.1.1. The three research 
objectives of this study are as follows: 
 
Research objective 1: To determine to what extent do commercial, professional and organisational 
behavioural drivers impact registered auditors in medium practice, and to what extent they are 
exposed to apparent risk following their predisposition. 
 
Research objective 2: To consider to what extent do registered auditors in medium practice evaluate 
risk through the application of sufficient audit procedures to support their engagement decisions, 
considering their predisposition.  
 
Research objective 3: To consider if registered auditors in medium practice are exposed to risk as a 
result of their engagement decision practices in general.  
 
From the findings of the results related to these research objectives, the overall research objective of 
this study will be concluded on in chapter 8. The overall research objective of this study as detailed in 
section 1.1.1. is as follows: 
 
The research objective of this study considers the engagement decision of auditors that operate in 
medium practice, which, it is argued, is impacted directly and indirectly by commercial, professional 
and organisational behavioral drivers, that cause auditors to be predisposed. It is further held that this 
predisposition of registered auditors in medium practice impacts the level of audit procedures 
performed during the engagement decision by such practitioners to such an extent that it impacts on 
the level of risk that these practitioners are exposed to. 
 
The research questionnaire (Annexure C to this study) was designed with the assistance of Statcon, 
with the intention to research several research questions in support of the research objectives and 
overall research field of this study. These research questions were defined following the study of 
literature on engagement decisions, statutory requirements (legislation) and professional guidance 
such as ISA’s. The research questions were categorised to such an extent that it would provide the 
basis for conclusions on the three research objectives as stated before.  
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The first section of the questionnaire addressed research objective 1, as it studied the impact of 
commercial, professional and organisational motivators, and the consideration that registered auditors 
in medium practice in South Africa give to such motivators during their engagement decisions as 
detailed in section 5.9. Section 7.2. to section 7.4. consider the conclusions in relation to research 
objective 1, as it provides critical analysis of the findings of this study in relation to the impact of these 
motivational drivers on the engagement decisions of practitioners in medium audit practice in South 
Africa. 
 
Research objective 2, is considered in section 7.5. to section 7.9. These sections reflect on the 
conclusions from the second and third part of the research questionnaire as detailed in section 5.9. 
which firstly dealt with the evaluation of risk through studying the considerations that registered 
auditors in medium practice give to the elements involved in risk evaluation as well as the use of risk 
mitigation.  
 
Secondly, in order to support engagement decision activities such as risk assessment, the last section 
of the questionnaire studied other engagement decision activities expected to form part of any 
engagement decision process. 
 
Chapter 6 concluded on the detailed findings of this study relating to the individual research questions 
by summarizing the responses as follows: 
? Conclusions related to the impact of commercial considerations; 
? Conclusions related to the impact of professional considerations on the engagement decisions of 
practitioners in medium audit practice; 
? Conclusions related to the impact of organisational motivators; 
? Conclusions related to the assessment of the elements of risk; 
? Conclusions on the application of judgement during engagement decisions by practitioners in 
medium practice; 
? Conclusions related to the use of risk mitigating strategies by practitioners; 
? Conclusions related to the use of specific audit procedures by registered auditors; and 
? Conclusions related to the use of information from third parties by practitioners. 
 
From the critical analysis of the findings of this study as detailed in sections 7.2. to 7.9. hereafter, risks 
are considered relating to engagement decisions as exercised by registered auditors in medium practice 
in South Africa in general. These risks that addresses research objective 3 as stated in section 1.1.1., 
are commented on extensively in chapter 8 hereafter, that continues to provide recommendations to 
industry, academics and regulators in relation to these risks that have been identified. The conclusions 
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on the research objectives provide the basis for the overall conclusion on the research field presented 
in chapter 8. 
  
7.2. Conclusions related to the impact of commercial considerations 
 
Table 7.1. hereafter, summarises the findings of the study in relation to the impact that commercial 
considerations have on registered auditors during their engagement decisions. As explained in section 
6.56., the tables provided in this chapter summarises the responses from the respondents per the 
general population and subpopulations. Figure 7.1. hereafter, graphically depicts the responses of the 
respondents per response category. 
 
  General Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulations) 
Age  
(Subpopulations) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Commercial 
considerations 
6.2. 
Moderate to large Consistent Consistent 
Annual 
revenues 
6.5. 
Moderate   Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Strategic 
focus on 
certain clients 
and industries 
6.6. 
Small to No extent Inconclusive Inconclusive 
Ability to pay 
audit fees 
6.7. 
Moderate to large Larger firms > Smaller firms Consistent 
Competitive 
edge  
6.8. 
Moderate Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Probable 
litigation  
6.9. 
Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
Personal 
remuneration 
6.15. 
Small to No extent Inconclusive Older > Younger 
BEE criteria 6.17. Small   Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
 
Table 7.1.  Conclusions related to the impact of commercial considerations on registered 
auditors in medium practice 
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Figure 7.1. Considering commercial motivational drivers by registered auditors in medium 
practice 
 
 
7.2.1. Critical analysis of conclusions related to the commercial predisposition of 
practitioners in medium practice 
 
From table 7.1. and figure 7.1., the following is concluded in relation to the commercial 
predisposition of practitioners in medium audit practice: 
? Practitioners in medium practice are predisposed towards commercial considerations 
from a moderate to a large extent. 
? Certain motivational drivers, such as a client’s ability to pay audit fees, is considered 
from a moderate to a large extent where as the risk of litigation, is considered to a large 
extent.  
? Meeting annual revenue targets and considering their firm’s competitive edge during 
engagement decisions are considered to a moderate extent.  
? Other motivational drivers, such as personal remuneration, are considered to a small 
extent. Similarly, complying with BEE criteria and the targeting of certain clients in 
certain industries are also considered to a small extent. 
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7.2.2. Conclusions pertaining to differences in responses pertaining to the audit firm size 
of the respondent and commercial predisposition of practitioners in medium 
practice 
 
? This study has concluded that all practitioners, irrespective of the size of the audit firm 
that they represent, are consistently predisposed towards commercial motivational drivers 
during their engagement decisions from a moderate to a large extent. 
? Practitioners in larger firms are more concerned with their clients’ ability to pay their 
audit fees, confirming concerns by Ryan (2005a: 21) that has argued that many audit 
firms in medium practice in South Africa may be under significant financial pressures 
due to competition within the market and the need to maintain expensive systems and 
methodologies. When considering the responses to section 6.53. which considered the 
existence of standardised policies and procedures related to the evaluation of ER on new 
assignments, it was concluded that smaller firms in many instances do not have such 
policies and procedures, confirming the concern of the possible lack of systems and 
methodologies commented on by Ryan (2005a: 21). This would explain in part why 
larger firms, who do maintain such systems, are very dependent on their clients’ ability to 
pay their fees. 
? Practitioners from larger firms are more predisposed to considering possible litigation 
during their engagement decisions than practitioners from smaller firms. This finding, it 
is argued, is based on similar findings by Clulow (2002) who argued that most publisised 
litigation appear to be launched against Big Four international audit firms. 
? Practitioners from smaller firms are however more concerned with meeting annual 
revenue targets, their competitive edge within the industry and meeting BEE criteria 
during their engagement decisions. These findings reflect on the significant competition 
that these practitioners are exposed to in the South African auditing profession, as these 
factors may differentiate them from their competitors and lead to increased revenues. In 
many instances, there are indications that smaller firms have greater difficulty in 
achieving a competitive edge due to market competition, such as their ability to meet 
BEE criteria, than their larger competitors. 
? The targeting of strategic clients and consideration of personal remuneration during 
engagement decisions, rendered inconclusive results to suggest prevalence for the 
consideration of these factors amongst any sub-population of the respondents, principally 
because most respondents indicated that these factors to a small or no extent impact their 
engagement decisions. 
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7.2.3. Conclusions pertaining to differences in responses pertaining to the age of the 
respondent and the commercial predisposition of practitioners in medium practice 
 
? Practitioners in medium audit practice are consistently predisposed towards commercial 
factors, irrespective of their age. Similarly the ability of clients to pay their audit fees, 
consistently predispose such practitioners from a moderate to a large extent. 
? In many instances however, younger practitioners are predisposed towards commercial 
motivators, to a greater extent than older practitioners, except when considering the 
impact of personal remuneration. In many instances this finding is related to the fact that 
partner aggressiveness towards commercial factors become less as partners develop more 
established client portfolios as found by Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504). 
? There is no trend to suggest a predominant predisposition amongst the population 
towards the targeting of specific clients, in fact the population considers such targets from 
a small to no extent during their engagement decision. 
 
 
7.2.4. Risks that practitioners in medium audit practice are exposed to as a result of their 
commercial predisposition 
 
? In South Africa, political incentives to redress the injustices of the past have resulted in 
many preferential procurement policies directed towards black owned business. The same 
is true of the audit profession, as 3 of the 11 audit firms in medium practice as defined in 
this study are in fact black owned, as studied in section 1.1.3.1. Due to the increasing 
importance of BEE compliance in many industries as commented on by Ryan (2005d: 
20), it would have been expected that registered auditors in medium practice would to a 
great extent be concerned with BEE, both at an ownership and staff employment level. 
The findings of this study however seems to confirm the view of Ryan (2005c: 21) that: 
“Transformation of the profession is taking place more within the Big Four firms than the 
small, black firms, which are struggling more and more to compete for skills.” 
 
 
7.2.5. Comparison of the study results relating to the commercial predisposition of 
practitioners in medium audit practice to local and international studies 
 
? The primarily commercial orientation of auditors, considering the drive to increase 
revenues and the impact of competitiveness within the profession, has been highlighted 
by several international studies. These include studies by Asare, et al. (1994: 169); 
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Dirsmith, et al. (1997: 12); Cohen and Trompeter (1998: 481-504); Willmott (1986: 576); 
Humphrey and Moizer (1990: 232); Auyers and Kaplan (1998: 139-153); (Kaplan, 1987: 
6-7); the USGAO (2003: 2) and Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3). This study has 
confirmed that practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa are commercially 
predisposed during their engagement decisions to a similar extent as was concluded in 
these international studies. 
? Practitioners in larger firms are more concerned with their clients’ ability to pay their 
audit fees, confirming concerns by Ryan (2005a: 21) that has argued that many audit 
firms in medium practice in South Africa may be under significant financial pressures 
due to competition within the market, as they need to maintain expensive systems and 
methodologies. When considering the responses to section 6.53. which considered the 
existence of standardised policies and procedures related to the evaluation of ER on new 
assignments, it was concluded that smaller firms in many instances do not have such 
policies and procedures, confirming the lack of systems and methodologies commented 
on by Ryan (2005a: 21). This would explain in part why larger firms, who do maintain 
such systems, are very dependent on their clients’ ability to pay their fees. 
? Internationally, the USGAO (2003: 2) has highlighted similar significant financial needs 
of smaller audit firms in order for them to maintain expensive systems, policies and 
procedures pertaining to audit methodologies. This study concludes that firms in medium 
practice in South Africa are exposed to similar financial pressures as those that were the 
subject of the study by the USGAO, to the extent that they may not be in a position to 
maintain expensive systems, policies and procedures. 
? Concerning the significant impact of litigation on the engagement decision of auditors, 
this study presents findings similar to the conclusions from international studies by St. 
Pierre and Anderson (1984: 242-263), Palmrose (1986: 97-110), Stice (1991: 516-533), 
Pratt and Stice (1994: 639-656), Huss and Jacobs (1991: 16-32), Francis and Reynolds 
(1998) and Johnstone (2000: 1-25). 
? International studies by Asare, et al. (1994: 172) and Trompeter (1994: 56-68) concluded 
that a firm’s practitioner-compensation scheme influences the engagement decision of 
auditors. This study has however found that registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa are generally not impacted by their personal remuneration during their 
engagement decision procedures. This suggests that personal remuneration may not be 
measured in relation to revenue and hence have a limited impact on the engagement 
decisions of practitioners in medium practice in South Africa. This finding may in fact 
reduce the risk that such practitioners may be overly commercially orientated during their 
engagement decisions. 
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7.3. Conclusions related to the impact of professional considerations on the engagement 
decisions of practitioners in medium audit practice 
 
 
Table 7.2. hereafter, summarises the findings of this study in relation to the impact that professional 
considerations have on registered auditors during their engagement decisions. Figure 7.2. hereafter, 
graphically depicts the responses of the respondents per response category. 
 
  
General 
Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulations) 
Age 
(Subpopulations) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Professional 
considerations 
6.3. 
Large 
Smaller firms > Larger 
firms Younger > Older 
Compliance with 
statutory 
requirements  
6.10. 
Large 
Larger firms > Smaller 
firms Younger > Older 
Compliance with the 
Code of Ethics 
6.11. 
Large Consistent Younger > Older 
Compliance with 
Auditing Standards 
6.12. 
Large 
Larger firms > Smaller 
firms Younger > Older 
Prior experience  6.14. 
Moderate 
Smaller firms > Larger 
firms Younger > Older 
Proposed statutory 
amendments  
6.18. 
Small   
Larger firms > Smaller 
firms Younger > Older 
Independence  6.19. 
Large 
Smaller firms > Larger 
firms Younger > Older 
 
Table 7.2. Conclusions related to the impact of professional considerations on registered 
auditors in medium practice  
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Figure 7.2. Summary of predisposition towards professional motivational drivers 
 
 
7.3.1. Critical analysis of conclusions related to the professional predisposition of 
practitioners in medium practice 
 
From table 7.2. and figure 7.2., the following is concluded in relation to the professional 
predisposition of practitioners in medium practice in South Africa: 
? Practitioners in medium audit practice are predisposed to professional considerations to a 
large extent. 
? The influence of prior experience of similar clients in similar industries is only 
considered to a moderate extent, whilst practitioners do not consider proposed 
amendments to statutory regulations during their engagement decisions at all. 
 
 
7.3.2. Conclusions pertaining to differences in responses pertaining to the audit firm size 
of the respondent and professional predisposition of practitioners in medium 
practice 
 
? The study indicates that firms with more practitioners are more concerned with 
compliance with statutory requirements, new and proposed amendments to statutory 
regulations, codes of ethics and compliance with auditing standards during their 
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engagement decisions than practitioners in smaller firms. Compliance with codes of 
ethics is considered consistently across the population. This finding may suggest that 
smaller firms are facing difficulties in complying with statutory regulations, codes of 
ethics and ISAs, raising significant concern as to the sustainability of these practices. 
? This study also found than smaller firms are more concerned with professional 
considerations, which include considering prior experience on assignments and 
independence from their clients during their engagement decisions. This it is argued may 
be as a result of the difficulties that smaller firms face in having to comply with standards 
that require practitioners to consider such prior experience as well as independence 
concerns in general, confirming concerns raised by Ryan (2005a-d) in section 1.1. 
 
 
7.3.3. Conclusions pertaining to differences in responses pertaining to the age of the 
respondent and professional predisposition of practitioners in medium practice 
 
? The study indicates with regards to all professional research objectives tested, that 
younger practitioners are more concerned with compliance with professional 
requirements than older practitioners during their engagement decisions. This finding is 
the likely result of concerns expressed in section 1.1. in relation to the difficulties that 
older partners have in remaining abreast of many statutory amendments in recent years. 
 
 
7.3.4. Risks that practitioners in medium audit practice are exposed to as a result of their 
professional predisposition 
 
? Legislative compliance is non-optional in nature, and hence all the responses from 
practitioners that indicate that they consider legislation to any extent less than to a large 
extent during their engagement decisions, may indicate that these practitioners may be 
exposed to non-compliance with legislation and hence be exposed to significant risk. 
There are some indications that certain practitioners consider their independence from 
their clients only to a small or even to no extent at all during their engagement decisions. 
These practitioners are likely to be exposed to regulatory non-compliance. 
? Practitioners in medium audit practice only consider proposed amendments to statutory 
requirements to a small extent during their engagement decisions. These amendments 
will have a significant impact on matters such as auditor rotation and the delivery of non-
audit services to audit clients. This highlights the risk that these audit firms may be 
exposed in instances where they currently provide services to their audit clients that may 
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not be allowed in future, increasing financial pressures on these firms that are already 
competing in an extremely competitive market. Limited practitioners in medium firms 
may also pose difficulties in relation to the requirements to rotate audit partners on 
assignments. A lack of consideration and planning in this regard, may give rise to 
significant limitations to these practitioners in future. 
? The fact that practitioners only consider prior experience to a moderate extent highlights 
the risk that these practitioners may be accepting appointments for which they do not 
have the required experience and skills that may expose them to risk on high risk and 
more complex assignments, and may also lead to non-compliance with auditing 
standards. 
? Lastly, of great concern, is the finding that younger practitioners are more concerned with 
compliance with professional requirements than older practitioners are during their 
engagement decisions, supporting concerns expressed in section 1.1. with regards to the 
inability of older practitioners to remain abreast of many changes to statutory 
requirements. 
 
 
7.3.5. Comparison of the study results relating to the professional predisposition of 
practitioners in medium audit practice to local and international studies and 
guidance 
 
? This study has found that similar to the results of international studies concluded by 
Sorensen and Sorensen (1974: 98-106) and Aranya, et al. (1981), registered auditors in 
medium practice in South Africa have developed a general sense of professional 
commitment. 
? Statutory regulation of the South African auditing profession was contained in the PAAA 
(South Africa, 1991: 1) at the test date of this study. The Auditing Profession Act, no. 26 
of 2005 replaced the PAAA in April 2006. Since then, this new act regulates the auditing 
profession (South Africa, 2005). Auditors also need to consider the Public Audit Act, 
which provides for the function of the Auditor General and the subcontracting of some of 
the latter’s assignments to registered auditors (South Africa, 2004c). This study has found 
that these statutory regulations are considered to a large extent by registered auditors in 
medium practice during their engagement decisions. 
? The fundamental ethical principles that need to be applied by professional accountants 
and auditors are noted in the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (IFAC, 2005a: 
par .100.4). Similarly, SAICA issues the Code of Professional Conduct. These Codes 
require consideration during engagement decisions of fundamental ethical principles as 
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well as threats to these principles that may arise on a new engagement. This study has 
found that registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa do consider such 
ethical compliance during their engagement decisions although there are indications that 
practitioners from smaller firms and older practitioners consider these to a lesser extent. 
? Research by independent institutions indicated that auditors do not adequately adhere to 
auditing standards (Gloeck, 2003; Bailey, 2003). International studies, such as those by 
Carpenter and Mahoney (2001: 3) as stated in section 2.7. further concluded that 
registered auditors in medium practice have very limited engagement decision procedures 
and systems that would support their ability to comply with auditing standards. This 
study has however indicated that registered auditors in medium practice consider such 
compliance to a large extent. There are however also indications of instances where 
auditing standards are not considered in a sufficient manner by auditors in medium 
practice in South Africa. It should also be noted, that considering these standards does not 
imply compliance with these standards. 
? An international study by Wofford and Goodwin (1990: 603-612) concluded that an 
important factor associated with expectation formation is prior experience, and hence 
considering prior experience related to similar clients is important during engagement 
decisions. This finding of Wofford and Goodwin is thus also applicable to some extent in 
South Africa as this study concludes that prior experience is important to the engagement 
decisions of registered auditors in medium practice to a moderate extent. 
? The proposed amendments to the Companies Act aim to establish and maintain the 
independence of auditors in support of the Auditing Profession Act (South Africa, 2005). 
Auditor independence thus remains key to the debate regarding the provision of non-audit 
services to audit clients (SAICA, 2002: 1-23).  Auditors must act independently to be 
able to perform their task of providing independent assurances to shareholders. This 
study has accordingly confirmed that registered auditors in medium practice consider 
independence to a large extent. 
 
 
7.4. Conclusions related to the impact of organisational motivators  
 
Table 7.3. hereafter, summarises the findings of this study in relation to the impact that organisational 
considerations have on registered auditors during their engagement decisions. Figure 7.3. hereafter, 
graphically depicts the responses of the respondents per response category. 
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  General Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulations) 
Age 
(Subpopulations) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Organisational 
considerations 
6.4. 
Moderate   Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Personal 
preferences 
6.13. 
Moderate Smaller firms > Larger firms Younger > Older 
Firm policy 6.16. Large Larger firms > Smaller firms Younger > Older 
 
Table 7.3.  Conclusions related to the impact of organisational motivators on registered 
auditors in medium practice 
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Figure 7.3. Summary of predisposition towards organisational motivational drivers 
 
From table 7.3. and figure 7.3., the following is concluded in relation to the organisational 
predisposition of practitioners in medium practice: 
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7.4.1. Critical analysis of conclusions related to the organisational predisposition of 
practitioners in medium practice 
 
? Registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa are moderately predisposed 
towards organisational motivational drivers during their engagement decisions. Similarly, 
they consider their own personal preferences during engagement decisions to a moderate 
extent. 
? Registered auditors in medium practice consider their firms’ policy on engagement 
decisions during their engagement decisions to a large extent, however this finding does 
not provide any assurances in instances where such policies do not exist. 
 
 
7.4.2. Conclusions pertaining to differences in responses pertaining to the audit firm size 
of the respondent and organisational predisposition of practitioners in medium 
practice 
 
? This study has found that practitioners in smaller firms are more predisposed towards 
organisational considerations during their engagement decisions than practitioners in 
larger firms. When considering the fact that practitioners in medium practice consider 
their own personal preferences to a moderate extent and are predisposed towards 
organisational motivators, it is suggested that in smaller firms, personal preferences and 
organisational factors may be more aligned.  
? This study also indicates that practitioners in larger firms are more predisposed towards 
considering their firms’ policies on client acceptance than practitioners in smaller firms 
during their engagement decisions. This finding is the likely result of smaller firms not 
having such policies and procedures as found by the USGAO (2003: 2) and Carpenter 
and Mahoney (2001: 3) and suggested by other findings of this study. 
 
 
7.4.3. Conclusions pertaining to differences in responses pertaining to the age of the 
respondent and organisational predisposition of practitioners in medium practice 
 
? Younger practitioners are more predisposed towards organisational considerations, 
suggesting alignment with their personal preferences. It is argued that this finding 
confirms findings by researchers such as Samuel (1998: 293-327) on the impact that the 
firm as an organisation has on the behaviour of younger pracititoners. 
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? Older practitioners consider firm policy to a greater extent than younger practitioners 
during their engagement decisions. This is the likely result of the difficulties that older 
practitioners face in remaining abreast with many changes to auditing standards such as 
ISQC 1 (2004a), and hence such older practitioners may be more dependent on firm 
policies during their engagement decisions than younger practitioners. 
 
 
7.4.4. Risks that practitioners in medium audit practice are exposed to as a result of their 
organisational predisposition 
 
? This study indicates that there is a risk that policies on engagement decisions may not 
exist in some practices (those with fewer practitioners); practitioners may not be aware of 
such policies or that engagement decisions amongst practitioners may not be consistent 
and thus expose the relevant practitioners and their firms to risk. 
 
 
7.4.5. Comparison of the study results relating to the organisational predisposition of 
practitioners in medium audit practice to local and international studies 
 
? International studies by Shockley (1981: 785); Knapp (1985: 202) and Asare, et al. 
(1994: 163-178) have confirmed the significant influence of practitioner preferences on 
engagement decisions of registered auditors in medium practice. This study similarly 
indicates that personal preferences of practitioners in medium audit practice in South 
Africa moderately impact their predisposition during engagement decisions. 
? The need for audit firms to adopt sophisticated, computerised systems for identifying ER 
is argued by Venuti, et al. (2002). Similarly, other international studies such as those by 
the USGAO (2003: 2) suggested that limited systems and policies related to engagement 
decisions may exist in smaller firms. Although the respondents indicated that they will 
consider their firms’ engagement decision policies to a large extent during their 
engagement decisions, the alignment between personal preferences and organisational 
factors in smaller firms suggests the limited existence of such policies and procedures in 
smaller firms as personal preferences on client selection become more aligned with 
policies. 
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7.5. Conclusions related to the assessment of the elements of risk 
 
Table 7.4. hereafter, summarises the findings of this study in relation to the assessment of the elements 
of risk by registered auditors during their engagement decisions. Figure 7.4. hereafter, graphically 
depicts the responses of the respondents per response category. 
 
 
  General 
Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulations) 
Age  
(Subpopulations) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Impact of commercial, 
organisational and 
professional 
considerations  
6.24. 
Moderate to large Consistent Consistent 
Evaluation of risk:       
IR 6.25. 
Moderate to large 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Older > Younger 
CR 6.26. 
Moderate 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Older > Younger 
DR 6.27. Moderate Consistent Older > Younger 
Abr 6.28. Large Consistent Younger > Older 
Cbr 6.29. 
Large 
Smaller firms > 
Larger firms Younger > Older 
FR 6.30. 
Large 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Younger > Older 
LR 6.31. 
Large 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Younger > Older 
 
Table 7.4. Conclusions related to the assessment of the elements of risk during engagement 
decisions by registered auditors in medium practice 
 
  311
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Zero response Not at all To a small extent To a moderate
extent
To a large extent
IR
CR
DR
Abr
Cbr
Fr
Lr
Evaluation of the elements of riskPercentage
Extent of predisposition
 
 
Figure 7.4. Summary of predisposition towards the evaluation of the elements of risk 
 
From table 7.4. and figure 7.4., the following is concluded in relation to the evaluation of the elements 
of risk by practitioners in medium audit practice: 
 
 
7.5.1. Critical analysis of conclusions related to the evaluation of the elements of risk by 
practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
? Risk assessments of registered auditors in medium practice are impacted by behavioral 
motivational drivers from a moderate to a large extent. This finding confirms the views 
by previous researchers such as Johnstone (2000: 1-21) as to the impact that motivational 
drivers have on the predisposition of practitioners during their engagement decisions 
? Registered auditors in medium practice are impacted by the assessment of CR and DR 
during the engagement decision process to a moderate extent, and the evaluation of IR 
from a moderate to a large extent. 
? Registered auditors in medium practice are impacted by the evaluation of Abr, Cbr, FR 
and LR during the engagement decision process to a large extent. These findings would 
suggest that the more recent thinking around the AR model as held by Johnstone (2000: 
1-21) relating to the increased importance of Abr and Cbr is also reflected in the AR and 
ER assessments of auditors in medium practice in South Africa. 
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7.5.2. Conclusions on differences in responses pertaining to the audit firm size of the 
respondent and the evaluation of risk by practitioners in medium practice 
 
? This study indicates that motivational factors that cause predisposition are considered 
consistently across the population during engagement decisions. 
? This study has found that the evaluation of FR, LR, CR and IR are considered to a greater 
extent by practitioners in larger firms than those in smaller firms. This finding may be 
related to the significant impact of fraud and litigation on larger firms as argued by 
Clulow (2002). It is also indicative of the difficulties that smaller firms may have in 
implementing and maintaining policies, systems and methodologies for the evaluation of 
the elements of AR as found by the USGAO (2003: 2). 
? The impact of DR and Abr are considered consistently across the population during their 
engagement decisions. 
? This study does indicate that smaller firms may be less concerned about Cbr during their 
ER assessments. This finding may be indicative that practitioners in smaller firms are 
more willing to accept business risk related to their clients, indicating on the competitive 
pressures that smaller firms may be experiencing in the current environment, confirming 
views held by Ryan (2005a-d) that smaller firms in South Africa are exposed to 
significant competition, resulting in these firms accepting high risk assignments. 
 
 
7.5.3. Conclusions on differences in responses pertaining to the age of the respondent and 
the evaluation of risk by practitioners in medium audit practice 
 
? This study indicates that motivational factors that cause predisposition are considered 
consistently across the population during engagement decisions. 
? The more traditional elements of the AR model – IR, CR and DR are considered to a 
greater extent by older practitioners than Abr, Cbr, FR and LR which are considered to a 
greater extent by younger practitioners. This finding, it is argued, may relate to concerns 
expressed in section 1.1. relating to the difficulties that many older practitioners have 
difficulty in remaining abreast of developments in auditing. The more traditional AR 
model is several years old. It was first introduced in the USA in SAP no. 54 in November 
1972. More recent thinking on the assessment of Abr and Cbr was only highlighted by 
researchers such as Johnstone in 2000, and incorporated into auditing standards such as 
ISA 315 that was issued in 2003. Hence, it may be argued that younger practitioners are 
more likely to be abreast with the approach of considering Abr and Cbr during 
engagement decisions, than older practitioners. 
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7.5.4. Risks that practitioners in medium audit practice are exposed to as a result of their 
evaluation of the elements of risk 
 
? The fact that practitioners in larger firms consider CR and IR to a larger extent than 
practitioners in smaller firms may be indicative of a limited application of the audit risk 
model in smaller firms, which suggests the limited existence of systems and methodology 
in smaller firms relating to ER assessments, as found by the USGAO (2003: 2). 
Similarly, a lack of an evaluation of the elements of AR, such as DR and CR during 
engagement decisions, again suggests a lack of systems and methodology, which may 
lead to an inaccurate assessment of ER. 
? Smaller firms may be accepting clients of high risk without always considering Cbr 
during their engagement decisions, exposing them to increased audit risk. 
 
7.5.5. Comparison of the study results relating to the evaluation of risk by practitioners in 
medium audit practice to local and international studies 
 
? The impact of motivational drivers on risk assessment as concluded on by international 
studies performed by Johnstone (2000: 1), Kirkham (1992: 301), Bailey (1995: 191-195) 
and Gendron (2002: 8) is also applicable to the South African context with reference to 
the influence of motivational drivers on risk assessment of registered auditors in medium 
practice. 
? This study confirms the findings by Johnstone (2000: 1-25) that concluded that auditors’ 
evaluation of a client’s IR affected their evaluation of the client’s future financial 
prospects and thus their AR. Johnstone (2000: 1-21) concluded on the importance of the 
evaluation of Abr and Cbr by auditors when considering an evaluation of ER. Similarly, 
this study has confirmed that Abr and Cbr are considered by registered auditors in 
medium practice in South Africa during their engagement decisions. 
? ISA 315 (IFAC, 2003b: par .2-5) requires auditors to obtain an understanding of a 
prospective client’s control environment. Although registered auditors consider this to a 
medium extent in medium practice, there are practitioners that are exposed to non-
compliance with this auditing standard. 
? The auditor should ensure that appropriate procedures are designed to obtain sufficient 
evidence to support the engagement decision process as concluded internationally by 
Wooten (2003) and Bell, et al. (2005: 1). Although registered auditors in medium practice 
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consider DR to a moderate extent, this study confirms that there are practitioners that 
may be exposed to DR. 
? The threat of FR and LR has been highlighted in international studies by Van Gass 
(2003) and Venuti, et al. (2002) respectively, due to the devastating impact that FR and 
LR may have on the sustainability of audit practices. This study has similarly confirmed 
the importance of considering FR and LR by registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa. 
 
 
7.6. Conclusions on the application of judgement during engagement decisions by 
practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
Table 7.5. hereafter, summarises the findings of this study in relation to the application of judgement 
by registered auditors during their engagement decisions. Figure 7.5. hereafter, graphically depicts the 
responses of the respondents per response category. 
 
  
General Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulations) 
Age 
(Subpopulations) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Making use of third-
party specialists  
6.37. 
Inconclusive 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Inconclusive 
Use of engagement 
letters 
6.38. 
Large 
Smaller firms > 
Larger firms Inconclusive 
Qualitative aids  6.39. 
Inconclusive 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Inconclusive 
Quantitative aids 6.40. Inconclusive Inconclusive Younger > Older 
Professional judgement  6.41. Large Consistent Older > Younger 
Professional judgement 
of fellow auditors 
6.42. 
Large Consistent Younger > Older 
 
Table 7.5. Conclusions on the application of judgement during the engagement decision 
process 
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Figure 7.5.   Summary of predisposition on the judgement of practitioners in medium audit 
practice 
 
From table 7.5. and figure 7.5. the following is concluded in relation to the application of judgement 
by practitioners in medium audit practice: 
 
 
7.6.1. Critical analysis of conclusions related to the application of judgement by 
practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
? This study indicates that practitioners in medium audit practice apply their own 
professional judgement and that of their fellow practitioners to a large extent during their 
engagement decisions. 
? This study has also indicated that engagement letters are used by such practitioners from 
a moderate to a large extent. 
? The findings in relation to the use of third party specialists as well as engagement 
decision aids are inconclusive, mainly as a result of the fact that these are used by as 
many practitioners as those who do not use such specialists and decision aids during their 
engagement decisions.  
 
This finding, is argued, is significantly impacted by the cost related to the use of such 
specialists and decision aids. 
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7.6.2. Conclusions on differences in responses pertaining to the audit firm size of the 
respondent and the application of judgement by practitioners in medium audit 
practice in South Africa 
 
? Practitioners apply professional judgement consistently during engagement decisions, 
irrespective of the size of the firm in which they practice. 
? Practitioners in larger firms, do however make use of third party specialists and decision 
aids to a greater extent than practitioners in smaller firms, confirming concerns expressed 
by Ryan (2005a-d) and the USGAO (2003: 2) as to the limited systems and procedures 
around ER assessments in smaller firms, most likely as a result of the high cost of 
implementing and maintaining such systems and procedures. 
? The use of quantitative decision aids is inconclusive as to their application in different 
size audit firms. This finding is the likely result of the limited use of such aids by 
practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa. 
 
 
7.6.3. Conclusions pertaining to differences in responses pertaining to the age of the 
respondent and the application of judgement by practitioners in medium audit 
practice 
 
? This study has found that older practitioners generally make more use of their own 
professional judgement than younger practitioners do; where as younger practitioners are 
more reliant on older practitioners’ professional judgement during engagement decisions. 
This finding is the likely result of older practitioners being more experienced and guiding 
younger practitioners in their engagement decisions. 
? The findings related to the use of third party specialists, engagement letters and 
qualitative decision aids are inconclusive as to any preference for the use of these aids 
and the age of a practitioner, however younger practitioners are more likely to use 
quantitative decision aids than older practitioners are.  
 
The latter argument is based on the latest thinking around the increased use of 
quantitative decision aids as argued by Bell, et al. (2005) in an attempt to decrease non-
sampling risk, of which older practitioners may not be aware. 
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7.6.4. Risks that practitioners in medium audit practice are exposed to as a result of their 
application of judgement during engagement decisions 
 
? The limited use of third party specialists and decision aids amongst practitioners in 
medium audit practice during their engagement decisions indicates that such practitioners 
may not have access to such aids possibly due to cost considerations as argued by Ryan 
(2005a-d), and as a result may be exposed to risk during their engagement decisions. 
 
 
7.6.5. Comparison of the study results relating to the application of judgement by 
practitioners in medium audit practice to local and international studies 
 
? Internationally, the benefits of the use of third party specialists have been highlighted by 
several researchers such as Johnstone (2000: 1-25) as well as Bell, et al. (2005: 3) who 
suggested that the use of third party specialists improve the quality of audit evidence that 
would support the engagement decision process. At the same time studies concluding on 
the significant cost constraints that firms in medium audit practice are exposed to as 
highlighted by Houston (1999) may impact on the prevalence of such use amongst 
registered auditors in medium practice. With reference to the South African context, this 
study has found that despite the benefits of decision aids as found internationally by 
researchers such as MacLullich (2003), specific cost concerns within firms in medium 
practice in South Africa, may be one of the reasons for the low level of application of 
decision aids to engagement decisions of practitioners in medium practice in South 
Africa, as suggested by Ryan (2005a-d).  
? ISAE 3000 (R) requires that the auditor should agree on the terms of an assurance 
engagement with the party who engages the practitioner through the use of an 
engagement letter (IFAC, 2005b: par .10). Although this study has concluded that more 
than half of the respondents consider the use of engagement letters from a moderate to a 
large extent, it is concerning that such a large number of registered auditors in medium 
practice in South Africa do not consider the issuance of engagement letters to a large 
extent. 
? Despite the need to develop decision aids, approaches and methods to assist in the 
evaluation and the mitigation of risk, international research by Humphrey, et al. (1993: 
39-62) and Pentland (1993: 605-620) confirmed the existence of a “gut feeling” for 
auditors over the rationale of formal procedures and decision aids. Similarly, Bell, et al. 
(2005: 20) argue that professional judgement remains the essence of auditing. The 
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prevalence of the use of such professional judgement has been confirmed by this study 
with specific reference to registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa.  
? Similarly, due to the benefit to be gained from peer review considering international 
studies by Carpenter, et al. (1994: 355-38) and Gendron (2002: 8), it is argued that 
practitioners will consider the professional judgement of their fellow auditors during their 
engagement decisions. This study has found that similar to these international studies, 
practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa will generally consider such peer 
review to a large extent during their engagement decisions. 
 
 
7.7. Conclusions related to the use of risk mitigating strategies by practitioners in medium 
audit practice in South Africa 
 
Table 7.6. hereafter, summarises the findings of this study in relation to the use of risk mitigating 
strategies by registered auditors during their engagement decisions. Figure 7.6. hereafter, graphically 
depicts the responses of the respondents per response category. 
 
  General  
Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulations) 
Age  
(Subpopulations) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Undue management 
pressure  
6.20. 
Moderate to large Inconclusive Younger > Older 
Interaction with the 
Audit Committee 
6.21. 
Moderate Inconclusive Younger > Older 
Delivery of non-
auditing services 
6.22. 
Moderate 
Larger firms > Smaller 
firms Younger > Older 
Rotation of auditors  6.23. 
Not at all 
Larger firms > Smaller 
firms Younger > Older 
Increasing audit fees 
on high risk clients 
6.32. 
Moderate to large Inconclusive Younger > Older 
Resigning from high 
risk assignments 
6.33. 
Small to No extent 
Larger firms > Smaller 
firms Inconclusive 
 
Table 7.6. Conclusions related to the use of risk mitigating strategies by registered auditors in 
medium practice 
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  General  
Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulations) 
Age  
(Subpopulations) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Refusing to accept the 
engagement 
6.34. 
Large 
Larger firms > Smaller 
firms Older > Younger 
Reviewing indemnity 
insurance 
6.35. 
Small to No extent 
Smaller firms > Larger 
firms Younger > Older 
Increasing 
experienced staff 
assigned  
6.36. 
Large 
Larger firms > Smaller 
firms Younger > Older 
 
Table 7.6. Conclusions related to the use of risk mitigating strategies by registered auditors 
in medium practice (continued) 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Zero
response
Not at all To a small
extent
To a
moderate
extent
To a large
extent
Management presure
Audit Committee
Delivery of non-audit services
Audit rotation
Increase fees
Resign high-risk
Refuse high-risk
Review indemnity
Increase experienced staff
Risk mitigation 
strategies
Percentage
Extent of predisposition  
 
Figure 7.6.  Summary of predisposition towards risk mitigation strategies of practitioners in 
medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
From table 7.6. and figure 7.6., the following is concluded in relation to the use of risk mitigating 
strategies by practitioners in medium audit practice: 
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7.7.1. Critical analysis of conclusions related to the use of risk mitigating strategies by 
practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
? Practitioners in medium practice will refuse to accept high risk assignments to a large 
extent. Similarly, they would also consider increasing the level of experienced staff on 
high risk assignments to a large extent. 
? Increasing audit fees on high risk assignments are considered from a moderate to a large 
extent, suggesting that practitioners do attempt to compensate high risk by increasing 
their fees. 
? The delivery of non-audit services; interaction with audit committees and the impact of 
undue management pressure on high risk assignments are considered moderately. 
? The rotation of auditors, resigning from high risk assignments and the review of 
indemnity insurance is considered to a small extent by practitioners in medium audit 
practice during their engagement decisions. This, it is argued, is as a result of 
practitioners in smaller firms possibly not being able to comply with rotation principles 
due to limited practitioners in such firms. The commercial predisposition of such 
practitioners may be the reason why such practitioners may not be in a position to resign 
from high risk assignments. 
 
 
7.7.2. Conclusions on differences in responses pertaining to the audit firm size of the 
respondent and the use of risk mitigation strategies by practitioners in medium 
audit practice in South Africa 
 
? Practitioners from larger firms are more concerned with the delivery of non-audit services 
to their clients than practitioners in smaller firms, mainly because future amendments to 
the Companies Act, that may limit such services, may have a negative impact on their 
revenues. 
? Similarly, practitioners in larger firms are more concerned with the rotation of audit 
partners on assignments. This finding would suggest that smaller firms may not have 
clients that would be required to comply with statutory rotation of individual audit 
partners, or that they may simply not be able to comply, due to a limited number of 
partners in such audit firms. 
? Resigning from high risk assignments, refusing to accept high risk assignments and 
increasing the levels of experienced staff on high risk assignments, is considered to a 
greater extent by practitioners in larger firms. These findings confirm the higher risk 
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aversiveness of practitioners in larger firms, a lack of depth of experienced staff in 
smaller firms and the possibility of significant competition amongst smaller firms. 
? Practitioners in smaller firms are more concerned with their levels of indemnity insurance 
during engagement decisions, suggesting that they may have limited insurance, most 
likely the result of cost pressures as argued by Ryan (2005a-d) or that they have had 
limited exposure to litigation. 
? This study is inconclusive on the impact of undue management pressure, interaction with 
audit committees and the strategy to increase audit fees on high risk assignments on 
practitioners and the size of their respective firms. 
 
 
7.7.3. Conclusions on differences in responses pertaining to the age of the respondent and 
the use of risk mitigation strategies by practitioners in medium audit practice 
 
? In most instances, risk mitigation is considered by younger practitioners to a greater 
extent than older practitioners during their engagement decisions. 
? Older practitioners are however more likely to refuse high risk assignments than younger 
practitioners, confirming the views of Asare, et al. (1994: 163-178), that older 
practitioners that may have had exposure to high risk assignments before, may be more 
conservative in accepting such clients thereafter. 
? These studies results are inconclusive on the strategy of resigning from high risk 
assignments and the age of a practitioner. 
 
 
7.7.4. Risks that practitioners in medium audit practice are exposed to as a result of their 
use of risk mitigating strategies 
 
? Older practitioners may be exposing younger practitioners to risk as they make less use of 
risk mitigation strategies during their engagement decisions. Similarly, practitioners in 
smaller firms that also consider such risk mitigation strategies to a lesser extent may be 
exposed to risk on high risk assignments. 
? The fact that practitioners do not consider resigning from high risk assignments, nor 
review their indemnity insurance during engagement decisions, combined with the lack in 
use of other risk mitigating strategies, might indicate the economic pressures under which 
such practitioners are, and the risk they may be exposed to.  
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7.7.5. Comparison of the study results relating to the use of risk mitigation strategies by 
practitioners in medium audit practice to local and international studies, ISA’s and 
legislation 
 
? This study has confirmed findings by Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996: 43-59) who 
concluded that management pressure does impact on ER, and ultimately impacts on 
engagement decisions, as practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa consider 
such pressures from a moderate to a large extent during their engagement decisions. 
? The findings of Van Dijk and Jansman (1994: 1) related to the impact of management 
pressure on audit fees and reporting practices would suggest that statutory guidance on 
the duties of audit committees such as their duty to consider and approve audit fees, as 
proposed by the proposed Amendments to the Companies Act Bill (South Africa, 2005a: 
s 269A) would have an impact on the pricing policies of audit firms in medium practice. 
This argument is based on the requirements of these amendments that will result in audit 
fees falling within the ambit of audit committees and may thus bring some independence 
to the auditor-client relationship. This amendment may prompt auditors to consider 
greater interaction with the party that will determine their future remuneration. This study 
has found that registered auditors consider these factors to a moderate extent in medium 
practice in South Africa. 
? This study has confirmed that registered auditors in medium practice consider the 
delivery of non-audit services to a moderate extent during their engagement decisions. 
This indicates that at the time of this study, the impact of proposed changes to the 
Companies Act and the Audit Profession Act, which limits the delivery of such services, 
has not yet had any great impact on registered auditors in medium practice. This may in 
part be as a result of the relatively high proportion of revenues from such services earned 
by firms in medium audit practice, as concluded from the profitability study of SAICA 
(2005) as discussed in section 1.1.3.2. 
? Proposed amendments to the Companies Act will require mandatory rotation of the 
nominated auditor every 5 years (South Africa, 2005a: s 274A). Similarly, ISQC 1 
requires the rotation of staff on all audit assignments with reference to a 7-year period 
(IFAC, 2004a: par .26-31).  This study has found that registered auditors in medium 
practice do not consider auditor rotation to any extent, raising significant concerns around 
the ability of such practitioners to comply with these requirements. 
? International research by Stice (1991: 516-533) and Pratt and Stice (1994: 649-656) 
examined and found a relationship between the likelihood of litigation and adjustments to 
audit fees to compensate for such LR. However, Turpen (1995) concluded that auditors 
might not fully adjust audit fees to reflect underlying client risk. Similarly, studies by 
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Messier and Plumlee (1987: 349-358); Maletta and Kida (1993: 689-691); Bedard and 
Wright (1994: 62-89); Pratt and Stice (1994: 639-656); Walo (1995: 115-124); 
Zimbelman (1997: 75-97); Houston, et al. (1999: 281-298); Johnstone (2000: 1-25); 
Asare and Wright (2002) and Bedard and Graham (2003: 55-70) all concluded that 
auditors respond to business risk by charging higher fees or adjusting their pre-
acceptance information collection strategies. Similarly, this study confirms that 
practitioners in South Africa would from a moderate to a large extent consider increasing 
their audit fees in response to high risk. Studies by Bedard (1989: 57-71); Simunic and 
Stein (1990: 119-134); Mock and Wright (1993: 39-61) and O’Keefe, et al. (1994: 241-
261) however concluded that auditors do not always make use of risk adaptation 
strategies. It could therefore be argued that registered auditors in medium practice may 
attempt to increase audit fees on high risk assignments but only to the extent that they 
need to incur cost to obtain specialists or perform additional procedures to mitigate such 
risk. The impact of fierce pricing competition might deter registered auditors in medium 
practice to merely increase fees in response to high levels of AR as suggested by Ryan 
(2005a-d). 
? Internationally, Hackenbrack and Hogan (2003: 2-6) concluded that most auditor 
resignations are pricing related as many audits go on tender in order to decrease audit 
costs. This is concerning to auditors as commercial pressures further deter auditors from 
resigning from high risk assignments (NYSCPA, 2003). This study has found that 
practitioners in medium practice in South Africa are less likely to resign from high risk 
assignments, confirming that practitioners in South Africa may be exposed to similar 
pricing and competitive pressures as concluded by Hackenbrack and Hogan (2006: 2-6). 
? A regular review of indemnity insurance has become an important aspect of modern day 
auditing, as indemnity insurance may not always keep track with changes in the audit 
environment (Kenny, 2000). This study has however found that registered auditors in 
medium practice in South Africa do not consider such regular review when considering 
new appointments. 
? In principle auditors may choose to avoid clients that based on an evaluation of risk, 
indicate an unacceptable high level of risk, or at least ensure that they are able to mitigate 
such risk to an acceptable level through the design of appropriate procedures (Colbert, et 
al. 1996: 55; McKelvie, et al. 2002: 32). Internationally, Huss and Jacobs (1991: 16-32); 
Lord (1992: 10) and Frost (1994: 22-35) further concluded that audit firms expect their 
members to exercise considerable caution in acquiring or retaining clients where such 
clients have been identified as high risk clients.  This study confirms that similar to the 
findings of these international studies, registered auditors in medium practice in South 
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Africa will to a large extent, consider refusing high risk audit assignments during their 
engagement decisions. 
? In terms of ISA 220 (R) an auditor should be satisfied that those performing the 
engagement collectively have the necessary professional expertise to perform the 
engagement (IFAC, 2004c: par .6). Registered auditors in medium practice generally 
consider increasing the levels of experienced staff on high risk assignments to a large 
extent, although there are indications that smaller firms may not be able to comply with 
this requirement. 
 
7.8. Conclusions related to the use of specific audit procedures by registered auditors in 
medium audit practice in South Africa during engagement decisions 
 
Table 7.7. hereafter, summarises the findings of this study in relation to the impact that the use of 
specific audit procedures have on registered auditors during their engagement decisions. Figure 7.7. 
hereafter, graphically depicts the responses of the respondents per response category. 
 
  General 
Population 
Firm Size 
(subpopulations) 
Age 
(Subpopulations) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Design specific audit 
procedures on risk areas 
6.43. 
Large Consistent Younger > Older 
Document understanding of 
business  
6.44. 
Inconclusive 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Older > Younger 
Perform the assessment of ER: 6.45.      
- The auditor  
Large 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Inconclusive 
- The audit manager  
Moderate 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Younger > Older 
- Audit staff  
Small 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Younger > Older 
Document assessment of ER: 6.46.      
 
Table 7.7. Conclusions related to the use of specific audit procedures during engagement 
decisions by registered auditors in medium practice 
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  General 
Population 
Firm Size 
(subpopulations) 
Age 
(Subpopulations) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
- The auditor  Moderate to 
large 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Older > Younger 
- The audit manager  Moderate to 
large 
Smaller firms > 
Larger firms Inconclusive 
- Audit staff   
Not at all 
Smaller firms > 
Larger firms Younger > Older 
Communicate outcome of 
engagement decision 
6.52. 
Large 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Inconclusive 
Existence of standardised 
policies and procedures on ER 
6.53. 
Large 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Younger > Older 
Peer review 6.54. Small to No 
extent 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Inconclusive 
Quality review 6.55. Moderate to 
large 
Larger firms > 
Smaller firms Older > Younger 
 
Table 7.7. Conclusions related to the use of specific audit procedures during engagement 
decisions by registered auditors in medium practice (continued) 
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Figure 7.7. Summary of predisposition towards audit procedures during engagement decisions 
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From table 7.7. and figure 7.7., the following is concluded in relation to the predisposition towards the 
use of specific audit procedures of practitioners in medium audit practice: 
 
 
7.8.1. Critical analysis of conclusions related to the use of specific audit procedures of 
practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
? This study has concluded that practitioners in medium audit practice design specific 
procedures to mitigate risks to a large extent during engagement decisions as required by 
ISA 330 (IFAC, 2003c).  
? This study has also indicated that such practitioners communicate the outcome of their 
engagement decisions to a large extent. 
? In terms of risk assessment, practitioners perform such an assessment to a large extent, 
whilst this assessment is more likely to be documented by managers and other staff, 
suggesting the use of decision aids to some extent in these other instances. 
? The study results are inconclusive on the requirement to document an understanding of 
the clients business. 
? This study has found that quality review is considered from a moderate to a large extent, 
whilst peer review is not considered at all, confirming concerns expressed by Ryan 
(2005a-d). 
? This study indicates that practitioners will to a large extent consider standardised policies 
on engagement decisions during their engagement decisions, however, other findings 
have questioned the actual existence of such standardised policies. 
 
 
7.8.2. Conclusions on differences in responses pertaining to the audit firm size of the 
respondent and the use of specific audit procedures by practitioners in medium 
audit practice in South Africa 
 
? This study has found that audit procedures during engagement decisions are more likely 
to be performed by practitioners in larger firms than practitioners in smaller firms, except 
for procedures around the documentation of engagement risk and the design of specific 
audit procedures to mitigate risk, which is consistently applied during engagement 
decisions by practitioners in medium audit practice. 
? Similarly, this study has found that practitioners in smaller firms are less likely to 
consider standardised policies during their engagement decisions as well as peer and 
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quality review, suggesting a possible lack of such systems as argued by Ryan (2005a-d) 
and concluded on by the USGAO (2003: 2). 
? Practitioners in smaller firms are more likely to rely on managers and other staff to 
perform and document ER assessments, suggesting limited partner resources in these 
smaller firms. 
 
 
7.8.3. Conclusions on differences in responses pertaining to the age of the respondent and 
the use of specific audit procedures by practitioners in medium audit practice in 
South Africa 
 
? This study is inconclusive as to a general relationship between the age of a practitioner in 
medium audit practice and the performing of ER assessments during their engagement 
decisions. 
? Older practitioners are more likely to document their understanding of a client’s business 
and their ER assessments during engagement decisions than younger practitioners are. 
They are also more likely to consider quality review of their engagement decisions. 
? Younger practitioners are more likely to consider their firm’s policies on engagement 
decisions as well as the design of specific procedures to mitigate risk during their 
engagement decisions, than older practitioners, supporting the concerns that older 
practitioners may not be abreast of the requirements of current auditing standards. This 
finding coupled with the fact that older practitioners are more likely to consider risk 
mitigation strategies during their engagement decisions may indicate on a fundamental 
difference in audit approach amongst practitioners. Older practitioners would rather avoid 
risk, whilst younger practitioners would accept high risk assignments by attempting to 
mitigate risks through expanding their substantive audit procedures during engagement 
decisions. 
? Younger practitioners are also more likely to involve managers and other staff in ER 
assessments, perhaps suggesting the existence and use of decision aids by such 
practitioners as suggested by section 6.40. 
? This study is inconclusive as to any relationship between the age of practitioners in 
medium audit practice and the assessment of ER by practitioners; the documentation of 
ER assessments by managers; communicating the outcome of engagement decisions and 
the use of peer review of engagement decisions. 
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7.8.4. Risks that practitioners in medium audit practice are exposed to as a result of their 
use of specific audit procedures during their engagement decisions 
 
? The fact that practitioners in larger firms more generally make use of audit procedures 
during engagement decisions than those in smaller firms may suggest the limited 
existence of audit procedures in relation to engagement decisions in many smaller firms 
in medium audit practice. 
? ER assessments are not always performed nor documented by audit practitioners, which 
may lead to a lack of documentation and expose their firms to risk, specifically 
considering the fact that peer and quality review is not always applied to a large extent on 
engagement decisions. 
? Quality and peer review policies and procedures around engagement decisions may not 
be in existence in many smaller firms in medium practice, which may lead to 
inappropriate engagement decisions and non-compliance with auditing standards such as 
ISQC 1 (2004a). 
 
 
7.8.5. Comparison of the study results relating to the use of specific audit procedures by 
practitioners in medium audit practice to local and international studies 
 
? This study confirms concerns raised in international studies by the USGAO (2003: 2) and 
Carpenter and Mahoney (2001:3) as studied in section 2.7. who indicated the lack of 
procedures pertaining to risk assessments performed by practitioners in smaller firms. 
These concerns are also valid in relation to registered auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa. 
? The first stage in obtaining evidence to support the engagement decision involves 
obtaining an understanding of the prospective client and its business (Willingham & 
Carmichael, 1979: 176; Puttick & Van Esch, 1992: 57; Robertson, 1993: 389). This study 
is however inclusive in terms of the predisposition of South African practitioners in 
medium audit practice towards their documentation of an understanding of a prospective 
client’s business. 
? Johnstone (2001: 5) argued that the person who performs and completes any related 
decision aids to the engagement decision process should be the most senior person on the 
engagement team, usually the registered auditor. This view was confirmed by this study 
to a large extent, as practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa complete ER 
assessments to a large extent. Practitioners should further be satisfied that those 
performing the engagement assessment collectively have the necessary professional 
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expertise to perform the engagement (AICPA, 2002: 8).  This study has however also 
confirmed the risk identified by Bierstaker and Wright (1999: 2) who concluded that in 
many instances lower levels of staff tend to perform engagement decision assessments to 
be valid in the South African context. 
? Communicating the outcome of all engagement decisions, including to those clients who 
have not been accepted is an important risk management procedure (AICPA, 2004).  This 
study confirmed that registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa communicate 
the outcome of their engagement decisions to a large extent. 
? The importance of standardised firm policies and procedures was highlighted when 
Odendaal argued that the engagement decision is the first step in any audit firm’s risk 
management process (Odendaal, 2002). Gendron (2001: 304) further argued that a firm’s 
client-acceptance policies influence decision processes, notably by providing auditors 
with an: “interpretative scheme, decision aids and a vocabulary that they frequently refer 
to when making decisions.” This study has confirmed the consideration of such policies 
and procedures by practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa during their 
engagement decisions to a large extent. Other findings however question the existence of 
such policies, specifically in smaller firms. 
? The objective of peer review, being the review of engagement decisions made by one 
practitioner of another, is to improve the quality of decision-making and to eliminate 
threats to objective decision-making (Steele, 1992: 24). This study has found that 
registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa do not consider such reviews 
important to any great extent during their engagement decisions, suggesting that they 
may be exposed to subjective decision making. 
? Colbert, et al. (1996: 55) states that quality control procedures within an audit practice 
should prescribe that if an engagement’s risk is assessed at an unacceptably high level, 
the auditor should not accept the engagement. ISQC 1 established more pervasive 
procedures that audit firms need to apply as a whole to engagement decision procedures 
(IFAC, 2004a: par .28-56). The requirements relating to quality control has become 
entrenched in ISA 220 (R) and ISQC 1 and as a result it is likely that registered auditors 
in medium practice will comply with these standards, despite concerns related to the high 
cost of compliance and the lack of systems to support such quality control (Houston, 
1999: 70-86; Ryan, 2005c: 21). This study has however found that only half of registered 
auditors in medium practice in South Africa consider quality review of their engagement 
decisions from a moderate to a large extent, questioning their views on the importance 
and mandatory nature as argued by these international studies and required by these 
auditing standards. 
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7.9. Conclusions related to the use of information from third parties by practitioners in 
medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
Table 7.8. hereafter, summarises the findings of this study in relation to the use of information from 
third parties by registered auditors during their engagement decisions. Figure 7.8. hereafter, 
graphically depicts the responses of the respondents per response category. 
 
 
  General 
Population 
Firm Size  
(subpopulations) 
Age  
(Subpopulations) 
Factor Section Predisposition Predisposition Predisposition 
Third party 
information:  
 
   
- Lawyers 6.47. Small to No extent Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
- Previous 
auditors 
6.48. 
Moderate to large Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
- Director 
background 
searches  
6.49. 
Moderate to large Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
- Credit 
bureaus 
6.50. 
Small to No extent Larger firms > Smaller firms Inconclusive 
- Regulatory 
bodies  
6.51. 
Small to No extent Larger firms > Smaller firms Older > Younger 
 
Table 7.8. Conclusions related to the use of information from third parties during 
engagement decisions by registered auditors in medium practice  
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Figure 7.8.  Summary of predisposition towards the use of third party information by 
practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
From table 7.8. and figure 7.8., the following is concluded in relation to the use of third party 
information by practitioners in medium practice during their engagement decisions: 
 
7.9.1. Critical analysis of conclusions related to the use of third party information by 
practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
? This study has found that practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa do not 
consider the use of third party information to any great extent, except for interaction with 
previous auditors and background searches on directors of prospective clients that are 
considered from a moderate to a large extent during engagement decisions. It is argued 
that this finding is related to the cost impact that the cost of obtaining such information 
from third parties has on the current cost pressures in firms in medium audit practice as 
suggested by Ryan (2005a-d). 
 
7.9.2. Conclusions on differences in responses pertaining to the audit firm size of the 
respondent and the use of third party information by practitioners in medium audit 
practice 
 
? Practitioners in larger firms are more likely to make use of information from third parties 
than practitioners in smaller firms, suggesting that smaller firms may not have access to 
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such information and systems, or that smaller firms generally cannot afford such 
information. 
 
 
7.9.3. Conclusions pertaining to differences in responses pertaining to the age of the 
respondent and the use of third party information by practitioners in medium  audit 
practice in South Africa 
 
? Older practitioners are more likely to consider the use of third party information during 
engagement decisions than younger practitioners, except the use of information from 
credit bureaus, which rendered inconclusive results in relation to the age of the 
respondents.  
 
 
7.9.4. Risks that practitioners in medium audit practice are exposed to as a result of their 
use of third party information 
 
? The limited use of information from third parties during engagement decisions by 
practitioners in medium audit practice may indicate that such practitioners do not have 
access to such information, arguably because their firm’s can not afford such information 
or do not have such systems and procedures that may require such information during 
engagement decisions. 
 
 
7.9.5. Comparison of the study results relating to the use of third party information by 
practitioners in medium audit practice to local and international studies 
 
? Internationally, McKelvie, et al. (2002: 32) and MacDonald (1997: 2) concluded that the 
use of client screening is an important step in the engagement decision process. This 
study has however confirmed that registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa 
do not consider the use of such screening during engagement decisions. 
? As studied in section 4.3.2.4.4., confidential inquiries of attorneys should be made in 
order to obtain information concerning the reputation or integrity of key management and 
significant owners of the prospective client (AICPA, 2004: 6). Due to cost concerns as 
highlighted by Houston (1999: 70-86), it could be argued that registered auditors in 
medium practice will be impacted negatively by the cost of third party information.  
Accordingly, this study confirmed that registered auditors in medium practice will 
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consider the use of information from third parties such as lawyers during the engagement 
decision process to a small extent or no extent at all. 
? Professional standards require that an auditor should communicate with the predecessor 
auditor (Willingham & Carmichael, 1979: 176; PAAB, 2003: s 15). This study has to a 
large extent confirmed the prevalence of such communications amongst practitioners in 
medium audit practice in South Africa. 
? Due to LR and lessons learned from litigation, client screening has become an important 
part in managing ER (NYSCPA, 2003; McKelvie, et al., 2002: 32; MacDonald, 1997: 2). 
Such screening can relate to background searches on directors. The finding of this study 
would suggest that registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa are exposed to 
risk to the extent that they do not consider the use of such background information during 
engagement decisions. 
? Timely confidential enquiries from regulatory bodies to whom a prospective client 
reports, may provide an auditor with information that would assist in their engagement 
decision processes (AICPA, 2004). This study has however confirmed that registered 
auditors in medium practice in South Africa generally do not consider the use of such 
enquiries from regulatory bodies during engagement decisions. 
 
 
7.10. Conclusion pertaining to the impact of commercial, professional and organisational 
behavioural drivers on registered auditors in medium practice during their engagement 
decisions 
 
Research objective 1 considered to what extent registered auditors in medium practice are impacted by 
commercial, professional and organisational behavioural drivers, and if are they exposed to risk 
following their apparent predisposition. This was considered in Part 1 and Part 2 of the questionnaire 
as detailed in section 5.9.3. and section 5.9.4. 
 
From the conclusions related to the consideration given by registered auditors in medium practice to 
motivational drivers, this study confirms that practitioners in medium audit practice are commercially 
orientated during their engagement decisions. This commercial orientation is commented on 
extensively in chapter 8, as this predisposition is likely to have a significant impact on practitioner 
behaviour as indicated by this study.  
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7.11. Conclusions on the size of an audit practice and its impact on engagement decisions 
 
From the study of the research results in chapter 6 and section 7.2. to section 7.8., this study argues 
that the defined population of this study – audit firms with 5 and more but 60 or less audit partners, 
does in fact consist of distinct sub-populations. This finding is based on the findings related to the 
various cross tabulation tables indicating consistency to a great extent in responses provided by 
practitioners in similar sized audit practices. It could be argued that the sub-populations within this 
study’s definition of registered auditors in medium practice consist of broadly two sub-populations. 
These relate to firms with 5 to 10 practitioners and those with 11 to 60 practitioners. There is some 
indication that firms with 50 to 60 practitioners may also form a third sub-population.   
 
From the age response distribution it would seem that older practitioners are less likely to consider the 
use of decision aids, peer review and quality review, and information from third parties. Their 
decisions are also less likely to be subjected to the professional judgement of fellow practitioners. 
Older practitioners are also more likely to accept high risk assignments, be less concerned with 
indemnity insurance or appropriate staffing considerations. This finding is significant as it may 
indicate that such practitioners may not be fully aware of current statutory regulation and ISA’s that 
require significant consideration to be given to the aforementioned practices during engagement 
decisions, and may indicate that older practitioners may be exposing younger practitioners to 
significant risk during their engagement decisions. This study therefore suggests distinct differences in 
the predispositions of broadly two subpopulations based on the age of the practitioners – those aged 21 
years to 40 years and those aged 41 years to 69 years. 
 
 
7.12. Conclusion on risks that registered auditors in medium practice are exposed to during 
their engagement decision practices 
 
Research objective 3 as documented in section 1.1.2. set out to consider whether registered auditors in 
medium practice are exposed to risk as a result of their engagement decision practices in general. As 
detailed in section 7.2. to section 7.9., several risks have been identified to which registered auditors in 
medium practice are exposed to during their engagement decisions. 
 
The most significant risk exposure from the engagement decisions of registered auditors in medium 
practice, is the risk that their current engagement decisions may be significantly impacted by their 
predisposition towards commercial drivers, to such an extent that they may not consider professional 
and organisational drivers during their engagement decisions, therefore impacting on the risk that 
these practitioners, their firms and the auditing industry at large is exposed to. The lesser consideration 
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of professional considerations by practitioners in smaller firms seems to be impacted by the position of 
such registered auditors in medium practice within the industry that places significant cost constraints 
(exasperated by increasing competition) on their ability to develop, implement and maintain systems 
and methodologies to comply with increasing regulatory and statutory requirements. These cost 
constraints render organisational drivers powerless in the balancing act between professional and 
commercial motivational drivers during engagement decisions. 
 
As stated in section 4.2., audit firms in the current auditing profession have to consider the 
engagement decision as central to their risk management strategies (Huss & Jacobs, 1991: 16; Francis 
& Reynolds, 1998; Johnstone, 2000: 2; Bedard & Biggs, 2002: 622-642; Basioudius, 2002: 3). 
Similarly, this study argues that these risks following from the current engagement decisions of 
registered auditors in medium practice needs to be critically considered in order to action 
improvements to the engagement decisions and related considerations of registered auditors in 
medium practice. 
 
As concluded from section 7.2. to section 7.9., not only are registered auditors in medium practice 
exposed to risks in their individual capacity, but the profession at large is also exposed to risk 
following from the current practices pertaining to engagement decisions of registered auditors in 
medium practice. It is therefore important to consider possible actions that registered auditors in 
medium practice may institute to address such risk concerns, as discussed in section 8.2. to section 
8.13., in order to prevent possible detrimental consequences from such risks to individual practitioners 
as well as the audit profession at large.  
 
 
7.13. Conclusion on the interpretation of the research results relating to the engagement 
decisions of registered auditors in medium audit practice 
 
 
Chapter 7 provided a critical analysis of the research results of this study per research objective, 
commenting on the findings in relation to the overall predisposition of the population; considering any 
relation between responses and the size of the firm represented by the respondent and similarly 
considering any trends related to the age of practitioners and their predispositions. The most 
significant conclusions of this study as considered in section 8.2. to section 8.9. hereafter, are as 
follows: 
 
? Registered auditors in medium practice are impacted by their personal preferences and 
professional judgement to a significant extent during their engagement decisions, in many 
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instances, exposing them to the risk of an unbalanced application of motivational drivers, mostly 
in favour of commercial orientation. 
? Compliance with professional guidance such as ISA’s and statutory regulation are not always at 
the levels required by such guidance in relation to many aspects of the engagement decision, most 
notably appropriate staffing of engagements, risk evaluation, risk mitigation and audit procedures 
to support the engagement decision. 
? Proposed amendments to statutory regulation related to practitioner rotation and limitations on the 
delivery of non-audit services to audit clients, have not been greatly considered by registered 
auditors in medium practice to date. 
? Audit procedures relating to the engagement decisions of registered auditors in medium practice 
are limited in terms of the use of decision aids and some indications exist that firm policies and 
procedures as well as systems to support the many increased regulatory requirements, such as 
quality control functions, may be limited in some instances. 
? The consideration of BEE by registered auditors in medium practice has been limited to date, 
suggesting significant difficulties being faced by such practitioners to integrate the impact of BEE 
on their practices, as well as raising concerns as to their ability to compete in a market where BEE 
is becoming increasingly important. 
 
From these conclusions, Chapter 8 will consider the overall impact of the predisposition of 
practitioners in medium audit practice during their engagement decisions on the profession at large. It 
is argued, that the impact of this predisposition on the audit procedures of registered auditors in 
medium practice exposes these practitioners to significant risk, predominantly in relation to possible 
non-compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements and the quality of audit procedures to 
support such decisions. The consequences of these risk exposures are likely to be detrimental to the 
individual practitioners and the auditing profession at large and recommendations in this regard is 
considered in Chapter 8. 
 
In conclusion of this study, chapter 8 considers 
 the overall research field of this study and its impact 
on the South African audit profession. 
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CHAPTER 8  CONCLUSION ON THE ENGAGEMENT DECISION PROCESS OF 
REGISTERED AUDITORS IN MEDIUM PRACTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
From the critical analysis of the research results in chapter 7, this chapter concludes on the research 
field of this study as stated in section 1.1.2. and considers the impact of this conclusion on the South 
African audit profession as it reflects on the risks that practitioners in medium audit practice are 
exposed to. 
 
The conclusion on the research field of this study as stated in section 1.1.2. is that audit practitioners 
that operate in medium practice in South Africa are impacted directly and indirectly by commercial, 
professional and organisational behavioural drivers. This predisposition is largely commercially 
orientated that negatively impacts on the level of audit procedures performed during engagement 
decisions by such practitioners. 
 
The impact of this predisposition on the audit procedures of registered auditors in medium practice 
exposes these practitioners to significant risk, predominantly in relation to possible non-compliance 
with statutory and regulatory requirements and the quality of audit procedures to support such 
decisions. The limited use of decision aids, information from third parties and the possible lack of 
policies and procedures in smaller firms, is likely to negatively impact on the quality of audit evidence 
that would support the engagement decisions of practitioners in medium audit practice in South 
Africa. The consequences of these risk exposures are likely to be detrimental to the individual 
practitioners and the auditing profession at large.  
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8.1. Concluding remarks on the most significant concerns identified by this study related to the 
predisposition of registered auditors in medium practice during their engagement decisions 
 
As commented on in section 7.13. certain risks identified from this study, are likely to have a 
pervasive impact on the audit industry at large, and hence are therefore considered to be critical to the 
actions of registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa during their engagement decisions.  
 
From the critical analysis of this study’s results as presented in chapter 7, chapter 8 will consider the 
most significant conclusions relating to the engagement decisions of practitioners in medium audit 
practice in order to make recommendations in relation to risks that these practitioners may be exposed 
to. These findings and recommended actions are concluded on in section 8.2. to section 8.9. as 
follows: 
? The impact of significant competition in the audit services market on practitioners in medium 
audit practice in South Africa; 
? The impact of BEE requirements on the engagement decisions of auditors in medium practice in 
South Africa; 
? Considering the impact of current and proposed amendments to legislation on registered auditors 
in medium practice in South Africa; 
? Considering the limited existences of policies, procedures and methodology related to engagement 
decisions of auditors in medium practice in South Africa; 
? The lack in use of qualitative decision aids during engagement decisions of practitioners in 
medium audit practice in South Africa; 
? Weaknesses in the application of the audit risk model by practitioners in medium audit practice in 
South Africa; and 
? Concerns related to audit procedures performed during the engagement decision by registered 
auditors in medium audit practice in South Africa. 
 
8.2. The impact of significant competition and the risk-aversiveness of practitioners in medium 
audit practice 
 
This study found that practitioners do not always consider resigning from high risk assignments nor do 
they review their indemnity insurance during all engagement decisions. These findings, combined with 
the lack of the application of other risk mitigating strategies in smaller audit firms within the medium 
audit practice population, indicate the economic pressures under which such practitioners operate, and 
ultimately the risk they may be exposed to.  
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The limited use of information from third parties during engagement decisions by practitioners in 
medium audit practice indicate that such practitioners may not have access to this information, 
arguably because they cannot afford such information or the possibility that they do not have such 
systems and procedures that may require such information for consideration during their engagement 
decisions. 
 
Audit firms should ensure that decision aids are applied during engagement decisions that measure and 
document assessments of the elements of audit risk. These decision aids should be reviewed as part of 
the central review of engagement decisions. It is argued, that regulatory institutions such as the IRBA 
may need to develop programs and guides that will assist firms in medium audit practice in the design 
and implementation of decision aids with due consideration to the cost constraints within these 
practices. 
 
One of the reasons why significant merger activities took place internationally within the profession, 
according to the USGAO (2003: 14) was to specifically address concerns around these systems which 
require significant capital investment. Through mergers, firms may be able to expand their base and 
create economies of scale by spreading these costs related to modernisation across a broader capital 
base. It may thus be argued that mergers between firms, representing registered auditors in medium 
audit practice, may partly enable these firms to improve their current systems and methodologies, and 
decrease their risk base.  
 
Engagement decision policies and procedures should be developed, implemented and monitored with 
due consideration to the maximum level of risk that the firm is willing to accept, the minimum hourly 
return on an engagement as well practical solutions to client targeting that will satisfy the 
aforementioned levels or risk and financial returns. This would at least protect audit firms against 
providing services to high risk clients and those who may have detrimental financial consequences on 
the audit practice.  
 
As to the impact of competition within the audit profession, similar studies in the USA by the USGAO 
(2003: 6) have concluded that: “It is unclear what, if anything can be done to address these issues”. 
This finding reflects on the significant market domination by the Big Four. This study by the USGAO 
has considered the impact that a merger between the 5th to 8th largest firms in the USA would have on 
rendering a possible 5th competitor to the Big Four. Market simulation models rendered results that 
indicated that not even a merger between these firms would render a competitor to the Big Four. 
Similarly, this study believes that when considering table 5.1., a competitor for the Big Four in South 
Africa is unlikely to arise, as the firms that hold the 5th to 8th position in South Africa are unlikely to 
merge as they have international affiliations that would require a merger before such a firm could be 
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created. The firms that hold the next four positions are simply too small to make any significant 
impact on the market in the event of a merger. 
 
Mandatory firm rotation on audits may to a great extent impact on the current competition within the 
audit profession in South Africa. Such rotation may in fact result in an increase in the likelihood that 
firms of a medium size may be considered for the audit of some of the more traditional Big Four 
clients. Currently, the proposed amendments to the Companies Act as discussed in section 3.2.1.4.1. 
may not have this effect as it does not require audit firms to rotate, only the registered individual. It is 
further unlikely that audit firm rotation will be implemented in the near future as alluded to by the 
Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, as the profession raised significant concerns against such rotation 
as studied in section 3.2.1.4.1., mainly based on the limited number of skilled resources in the country.  
 
8.3. Considering the impact of current and proposed amendments to legislation on registered 
auditors in medium audit practice 
 
Legislative compliance is non-optional in nature, and hence all the responses in this study from 
practitioners that indicate that they consider legislative compliance to any extent less than to a large 
extent, may indicate that these practitioners are exposed to non-compliance with legislation.  
 
It may be argued that auditors are not likely to consider statutory requirements that govern their 
activities unless such requirements are legally enforceable, i.e. enacted. Similar to Terry (2002: 7) as 
stated in section 3.2.1.4.1., this study argues that the quantum and impact that proposed amendments 
to the Companies Act, as well as the Auditing Profession Act will have on auditors in South Africa, is 
significant to the sustainability of registered auditors in medium audit practice and should hence be 
considered by such auditors during their engagement decisions. Based on the findings of this study, 
registered auditors in medium audit practice have perhaps not yet considered many of these 
amendments or have simply concluded that these amendments would not have any real impact on their 
business. It may also be argued that they do not consider their current engagement decisions against 
such proposed amendments until these amendments are enacted.  
 
The delivery of non-audit services by registered auditors to their audit clients, which is “bread-and-
butter” income for many medium and smaller practices, could be impacted negatively once said 
legislation is enacted unless such practitioners pro-actively redress their product profiles and consider 
possible mechanisms to achieve the objectives of such legislation whilst not having any negative 
impact on their earnings. Gloeck (2003) as discussed in section 3.2.1.4.2. similarly argued that audit 
firms will be impacted negatively if they are not able to continue to provide non-audit services to their 
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audit clients. The SAICA 2005 profitability study, referred to in section 3.2.1.4.2., also indicated that 
firms with fewer practitioners earn as much as 60% to 70% of their turnover from the delivery of non-
audit services to audit clients as opposed to 30% to 40% in larger practices (SAICA, 2005b: 1-33). 
Thus, the needs of registered auditors in medium audit practice should be considered against their 
possible service rendering to their current client base, considering the impact of such amendments to 
legislation and requirements of auditing standards such as ISQC 1 (2004a).  
 
It could also be argued that these amendments in legislation and auditing standards may be an 
opportunity for registered auditors in medium audit practice, as the Big Four may find themselves in 
certain conflicted situations and opportunities to service their current clients may be available to 
registered auditors in medium audit practice with sufficient capacity. These conflicts may arise due to 
the concentration of suppliers in the first tier of firms as argued by the USGAO (2003: 1) and mainly 
relate to independence requirements where such firms are currently performing non-audit services to 
their audit clients. Conclusions by the USGAO (2003: 4) on the preference that larger listed multi-
national clients have for the use of Big Four audit firms may however indicate that these opportunities 
are likely to be limited. 
 
Registered auditors in medium audit practice need to critically analyse their current revenue stream in 
relation to the impact that proposed statutory amendments related to the provisioning of non-audit 
services to audit clients and rotation of registered auditors may have on their practices. In order to 
ensure the sustainability of their practices, these firms may consider arrangements with other firms 
whereby they jointly consider their client portfolios in order to consider referral of clients that may be 
impacted by these proposed amendments between themselves as well as agreement on alliances that 
may assist them in requirements related to the rotation of auditors. It is possible that smaller firms will 
need to consider mergers with other firms in order to be able to ensure their sustainability and 
compliance with new regulatory requirements.  
 
The drafting of ISQC 1 (2004a) that requires the rotation of audit staff on audit assignments further 
supports the reality that registered auditors in medium audit practice may need to increase the number 
of staff that they employ, or enter into portfolio-rotation agreements with similar firms or even merge 
with other firms in order to meet these requirements. It is however unlikely that ISQC 1 (2004a) will 
drive merger activity within the profession, but it is likely that audit firms in medium audit practice 
may need to critically re-assess their operating structures and find creative means to achieve the 
objectives of ISQC 1 (2004a). 
 
Non-compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements can be avoided when decision aids that 
consider such requirements are applied during engagement decisions. Central review of such decision 
  342
aids as well as audit evidence obtained to support such engagement decisions are likely to decrease the 
risk of non-compliance with regulatory and statutory regulations. Limited consideration of ethical 
requirements can only be eliminated through the design, implementation and monitoring by central 
review of all engagement decisions against pre-determined policies and criteria.  
 
In many instances, non-compliance related to auditing standards may follow as a result of the high 
cost of compliance. Critical analysis of process flow within smaller audit firms are likely to render 
viable solutions to enable such practices to comply with the core requirements of all auditing 
standards. At the same time, smaller practices may need to consider increasing the hourly rates that 
they charge their clients, in order to ensure the affordability of appropriate systems and methodologies 
that would ensure compliance with auditing standards. Although this may affect their competitive 
position within the profession in the short term, considering the risk of non-compliance and related 
penalties, increasing audit fees may be a less risky alternative. 
 
Other areas of non-compliance highlighted by this study, relate to the use of engagement letters as 
well as ensuring that appropriate staff have been assigned to high risk assignments. Again, firm policy 
and central review to ensure such policy has been applied on all engagement decisions, may mitigate 
these risk areas. 
 
The fact that practitioners only consider prior experience to a moderate extent, highlights the risk that 
these practitioners may be accepting appointments for which they do not have the required experience 
and skills that may expose them to risk on high risk and more complex assignments, and may also lead 
to non-compliance with ISA 315 (IFAC, 2003b: par .2-5). 
 
Of great concern, is the finding that younger practitioners are more concerned with compliance with 
professional requirements, confirming concerns expressed in section 1.1. with regards to the suggested 
inability of older practitioners to remain abreast of many changes to statutory changes. Similarly, there 
are indications that older practitioners are not abreast of changes in auditing standards as they are more 
focused on applying the more traditional audit model than the newer elements such as Cbr and Abr as 
argued by Johnstone (2000: 1-21). 
 
CPD is likely to improve the knowledge of practitioners, and specifically older practitioners, in 
relation to the many regulatory and statutory changes within the profession. The CPD requirements 
introduced by SAICA from 1 January 2006, requiring a minimum number of CPD hours per year for 
each practitioner, may address these concerns to some extent. However, due to the cost constraints of 
smaller practices, SAICA may need to continue considering alternative methods of ensuring continued 
professional training. This may take the form of on-line examinations controlled by SAICA, requiring 
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practitioners to earn a certain number of credits on an annual basis based on their participation and 
results in such examinations. The current CPD structure has not addressed the primary concerns 
relating to the high cost of training, which this study argues will continue to impact on the success of 
any CPD program.  
 
8.4. Considering the limited existences of policies, procedures and methodology related to 
engagement decisions of auditors in medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
This study indicates that there is a risk that policies on engagement decisions may not exist in some 
practices, practitioners may not be aware of such policies or that engagement decisions amongst 
practitioners may not be consistent and thus expose the relevant practitioners and their firms to risk. 
 
The fact that practitioners in larger firms consider CR and IR to a larger extent than practitioners in 
smaller firms may be indicative of limited application of the audit risk model in smaller firms, which 
may be related to the existence of limited systems and methodology in smaller firms. 
 
The existence of firm policy, annual independence declarations and central review of such policies and 
declarations needs to be implemented and monitored on a regular basis. Severe punitive action, such 
as financial penalties related to profit share of practitioners should be instituted, in order to avoid any 
instances where independence has not been considered, when in fact it should have been declared. 
 
Regulatory institutions should also assist registered auditors in medium audit practice in developing 
standard firm policies on engagement decisions. The use and monitoring thereof should be promoted 
through the inclusion of such compliance in the Key Performance Criteria (hereafter KPC) and 
remuneration structures of practitioners by audit firms. Firm reviews by the IRBA should also evaluate 
the existence and compliance with such policies by practitioners. 
  
8.5. The impact of BEE requirements on the engagement decisions of auditors in medium audit 
practice in South Africa 
 
In South Africa, political incentives to redress the injustices of the past have resulted in many 
preferential procurement policies directed towards black owned business. The same is true of the audit 
profession, as 3 of the 11 audit firms in medium audit practice as defined in this study are in fact black 
owned as studied in section 1.1.3.1. Due to the increasing importance of BEE compliance in many 
industries as commented on by Ryan (2005d: 20), it was expected that registered auditors in medium 
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audit practice would to a great extent be concerned with BEE, both at an ownership and staff 
employment level. The findings of this study however seems to confirm the views of Ryan (2005c: 21) 
that: “Transformation of the profession is taking place more within the Big Four firms than the small, 
black firms, which are struggling more and more to compete for skills.” 
 
As this study has found that registered auditors in medium audit practice do not consider BEE 
requirements during their engagement decisions, it may be argued that this may be based on the 
inability of registered auditors in medium audit practice to comply with BEE requirements. This 
inability in part may be due to the significant shortage of PDI chartered accountants as identified by 
Sadler and Erasmus (2003: 129). 
 
The fact that this study indicated that registered auditors in medium audit practice do not consider 
BEE during their engagement decisions should however be reflected on with reference to the current 
challenges faced by the profession in South Africa at large in attracting and increasing the number of 
chartered accountants that are from previously disadvantaged communities. Although it is not clear 
from this study why consideration is not given to BEE requirements, the ability of such practitioners to 
address BEE requirements in future is central to the sustainability of their practices and to the greater 
auditing profession in South Africa. 
 
The drafting of an industry charter for the audit profession has been completed after the test date of 
this study. The charter, similar to other industry charters in South Africa, aims to attract and improve 
PDI representation amongst the staff and ownership of audit firms in South Africa. The lack of PDI 
resources has a rippling effect on all staff levels from employees to ownership level as argued by Ryan 
(2005a-d).  
 
The resultant competition in the market place for this limited resource is possibly why many 
traditional and other firms in medium audit practice are not yet in a position to consider the impact of 
BEE on their business, as they may not be able to satisfy any requirements to address their staff 
profile, even if they wanted to do so as argued by Ryan (2005a-d). It is argued, that current support 
and programs aimed at increasing the number of qualified black chartered accountants need to be 
intensified, and specific focus should be given to medium and smaller audit firms’ ability to attract and 
retain such PDI audit staff.  
 
The difficulty that audit firms in medium audit practice face in attracting and retaining PDI’s has been 
highlighted in section 1.1.2. and section 2.7. This inability has a spiraling impact on the sustainability 
of such firms and the profession at large, as it is likely to increase the differing characteristics between 
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the Big Four audit firms (who have a better chance at achieving such PDI requirements), and thus 
further negatively impacting on competition within the audit profession market. 
 
Regulatory involvement is likely to be the only manner in which the impact of market forces may be 
re-directed to enable auditors in more traditional medium audit practices that are mainly white owned, 
to appoint and retain PDI staff. Audit firms in medium audit practice may also consider various long-
term staffing strategies and bursaries aimed at a specific market segment of PDI staff such as those 
who study part time. Current Big Four employment strategies are more likely to be aimed at attracting 
employees who have completed their academic obligations, than those who study part-time. 
 
The retention of such PDI staff, once qualified, will however remain to be a significant challenge to 
practitioners in medium and small audit practice, as long as the South African industry at large has a 
significant shortage of PDI Chartered Accountants across all sectors of business. 
 
8.6. The use of qualitative decision aids during engagement decisions by practitioners in medium 
audit practice in South Africa 
 
Several studies have concluded on the use of qualitative decision aids, mostly concluding as to their 
advantages and value in decision-making processes. Although the use of checklists is arguably cost 
effective audit procedures, this study has found that registered auditors in medium audit practice are 
indifferent to their use, suggesting inconsistent application of such decision aids, and possibly a lack 
of formal firm policies and monitoring of such policies when dealing with engagement decisions 
across the population. This finding is concerning, as it indicates a possible lack in consistency of 
decision making (which exposes practitioners to risk), and a lack of firm guidance on the process and 
methods to be applied during engagement decisions. 
 
Similarly, many studies have concluded on the benefits of using quantitative decision aids, as these 
aids appear to have additional benefits when considering multiple statistical variables, which is typical 
of many engagement decisions. These decision aids are typically more expensive to design and 
maintain and considering cost concerns of registered auditors in medium audit practice, the use of such 
aids may thus be limited when considering cost vs. benefit. In many instances, practitioners may 
believe that they are able to conclude on a given set of facts based merely on professional judgement 
rather than using more technical decision aids to corroborate their views. This view by practitioners, it 
is argued, may be exposing practitioners to risk as they may not have considered all variables in their 
professional judgement, and the quality of decision making may have been improved by corroborating 
their views with the outcome of such decision aids.  
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Many decision aids may not be costly to implement, such as qualitative decision aids. Practitioners 
should engage with SAICA or academic institutions to assist them in developing these aids. Such aids 
will greatly improve the process flow of engagement decisions, related audit procedures and improve 
the documentation of engagement decisions. SAICA should also consider presenting workshops to 
registered auditors in medium audit practice and advice in the development of such decision aids. 
Again, the use of KPC’s by audit firms will ensure the execution and use of such decision aids on 
engagement decisions. 
 
Lastly, the risk of a high level of application of professional judgement during engagement decisions, 
in the absence of the use of aids and their documentation, may result in in-appropriate and inconsistent 
engagement decisions. The use of professional judgement however remains an intrinsic part of any 
decision and therefore also the engagement decision. The existence and use of firm policies and 
procedures will however avoid decisions being made only on personal preference and professional 
judgement. Peer review is further crucial to review the professional judgement of other practitioners, 
in order to ensure consistent engagement decisions. 
 
8.7. Quality control and peer review by practitioners in medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
The requirement to establish and implement quality control procedures internally in audit firms is 
entrenched in ISA 220 (R) (IFAC, 2004c) and ISQC 1 (IFAC, 2004a). The engagement decision is a 
critical element to any audit and hence requires quality control, more so noting its importance within 
the overall risk management framework of audit firms. Concerns expressed by Ryan (2005a-d) on the 
ability of audit firms in medium audit practice to develop, implement and staff such functions has to a 
great extent been suggested by this study. Similarly, the limited consideration of peer review by fellow 
practitioners of engagement decisions in certain instances, specifically older practitioners, further 
exposes audit firms to risk. Firms in medium audit practice will need to consider methods and the 
design of systems that would enable them to meet the objectives of these standards. As argued by Bell, 
et al. (2005) the quality of audit evidence is of great concern in modern day auditing, and discipline in 
relation to quality control and peer review is arguably an important element in monitoring audit 
evidence obtained in support of decisions such as engagement decisions.  
 
Audit firms must consider practical structures to ensure that all engagement decisions are reviewed. 
Although there may be a limited number of practitioners in firms in medium audit practice, it is 
important to develop rotational review of decisions made by one practitioner on another. Using 
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organisational motivational drivers such as KPC’s that monitor such review, practitioners will be 
encouraged to ensure compliance with such review policies. 
 
8.8. Weaknesses in the application of the audit risk model by practitioners in medium audit 
practice in South Africa 
 
Auditor judgement during risk assessment is impacted by motivational drivers, which if unbalanced, 
may expose an auditor to risk depending on the particular predisposition. A lack of evaluation related 
to the elements of AR may be indicative of a lack of systems and methodology, which may lead to an 
inaccurate risk assessment of ER. Those practitioners that do not evaluate DR and CR during their 
engagement decisions to any great extent, may be exposed as their planned procedures may not be 
appropriate to address identified risk. Again, the development of systems, policies and decision aids 
may improve the current quality of decisions made by practitioners in medium audit practice as argued 
by Bell, et al. (2005) 
 
8.9. Concerns related to audit procedures performed during the engagement decision by 
registered auditors in medium audit practice in South Africa 
 
This study has found that the use of third party information during engagement decision audit 
procedures, aimed at obtaining evidence relating to the background of a prospective client, is limited. 
It is argued that this is as a result of the commercial focus of registered auditors in medium audit 
practice and the concerns related to the cost of such information. Such practitioners may argue that 
there are sufficient alternative means to obtain information to support their engagement decisions that 
may be more cost effective. The limited use of engagement decision aids, limited documentation of 
engagement decisions and limited use of third party information during engagement decisions, all 
indicate on the significant reliance that registered auditors in medium audit practice are placing on 
their own personal preferences and professional judgement. 
 
The limited use of information from third parties during engagement decisions by practitioners in 
medium audit practice indicate that such practitioners may not have access to this information, 
arguably because they cannot afford such information or do not have such systems and procedures that 
may require such information during engagement decisions. Similarly, older practitioners may be 
exposing younger practitioners to risk as they make less use of risk mitigation strategies during their 
engagement decisions. Similarly, practitioners in smaller firms within medium audit practice that also 
consider such risk mitigation strategies to a lesser extent may be exposed to risk on high risk 
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assignments. Smaller firms within the medium audit practice population may be accepting clients of 
high risk by not always considering Cbr during their engagement decisions, exposing them to an 
increase in audit risk. 
 
Considering recent thinking on the quality of audit evidence as argued by Bell, et al. (2005) as studied 
in section 4.3.7.1. and the need to improve methodologies in this regard such as the use of 
triangulation, it is argued that systems and support need to be provided to registered auditors in 
medium audit practice in order to be able to consider information from third parties during their 
engagement decisions. Regulatory bodies may need to provide a network of resources to audit firms to 
access such information more affordably.  
 
The IRBA may obtain information from certain institutions and service providers and may in turn 
provide such information free of charge to audit firms. The cost thereof may be recovered from the 
profession at large through membership fees. A sliding scale based on firm characteristics may also be 
considered for members of the profession, in order to address the cost concerns of smaller firms within 
the medium audit practice population.  
 
8.10. The position of this study in the South African audit profession 
 
The following matters in section 8.10.1. to section 8.10.6. pertain to the auditing industry in South 
Africa, and ultimately have an influence on the greater economy with reference to the assurance 
related contribution that the auditing fraternity provides to underlying business in South Africa.  
 
 
8.10.1. The impact of engagement decisions of registered auditors in medium audit 
practice on the profession at large 
 
The position of registered auditors in medium audit practice in South Africa has not been 
previously considered in research, certainly not in the last decade, during which time the 
profession itself has undergone many changes. During this period, there has been an emergence of 
registered auditors in medium audit practice (as highlighted in table 5.1.), the demise of Arthur 
Andersen and a structural change in the need for PDI ownership in the profession, as well as an 
increased need for PDI’s as chartered accountants at all levels of commerce. 
 
Research pertaining to the behaviour of auditors throughout the South African industry is limited. 
The conclusions of this study would suggest that there may in fact be a need for a formalised 
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review of certain behavioural patterns in order to note tendencies within the profession by 
regulatory institutions such as SAICA and academic institutions. The 1990’s have seen audit firms 
expanding their services to provide non-audit services to their clients, in order to increase 
revenues. It may be argued that specific review and analysis of industry tendencies may have 
elevated independence concerns much sooner than the demise of Arthur Andersen. 
 
This study also addresses, to a limited extent, concerns around BEE within the profession, not 
only from a human resource and ownership perspective, but also from the perspective that 
preferential procurement policies following from various industry charters may have a significant 
impact on the future of many registered auditors in medium audit practice in the profession.  
 
Lastly, the study confirms similar findings of other international studies suggesting that audit 
industry structures have become global to a great extent as a result of the significant market power 
held by the Big Four and global concerns in the profession, such as independence of auditors. 
However, as these studies have made several recommendations, similar recommendations would 
indicate the need for the profession at large, including regulatory bodies and the Big Four, to assist 
registered auditors in medium audit practice in South Africa in an environment where risk 
management policies, procedures and methodologies are becoming extremely important. 
 
 
8.10.2. Lessons from practice and firm reviews in relation to engagement decisions 
 
Practice and firm review provide the IRBA with an opportunity to evaluate systems and policies of 
individual auditors and practices. It is argued that the IRBA should not only use these reviews as a 
policing exercise, but should evaluate current practice in order to educate the profession at large, 
from the findings of these reviews. Support structures should be put in place by IRBA to assist 
practices in processes and methodologies around engagement decision practices and risk 
management policies at large. The IRBA have instituted firm review in 2006 (Temkin, 2006: 17). 
This firm review which initially is aimed at the Big Four will be extended to audit firms in 
medium audit practice. However, attention should be given to the cost constraints of these 
practices, as practice and firm reviews are likely to be expensive (Temkin, 2006: 17). 
 
 
8.10.3. Continued review of competition within the South African audit profession 
 
The demise of Arthur Andersen has had a significant impact on the audit profession globally. 
Several studies have concluded on the difficulty that local firms in medium audit practice have in 
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competing with the Big Four. This study has confirmed that registered auditors in medium audit 
practice are significantly commercially orientated, supporting their “survival” position within the 
industry. Measurement of pricing tendencies and competition behaviour in tenders and the 
awarding of sub-contracting work by companies, may benefit the profession at large, and stimulate 
competition. Practitioners in the short term are however likely to be exposed to increasing 
competition in the South African profession, and may need to consider mergers and alliances in 
order to enable them to share cost structures and be able to comply with amendments to statutory 
and regulatory changes. 
 
 
8.10.4. Stimulating student interest in the auditing profession 
 
Lastly, the future of the audit profession in South Africa is very much dependent on future 
chartered accountants. Current concerns around the race demographics are being attended to by 
the profession and regulatory bodies. However, not only representation is important but also 
retention within the profession. This study has highlighted the decrease in representation based on 
increase in age, which is arguably related to the continued and vast changes to reporting 
frameworks, such as International Financial Reporting Standards, statutory legislation and ISA’s. 
 
It may be argued that the significant increase in changes to statutory and regulatory changes may 
have resulted in many practitioners opting to leave the profession as argued in section 1.1. 
Significant interest in the profession may exist, however, regulatory bodies, academic institutions 
and audit firms need to continue their efforts to assist PDI’s in being successful in their academic 
studies, and renewing interest in the auditing profession. Considering that there were only 600 
registered black chartered accountants in 2005 against the SAICA goal of 3 000 as stated in 
section 1.1.3.1., the importance of an increased effort by audit firms, academic institutions, 
regulators and the business community at large is evident and it is likely to remain a key focus 
area within the profession in the next couple of years. 
 
8.11. Research areas identified for future study 
 
This study has highlighted a number of related study areas that warrant future study. It may be argued 
that formal research pertaining to the audit industry in South Africa at a tertiary institution level is 
extremely limited. However, many international studies have concluded on many principles which, it 
is argued, are likely to be true of the South African audit environment, due to the global domination of 
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the Big Four. Proposed research topics have thus been selected to compliment this and related fields of 
this study. 
 
8.11.1. Comparative study of engagement decisions as exercised by the Big Four and firms 
in small and medium audit practice 
 
This study has only considered the engagement decision activities of registered auditors in 
medium audit practice in South Africa. Obtaining an understanding of how these practices 
compare to that of the Big Four and smaller practices, may further assist the profession at large in 
identifying the unique characteristics that the size of a practice has on its engagement decisions 
and result in the sharing of “best practices” and policies and procedures. 
 
8.11.2. Considering the findings of practice and firm review performed by the IRBA, with 
specific reference to compliance with quality control standards by firms in medium 
audit practice 
 
It is argued that registered auditors in medium audit practice will continue to face significant 
challenges in implementing quality control measures as envisaged by ISQC 1 (2004a) until such 
time as access to affordable systems and methodology is addressed. A study of the findings of the 
IRBA practice review department in this regard may assist in sharing best practice and decreasing 
the overall risk that the profession is exposed to in this regard. Firm review by the IRBA is also 
likely to identify these practitioners and their firms that do not always comply with ISA’s and may 
then institute actions to prevent any exposures to these firms and the greater auditing profession. 
 
8.11.3. The influence of the organisation on risk management practices within firms in 
medium audit practice 
 
Although a study of the influence that the organisation through the intentional application of 
organisational drivers such as firm policies has on risk management practices of auditors can be 
extended to the Big Four, it is likely that these practices are in existence and well supported in the 
Big Four firms. Based on the limited use of organisational drivers by practitioners in medium 
audit practice, as suggested by this study, it would seem that registered auditors in medium audit 
practice have not yet realised the benefits of organisational motivators or have other difficulties in 
harnessing such benefits. A study of such interaction would benefit the industry and specifically 
registered auditors in medium audit practice who may be struggling to design, implement and 
maintain risk management policies and review structures. 
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8.11.4. Risk management practices applied by registered auditors in medium audit practice 
 
Lastly, this study recommends that risk management policies of registered auditors in medium 
audit practice should be studied, as the evaluation of ER is but one area of risk evaluation that 
impacts on the sustainability of firms in medium audit practice. Although risk management in its 
broader context could serve as basis for several related studies, this study suggests that the 
existence of risk management policies in firms in medium audit practice may be critical to the 
future sustainability of these practices in a profession that is facing increasing regulatory and 
statutory demands. 
  
8.12. Concluding remarks related to an evaluation of the engagement decision as exercised 
in medium audit practice 
 
This study concludes on the engagement decision of auditors in medium audit practice through 
presenting a holistic view of this process whereby auditors conclude on accepting appointments as 
external auditors to companies. Wooten (2003) suggested that there are real differences in the service 
delivery between firms with a different number of practitioners. This study has found that the same is 
concluded in relation to the engagement decisions activities of firms with a different number of 
practitioners in South Africa. Whilst this study was not a comparative study between the Big Four 
firms, firms in medium audit practice and smaller firms, differences within the population studied 
(medium audit practice) supports the view that engagement decisions may differ within audit firms. 
The most significant findings of this study suggest that: 
? Significant competition within the auditing profession in South Africa, has mainly resulted in 
practitioners in medium audit practice being significantly commercially predisposed. Whilst this 
study does not suggest that commercial orientation is undesirable, it does suggest that an 
unbalanced predisposition exists when considering professional, commercial and organisational 
motivational drivers during engagement decisions. This unbalanced predisposition may expose 
practitioners to risk. 
? Audit procedures applied by practitioners in medium audit practice also differ. Many practitioners, 
more notably in firms with fewer practitioners, may have less access to, or make less use of 
decision aids and information from third parties during their engagement decisions, certainly 
questioning the quality of audit evidence on which they base their engagement decisions. 
? The entire profession is facing constraints from a human resource perspective, as incentives such 
as BEE, is severely hampered by limited resources of PDI’s. This study also highlights the risk 
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that in many instances, smaller firms within the medium audit practice population may not have 
sufficient experienced staff to assign to high risk engagements. 
? Risk mitigation is limited amongst smaller firms in medium audit practice. This study has found 
that in many instances, firms with fewer practitioners will accept high risk assignments. This 
finding is concerning when considering their limited access to staffing, limited use of decisions 
aids and information from third parties. 
? Proposed amendments to statutory legislation and new auditing standards, are likely to have a 
costly impact on practitioners in medium audit practice, yet many has indicated that they do not 
yet consider its impact on their engagement decisions. 
? The many changes to legislation and auditing standards in recent years, in the absence of CPD that 
was regulated, have led to significant differences in decision making by practitioners and their 
knowledge of regulation and standards, based on their age. 
? Lastly, whilst professional judgement remains at the core of any decision making within the audit 
profession, this study has found an overly dependence on such judgement in many instances, in 
the absence of any supporting processes to concur with the relevant decisions made. 
 
The findings of this study have further highlighted significant differences in the predisposition of 
practitioners depending on the number of practitioners in an audit firm, suggesting that in general 
terms, practitioners in smaller firms are likely to be exposed to higher audit risk, than those in larger 
firms. Figure 8.1. illustrates this general finding. 
 
Audit Risk
Number of practitioners
Less practitioners More practitioners
High
Low
A
D
C B
Risk mitigation
Decision aids
Substantive procedures
Policies
 
 
Figure 8.1. The relation between the size of a firm in medium audit practice and audit risk 
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In figure 8.1., line AB represents the current level of audit risk that practitioners are exposed to in 
relation to the size of their respective audit firms. Line CD similarly represents the level of audit risk 
that practitioners are exposed to in relation to the size of their respective firms after considering the 
positive impact of risk mitigation, engagement decision policies and procedures, the use of decision 
aids during engagement decisions and the design of specific audit procedures to mitigate identified 
risks on their engagement decisions. 
 
This study has similarly found, that predisposition of practitioners are also generally based on age, and 
suggests that older practitioners in most instances are exposed to higher audit risk than younger 
practitioners, based on their engagement decision activities as illustrated in figure 8.2. hereafter. 
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Figure 8.2. The relation between the age of practitioners in medium audit practice and audit risk 
 
In figure 8.2., line AB represents the current level of audit risk that practitioners are exposed to in 
relation to the age of the respective practitioners. Line CD similarly represents the level of audit risk 
that practitioners are exposed to in relation to the age of the respective practitioners after considering 
the positive impact of risk mitigation, engagement decision policies and procedures, the use of 
decision aids during engagement decisions and the design of specific audit procedures to mitigate 
identified risks on their engagement decisions. 
 
  355
As illustrated in figure 8.1. and figure 8.2., current levels of audit risk can be decreased by 
practitioners, through the application of risk mitigating strategies, the development of policies and 
procedures on engagement decisions, the use of decision aids and the design of audit procedures that 
would improve the quality of engagement decisions (Illustrated by line AB moving downwards 
towards line CD in figure 8.1. and figure 8.2.).  
 
It is however unlikely that the differences in audit risk between larger and smaller firms and older and 
younger practitioners would become more balanced in the near future. This, it is argued, is as a result 
of the impact that competition within the audit profession will continue to have on practitioners in 
medium audit practice. It is likely that practitioners in smaller practices will continue to accept higher 
risk clients than some of the larger audit firms. Similarly, the general lack of knowledge of new and 
revised ISA’s, new and amended legislation and codes of ethics amongst older practitioners is likely to 
continue in the short term until the impact of CPE can be seen. 
 
In the interest of the greater auditing profession in South Africa, this study should be considered by 
regulators, academics and practitioners in order to address not only the specific risks and weaknesses 
in the general engagement decisions of practitioners in medium audit practice, but also to consider 
processes to support practitioners in medium audit practice and ultimately the profession at large, to 
improve the quality of such decisions and processes and the engagement decision process of 
practitioners in medium audit practice. 
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Annexure A – SAICA covering letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 September 2005 
 
<member detail> 
 
Dear Member 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNARE REGARDING ENGAGEMENT DECISIONS 
 
Please would you take a little time to complete the attached questionnaire, which looks at the 
engagement decision process by medium sized firms in the wake of the large corporate collapses a few 
years ago. 
 
The results will be made available to all participants and may be of some use to you in the 
management of your firm’s risks in the future. 
 
Your participation would be appreciated. 
 
 
 
Kind regards 
 
 
Rob Ross 
Senior Executive: Small Practices 
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Annexure B – Research Questionnaire introduction letter 
 
 
<member detail> 
 
Dear <Practitioner name> 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE REGARDING THE ENGAGEMENT DECISION AS EXERCISED BY REGISTERED 
AUDITORS IN MEDIUM PRACTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The audit profession has been under severe public and regulatory scrutiny during recent years following widely publicised 
corporate collapse. Many firms have responded to increased risk of litigation and reputational risk by improving engagement 
decision policies and as reported by the Economist – refusing to serve as auditors to high risk audit clients. Medium sized 
audit firms are not immune to these trends within the audit profession. Many of these firms serve large multi-national audit 
clients; yet they often have limited resources compared to the Big Four audit firms. Auditing standards provide limited 
guidance on the engagement decision process and hence medium sized audit firms could be exposed to engagement risk to a 
greater extent than their larger international counterparts. 
 
I am currently doing research for a D Com thesis at the University of Johannesburg on the engagement decision as exercised 
by registered auditors in medium practice in South Africa. It would be greatly appreciated if you as a member of a firm 
deemed to be a medium sized audit firm for the purpose of this study could assist in this project by providing information 
regarding your engagement decision process as a practitioner of a medium sized audit firm. 
 
The completion of this questionnaire should not take longer than 10 minutes. All the information is treated as confidential 
and will not be revealed to any parties. The consolidated research findings can however be obtained from the researcher upon 
completion of the project. 
 
Please complete the research questionnaire and return it electronically to dirk.steyn@telkomsa.net by not later than 5 October 
2005 or mail a printed copy to PO Box 569, Riverclub, 2149. If you have any objection to the completion of this 
questionnaire, please state your reason and return a “nil” return for control purposes. Your co-operation is highly appreciated. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Dirk Steyn (CA) SA  Prof Ben Marx (CA) SA 
Researcher    Research Supervisor 
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Annexure C – Research Questionnaire 
 
 
The engagement-decision process of medium-sized auditing practitioners 
in South Africa 
 
Please indicate, in your opinion, the most appropriate answer to each of the following questions by CIRCLING the appropriate 
number. 
 
Please indicate the size of the auditing firm that you are a practitioner of:   
• 5 to 10 auditors 1 
• 11 to 20 auditors 2 
• 21 to 30 auditors 3 
• 31 to 40 auditors 4 
• 41 to 50 auditors 5 
• 51 to 60 auditors 6 
 
Please indicate the province in which your auditing practice office is located:   
• Eastern Cape 1 
• Freestate 2 
• Gauteng 3 
• Kwazulu Natal 4 
• Limpopo 5 
• Mpumalanga 6 
• North West 7 
• Northern Cape 8 
• Western Cape 9 
 
Please indicate your age:   
• 21 to 29 years 1 
• 30 to 39 years 2 
• 40 to 49 years 3 
• 50 to 59 years 4 
• 60 to 69 years 5 
• Other 6 
 
 
This questionnaire consists of the following three sections: 
 
 
A. Auditor predisposition 
 
B. Identification of risk factors 
 
C. Auditing audit procedures 
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A. Auditor predisposition 
 
“Auditor predisposition refers to the auditor’s state of mind, which allows him/her to favour certain clients when deciding to 
accept a new client above others.” 
 
To what extent is your decision to accept a new client impacted by each 
of the following factors: 
Not at all 
 
 
To a 
small 
extent 
To a 
moderate 
extent 
To a 
large 
extent 
• Commercial considerations, such as the profitability of an 
assignment. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• Professional considerations, such as independence from the client.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• Organisational considerations, such as the strategy adopted by your 
firm on targeting certain clients in certain industries. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
To what extent do you consider each of the following factors when 
deciding to accept a new client: 
    
• Your firm’s targets to increase annual revenues. 1 2 3 4 
• Your firm’s strategic focus to gain certain clients in certain 
industries. 
    
• The prospective client’s ability to pay your fees. 1 2 3 4 
• The competitive edge of your auditing firm. 1 2 3 4 
• Probable litigation against your auditing firm. 1 2 3 4 
• Compliance with statutory requirements (such as the Public 
Accountants’ and Auditors’ Act, The Public Audit Act and the 
Companies Act). 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
• Compliance with the Code of Ethics for independent auditors and 
accountants. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• Compliance with Auditing Standards on the acceptance of a new 
client. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• Your personal preferences on client selection. 1 2 3 4 
• Your prior experience of clients similar to the prospective client.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• Your personal remuneration. 1 2 3 4 
• Your firm’s policy on the acceptance of new clients. 1 2 3 4 
• Your firm’s ability to satisfy BEE criteria and your employment 
statistics related to persons from previously disadvantaged 
communities. 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
• Proposed amendments to the Companies Act and the draft Audit 
Profession Bill. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• Your independence to the client. 1 2 3 4 
• The influence of undue management pressure in your intended 
auditing approach and reporting practices. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• Interaction with the Audit Committee, where applicable. 1 2 3 4 
• The delivery of non-auditing services to the prospective audit client.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• The rotation of your auditors on all assignments after a certain 
number of years on an assignment. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Do you believe that commercial, organisational and professional 
considerations impact on the number of risks that you identify during the 
engagement-decision process? 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
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B. Identification of risk factors 
 
 
To what extent do you perform an evaluation of the following risks during 
the decision to accept a new client? 
Not at all 
 
 
To a 
small 
extent 
To a 
moderate 
extent 
To a 
large 
extent 
• The inherent risk posed by the prospective client. 1 2 3 4 
• The control risk posed by the prospective client. 1 2 3 4 
• Detection risk, that is, your ability to design appropriate auditing 
procedures to audit the prospective client. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• Your assessment of the impact that the prospective client may have on 
the business risk of your auditing practice. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• The business risk of the client and its ability to continue trade in the 
future. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• The risk that fraudulent activity may be present at the prospective 
client. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• The risk that you may be exposed to litigation following the auditing 
of the prospective client. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
When a prospective client is evaluated as a high risk client, to what extent 
do you consider the following practices:  
   
• Increasing the audit fee due to the increased risk posed by the client. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• Reviewing your client base and resigning from other high risk 
assignments. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• Refusing to accept the engagement. 1 2 3 4 
• Reviewing levels of indemnity insurance. 1 2 3 4 
• Increasing the number of experienced staff assigned to the high risk 
client. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• Making use of third-party specialists to perform those auditing 
functions that you are not able to staff, such as using valuators and 
actuaries. 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
• Obtaining agreement with the client on an appropriately worded 
engagement letter before the auditing process commences. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
To what extent do you evaluate the DR of a prospective client using each 
of the following aids: 
    
• Qualitative aids (such as questionnaires that evaluate client facts and 
circumstances that would indicate high- and low-risk factors). 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
• Quantitative aids (such as auditing software tools and statistical 
models that provide a “risk rating”, for instance, high, medium or 
low). 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
• Your personal professional judgement as to whether or not to accept a 
prospective client. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
• The professional judgement of and review by your fellow auditors.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
To what extent do you design specific substantive auditing procedures to 
mitigate specific risks that you have identified during the engagement-
decision process? 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
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C. Auditing audit procedures 
 
  
Not at all 
 
 
To a 
small 
extent 
To a 
moderate 
extent 
To a large 
extent 
To what extent do you document your understanding of the nature of 
the prospective client’s business whilst deciding whether to accept 
him/her as a new client? 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
To what extent do the following people perform the assessment of 
engagement risk of your prospective clients? 
    
• The auditor. 1 2 3 4 
• The audit manager. 1 2 3 4 
• Audit staff other than the practitioner or manager. 1 2 3 4 
 
To what extent do the following people document the assessment of 
your prospective clients’ engagement risk? 
    
• The auditor. 1 2 3 4 
• The audit manager. 1 2 3 4 
• Audit staff other than the practitioner or manager. 1 2 3 4 
 
To what extent do you consider the following information about the 
prospective client to assist you at deciding on his/her acceptance? 
    
• Information obtained from the prospective client’s lawyers. 1 2 3 4 
• Information obtained from the client’s previous auditors. 1 2 3 4 
• Background searches on the directors of the client. 1 2 3 4 
• Client information held by credit bureaux. 1 2 3 4 
• Information from regulatory bodies to which the client reports.  
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
Do you communicate the outcome of your decision to accept/reject a 
prospective client to the client? 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
Does your auditing firm have standardised policies and procedures 
that all auditors need to comply with for the evaluation of new 
assignments and engagement risk? 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
Are engagement decisions made by auditing practitioners in your firm 
reviewed centrally before a final decision is made? 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
Are the engagement decisions made by practitioners in your firm 
reviewed by a quality control function? 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
Additional comments: 
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Thank you for your participation in this research project.  Please forward your completed research questionnaire to: 
 
 
 
Dirk Steyn 
PO Box 569 
Riverclub 
2149 
by no later than 5 October 2005. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
